Lola Felicia Cash and Jason Reed Holt v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION II

LOLA FELICIA CASH AND

JASON REED HOLT

APPELLANTS

V.

SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

APPELLEE

CA01-576

January 9, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD DIVISION

[NO. CV 2000-9901]

HON. JOHN C. WARD,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The appellants had an automobile insurance policy that was issued by the appellee insurer. Appellant Lola Cash filed an insurance claim alleging that her vehicle had been stolen. Appellee investigated the claim, decided that it was fraudulent, and brought an action for a declaratory judgment to establish that it had no liability on the claim. Appellants' answer was due on January 2. Appellants missed the deadline, but filed an answer and counterclaim on January 5. Appellee moved for default judgment, and to strike the belated answer and counterclaim. After a hearing, the trial court determined that appellants had no just cause for failing to file a timely answer, and entered an order striking the answer, dismissing the counterclaim, and granting default judgment to appellee. From that decision, comes this appeal.

For reversal, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting default judgment, erred in dismissing appellants' counterclaim, and exhibited bias in ruling against appellants.

We hold that the trial court did not err in granting default judgment against appellants. Rule 6(b)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure allows a trial court, in its discretion, to enlarge the time for answering after the initial period for answering has passed, but it does not require a court to permit such answers in any circumstance. Layman v. Bone, 333 Ark. 121, 967 S.W.2d 561 (1998). The rule specifies that such an extension of time is proper only where the untimeliness was the result of excusable neglect or other just cause. An abuse of discretion standard is likewise applied in reviewing the granting of a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(a). Here the appellants asserted that their failure to file their answer in a timely manner was due to recent inclement weather and the holiday season. The trial judge found that there was no excusable neglect or just cause because there was no unusually inclement weather on the day the pleading was due, and the courthouse had been open that day. We cannot say that he erred in so finding. In the absence of excusable neglect, the trial court may properly enter default judgment if a filing deadline is missed by a single day. Layman v. Bone, supra.

Appellants next contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their counterclaim. We express no opinion on this issue. Appellants cite no authority and make no argument, but instead simply assert in a conclusory fashion that the trial court erred without explaining how or why. We do not consider arguments without convincing argument or citation toauthority in support unless it is apparent without further research that these arguments are well-taken. Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001); Womack v. Foster, 340 Ark. 124, 8 S.W.3d 854 (2000); Ellis v. Price, 337 Ark. 542, 990 S.W.2d 543 (1999).

Finally, appellants assert that the trial judge exhibited bias in ruling against appellants. We do not reach this issue because it was not raised and ruled on below. Absent an objection below, the issue of judicial bias may not be raised on appeal. Franklin v. State, 314 Ark. 329, 863 S.W.2d 268 (1993).

Affirmed.

Jennings and Vaught, JJ., agree.