Diane Haskins, Individually and as Mother and Next of Kin of Parec Pruitt v. Mattie Morrow

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE

DIVISION I

DIANE HASKINS, Individually and as Mother and Next of Kin of PAREC PRUITT

APPELLANTS

V.

MATTIE MORROW

APPELLEE

CA01-297

February 13, 2002

APPEAL FROM PHILLIPS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 98-333]

HON. HARVEY L. YATES,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Diane Haskins, appeals from a jury verdict for appellee, Mattie Morrow, in this negligence action. Appellant argues that the trial court's failure to grant her a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes reversible error. We disagree and affirm.

On August 27, 1997, the parties were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in West Helena, Arkansas. Appellant was traveling in the outside lane of a four-lane street, and appellee made a left-hand turn onto the street. After making her turn, at least part of appellee's vehicle was in the lane occupied by appellant. Only the rear portion of appellee's vehicle was struck by appellant. Neither party was issued a citation, but the investigating officer noted on the accident report that appellee contributed to the accident by failing to yield the right-of-way to appellant.

Following the accident, appellant brought a negligence action against appellee. Several witnesses testified that appellant had the right-of-way immediately before the accident occurred; nevertheless, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee. After the trial, appellant moved for anew trial under Rule 59(a)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging that the jury's verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant's motion was denied and this appeal was lodged.

When acting upon a motion for new trial challenging a jury's verdict, the trial court is required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) to set aside the verdict if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or contrary to the law. Lloyd's of London v. Warren, 66 Ark. App. 370, 990 S.W.2d 589 (1999). The test on review, where the motion is denied, is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence

. Schaeffer v. McGhee, 286 Ark. 113, 689 S.W.2d 537 (1985). It is only where there is no reasonable probability that the incident occurred according to the version of the prevailing party or where fair-minded men can only draw a contrary conclusion that a jury verdict should be disturbed. Blissett v. Frisby, 249 Ark. 235, 458 S.W.2d 735 (1970). Jurors are entitled to take into the jury box their common sense and experience in the ordinary affairs of life. Palmer v. Myklebust, 244 Ark. 5, 424 S.W.2d 169 (1968); Rogers v. Stillman, 223 Ark. 779, 268 S.W.2d 614 (1954).

Here, photographs introduced at trial clearly show that only the rear of appellee's vehicle was damaged in the accident. The jury, using their "common sense and experience in the ordinary affairs of life" could reasonably infer that appellant was not exercising ordinary care while operating her vehicle, and with due care could have avoided striking the rear of appellee's vehicle. Therefore, we cannot say that the jury's verdict was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence or contrary to the law. Affirmed.

Hart and Griffen, JJ., agree.