Anthony Reed v. State of Arkansas

DIVISION III

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN E. JENNINGS, JUDGE

CACR 01-707

February 27, 2002

ANTHONY REED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON COUNTY

APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT

VS.

HONORABLE H.A. TAYLOR

CIRCUIT JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Anthony Reed was found guilty in a jury trial of aggravated robbery, theft of property, felon in possession of a firearm, and two counts of second-degree battery. As an habitual offender, he was sentenced to a total of seventy-five years in prison. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his convictions of aggravated robbery and theft of property. He contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that he was an accomplice to these crimes. We disagree and affirm.

On the evening of July 24, 1999, Richard Lloyd Fowler was asleep at his father's house when he heard a knock at the door. Fowler testified that, when he answered the door, appellant struck him in the head with a pistol. Fowler said that there were two or three other people with appellant and that he was dazed and did not know how many times he had been struck, but his injuries included stab wounds to the head and left thigh, a laceration to his face, and a broken elbow. Fowler identified Sylvester Bobby Brown as another of his assailants.

Earlier that same day, John E. Price, a disabled Vietnam veteran, was driving in his truck when he was flagged down by Sylvester Brown. Price picked Brown up, and they drove to appellant's residence where Brown was also staying. Appellant's home is in the same neighborhood as the home where Mr. Fowler was attacked. Price testified that appellant was there when they arrived, as well as appellant's and Brown's girlfriends. Price said that he stayed there with them all afternoon and into the evening hours and that he allowed appellant and Brown to borrow his truck a couple of times during the course of his visit. Price testified that all was well until one of the women complained that he was talking too much. At that point, Brown brandished a bloody baseball bat and said that he had just beaten another man and that he would beat Price, too, if he did not act right. Price said thatBrown wiped blood from the bat onto his tennis shoe and hit him with the bat. Price said that Brown also told him that he was going to keep Price's truck, that Brown refused to return the keys, and that Brown and appellant left in the truck for a while. Price further testified that he was held captive and beaten by Brown and the women throughout the night. He said that appellant did not beat him, but that appellant did push him, bully, intimidate, and "put fear in" him. Price said that he managed to escape the next day by running out of the house and jumping into a vehicle of an acquaintance. Price's truck was found damaged several days later.

Appellant was tried as an accomplice with respect to the offenses of aggravated robbery and theft of property committed against Mr. Price. He contends on appeal that there is insuffi cient evidence to support the jury's finding that he was guilty of these offenses.

A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-103(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). A person commits the offense of robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another. Ark. Code Ann § 5-12-102(a) (Repl. 1997). "Physical force" means any bodilyimpact, restraint, or confinement or threat thereof. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-101 (Repl. 1997).

A person commits theft of property if he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of that property. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Supp. 2001).

A defendant may be found guilty not only of his own conduct, but also the conduct of his accomplice. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 898 (1996). An accomplice is one who directly participates in the commission of an offense or who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the offense. Pack v. State, 73 Ark. App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409 (2001). The presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation are relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice with the crime. Harrell v. State, 331 Ark. 232, 962 S.W.2d 325 (1998). When two persons assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of both. A participant cannot disclaim responsi bility because he did not personally take part in every act thatwent to make up the crime as a whole. Crutchfield v. State, 306 Ark. 97, 812 S.W.2d 459 (1991) (supp. opin. denying rehearing).

When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Barnett v. State, 346 Ark. 11, 53 S.W.3d 527 (2001). Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond speculation and conjecture. Arnett v. State, 342 Ark. 66, 27 S.W.3d 721 (2000).

In this case, the evidence shows that Mr. Price was held captive, beaten, and robbed of his truck. These events took place at appellant's own home. Although appellant did not take part in every wrongful act, there was evidence that appellant pushed, threatened, and bullied Mr. Price during the ordeal and that appellant rode in the stolen truck with Mr. Brown. Moreover, there was evidence that, when the police came to his house, appellant attempted to flee out of the back door. Evidence of flight to avoid arrest may be considered by the jury as being corroborative of guilt. Flowers v. State, 342 Ark. 45, 25 S.W.3d 422 (2000). We think the jury could find that appellant's level of participation went beyond merely being present while the crimes were committed. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the guilty verdict.

Affirmed.

Hart and Neal, JJ., agree.