Roger Alan Hardesty v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

SAM BIRD, JUDGE

DIVISION I

ROGER ALAN HARDESTY,

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,

APPELLEE

CACR01-667

JULY 3, 2002

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,

NO. CR00-510,

HON. MARION HUMPHREY, JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Roger Hardesty was charged with first-degree murder, arising from the death of Mark Jones. With a wrench, Hardesty inflicted numerous blows to Jones's head, and Jones died as a result of the injuries. Hardesty asserted a claim of self-defense, contending that Jones had entered his home and assaulted him. A jury convicted Hardesty of the lesser-included offense, second-degree murder, which required a finding of a purpose to inflict serious bodily harm as opposed to a finding of a purpose to cause the death of another.

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j), Hardesty's counsel has filed a motion to be relieved and a brief stating that there is no merit to the appeal. Hardesty was notified of his right to file pro se points for reversal within thirty days. Hardesty has raised one pro se point for reversal, contending that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the victim's prior conviction or reference to the victim having been incarcerated because, Hardesty argues, such knowledge was necessaryto

the self-defense claim to show his state of mind during the altercation.

Counsel has abstracted and briefed all adverse rulings, as required by Rule 4-3(j). We agree that the multiple adverse rulings discussed by counsel present no meritorious ground for appeal, but will discuss only the pro se point for reversal raised by the appellant.

The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to prevent introduction of or reference to the victim's prior forgery conviction. In its motion in limine, the State argued that a forgery conviction was irrelevant to Hardesty's justification defense; whereas, Hardesty argued, and now argues in his point for reversal, that the conviction was necessary evidence to show his state of mind and his knowledge that Jones was a "convicted felon," though he did not know of what offense.

Evidence of a victim's violent character and prior violent acts is admissible when the defendant is claiming self-defense if the defendant was aware of the acts or character through personal experience or reputation. See Simpkins v. State, 48 Ark. App. 14, 889 S.W.2d 37 (1994). A trial court's evidentiary ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Chapman v. State, 343 Ark. 643, 38 S.W.3d 305 (2001).

A forgery conviction does not evidence a victim's violent character, nor is it a prior violent act. Forgery is a crime that is indicative of a lack of veracity; whereas, crimes such as assault are indicative of a violent character. See 3 wigmore on Evidence § 982 (1940). Thus, the trial court appropriately excluded evidence of Jones's conviction. Furthermore, even if a forgery conviction could be indicative of a violent character, Hardesty was notaware of the nature of Jones's conviction. Hardesty testified only that he was aware that Jones had served time in prison for some non-specific felony conviction. Such knowledge is not relevant to a justification defense and was properly excluded from evidence by the trial court. See Anderson v. State, 312 Ark. 606, 610, 852 S.W.2d 309, 312 (1993) (stating that "[t]he absence of a felony record is not evidence of peacefulness anymore than the mere existence of a felony record, by itself, is evidence of a violent temperament.").

We have reviewed the record in accordance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j). We conclude that there were no errors with respect to rulings adverse to Hardesty and that this appeal is without merit. Therefore, we grant counsel's motion to be relieved and affirm.

Motion granted.

Affirmed.

Stroud, C.J., and Crabtree, J., agree.