Thomas H. McCracken v. Director, Arkansas Employment Security Department and Greene County Sheriff's Department

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

TERRY CRABTREE, JUDGE

DIVISION II

THOMAS H. McCRACKEN

APPELLANT

V.

DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT AND GREENE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

APPELLEES

E 00-193

OCTOBER 31, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. E 00-193]

AFFIRMED

The appellant, Thomas McCracken, appeals the denial of unemployment benefits after resigning from his position at the Green County Sheriff's Department on April 28, 2000. He filed for benefits at the Employment Security Department, and appealed to the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review. He did not prevail at any of those levels, and now he appeals to this court claiming that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

The Board of Review denied appellant benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(c)(1) (Supp. 1999), because the Board determined that he had voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, left his employment. Appellant testified that his employer assigned him to accompany a man from out of state, who had a court order for child custody. The man was scheduled to meet a woman at a residence to pick up their two

children. The sheriff, Don Langston, testified that this domestic situation was potentiallyvolatile and that appellant was to remain at the residence while the estranged couple discussed the matter. In fact, the sheriff department's policy required patrolmen to remain on the scene of a domestic dispute until the matter is resolved. In this instance, appellant left the scene while the parties were talking in the back seat of a car. After appellant left, the sheriff's office received an emergency call for assistance at the residence. As a result, Sheriff Langston reprimanded appellant for leaving the scene of a domestic dispute, relieved him of his duties as a deputy, and reassigned him to work as a jailer. Appellant submitted his resignation in lieu of accepting the demotion.

On appeal, the findings of fact of the Board of Review are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-529(c)(1) (Supp. 1999). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Baldor Electric v. Director, 71 Ark. App. 166, 27 S.W.3d 771 (2000). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings. Feagin v. Everett, 9 Ark. App. 59, 652 S.W.2d 839 (1983). Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

Appellant maintains that he did not violate the sheriff department's policy by leaving the residence because he believed that the matter was settled. He also testified that he drove about ten miles and asked another patrolman to check on the parties. We agree with theBoard's finding that "[t]his fact suggests that appellant knew that the matter was not settled; otherwise, there was no need for another patrolman to check on the situation." The Board also found that appellant left "a very unstable situation because it was time for his shift to end." The Board further opined that appellant's actions showed an intentional disregard for his employer's best interest and that he was demoted for that disregard. The Board stated that the demotion was a reasonable means by which the employer sought to maintain disciplinary authority and did not constitute good cause connected with the work for appellant to leave his employment.

The term "good cause" means a justifiable reason for not accepting the particular job offered. Rowlett v. Director, 45 Ark. App. 99, 872 S.W.2d 83 (1994). To constitute good cause, the reason for refusal must not be arbitrary or capricious, and the reason must be connected with the work itself. Id. The question of what is good cause must be determined in the light of the facts in each case. Barber v. Director, 67 Ark. App. 20, 992 S.W.2d 159 (1999).

We have held that good cause sufficient to have a successful unemployment benefits claim is cause that would reasonably impel an average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his employment. Garrett v. Director, 58 Ark. App. 7, 944 S.W.2d 865 (1997). Good cause depends not only on the good faith of the employee involved, which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also depends on the reaction of an average employee. Barber, supra. Good cause for quitting work involves good faith, the desire to work, and whether the employee took appropriate steps to remedythe situation causing the problem with the work; this issue presents a question of fact. Morton v. Director, 22 Ark. App. 281, 742 S.W.2d 118 (1987). It is settled that the factual determinations of the Board of Review must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence and that this means legal evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Victor Indus. Corp. v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 6, 611 S.W.2d 794 (1981).

We agree with the Board of Review that appellant's action constituted misconduct and that the sheriff's reprimand and demotion of appellant was a reasonable response to appellant's misconduct. We do not believe that the average able-bodied qualified worker would be compelled to give up employment based upon a reasonable disciplinary action. From our review of the evidence we hold that substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that appellant left his last work without good cause connected with the work.

Affirmed.

Bird and Griffen, JJ., agree.