Little Rock Water Works Risk Management Resources v. Wanda J. Tappin

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

OLLY NEAL, Judge

DIVISION III

CA01-580

NOVEMBER 28, 2001

LITTLE ROCK WATER WORKS

RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

APPELLANT(S) WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION [EE910041]

v.

WANDA J. TAPPIN

APPELLEE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Little Rock Water Works Risk Management Resources, appeals from a decision of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission finding that appellee, Wanda Tappin, proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her carpal tunnel syndrome was causally connected to her employment with appellant. Appellant argues that the Commission's finding is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree, and therefore affirm the Commission's decision.

Appellee has worked sixteen years for appellant. She worked five years as a mail processor in the mail room before moving to customer service. Appellee testified that her duties in customer service require her to spend six hours each day keying information into the computer.

Appellee testified that in 1999, she began experiencing numbness in her hands "like pins were going dead on my arms and my hands[.]" On August 8, 1999, she began experiencing pain that she described as "[shooting] all the way up my arm, and the whole right side of my arm was like dead and pinching through it [sic]." When appellee sought treatment in the emergency room, she was referred to her family physician, Dr. Archie Hearne. Dr. Hearne referred appellee to Dr. Ron Williams, a neurologist. Dr. Williams ordered nerve conduction testing. The results of the testing revealed that appellee suffered bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

At a hearing on July 5, 2000, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that appellee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable injury as a result of her employment with appellant. The Commission reversed the decision of the ALJ, finding that appellee presented medical opinions sufficient to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that her claim was compensable. The Commission also found that appellee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits from October 1 to October 23, 1999. From these findings, appellant brings this appeal.

In workers' compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and will affirm if those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Castleberry v. Elite Lamp Co., 69 Ark. App. 359, 13 S.W.3d 211 (2000). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Smith v. CountyMarket/Southeast Foods, 73 Ark. App. 333, 44 S.W.3d 737 (2001). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones, 73 Ark. App. 158, 40 S.W.3d 333 (2001).

Appellant does not dispute the fact that appellee suffers carpal tunnel syndrome. On appeal, appellant alleges that the Commission's opinion finding that appellee sustained a compensable workers' compensation injury is not supported by substantial evidence. In order for appellee to maintain her claim for compensation, she was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) the injury was a major cause of the disability or need for treatment. See Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001). Furthermore, medical opinions addressing compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Crudup, supra.

Appellant specifically argues that appellee failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence a causal connection between her carpal tunnel syndrome and her employment with appellant. At the hearing, appellant presented a medical questionnaire from Dr. Hearne. In the questionnaire Dr. Hearne stated, "I would contribute [sic] Ms. Tappin's work duties to her injury. Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty her condition si[sic] 75% due to her work duties over time." Appellant countered this evidence with a letter from Dr. Michael Moore dated June 26, 2000. In the letter, he stated the following:

I cannot definitively state that the work Ms. Tappin performs at the Little Rock Water Department would be the primary cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome. This opinion is based on the fact that she performed this work for approximately 15 years before experiencing symptoms. If the work she performed was the primary cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome, I would have expected her to develop symptoms sooner after the beginning of her employment. It is my opinion Ms. Tappin's work activity has precipitated or exacerbated the symptoms associated with carpal tunnel syndrome.

Dr. Moore concluded the letter by stating that his statements were made within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Determinations of credibility and weight to be given a witness's testimony is within the sole province of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Arnold v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 64 Ark. App. 245, 983 S.W.2d 444 (1998). The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Id. Furthermore, it is well established that it is within the Commission's province to weigh all the medical evidence and to determine what is most credible. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).

In the case at bar, the Commission gave Dr. Hearne's statement greater weight than that of Dr. Moore's. We hold that substantial evidence exists to support the Commission's finding that appellee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the carpal tunnel syndrome she sustained was causally related to her employment with appellant.

Affirmed.

Robbins and Crabtree, JJ., agree.