Technical Hydraulics v. Gerald Socwell

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

OLLY NEAL, Judge

DIVISION III CA01-574

NOVEMBER 7, 2001

TECHNICAL HYDRAULICS, AN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

(UNION STANDARD WORKERS' COMPENSATION

INSURANCE COMPANY, Carrier) COMMISSION [E703941]

APPELLANT

v.

GERALD SOCWELL

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

On March 4, 1997, appellee was injured on the job when part of a machine fell on his thumb, partially amputating the tip of his left thumb. Appellant accepted appellee's claim as a compensable injury and paid the appropriate benefits. Following a debridement and full thickness skin graft, Dr. R.W. Alderson noticed appellee was repeatedly visualizing his injury and having the episode "just invade his thoughts." Dr. Alderson felt appellee was anxious and possibly depressed and recommended he seek professional counseling.

Appellee did seek the help of Dr. William E. McCollum who, on April 3, 1997, performed a psychiatric evaluation and diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), 309.81, acute. On April 25, 1997, Dr. McCollum noted appellee also suffered from major depression, single episode severe without psychotic features, 296.23.

For a determination of his social security disability, Dr. Mary Sonntag, on October 3, 1997, performed a psychological evaluation on appellee; she diagnosed appellee suffered from major depression, but not PTSD.

Appellant refutes the fact that this mental injury is a compensable injury for which workers' compensation benefits are warranted. Specifically, appellant contends that appellee, prior to sustaining the compensable injury, had many other stressors in his life that could relate to the mental injury. The sole question on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the appellee sustained a compensable mental injury within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (Repl. 1996) for which he is entitled to medical treatment and twenty-six weeks of temporary total disability benefits.

This court reviews decisions of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. County Market/Southeast Foods, 73 Ark. App. 333, 44 S.W.3d 737 (2001). Substantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wheeler Constr. Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001). If reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Brown, 73 Ark. App. 174, 40 S.W.3d 835 (2001).

Appellant asserts that the Commission placed too much "faith" in the medical/psychiatric opinion of Dr. McCollum and that reasonable minds would not accept his opinion as dispositive. Specifically, appellant points to the fact that appellee smokes heavily, and suffers from arthritis, emphysema, impotency, severe dentrition, diabetes, bronchitis, hip pain, shoulder pain, and breathing problems. Appellant also points to appellee's previous mental problems resulting from a domestic dispute appellee had with his wife, the death of three of his daughters, and dealing with a handicapped son, an imprisoned daughter, and a hospitalized granddaughter who had recently been placed in foster care due to her mother's imprisonment.

Appellant submits that all of the foregoing mitigates against a finding that there is a substantial causal relationship between appellee's compensable physical injury and his depression and PTSD. Appellant asserts that "claimant's emotional difficulties are the results of a bewildering combination of factors with no single, dominant cause," and that Dr. Sonntag's non-specific and single diagnosis of recurrent major depression is far more credible than that offered by Dr. McCollum. Alternatively, appellant argues that even if appellee does suffer from depression and PTSD related to his compensable injury that said conditions are not severe enough to warrant a finding that he is temporarily totally disabled or that any such alleged disability is particularly related to emotional problems.

Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-113 (Repl. 1996) provides the guidelines for the compensability of mental injury or illness. In part, it states:

(a)(1) a mental injury or illness is not compensable injury unless it is caused by physical injury to the employee's body, and shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment or compensable unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.

(2) No mental injury or illness under this section shall be compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria established . . .

(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, where a claim is by reason of mental injury or illness, the employee shall be limited to twenty-six (26) weeks of disability benefits.

. . .

In the instant case, in order for us to find this injury compensable, it must arise out of and in the course of employment and be diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. The Commission found that a preponderance of the credible evidence supported a finding that appellee suffered from a mental injury within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-113 (Repl. 1996). It stated that Dr. McCollum was "qualified to render an opinion, and his diagnosis comported with DSM IV. Rather than furnishing mere diagnoses, Dr. McCollum articulated the symptoms claimant exhibited which supported the respective conditions." Psychiatrist Dr. McCollum, by deposition, acknowledged that appellee "was experiencing other stressors which could affect his mental state." Nevertheless, he identified the traumatic loss of the thumb as the "most prominent cause" of appellee's conditions.

The Commission was also convinced that appellee satisfied the requisite causal connection. It recognized the disagreement between Drs. McCollum and Sonntag with respect to appellee's diagnoses. Psychologist Mary Sonntag's evaluation, onbehalf of the Social Security Administration, diagnosed that appellee suffers from major depression with psychotic features. The Commission gave greater weight to Dr. McCollum's opinion and found his vantage point was superior because he examined appellee soon after the work-related accident, and his treatment was ongoing whereas Dr. Sonntag evaluated appellee only once.

It is the Commission's duty to resolve evidentiary conflicts in medical evidence and testimony. Maverick Transp. v. Buzzard, 69 Ark. App. 128, 10 S.W.3d 467 (2000). The issue is not whether we may have reached a different conclusion or whether the evidence might have supported a contrary finding. Ellison v. Therma-Tru, 66 Ark. App. 286, 989 S.W.2d 987 (1999) (citing Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996)). We defer to the Commission's findings on what testimony it deems to be credible. Id. When there are contradictions in the evidence, it is within the Commission's province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the true facts. Id. The Commission is not required to believe the testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deems worthy of belief. White v. Gregg Agric. Ent., 72 Ark. App. 309, 37 S.W.3d 649 (2001) (citing Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995)).

The issue of whether the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with a latent prior condition in order to produce the disability is a question of fact, and a finding of fact by the Commission based on medical testimony may not be overturned unless the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. Owens v. Nat'lHealth Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ark. App. 92, 648 S.W.2d 829 (1983). Medical opinions must be more than speculation; if the doctor renders an opinion about causation with language that goes beyond possibilities and establishes that work was the reasonable cause of the injury, this evidence should pass muster. Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001).

Dr. McCollum recognized that appellee's diabetes and severe tooth decay could cause his depression, yet he pronounced that the amputation of appellee's thumb was the "most prominent cause" of appellee's mental injury. This language goes beyond mere possibilities and establishes that the thumb injury was the reasonable cause of appellee's injury. The Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Robbins and Crabtree, JJ., agree.