Shelidra Williams v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

OLLY NEAL, Judge

DIVISION IV

CA00-940

MAY 9, 2001

SHELIDRA WILLIAMS

APPELLANT AN APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

v. [JJN 2000-35]

ARKANSAS DEP'T OF HUMAN HONORABLE JOYCE WILLIAMS

SERVICES WARREN, JUVENILE JUDGE APPELLEE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Shelidra Williams, the natural mother of Telvin Higgins, appeals from an order of the Pulaski County Chancery Court finding that Telvin is a dependent-neglected child. We find no error and affirm.

Appellant gave birth to Telvin on January 3, 2000. On January 4, 2000, the Arkansas Department of Human Services ("DHS") filed a petition for emergency custody of the child alleging that he is dependent-neglected. DHS based its request for emergency custody on events leading up to the December 1999 termination of appellant's parental rights to two of her other children, Lexas and Tayshunda. On January 10, 2000, the court ruled that probable cause existed for the removal of the child and set an adjudication hearing.

At the adjudication hearing, over appellant's objection, DHS introduced evidence related to the termination of appellant's parental rights to Lexas and Tayshunda. The order adjudicating Tayshunda and Lexas as dependent-neglected provided that Lexas was adjudicated dependent-neglected because of severe maltreatment and severe physical abuse. The court found that most of Lexas' injuries were likely cased by shaken baby syndrome. The court also adjudicated Tayshunda dependent-neglected because, as a sibling of Lexas, Tayshunda was at risk of serious harm if she were returned to her mother's custody. At the adjudication concerning Tayshunda and Lexas, the court ordered reunification services. Specifically, appellant was to undergo a psychological evaluation and follow the recommendations of the evaluation. The court, however, noted that appellant did not have to obey the court order regarding the evaluation because of pending criminal charges related to the abuse of Lexas. The court also ordered that the girls not have any contact with appellant's boyfriend Calvin Higgins or her sister Sheritha Williams because statements given by appellant indicated that she, Mr. Higgins and Sheritha Williams were the only persons who had contact with Tarshundra and Lexas on the days leading up to Lexas's admission to the hospital for injuries resulting from abuse.

Over appellant's objection, the court also admitted a copy of the order terminating appellant's rights to Lexas and Tayshunda. According to that order, appellant did not submit to the psychological evaluation on the advice of her attorney or correct the conditions that caused the children to be removed initially. Specifically, the court noted that appellant continued to live with Mr. Higgins, whom the court had ordered not tohave any contact with Lexas or Tayshunda.

Based primarily on testimony and other evidence regarding appellant's relationships with Tayshunda and Lexas, the court concluded that appellant was an unfit parent and that Telvin was a dependent-neglected child. Specifically, the court concluded that circumstances had not changed since Lexas and Tayshunda were found dependent-neglected and when appellant's parental rights were terminated with reference to them. The court concluded that based on this continuation of circumstances, Telvin was at substantial risk of harm.

On appeal, Williams argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a previous dependency-neglect action and termination of parental rights concerning Tayshunda and Lexas. She contends that such evidence was irrelevant and that it violated her Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.

The juvenile code requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence in dependency-neglect proceedings. Ark. Code Ann § 9-27-325(h)(2)(B) (Supp. 1999). We review a chancellor's findings of fact de novo, and will not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See also Johnson v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 55 Ark. App. 392, 935 S.W.2d 589 (1996). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the finding, after reviewing all of the evidence, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Nichols v. Wray, 325 Ark. 326, 925 S.W.2d 785 (1996).

A dependent-neglected juvenile is defined as "any juvenile who as a result of abandonment, abuse, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or parental unfitness is at substantial risk of serious harm." Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(15)(A). Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-302(2)(B) provides that one of the purposes of the Juvenile Code is "[t]o protect a juvenile by considering the juvenile's health and safety as the paramount concerns in determining whether or not to remove the juvenile from the custody of his parents or custodian...."

In this case, appellant does not deny that Lexas was abused or that she and Tayshunda were in serious risk of harm when DHS sought to remove them from appellant's home. Rather, appellant argues that the adjudications of Lexas and Tayshunda and the subsequent termination of her parental rights to them are irrelevant to the instant action. This court has previously ruled that a parent's treatment of one child is relevant in an adjudication of another child. See Brewer v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 71 Ark. App. 364, 371-A, 32 S.W.3d 22 (2001) (supplemental opinion denying rehearing).

In this case, while the behavior that led to the adjudication of Tayshunda and Lexas as dependent-neglected occurred over a year prior to the hearing concerning Telvin, just two weeks prior to DHS's initial contact with Telvin a court concluded that appellant had not corrected the circumstances that led to the abuse of Lexas. Certainly, appellant's treatment of Lexas and Tayshunda, as well as her failure to take correctiveaction and regain custody of those two children, was relevant to the court's determination of her fitness as a parent.

In addition to challenging the relevancy of evidence regarding her treatment of other children, appellant also makes several constitutional arguments challenging certain portions of the Juvenile Code. Specifically appellant argues that Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4), allowing a court to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child if the parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have his parental rights involuntarily terminated as to the child's sibling is a violation of a parent's due process and equal protection rights. She also argues that the use of evidence from a prior adjudication or termination hearing in a later hearing violated her Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.

We do not reach appellant's challenges to section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4) because the abstract makes it evident that appellant did not obtain a ruling from the trial court on her constitutional claims.1 We do not reach the merits of claims when theappellant did not obtain a ruling from the trial court. In its rulings from the bench, the trial court continuously stated that the information regarding the adjudications of Tayshunda and Lexas was relevant evidence. Such rulings do not sufficiently address appellant's constitutional claim. Our Supreme court has repeatedly stated that the failure to obtain a ruling on an issue at the trial court level, including a constitutional issue, precludes a review of the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Wooten v. State, 325 Ark. 510, 931 S.W.2d 408 (1996); Technical Servs. of Ark., Inc. v. Pledger, 320 Ark. 333, 896 S.W.2d 433 (1995); Parmley v. Moose, 317 Ark. 52, 876 S.W.2d 243 (1994).

Affirmed.

Hart and Baker, JJ., agree.

1 In addition to having failed to obtain a ruling on her constitutional arguments, appellant appears to lack standing to challenge the section. In numerous cases, our supreme court has held that a litigant has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if the law is unconstitutional as applied to that particular litigant. Morrison v. Jennings, 328 Ark. 278, 943 S.W.2d 559 (1997); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 879 S.W.2d 416 (1994); Medlock v. Fort Smith Serv. Fin. Corp., 304 Ark. 652, 803 S.W.2d 930 (1991). The general rule is that one must have suffered an injury or belong to a class that is prejudiced in order to have standing to challenge the validity of a law. Morrison, supra; Medlock, supra. Stated differently, a plaintiff must show that the questioned act has a prejudicial impact on her. Tauber v. State, 324 Ark. 47, 919 S.W.2d 196 (1996); Garrigus v. State, 321 Ark. 222, 901 S.W.2d 12 (1995). The present appeal is from a dependency-neglect hearing and not from a hearing to terminate parental rights.Thus, section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4) was not at issue. Moreover, the order appealed from provides that the goal of this case is reunification. Therefore, appellant has not shown that she suffered any injury due to the application of section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4).