Steven Lee Baker v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, JUDGE

DIVISION IV

STEVEN LEE BAKER

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR01-193

November 28, 2001

APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CR-2000-190]

HON. WILLIAM A. STOREY,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

The appellant in this criminal case pled guilty to first-degree battery and was placed on probation for a period of three years. Approximately five months later, the State filed a petition to revoke appellant's probation. After a hearing, the trial court found that appellant had violated several conditions of his probation and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. For reversal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and sentencing him to the penitentiary because the evidence was insufficient to show that certain violations were inexcusable. We affirm.

In revocation proceedings, the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated a condition of his suspension or probation. Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal from an order of revocation, we will not reverse the trial court unless its findings are clearly against the preponderance

of the evidence. In making our review, we defer to the superior position of the trial court to determine questions of credibility and the weight to be given to the evidence. Jones v. State, 52 Ark. App. 179, 916 S.W.2d 766 (1996).

At the hearing, evidence was presented that appellant had failed to pay court-ordered fines, restitution, and fees; failed to complete court-ordered counseling and work-release; committed a battery against his wife while he was drunk; stated to the arresting police officer that he (appellant) would "not go to jail without a fight" and thereafter passively refused to submit to arrest; and failed to report his arrest for that battery to his probation officer. Appellant testified that he was financially unable to comply with the conditions requiring payment of money and the conditions that he attend counseling and work-release. He denied that he struck his wife. Afterwards, the trial court found that appellant had violated the conditions of probation requiring that he pay fines and restitution, complete a work-release program, obey the law, and report any arrest to his probation officer.

On appeal, appellant argues that the State failed to prove that he inexcusably failed to pay court costs, restitution, and fees, or that he inexcusably failed to complete court-ordered work-release assignments. He contends that these failures were due to his lack of financial abilities and that the court, in effect, sentenced him to imprisonment solely because of his indigency in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984). We disagree.

Appellant's argument overlooks the evidence that he also committed battery against his wife, refused to submit to arrest, and failed to report his arrest to his probation officer, all in violation of the conditions of his probation. In fact, he makes no argument regarding these violations, despite the fact that the trial court specifically found that the State had proven that he had committed a number of new crimes and had failed to report his arrest to his probation officer. The State was only required to prove that appellant violated one condition of his probation in order to support revocation. Ramsey v. State, 60 Ark. App. 206, 959 S.W.2d 765 (1998); Ross v. State, 22 Ark. App. 232, 738 S.W.2d 112 (1987); Farr v. State, 6 Ark. App. 14, 636 S.W.2d 884 (1982). Because the trial court did not revoke appellant's probation solely on account of his failure to pay money and complete work-release, and because appellant does not challenge the court's findings that he violated his conditions by committing additional crimes and not reporting to his probation officer, we need not address whether appellant's failure to pay money and attend programs was inexcusable. See Farr v. State, supra; see also Camp v. State, 66 Ark. App. 134, 991 S.W.2d 611 (1999).

Affirmed.

Neal and Vaught, JJ., agree.