Jeffery Miner v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN E. JENNINGS, JUDGE

DIVISION III

CACR 00-896

March 28, 2001

JEFFERY MINER APPEAL FROM PULASKI COUNTY

APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT

VS.

HONORABLE JOHN LANGSTON,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

Jeffery Miner was found guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a directed verdict as there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either offense. We disagree and affirm.

Officer Tim Willis testified that he and other officers approached a residence in North Little Rock to investigate a strong odor that they associated with the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Willis stated that, after receiving permission from the owner of the house, the officers entered in order to search for persons inside for safety concerns. Willis testified that when he entered the residence he could hear people scrambling about. He said that he saw appellant in the bathroom with another person dumping chemicals out of mason jars into the toilet. Willis recalled that appellant was working a plunger.

Chris Harrison, a chemist for the State Crime Lab, testified that the items he saw in the house would suggest that methamphet amine was being manufactured and that virtually every component and utensil needed to make methamphetamine was found at the scene. He testified that a mason jar found at the scene smelled of ether.

Appellant testified that he was only spending the night at the residence in question after he and his roommate had an argument. He stated that he was asleep in a back bedroom when the police arrived and that he was not in the bathroom. Appellant denied participating in the manufacturing of methamphetamine.

Billy Ray Quick, the other person Officer Willis identified in the bathroom, testified that he was the only one in the bathroom as there was not space for anyone else in the tiny bathroom. Quick stated that he was the one dumping the contents of the mason jars into the toilet and that those jars contained the "seed" for "cooking" methamphetamine. Quick testified that appellant knew the cooking was taking place and that appellant was an addict, but thathe, Quick, did not plan to give appellant any of the finished product because appellant had nothing invested like the others. Quick testified that appellant was merely standing around and had nothing to do with the manufacturing process.

A motion for a directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence to support it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Smith v. State, 68 Ark. App. 106, 3 S.W.3d 712 (1999). Substantial evidence is evidence that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion that goes beyond speculation and conjecture. Hendrickson v. State, 316 Ark. 182, 871 S.W.2d 362 (1994). Circumstantial evidence alone may constitute substantial evidence when every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is excluded. Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993). The question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes any other hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Key v. State, 325 Ark. 73, 923 S.W.2d 865 (1996). Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the manufacturing charge because the State's evidence failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but guilt. He argues that it is possible that his flushing the materials was simply an attempt to avoid a possession charge. Appellant argues that thefact that the jury returned two separate verdicts on two separate crimes based on the same set of facts proves that more than one reasonable hypothesis exists.

It was for the jury to decide whether every other reasonable hypothesis but guilt had been excluded. Key, supra. Jurors need not view each fact in isolation but are to consider the evidence as a whole. See Bridges v. State, 46 Ark. App. 198, 878 S.W.2d 781 (1994). The jury was entitled to believe Officer Willis's testimony over that of the appellant.

Appellant further argues that his presence at the scene and his actions in the bathroom are the only "links" between him and the manufacturing and that the jury would have had to speculate about his purpose in flushing materials down the toilet. He also argues that flushing materials down a toilet is not part of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. While Green v. State, 265 Ark. 179, 577 S.W.2d 586 (1979), establishes that mere presence at a crime scene is not proof of guilt, it was for the jury to determine whether the circumstantial evidence constituted substan tial evidence to convict appellant. The jury could infer that appellant was involved in the manufacturing process because of his efforts to conceal the crime. Steggall v. State, 340 Ark. 184, 8 S.W.3d 538 (2000) (holding that the jury could have properly considered evidence of defendant's attempts to cover up his connection to a crime as proof of a culpable mental state).

Appellant points out that the chemist did not test the substance in the mason jars. Appellant argues that, assuming the jars contained methamphetamine, he could only be found guilty as an accomplice. We note that appellant overlooks the testimony of Billy Quick who confirmed that the jars contained the "seed" for making methamphetamine, and Officer Willis's testimony placed appellant in the bathroom along with Quick who admitted that he was involved in the manufacturing process.

Appellant argues that the State failed to prove that the other items seized were under appellant's dominion and control since there was joint occupancy of the premises. Officer Willis's testimony established that appellant was in the bathroom while Quick's testimony revealed that the mason jars contained the "seed" needed for making the methamphetamine. Significantly, Quick's testimony confirms that appellant knew the cooking was taking place. When only circumstantial evidence is presented, there must be some factor in addition to the joint control of the premises to link the accused with the controlled substance. Ravelette v. State, 264 Ark. 344, 571 S.W.2d 433 (1978). The jury could reasonably infer from the testimony that, because appellant exercised control over an essential ingredient in the entire cooking process, that he exercised control over the other items as well.

Next, appellant argues that, although numerous exhibits were introduced, the mason jars from which he was allegedly dumping materials were not introduced nor were their contents proven. Appellant contends that he was not in possession of any of the items introduced. In his directed verdict motion, appellant did not contest the State's failure to introduce the mason jars into evidence, and he cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Vanesch v. State, 70 Ark. App. 277, 16 S.W.3d 306 (2000). In any event, appellant is mistaken when he argues that the State failed to prove the contents of the jars. Simply because Harrison did not formally test the substance does not mean that he could not recognize the smell of ether because of his experience. In any event, Quick confirmed that the jars contained "seed," which is a combination that includes ether.

Finally, appellant contends that, because the residence was jointly occupied, the State had to prove that he had knowledge of the contraband. Willis's testimony placed appellant in the bathroom dumping the contents of the mason jars into the toilet and wielding a plunger. Thus the jury could have inferred that appellant had knowledge of the contraband. We conclude that the verdict of the jury is supported by substantial evidence.

Affirmed.

Neal and Roaf, JJ., agree.