Shellie D. Coffman v. Collier Investments, Inc.

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JOHN E. JENNINGS, JUDGE

DIVISION I

CA 00-176

October 25, 2000

SHELLIE D. COFFMAN AN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

APPELLANT WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

E802837

VS.

COLLIER INVESTMENTS, INC. AFFIRMED

APPELLEE

Shellie Coffman alleged that she injured her back when she fell against the machine she was operating on October 22, 1997. The law judge found her injury compensable, but the Commission reversed finding that the pseudomeningocele, a spinal fluid-filled sac, which was likely causing her back pain, resulted from her 1993 back surgery and not the fall that happened to impact the surgical site. Appellant argues that the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. She has also filed a motion to strike appellee's supplemental abstract. We hold that theCommission's decision is supported by substantial evidence and affirm.

Appellant testified that she had just gotten to work when her machine broke down. The mechanic promptly fixed the problem, but it malfunctioned again shortly afterward. As appellant was turning to get the mechanic, her feet flew out from under her because the floor had just been mopped and was oil-slicked from her machine. Appellant stated that she landed on her arm and her rear and that her back hit a metal part on the machine. She informed her supervisor that she had fallen and went to the hospital. After various referrals and tests, radiographics finally revealed a pseudomeningocele along appellant's spinal canal. Appellant testified that she had fully recovered from her previous back surgery in 1993 and had no symptoms until she fell in October 1997.

Dr. Mark Nardone, an orthopedic surgeon, testified that it was possible that appellant had the meningocele before the work incident but that it was unlikely because, when he operated on her in 1993, everything was dry when he closed the surgical seal and there was no injury to the meninges at that time. Dr. Nardone stated that he thought that appellant's fall impacted the facet joint and that this in turn injured her meninges, which caused her to develop a meningocele.

James Cockrell, appellant's supervisor, testified that appellant missed quite a bit of work prior to her accident. He stated that appellant would come in to work but would say that her back was hurting or that she was having female problems and needed to go home.

Dr. J.S. Boatner indicated in his radiology report that appellant's pseudomeningocele was "apparently incurred in conjunc tion with the prior surgery."

Dr. William Brown, in interpreting the results of appellant's MRI of January 1998, stated that the areas of fluid were "consis tent with postoperative pseudomeningocele."

In denying the appellant's claim, the Commission gave little weight to Dr. Nardone's opinion. Instead, the Commission relied on the testimony of Mr. Cockrell who indicated that appellant had already missed work prior to October 22 due to back pain she was experiencing. The Commission noted that Dr. Nardone was apparently unaware that appellant's back pain pre-existed the trauma to which he attributed her symptoms. The Commission also pointed out that, while Dr. Nardone concluded that appellant's pseudomeningocele was caused by blunt trauma, the hospital records noted specifically that there were no abrasions or bruising. Finally, the Commission found that Dr. Nardone's opinion was contrary to at least two other doctors who referred to the pseudomeningocele as being postoperative and having been incurred in conjunction with the prior surgery.

When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). The question is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion from the one found by the Commission if it were reviewing the case de novo, or even whether the evidence supports a contrary finding. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988). The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997). It is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark. App. 166, 912 S.W.2d 14 (1995).

Here, the Commission gave greater weight to the opinions of Dr. J.S. Boatner and Dr. William Brown who stated that the pseudomeningocele likely resulted from the 1993 back surgery. Likewise, the Commission was entitled to believe Mr. Cockrell'stestimony that appellant had missed work due to back pain prior to her fall in October 1997. Although appellant contends that the Commission used the wrong standard of proof, there is simply no indication of that, as the Commission clearly stated the correct standard in its opinion.

Finally, because we have declined to consider the appellee's supplemental abstract, appellant's motion to strike is rendered moot.

Affirmed.

ROAF and CRABTREE, JJ., agree.