Freddie Ray Walker v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JUDGE JOHN F. STROUD, JR.

DIVISION IV

FREDDIE RAY WALKER

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CACR 00-467

December 6, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, 7TH DIVISION [CR99-2563]

HONORABLE JOHN B. PLEGGE,

CIRCUIT JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Freddie Ray Walker, was charged as an habitual offender with theft of property and with breaking and entering. He was tried by the court, found guilty, and sentenced to serve forty-two months on each conviction in the Arkansas Department of Correction, with the sentences to run concurrently. For his sole point of appeal, appellant contends that "the evidence was insufficient to prove that the car the appellant was driving was the stolen vehicle alleged in the information, and therefore the State failed to prove by sufficient evidence that the appellant committed the offenses charged." We disagree and affirm.

Bob Owens owns BJ Motors, which is located at 1020 East Broadway in North Little Rock, Arkansas. He testified that on June 3, 1999, he received a call informing him thatsomeone had taken a 1986 white, four-door, Lincoln Town Car from the car lot and had run it through the gate. He testified that he then went to the lot; that approximately twenty or thirty minutes later he got a call from the police saying that they had his car; that he went to get the car; and that the only damage to the vehicle was a few scratches, but that the gate at his place of business had been torn up, with approximately $560 worth of damages. He stated that he did not know appellant and that no one had permission to take the vehicle.

Officer Daniel Ball testified that on the night of June 3, 1999, he was advised by radio to keep a lookout for a stolen vehicle; that approximately thirty minutes later he saw a vehicle matching the description he had been given going over the Main Street viaduct in North Little Rock; that he followed it and stopped it near the corner of Broadway and Markham Streets in Little Rock; and that it was a white Lincoln driven by the appellant. He also testified that appellant immediately advised him upon exiting the vehicle that he had stolen it.

After the State rested its case, appellant moved for a directed verdict, contending that the State had failed to prove that the car that was stolen was the car in which he was found. The motion was denied, appellant was found guilty and sentenced as an habitual offender, and this appeal followed. In making the same argument on appeal, appellant asserts that Mr. Owens "was not asked to identify a photograph of the car, or to give its VIN or otherwise specifically identify the particular vehicle he picked up that night." He further asserts that Officer Ball only described the car as a "white Lincoln."

Directed verdict motions are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Blockman v. State, 69 Ark. App. 192, 11 S.W.3d 562 (2000). Where sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the reviewing court considers only that evidence that supports the guilty verdict. Id. The test is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Id. On appellate review, it is only necessary for the appellate court to ascertain that evidence which is most favorable to the State. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of such certainty and precision as to compel a conclusion one way or another. Id. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence. Gregory v. State, 341 Ark. 243, 15 S.W.3d 690 (2000). Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must still force the fact finder to reach a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. The longstanding rule in the use of circumstantial evidence is that the evidence, to be substantial, must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Id. This demands that in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence the circumstances relied upon must be so connected and cogent as to show guilt to a moral certainty, and must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Circumstances, however strong they may be, ought never coerce the mind of the jury to a conclusion of guilt if they can be reconciled with the theory that one other than the defendant has committed the crime, or that no crime has been committed at all. Id. Where the trial is before the bench, the trial judge sits as fact finder. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000).

Here, the circumstances relied upon by the trial court are sufficiently connected and cogent as to show appellant's guilt. That is, the officer received a report to look for a stolen vehicle; within a very short period of time he spotted a vehicle matching the description he had been given; he stopped the vehicle, a white Lincoln; it was being driven by appellant; and Bob Owens, the owner, testified that the car had some scratches, but was otherwise unharmed. Add to that appellant's admission that he had stolen the car and it is clear that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of guilt.

Affirmed.

Jennings and Bird, JJ., agree.