Anderson v. Anderson

Tom ANDERSON v. Paula ANDERSON

CA 97-498                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                           Division II
               Opinion delivered February 11, 1998


1.   Courts -- rules -- construction. -- The appellate court construes
     court rules using the same means, including canons of
     construction, that are used to interpret statutes.

2.   Statutes -- construction -- basic rule. -- The basic rule of
     statutory interpretation to which all other interpretative
     guides must yield is the necessity to give effect to the
     intent of the drafter of the statute.

3.   Statutes -- construction -- remedial legislation. -- The cardinal
     principle for construing remedial legislation is for courts to
     give appropriate regard to the spirit that promoted the
     enactment of the remedial legislation, the mischief sought to
     be abolished, and the remedy proposed.

4.   Statutes -- construction -- purpose must be considered. -- The purpose
     of a statute must be considered when construing it.

5.   Statutes -- construction -- common-sense approach. -- In interpreting
     statutes, a court should take a common-sense approach. 

6.   Divorce -- child support -- purpose of family support chart. -- The
     family support chart was established to ensure the proper
     enforcement of child-support awards.

7.   Divorce -- child support -- appellant's interpretation of provisions
     contrary to purpose of family support chart. -- It is wholly
     inconsistent with the purpose of the family support chart to
     interpret it in such a way as to encourage child-support
     payors to minimize their child-support income; the appellate
     court concluded that appellant's interpretation of the
     provisions of the family support chart that permit deduction
     of income-tax payments from the income that a child-support
     payor has available to pay child support was contrary to the
     purpose of the chart because it would encourage child-support
     payors who are also shareholders in subchapter S corporations
     to favor their own long-term financial interests in their
     corporations over their children's need for support until such
     time as the children are no longer minors; the chancery court
     did not err in rejecting appellant's interpretation.

8.   Appeal & error -- inducement of or consent to chancellor's decision --
     appellant may not complain. -- An appellant may not complain on
     appeal that the chancellor erred if the appellant has induced,
     consented to, or acquiesced in the chancellorþs decision.

9.   Divorce -- child support -- amount lies within court's discretion. -- The
     amount of child support a chancery court awards lies within
     the chancery court's sound discretion, and the appellate court
     will not disturb a chancellor's child-support award absent an
     abuse of discretion.

10.  Divorce -- child support -- reference to family support chart mandatory. -
     - Reference to the family support chart is mandatory; the
     chart itself establishes a rebuttable presumption of the
     appropriate amount of child support, which can only be
     disregarded if the chancery court makes express findings of
     fact stating why the amount of child support set forth in the
     support chart is unjust or inappropriate.

11.  Divorce -- alimony -- decision to award lies within court's discretion. --
     The chancery court's decision to award spousal support, i.e.,
     alimony, is a matter that lies within the court's sound
     discretion; a chancery court's decision to award alimony will
     not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

12.  Divorce -- alimony -- purpose of. -- The purpose of alimony is to
     rectify economic imbalance in the earning power and the
     standard of living of the parties to a divorce in light of the
     particular facts of each case.

13.  Divorce -- alimony -- award of -- factors to be considered. -- The
     primary factors that a chancery court should consider in
     determining whether to award alimony are the financial need of
     one spouse and the other spouseþs ability to pay; to balance
     these primary factors, a chancery court should consider
     certain secondary factors, among which are: (1) the financial
     circumstances of both parties; (2) the amount and nature of
     the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties; (3)
     the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each of
     the parties; and (4) the earning ability and capacity of both
     parties.

14.  Divorce -- chancery court did not err in amounts awarded for child and
     spousal support. -- Given the testimony that was before the
     chancery court, the appellate court could not say that the
     chancery court abused its discretion in setting the monthly
     amounts it ordered appellant to pay in child support for two
     children and in spousal support; the chancery court's child-
     support award was nothing more than a straightforward
     application of the family support chart to the monthly income
     that appellant had available to pay child support; the
     chancery court's spousal support award was based on testimony
     from which the court could conclude that appellee needed a
     certain amount per month in support and that appellant had the
     financial ability to provide the support.

15.  Divorce -- allocation of debt -- chancery court's authority. -- A
     chancery court has authority to consider the allocation of
     debt in a divorce case; a chancery court's decision to
     allocate debt to a particular party in a divorce case is a
     question of fact and will not be reversed on appeal unless
     clearly erroneous; a chancery court's determination that debt
     should be allocated between the parties in a divorce case on
     the basis of their relative ability to pay is not a decision
     that is clearly erroneous.

16.  Divorce -- chancellor's allocation of parties' credit card debt not clearly
     erroneous. -- Where there was ample testimony before the
     chancellor from which he could conclude that appellant's
     financial position was decidedly superior to appellee's, the
     court's allocation of the parties' credit card debt was not
     clearly erroneous.

17.  Divorce -- award of attorney's fee -- chancellor's discretion. --
     Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  9-12-309(a) (Repl. 1993),
     attorney's fee awards are permissible in divorce cases; a
     chancellor has considerable discretion to award attorney's
     fees in a divorce case; moreover, the chancellor is in a
     better position to evaluate counsel's services than an
     appellate court, and, in the absence of clear abuse, the
     chancellor's award of an attorney's fee will not be disturbed
     on appeal.
18.  Divorce -- attorney's fees -- financial abilities considered. -- In
     determining whether to award attorneyþs fees, the chancellor
     must consider the relative financial abilities of the parties.

19.  Divorce -- attorney's fees -- chancellor did not abuse discretion in
     ordering appellant to pay. -- Where, from the testimony given by
     appellant and his witnesses, the chancellor could have
     concluded that he was, relative to appellee, in a much better
     financial position; where review of the record showed that, in
     the course of representing appellee, her counsel conducted a
     deposition, responded to two sets of interrogatories, and
     studied complex financial and tax records; and given the
     chancellor's superior position to evaluate the services
     appellee's counsel rendered, the appellate court could not say
     that the chancery court clearly abused its discretion in
     ordering appellant to pay attorney's fees.


     Appeal from Sebastian Chancery Court, Fort Smith District;
Harry Foltz, Chancellor; affirmed.
     Pryor, Barry, Smith, Karber & Alford, PLC, by: Gregory T.
Karber, for appellant.
     Eddie N. Christian, Jr., for appellee.

     John B. Robbins, Chief Judge.
     Appellant Tom Anderson appeals the Sebastian County Chancery
Courtþs order directing that he pay alimony and child support to
his ex-wife, appellee Paula Anderson.  Appellant Anderson also
appeals those parts of the chancery courtþs order directing him to
pay certain marital debts and to pay appellee Andersonþs counsel a
fee of $4,000.  We conclude that the chancery court did not err in
ordering appellant Anderson to pay alimony and in determining the
amount of child support that it ordered appellant to pay to
appellee Paula Anderson.  We further conclude that the chancery
court did not err in ordering appellant Anderson to pay certain
marital debts and to pay Paula Andersonþs attorneyþs fees.  Because
the chancery court did not err, we affirm.
     The chancery court entered the order at issue on January 14,
1997, as a supplement to a divorce decree that it had previously
entered on April 17, 1996.  In the 1996 decree the chancery court
awarded appellant Anderson a divorce from Paula Anderson and
awarded custody of the Andersonsþ two minor daughters to her.  In
this decree the chancery court noted þthat issues concerning the
property settlement, permanent child support and alimony will be
deferred until further order.þ  Until such time as this further
order was entered, the chancery court ordered appellant Anderson to
pay $1,267 in alimony and child support every month and to make the
monthly mortgage payments on the family home.  The chancery court
entered this order after having heard testimony from appellant
Anderson and his father, Frank Anderson, at a hearing held on April
11, 1996.  In order to decide the issues preserved in the 1996
divorce decree, the chancery court held an additional hearing on
November 18, 1996.  Appellant Anderson and his father also
testified at this hearing.  In addition, William Beall, the
accountant for the Anderson family business, testified on behalf of
appellant Anderson.  Paula Anderson testified as well.  After
hearing the testimony of these witnesses and after considering
arguments made by counsel in post-hearing briefs, the chancery
court entered the order, noted above, from which appellant Anderson
appeals.
     Appellant Anderson makes five allegations of error.  He
asserts that, in determining his income for the purpose of
calculating the alimony and child support he should pay each month,
the chancery court erred by refusing to deduct the income taxes
that he paid on a portion of his 24% share of earnings that was
retained by the family business, a closely held corporation,
Anderson-Martin Machine Company (hereinafter AMCO).  This error
resulted in the chancery court ordering him to pay child support of
$2,133 per month.  He also contends that, under the circumstances
of this case, the court abused its discretion in ordering him to
pay alimony of $500 per month for a period of time that extended to
five years after the partiesþ youngest child attains the age of
eighteen or graduates from high school.  Anderson also asserts that
the chancery court erred in ordering him to pay up to $5,000 of
credit card debts that the parties incurred during their marriage. 
He further asserts that the chancery court erred in refusing to
order appellee Paula Anderson to pay part of a $150,000 debt that
he owes in connection with a failed business venture.  Finally,
appellant Anderson asserts that the chancery court erred in
directing him to pay a fee of $4,000 to Paula Andersonþs counsel. 
For the reasons we will set forth, we conclude that none of these
allegations of error has merit.
     Appellant Andersonþs first allegation of error presents a
question of first impression concerning the interpretation of the
Arkansas Family Support Chart set forth in In re: Guidelines for
Child Support, 314 Ark. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291 (1993).  This issue
is of substantial public interest to individuals, such as appellant
Anderson, who have child-support obligations and who also receive
income based on their pro rata ownership of a closely held business
corporation that pays no federal income tax pursuant to subchapter
S of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.S.  1361-79 (1996), and
no state income tax pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  26-51-409 (Supp.
1995/Repl. 1997), pursuant to which subchapter S of the Internal
Revenue Code is adopted to determine the state income tax owed by
certain closely held business corporations.  According to appellant
Anderson, the chancery court erred in concluding that it should not
deduct from the income that Anderson had available to pay child
support in 1995 the income taxes that he paid for that year on his
pro rata share of the profits earned by his family business, AMCO,
which is a subchapter S corporation.  Pursuant to the family-
support chart, a child-support payor may deduct from his income
available to pay child support the amount of federal and state
income taxes that he paid for that year.  Guidelines, 314 Ark. at
646.  Appellant Anderson asserts that this provision of the family-
support chart permits him to deduct from the income he had
available in 1995 to pay child support the income taxes that he
paid for that year on his pro rata share of AMCOþs earnings that
the corporation retained and did not distribute to him, as a
shareholder.
     This issue arose because appellant Anderson owns 24% of AMCO,
and its income taxes are accounted for pursuant to subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code.  A subchapter S corporation is defined
as follows:
          A small business corporation with a statutorily limited
     number of shareholders, which, under certain conditions, has
     elected to have its taxable income taxed to its shareholders
     at regular income tax rates.... Its major significance is the
     fact that S corporation status usually avoids the corporate
     income tax, and corporate losses can be claimed by the
     shareholders.

Blackþs Law Dictionary 342 (6th ed. 1990).  Pursuant to subchapter
S, a small business corporation can have its profit taxed in the
same way that the profit of a partnership is taxed:  
          Corporations which elect to be treated as small
     business corporations under the provisions of Subchapter
     S receive tax treatment that is similar to that of
     partnerships.  Shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation
     are required to include their respective pro rata shares
     of the undistributed taxable income of the corporation as
     part of their gross income on their individual tax
     returns.... In addition, shareholders in a Subchapter S
     corporation can deduct their pro rata share of any net
     operating loss of the corporation on their individual tax
     returns.

Hudspeth v. C.I.R., 914 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1990).
     Before the chancery court, appellant Anderson argued that his
shareholder income for 1995 that was retained by AMCO should not be
counted as income available to pay child support.  For simplicity,
appellant has used hypothetical figures in his argument.  We will
do likewise.  If the net earnings of AMCO in 1995 equal $1,000,000,
then appellantþs 24% distributable share that is reported to the
IRS on Schedule K-1 is $240,000.  Appellant must pay $90,000 of
state and federal income taxes on this sum, even if AMCO holds back
$80,000 and only distributes $160,000 of its income to appellant. 
While this retention of part of appellantþs share of profits may
impact appellantþs ability to pay his taxes, it does not reduce his
tax liability.  The chancery court agreed with appellantþs
contention and excluded from its computation of his income for
child-support purposes the portion of his shareholder income that
was retained by AMCO in 1995, which was $80,000 in the above
hypothetical.
     Appellant Anderson also asserted that, in its computation of
his income for child-support purposes in this hypothetical, the
court should deduct the total income taxes of $90,000 that he paid
on his $240,000 share of AMCOþs distributed earnings.  The chancery
court rejected this argument.  It deducted from appellantþs income
only $60,000, which is the proportion of his income taxes that is
attributable to the $160,000 of AMCO earnings actually distributed
to him.  The $30,000 of income taxes attributed to the $80,000 of
appellantþs earnings retained by AMCO was not deducted.  In its
January 14, 1997, order, the chancery court explained its decision
as follows:
     The court has determined that child support should be
     based on plaintiffþs net income for 1995 exclusive of his
     companyþs retained earnings and after giving him credit
     for income taxes paid on his distributed income, but not
     for income taxes paid on retained earnings.

          ....

          In reaching its decision on the amount of child
     support to award the  defendant the court has carefully
     considered the arguments of counsel for both parties.  It
     is convinced that plaintiffþs share of retained earnings
     he receives each year from his company, of which he is a
     24% shareholder, is income for child support calculation
     purposes, according to the definition of income in the
     Supreme Courtþs per curiam opinion and under A.C.A.
     Section 9-14-107 (b).  It is further convinced, however,
     that plaintiff has rebutted the presumption that the
     amount reflected by the child support chart after
     including income from retained earnings is the just
     amount of child support to order in this particular case,
     and that accordingly plaintiffþs share of his companyþs
     undistributed share of retained earnings should not be
     used in calculating income or child support in this
     particular case.  It is further convinced, however, that
     if the court is not going to include plaintiffþs
     undistributed share of retained earnings in calculating
     his child support it would be inequitable to give
     plaintiff credit for income taxes paid on those retained
     earnings even though the taxes are deducted from
     plaintiffþs paycheck.  Notwithstanding the fact that
     plaintiff may not immediately receive his share of
     retained earnings, he, nevertheless does benefit from
     them (his stockholderþs equity is increased) and it would
     be inequitable for him to receive this substantial
     benefit in which the defendant does not share and then
     deprive the defendant further by allowing plaintiff to
     reduce that portion of his income for child support
     calculation purposes by deducting the taxes on the
     retained earnings.

     As noted above, this issue requires interpretation of the
family-support chart.  The family-support chart is, in essence, a
rule promulgated by the Arkansas Supreme Court. We construe court
rules using the same means, including canons of construction, that
are used to interpret statutes.  See Gannett River States Pub. Co.
v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commþn, 304 Ark.
244, 247, 801 S.W.2d 292 (1990).  The basic rule of statutory
interpretation to which all other interpretative guides must yield
is the necessity to give effect to the intent of the drafter of the
statute.  See Rogers v. Tudor Ins. Co., 325 Ark. 226, 234, 925 S.W.2d 395 (1996).  The cardinal principle for construing remedial
legislation is for courts to give appropriate regard to the spirit
which promoted the enactment of the remedial legislation, the
mischief sought to be abolished, and the remedy proposed.  Arkansas
Depþt of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 209, 866 S.W.2d 823
(1993).  The purpose of a statute must be considered when
construing it.  Stover v. Stover, 287 Ark. 116, 119, 696 S.W.2d 750
(1985).  Moreover, in interpreting statutes, a court should take a
common-sense approach.  Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 485, 830 S.W.2d 869 (1992).
     When we apply these principles of statutory interpretation to
the chancery courtþs interpretation of the pertinent provisions of
the family-support chart, we conclude that the court did not err in
rejecting appellant Andersonþs contention that, pursuant to the
chart, he was entitled to have deducted from his income available
to pay child support the income taxes that he paid on his 1995
shareholder earnings that were retained by AMCO.  We agree with the
chancery courtþs interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the
family-support chart and reject Andersonþs interpretation because
it is contrary to the purpose for which the family-support chart
was promulgated.  The family-support chart was established þto
ensure the proper enforcement of child-support awards in this
state.þ  Guidelines, 314 Ark. at 650.  
     Appellant Andersonþs interpretation of the provisions of the
chart that permit deduction of income-tax payments from the income
that a child-support payor has available to pay child support is
contrary to the purpose of the family-support chart.  His
interpretation would encourage child-support payors, who are also
shareholders in subchapter S corporations, to favor their own long-
term financial interests in their corporations over their
childrenþs need for support until such time as the children are no
longer minors.  A subchapter S corporation shareholder, such as
appellant, would have an incentive to keep most or all of his
shareholder income as retained earnings by the corporation.  The
greater the percentage of his income that the shareholder has
retained by the corporation, rather than distributed to him, the
lesser will be his income available to pay child support.  This is
so because not only would the child-support payor/subchapter S
corporation shareholder, pursuant to the chancery courtþs decision
in this case, be able to deduct from his child-support income the
amount of his shareholder earnings retained by the corporation, but
he would also be able to reduce his child-support income by the
entire amount of income taxes that he pays on his corporate
earnings, whether distributed to him or retained by the
corporation.  It is wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the
family-support chart to interpret it in such a way as to encourage
child-support payors to minimize their child-support income. 
Appellant Andersonþs interpretation does so and the chancery court
did not err in rejecting it.
     Appellant Anderson also asserts that the chancery court erred
in declining to order appellee Paula Anderson to pay some of the
$150,000 debt that he owes to a bank in connection  with a failed
business venture.  In 1992 appellant Anderson and a partner started
a company, Technology Direct, to build and sell inexpensive
computers.  The business failed in October of 1995, and appellant
Anderson and his partner were jointly liable for a $150,000 debt to
a bank that had provided financing for Technology Direct.  In April
of 1996, when the first hearing was held in this case, appellant
Anderson was personally liable for one-half of this debt and was
responsible for the entire debt if his partner failed to pay his
half.  At this hearing, appellant Anderson volunteered to þjust
keep payingþ his debt to the bank.  When asked on direct
examination if he intended to ask Paula Anderson to pay part of
this debt, appellant Anderson replied, þI donþt foresee her being
able to pay it and weþll just do the best we can on that one.þ  At
the second hearing that was held in this case, in November 1996,
appellant Anderson testified that his partner in Technology Direct
had failed to pay his half of the debt to the bank and, therefore,
he was liable to the bank for approximately $150,000.  On cross-
examination, appellant Anderson was asked if anything had changed
with regard to Paulaþs financial situation such that she could pay
some of the Technology Direct debt.  He replied, þShe hasnþt
received any kind of high paying job at this point.þ  Given
appellant Andersonþs testimony at the two hearings that he did not
foresee that Paula would have the financial ability to pay any of
the Technology Direct debt, he will not be heard on appeal to
complain that the chancery court erred by agreeing with his
conclusion that Paula lacked the financial resources to pay part of
the Technology Direct debt.  An appellant may not complain on
appeal that the chancellor erred if the appellant has induced,
consented to, or acquiesced in the chancellorþs decision.  Dodson
v. Dodson, 37 Ark. App. 86, 89, 825 S.W.2d 608 (1992).
     Appellant Anderson also asserts that the chancery court erred
in ordering him to pay child support of $2,133 per month. 
Moreover, he contends that the chancery court erred in ordering him
to pay Paula alimony of $500 per month until five years after the
graduation of their youngest child or until she remarries.  The
chancery court made the $2,133 per month child-support award after
determining that appellant Andersonþs net income for child-support
purposes in 1995 was $116,357 ($9,696 per month) and by then
applying to this figure the appropriate directive set forth in the
Arkansas Family Support Chart.  The support chart that was then in
effect stated, in essence, that when the payorþs income exceeds
$5,000 per month the appropriate level of child support for two
dependents is 22% of the payorþs monthly income.  In re: Guidelines
for Child Support, 314 Ark. 644, 646, 863 S.W.2d 291 (1993).  With
regard to its award to Paula of $500 alimony per month, in its
order the chancery court noted:
          In addressing the subject of alimony, the court is
     convinced the plaintiff has the ability to pay alimony
     and that the defendant is in need of it.  The court
     further believes that the defendantþs desire to obtain
     employment which will allow her to be at home with the
     children when they are out of school is not unreasonable
     considering that defendant has always been at home with
     the children during this marriage of substantial
     duration.  Obtaining employment which will coincide with
     the childrenþs school schedule will, of course, limit the
     job opportunities available to defendant and the amount
     of compensation.  Considering the length of the marriage,
     the wifeþs prospects for employment, and the husbandþs
     ability to pay, the court finds plaintiff should pay
     alimony until five years after the youngest child is
     presently scheduled to graduate from high school or until
     defendant remarries or cohabits with a man to whom she is
     not related.

     Moreover, in its order the chancery court noted that the total
of appellant Andersonþs monthly child-support payment ($2,133) and
of his monthly alimony payment ($500) was $2,633 per month.  The
chancery court noted further that, after subtracting these amounts
from appellant Andersonþs 1995 income of $9,696 per month and after
further subtraction of monthly payments on the Technology Direct
debt and payments for additional income taxes on his undistributed
earnings portion of his 1995 income, appellant Anderson will still
have $2,364 per month to support himself and will still have 24%
ownership of AMCO.  The chancery court noted further that the
$2,364 per month that appellant Anderson will have to live on þis
only $269 less than the amount provided by the court for defendant
[Paula] and [the] two children.þ
     Certain case-law principles govern our review of a chancery
courtþs award of spousal and child support.  The amount of child
support a chancery court awards lies within the courtþs sound
discretion, and we will not disturb the chancellorþs child-support
award absent an abuse of discretion.  Mearns v. Mearns, 58 Ark.
App. 42, 48, 946 S.W.2d 188 (1997); Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7,
12, 858 S.W.2d 130 (1993).  Reference to the family-support chart
is mandatory, and the chart itself establishes a rebuttable
presumption of the appropriate amount of child support which can
only be disregarded if the chancery court makes express findings of
fact stating why the amount of child support set forth in the
support chart is unjust or inappropriate.  See Black v. Black, 306
Ark. 209, 214, 812 S.W.2d 480 (1991); McJunkins v. Lemons, 52 Ark.
App. 1, 5, 913 S.W.2d 306 (1996).  With regard to a chancery
courtþs decision to award spousal support (alimony), the chancery
courtþs decision to do so is a matter that also lies within the
courtþs sound discretion.  Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 199, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).  A chancery courtþs decision to award alimony
will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.  Id.;
Tortorich v. Tortorich, 50 Ark. App. 114, 121, 902 S.W.2d 247
(1995).  The purpose of alimony is to rectify economic imbalance in
the earning power and the standard of living of the parties to a
divorce in light of the particular facts of each case.  Harvey v.
Harvey, 295 Ark. 102, 105, 747 S.W.2d 89 (1988).  The primary
factors that a chancery court should consider in determining
whether to award alimony are the financial need of one spouse and
the other spouseþs ability to pay.  Id.; Mearns v. Mearns, 58 Ark.
App. at 49.  To balance these primary factors, a chancery court
should consider certain secondary factors.  See Mearns v. Mearns,
58 Ark. App. at 49-50.  Among these secondary factors are:  (1) the
financial circumstances of both parties; (2) the amount and nature
of the income, both current and anticipated, of both parties; (3)
the extent and nature of the resources and assets of each of the
parties; and (4) the earning ability and capacity of both parties. 
Id.
     Testimony pertaining to the nature and amount of appellant
Andersonþs income, pertaining to the extent and nature of his
resources and assets and pertaining to his earning ability and
capacity have been noted, above, in connection with his contention
that the chancery court erred in not reducing his income available
to pay child support by the amount of income taxes he paid in 1995
on his pro rata share of earnings retained by AMCO.  At the hearing
that was held on November 18, 1996, Paula testified concerning the
nature and amount of her income, both current and anticipated,
testified about the nature and extent of her financial resources
and assets, and also testified about her earning ability and
capacity.  She testified that she had married appellant Anderson in
1973.  She noted that prior to her marriage she had worked as an
administrative secretary for a county health department and that
she had graduated from high school and had attended the University
of Arkansas for one year.  She testified further that she and
appellant had had three daughters and that the two youngest were
twelve and fourteen years of age.  She stated that she and
appellant Anderson had agreed in 1977 that she would not work after
their first child was born but that she would stay home and raise
the children.  She acknowledged that since September 1995 she had
worked as a substitute secretary and a substitute media specialist
for the Fort Smith Public Schools and that she intended to apply
for a permanent job as a secretary with the school system.  She
noted that, if she were hired, she would earn $10,000 to $18,000
for a nine-month contract.  She explained that she was applying for
a permanent job only with the school system so that she could be at
home with her daughters during the summer months when school was
not in session.  With regard to the extent and nature of her
financial resources and assets, Paula said:  þIþm forty-three (43)
years old.  I have very little education.  I do not have anything. 
I donþt have any CDs.  I donþt have any stocks.  I donþt have any
retirement.... Itþs going to take a long time for me to get back on
my feet .... And I also donþt own 24 percent in stock in a company
like Mr. Anderson does.  I donþt have anything to fall back on.þ  
     Given the testimony, noted above, that was before the chancery
court, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in
ordering appellant Anderson to pay $2,133 per month in child
support for two children and to pay $500 per month in spousal
support.  The chancery courtþs child-support award was nothing more
than a straightforward application of the family-support chart to
the $9,696 monthly income that appellant Anderson had available to
pay child support.  The chancery courtþs spousal-support award was
based on testimony from which the court could conclude that Paula
needed $500 per month in support and that appellant Anderson had
the financial ability to provide this support.
     Appellant Anderson also asserts that the chancery court erred
in ordering him to pay up to $5,000 of credit card debts that he
and Paula had incurred.  In its order, the chancery court ordered
appellant Anderson to pay this debt because Paula þhas no ability
to pay ... the credit cards debts.þ  A chancery court has authority
to consider the allocation of debt in a divorce case.  See Box v.
Box, 312 Ark. 550, 557, 851 S.W.2d 437 (1993).  A chancery courtþs
decision to allocate debt to a particular party in a divorce case
is a question of fact and will not be reversed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous.  See Grace v. Grace, 326 Ark. 312, 317, 930 S.W.2d 362 (1996).  A chancery courtþs determination that debt
should be allocated between the parties in a divorce case on the
basis of their relative ability to pay is not a decision that is
clearly erroneous.  See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498,
503, 659 S.W.2d 510 (1983).  As noted above, there was ample
testimony before the chancellor from which he could conclude that
appellant Andersonþs financial position was decidedly superior to
Paulaþs.  Therefore, the courtþs allocation of the partiesþ credit
card debt was not clearly erroneous.
     Finally, appellant Anderson asserts that the chancellor erred
in ordering him to pay Paulaþs counsel a fee of $4,000.  Pursuant
to statute, such fee awards are permissible in divorce cases.  Ark.
Code Ann.  9-12-309(a) (Repl. 1993).  A chancellor has
considerable discretion to award attorneyþs fees in a divorce case. 
Gavin v. Gavin, 319 Ark. 270, 272, 890 S.W.2d 592 (1995); Stepp v.
Gray, 58 Ark. App. 229, 240-41, 947 S.W.2d 798 (1997).  Moreover,
the chancellor is in a better position to evaluate counselþs
services than an appellate court, and, in the absence of clear
abuse, the chancellorþs award of an attorneyþs fee will not be
disturbed on appeal.  Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 198, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987).  In determining whether to award attorneyþs
fees, the chancellor must consider the relative financial abilities
of the parties.  Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 310-11, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983); see also Lee v. Lee, 12 Ark. App. 226, 674 S.W.2d 505 (1984).  As we have previously noted, from the testimony given
by appellant Anderson and his witnesses, the chancellor could have
concluded that he was, relative to Paula, in a much better
financial position.  Review of the record shows that in the course
of representing Paula her counsel conducted a deposition, responded
to two sets of interrogatories, and carefully studied many complex
financial and tax records of appellant Anderson and AMCO.  Given
the chancellorþs superior position to evaluate the services Paulaþs
counsel rendered, we cannot say that the chancery court clearly
abused its discretion in ordering appellant Anderson to pay
attorneyþs fees.
     For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Sebastian
County Chancery Courtþs order of January 14, 1997.
     Affirmed.
     Bird and Griffen, JJ., agree.