Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Cook

OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT v. 
John R. COOK

CA 97-444                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                           Division I
               Opinion delivered January 28, 1998


1.   Parent & child -- child support -- appellee satisfied no requirements
     regarding limitations placed upon modification of out-of-state support
     orders. -- Appellee satisfied none of the statutory requirements
     with respect to the limitations placed upon the modification
     of child-support orders issued in other states where the
     mother and child remained Florida residents and had not
     consented to the jurisdiction of the Arkansas chancery court. 
     

2.   Jurisdiction -- no question presented concerning Florida court's personal
     jurisdiction over appellee. -- The reduction of appellee's weekly
     child-support obligation required application to the issuing
     tribunal in Florida; where appellee did not file a cross-
     appeal from the chancellor's finding in the Arkansas order
     that the Florida divorce decree was entitled to full faith and
     credit, there was no real question presented on appeal as to
     whether the Florida court had personal jurisdiction over
     appellee.

3.   Parent & child -- child support -- chancellor's order modifying Florida
     decree reversed and remanded. -- Where appellee did not establish
     a basis for contesting the registration and enforcement of the
     Florida decree and did not prove that either of the
     circumstances permitting modification were present, the
     appellate court, holding that the chancellor erred in
     modifying the Florida support order, reversed the chancellor's
     order modifying the Florida decree and remanded the matter.


     Appeal from Lawrence Chancery Court; Tom L. Hilburn,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     Grider Law Firm, PLC, by: Murrey L. Grider, for appellant.
     Robert H. Crank, for appellee.

     Olly Neal, Judge.
     The Office of Child Support Enforcement has brought this
appeal from an order of the Lawrence County Chancery Court that
registered and modified a Florida child-support order.  For
reversal of the chancellor's order, appellant contends that the
chancellor committed error in modifying the Florida order of
support, and in failing to grant its motion for a new trial.  We
agree with appellant that, under the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA), Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-101 through 9-17-905
(Repl. 1993), the chancellor erred in modifying the Florida support
order, and reverse and remand this matter to the trial court.
     Linda Cook obtained a divorce by default from appellee John
Cook on April 3, 1996, in Florida's Seminole County Circuit Court. 
She received custody of the couple's two minor children.  The
divorce decree obligated appellee to pay $203.25 per week in child
support to Ms. Cook.  On August 22, 1996, appellant filed an action
under UIFSA to register the Florida order in Lawrence County
Chancery Court and to obtain judgment against appellee for child-
support arrearages.  In his response, appellee alleged that he had
not been properly served with notice of the Florida divorce
proceedings and asserted that the child-support obligation of
$203.25 per week for two minor children was "not remotely based
upon [appellee's] ability to pay support and amounts to a grossly
unrealistic support order...."  He requested that the child-support
arrearage be held unenforceable, and asked that the Lawrence County
chancellor reduce his child-support obligation in accordance with
his take-home pay.
     At the hearing, appellant presented evidence that, based upon
the Florida support order, appellee owed Ms. Cook $3,252 in child
support.  Appellee testified that, although he had signed some
papers at the sheriff's office in December 1995, the only document
he had received was a summons and that he had not received copies
of the divorce complaint or the decree.  Appellee stated that he
had not been able to afford an attorney to represent him in the
Florida divorce and admitted that he had known that a lawsuit had
been filed against him.  Appellee also introduced into evidence his
income tax return for 1995 that listed his adjusted gross income as
$2,898.  He testified that, at present, his take-home pay is $250
per week.
     At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for appellant argued
that the chancellor should not modify the Florida decree.  The
chancellor responded in the following manner:
          Well, let me put it this way.  I've heard
          the testimony, and I've looked at the tax
          return, and I've looked at the judgment
          that was entered in the divorce decree, and
          regardless of whether Florida wants to accept
          the modification or not, if they want it
          collected in the State of Arkansas, they will
          have to accept the modification....
The chancellor also stated that, based upon appellee's present
take-home pay, appellee should be required to pay $68 a week in
child support and indicated that he would grant judgment for the
arrearage based only upon this amount.
     In the order registering the Florida decree, the chancellor
made the following findings and conclusions:
               2.  The Court finds that the foreign judgment,
          Linda Weir Cook vs. John Raymond Cook, in the Circuit
          Court of Seminole County, State of Florida, No. 95-
          3316-DR 01 A, entered April 3, 1996, is hereby registered
          with this Court for enforcement purposes pursuant to
          UIFSA, and is hereby given "full-faith-and-credit"
          pursuant to the Constitution of the United States
          and the State of Arkansas.  That the aforementioned
          foreign judgment is enforceable as if it were issued by
          this Court.

               3.  That the [appellee] has accrued child support
          arrearage in the amount of $2,400.00 as of OCTOBER 11,
          1996, for which Plaintiff is hereby granted Judgment....

               4.  That the [appellee's] current child support 
          obligation shall be $68.00 per week, with an additional
          10% of [appellee's] net income per week going toward
          accrued arrearage, to begin at the [appellee's] next
          regularly scheduled child support payment due date
          following this hearing.  Deviation from the chart is
          supported by evidence presented to the Court and so
          noted on the record pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  9-12-
          312.
     We agree with appellant that the chancellor erred in modifying
the Florida support order.  In 1993, the legislature enacted Act
468 of 1993, which repealed the Revised Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) and adopted UIFSA in its place. 
See Jefferson Co. Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Hollands, 327
Ark. 456, 939 S.W.2d 302 (1997); Office of Child Support
Enforcement v. Troxel, 326 Ark. 524, 931 S.W.2d 784 (1996). 
Arkansas Code Annotated  9-17-603(c) (Repl. 1993) provides:
     "Except as otherwise provided in Article 6, a tribunal of this
state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered
order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction."
     The following limitations are placed upon modification of
child-support orders issued in other states:
          (a)  After a child support order issued in another
      state has been registered in this state, the responding    
      tribunal of this state may modify that order only if,
      after notice and hearing, it finds that:

          (1) the following requirements are met:

               (i) the child, the individual obligee, and
               the obligor do not reside in the issuing state;

               (ii)  a petitioner who is a nonresident of
               this state seeks modification; and

               (iii) the respondent is subject to the personal
               jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or

               (2) an individual party or the child is subject
               to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal and
               all of the individual parties have filed a written
               consent in the issuing tribunal providing that a
               tribunal of this state may modify the support order
               and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over
               the order.

               (b)  Modification of a registered child support
               order is subject to the same requirements, 
               procedures, and defenses that apply to the modifi-
               cation of an order issued by a tribunal of this
               state and the order may be enforced and satisfied
               in the same manner.

               (c) A tribunal of this state may not modify any
               aspect of a child support order that may not be
               modified under the law of the issuing state.

Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-611 (Repl. 1993).
     Clearly appellee satisfied none of the requirements with
respect to the limitations placed upon the modification of child-
support orders issued in other states.  The mother and child remain
Florida residents, and they have not consented to the jurisdiction
of the Lawrence County Chancery Court.  
     Appellee contends that, as provided in Ark. Code Ann.  9-17-
607 (a)(5), he had a defense under the law of this state to the
remedy sought because the Florida order required him to pay "more
child support per week than he had income per week...."  Appellee
has, however, provided us with no authority holding that, even
though he failed to appeal from the Florida order, he can now
assert that his child-support obligation was more than he could pay
per week.  We note the lack of correlation between appellee's
weekly income and his weekly child-support obligation.  Neverthe-
less, the reduction of appellee's weekly child-support obligation
requires application to the issuing tribunal -- Florida's Seminole
County Circuit Court.  In the Lawrence County order, the chancellor
held that the Florida divorce decree was entitled to full faith and
credit, and appellee has not filed a cross-appeal from this
finding.  Therefore, there is no real question presented on appeal
as to whether the Florida court had personal jurisdiction over
appellee.
     We are, therefore, compelled to hold that the chancellor erred
in modifying the Florida support order.  Appellee did not establish
a basis for contesting the registration and enforcement of the
Florida decree and did not prove that either of the circumstances
permitting modification were present.  Accordingly, the order of
the chancellor modifying the Florida decree is reversed, and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
     Reversed and remanded.
     Rogers and Stroud, JJ., agree.