May v. May

Melissa MAY v. Jerry Glenn MAY

CA 96-913                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                          Division III
                  Opinion delivered May 7, 1997


1.   Judgment -- enforcement of foreign judgments -- operation of Uniform Act. -
     - The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, codified
     at Ark. Code. Ann.  16-66-601 to -608 (Supp. 1995), provides
     a summary procedure in which a party in whose favor a judgment
     has been rendered may enforce that judgment promptly in any
     jurisdiction where the judgment debtor can be found; the
     Uniform Act requires only that the foreign judgment be regular
     on its face and duly authenticated to be subject to
     registration.  

2.   Judgment -- foreign judgments protected from collateral attack under Full
     Faith and Credit Clause. -- Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
     of the United States Constitution, a foreign judgment is as
     conclusive on collateral attack as a domestic judgment would
     be, except for the defenses of fraud in the procurement or
     want of jurisdiction in the rendering court; foreign judgments
     entered by default are equally protected against collateral
     attack, unless the previously stated defenses can be
     established.

3.   Judgment -- Texas court's jurisdictional finding not subject to collateral
     attack -- trial court's decision reversed and remanded for entry of order
     accepting registration of foreign judgment. -- Where appellee
     contested personal jurisdiction in a Texas court and did not
     appeal that adverse determination, the Texas court's finding
     that it had personal jurisdiction was res judicata and not
     subject to collateral attack; the appellate court reversed the
     trial court's decision denying appellant's petition to
     register a foreign judgment and remanded for the trial court
     to enter an order accepting registration of the Texas
     judgment.


     Appeal from Crittenden Circuit Court; Samuel Turner, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Sloan, Rubens & Peeples, by: James A. Davis, Jr., for
appellant.
     Durrett & Coleman, by: Gerald A. Coleman, for appellee.

     Judith Rogers, Judge.
     Appellant brings this appeal from the trial court's denial of
her petition to register a foreign judgment based on a finding that
the Texas court that rendered the judgment did not have personal
jurisdiction over appellee.  For reversal, appellant contends that
appellee was bound by the Texas court's finding of personal
jurisdiction and that the trial court erred by permitting appellee
to collaterally attack the judgment on that ground in this
proceeding.  We agree and reverse.
     Appellant, Melissa May, is the daughter of appellee, Jerry
Glenn May.  On August 30, 1994, appellant obtained a default
judgment against appellee in the District Court of Cameron County,
Texas, in the total amount of $28,951.43, representing unpaid child
support, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees.  On May 16,
1995, appellant petitioned the Circuit Court of Crittenden County,
Arkansas, for registration of the Texas judgment.  Appellee
objected to appellant's petition, arguing that the Texas court had
no personal jurisdiction over him.  After a hearing, the trial
court agreed with appellee's argument and entered an order
dismissing appellant's petition.  
     The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, codified in
Arkansas at Ark. Code. Ann.  16-66-601 to -608 (Supp. 1995),
provides a summary procedure in which a party in whose favor a
judgment has been rendered may enforce that judgment promptly in
any jurisdiction where the judgment debtor can be found.  The
Uniform Act requires only that the foreign judgment be regular on
its face and duly authenticated to be subject to registration. 
Butler Fence Co. v. Acme Fence & Iron, 42 Ark. App. 30, 852 S.W.2d 826 (1993).  Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution, a foreign judgment is as conclusive on
collateral attack as a domestic judgment would be, except for the
defenses of fraud in the procurement or want of jurisdiction in the
rendering court.  Strick Lease, Inc. v. Juels, 30 Ark. App. 15, 780 S.W.2d 594 (1989).   Foreign judgments entered by default are
equally protected against collateral attack, unless the previously
stated defenses can be established.  Butler Fence Co. v. Acme Fence
& Iron, supra.
     Appellant's argument in this appeal is based on appellee's
testimony at the hearing and the supreme court's decision in Monark
Boat Co. v. Fischer, 292 Ark. 544, 732 S.W.2d 123 (1987).  It was
appellee's testimony that, when he learned of the judgment, he
hired an attorney and filed a motion for a new trial in which he
contested the Texas court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
him.  He said that the Texas court denied his motion based on a
finding that the court did have personal jurisdiction and that he
chose not to appeal that decision because of the expense. 
Certified copies of appellee's motion for a new trial and the order
denying it were introduced into evidence.
     In Monark Boat Co. v. Fischer, supra, the issue before the
court was whether a party, against whom a foreign judgment had been
rendered and who had contested the matter of personal jurisdiction
in the foreign court, may assert the lack of personal jurisdiction
of the rendering court when the judgment is sought to be registered
in Arkansas.  The court answered the question negatively, saying:
When the appellant appeared in the Ohio court
to contest the matter of whether that court
had personal jurisdiction of it, it subjected
itself to the jurisdiction of that court to
determine that issue.  The decision of the
Ohio court that it had jurisdiction of the
appellant was binding on the appellant, and
while it could have appealed that decision, it
could not collaterally attack it in a collat-
eral proceeding, such as the one before us
now, because of the doctrine of res 
judicata.
Id. at 547, 732 S.W.2d  at 125.
     The appellee in this case contested personal jurisdiction in
the Texas court and did not appeal that adverse determination. 
Therefore, under the decision in Monark, the Texas court's finding
that it had personal jurisdiction is res judicata and is not
subject to collateral attack in this proceeding.  Although the
appellant referred the trial court to the supreme court's decision
in Monark, the court did not abide by it.  Consequently, we reverse
the trial court's decision and remand for the trial court to enter
an order accepting registration of the Texas judgment.
     Reversed and remanded.
     Robbins, C.J., and Jennings, J., agree.