Carpenter v. Director

Debra CARPENTER v. DIRECTOR of Arkansas
Employment Security Department and Stark
Manufacturing, Inc.

E 94-307                                           ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                           Division I
              Opinion delivered September 25, 1996


1.   Unemployment compensation -- review of Board's findings --
     when reversed. -- On appeal, the findings of the Board of
     Review are reviewed in the light most favorable to the
     prevailing party, and those findings are reversed only where
     the Board's findings are not supported by substantial
     evidence.

2.   Unemployment compensation -- leaving work without good cause -
     - good cause defined. -- Good cause has been defined as a
     cause that would reasonably impel the average able-bodied,  
     qualified worker to give up his or her employment; it is
     dependent not only on the good faith of the employee involved,
     which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work and to
     be self-supporting, but also on the reaction of the average
     employee; good cause has also been found to mean justifiable
     reason for not accepting the particular job offered; in other
     words, to constitute good cause, the reason for refusal must
     not be arbitrary or capricious, and the reasons must be
     connected with the work itself; the question of good cause
     must be determined in the light of the facts in each case.

3.   Unemployment compensation -- whether claimant refused 
     suitable employment -- distance of work from claimant's
     residence a factor. -- The distance of available work from a
     claimant's residence is a relevant factor in consideration of
     whether a claimant has refused suitable employment; there
     exists no bright-line test for determining what distance is
     unreasonable; the issue of distance may not be isolated from
     other relevant factors, including the economic impact of the
     commute on the particular claimant. 

4.   Unemployment compensation -- Board's findings that appellant
     left her last work for reasons that did not constitute good
     cause were not supported by substantial evidence -- appellant
     did not fail to accept suitable work. -- Where, in addition to
     the increased distance of travel necessitated by appellee,
     there was evidence that commuting employees would have to
     undertake the additional safety hazard presented by the
     inherent condition of the roads in the area, and appellant
     earned only $5.25 an hour and presented evidence that, after
     the initial sixty days of compensation at $3.00 a day for
     travel expenses, the increased costs of gasoline would reduce
     the amount of her take-home, the appellate court held that the
     Board's findings that appellant left her last work for reasons
     that did not constitute good cause in connection with the work
     and that her decision not to commute constituted failure to
     accept suitable work when offered without good cause were not
     supported by substantial evidence.


     Appeal from the Board of Review of the Arkansas Employment
Security Division; reversed.
     Jeannie L. Denniston, for appellant.
     Allan Pruitt, for appellees.

     Olly Neal, Judge.
     Appellant Debra Carpenter appeals a decision of the Arkansas
Board of Review which affirmed a decision of the Appeal Tribunal
and an earlier determination by the Arkansas Employment Security
Department that appellant should be disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits under Ark. Code Ann.  11-10-513 (a) (1987). 
We believe that the Board of Review's decision was not supported by
substantial evidence and should be reversed.
     At the Appeal Tribunal hearing, Ms. Carpenter testified that
after she had worked at Starks Manufacturing for three or four
months, she was notified that appellee intended to close its plant
in Ozark, Arkansas.  According to appellant, she refused
reassignment to the facility located at Paris because the transfer
would require additional driving.  Appellant's family had only one
automobile and Starks did not offer to increase its employees' rate
of compensation.  Appellant also found the $3.00 a day for sixty
days' travel expenses offered by Stark insufficient to cover the
additional travel expenses that would be generated.  Ms. Carpenter
stated that prior to the closure of the Ozark plant, she only drove
ten miles to work, one-way, and that accepting the reassignment
would necessitate at least sixty miles of driving daily, much of
which would be on narrow, winding mountainous roads, sometimes in
inclement weather.  Finally, appellant Carpenter testified that,
although the employer intimated to its employees that they would
remain eligible for unemployment benefits should they not accept
the reassignment, the employer denied such statements and
controverted all claims for benefits.  Ms. Carpenter's last day of
work for appellee was August 25, 1994, the day Stark's Ozark
facility was closed.
     On appeal, we review the findings of the Board in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, only reversing where the
Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 
Roberson v. Director of Labor, 28 Ark. App. 337, 775 S.W.2d 82
(1989).  Here the Board found that appellant left her last work for
reasons which do not constitute good cause in connection with the
work and that appellant's decision not to commute to the new
location constituted failure to accept suitable work when offered
without good cause.
     Good cause has been defined as:
     [A] cause that would reasonably impel the average able-bodied,
     qualified worker to give up his or her employment.  (Citation
     omitted).  It is dependent not only on the good faith of the 
     employee involved, which includes the presence of a genuine 
     desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also on the 
     reaction of the average employee.
     
Perdrix-Wang v. Director, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

Similarly, good cause has also been found to mean:

     A justifiable reason for not accepting the particular job
     offered.  In other words, to constitute good cause, the 
     reason for refusal must not be arbitrary or capricious and
     the reasons must be connected with the work itself.... [T]he
     question of good cause must be determined in the light of the
     facts in each case.

Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. App. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980).

The fact that Ms. Carpenter continued to work for appellee through
the day the Ozark plant closed, forecloses any finding of
substantial evidence to support a finding that she left her last
work for reasons which do not constitute good cause in connection
with the work.
     Although the relevant statute, Ark. Code Ann.  11-10-515
establishes the distance of available work from a claimant's
residence as a relevant factor in consideration of whether a
claimant has refused suitable employment, our case law has not
established a bright-line test for determining what distance is
unreasonable.  We acknowledged in Rowlett v. Director, 45 Ark. App.
99, 872 S.W.2d 83 (1994), that, "under normal conditions, a
distance of several hundred miles between home and work would make
commuting unreasonable," but, on the other hand, held in Roberson
v. Director of Labor, 28 Ark. App. 337, 775 S.W.2d 82 (1989), that
a fifteen-mile commute was not unreasonable.  We note that the
issue of distance may not be isolated from other relevant factors,
including the economic impact of the commute on the particular
claimant.  See Jackson v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 74, 600 S.W.2d 427
(1980).
     In the case before us, in addition to the increased distance
of travel necessitated by appellee, there was evidence that
commuting employees would have to undertake the additional safety
hazard presented by the inherent condition of the roads in the
area.  Also, appellant earned only $5.25 an hour and presented
evidence that after the initial sixty days of compensation at $3.00
a day for travel expenses, the increased costs of gasoline would
reduce the amount of her take-home.  Based on those factors, we
hold that the Board's findings that Ms. Carpenter left her last
work for reasons that do not constitute good cause in connection
with the work and that her decision not to commute constituted
failure to accept suitable work when offered without good cause are
not supported by substantial evidence.
     Reversed.
     Mayfield and Rogers, JJ., agree.