Lowe v. Car Care Marketing

Randall LOWE v. CAR CARE MARKETING

CA 95-468                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                           Division I
                Opinion delivered April 17, 1996


1.   Workers' compensation -- Commission must make findings
     sufficient to justify denial of compensation -- sufficient
     findings of fact discussed. -- When the Commission denies
     compensation, it is required to make findings sufficient to
     justify that denial; a satisfactory, sufficient finding of
     fact must contain all of the specific facts relevant to the
     contested issue or issues so that the reviewing court may
     determine whether the Commission has resolved these issues in
     conformity with the law; the Commission must find as facts the
     basic component elements on which its conclusion is based;
     while the Commission may specifically adopt the findings of
     fact made by the administrative law judge, it is necessary
     under such circumstances that the administrative law judge
     have made sufficient findings.

2.   Workers' compensation -- composition of sufficient finding of
     fact -- conclusory language is not sufficient. -- A finding of
     fact sufficient to permit meaningful review is a "simple
     straightforward statement of what happened"; neither "a
     statement that a witness, or witnesses, testified thus and
     so," nor language by the Commission that is merely "conclusory
     and does not detail or analyze the facts upon which it is
     based," will suffice. 

3.   Workers' compensation -- opinion consisted almost entirely of
     a narration of testimony -- case remanded for specific
     findings. -- The opinion adopted by the Commission consisted
     almost entirely of a narration of testimony followed by the
     statement that "the claimant did not sustain an injury arising
     out of and during the scope of his employment on October 9,
     1992"; although labeled a finding of fact, the quoted
     statement was a conclusion of law; a claimant is entitled to
     know the factual basis upon which his claim is denied, and
     cases lacking this degree of specificity will be remanded for
     a decision based upon a specific finding; as the court was
     unable to determine the facts upon which the Commission relied
     in reaching its conclusion, the case was reversed and remanded
     for the Commission to make specific findings of fact.


     Appeal from the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission;
reversed and remanded.
     The Whetstone Law Firm, P.A., by:  Robert H. Montgomery, for
appellant.
     Bailey, Trimble, Capps, Lowe, Sellars & Thomas, by:  Peter O.
Thomas, for appellee.

     John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.
     *ADVREP*CA1*
                           DIVISION I



                                   CA 95-468

                                                 April 17, 1996


RANDALL LOWE                       AN APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
          APPELLANT                WORKERS' COMPENSATION
                                   COMMISSION
                                   [NO. E217987]

VS.


CAR CARE MARKETING                 REVERSED AND REMANDED
          APPELLEE




                   John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.

     The appellant, Randall Lowe, appeals from an order of the
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying his claim for
medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits.  He
contends that the administrative law judge's opinion, which the
Commission adopted as its own, fails to set forth sufficient
findings of fact to support the decision and that any findings that
were made are not supported by substantial evidence.  We agree with
the first of these points, and we reverse and remand for the
Commission to make specific findings of fact.
     When the Commission denies compensation, it is required to
make findings sufficient to justify that denial.  Wright v.
American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986). 
A satisfactory, sufficient finding of fact must contain all of the
specific facts relevant to the contested issue or issues so that
the reviewing court may determine whether the Commission has
resolved these issues in conformity with the law.  Id.  The
Commission must find as facts the basic component elements on which
its conclusion is based.  Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v.
Patterson, 309 Ark. 365, 830 S.W.2d 857 (1992).  While the
Commission may specifically adopt the findings of fact made by the
administrative law judge, it is necessary under such circumstances
that the administrative law judge have made sufficient findings. 
See Hardin v. Southern Compress Co., 34 Ark. App. 208, 810 S.W.2d 501 (1991); ITT/Higbie Mfg. v. Gilliam, 34 Ark. App. 154, 807 S.W.2d 44 (1991).
     A finding of fact sufficient to permit meaningful review is a
"simple straightforward statement of what happened."  Wright, 18
Ark. App. at 21, 709 S.W.2d  at 109.  Neither "a statement that a
witness, or witnesses, testified thus and so," id., nor language by
the Commission that is merely "conclusory and does not detail or
analyze the facts upon which it is based" will suffice.  Cagle
Fabricating & Steel, Inc., 309 Ark. at 369, 830 S.W.2d  at 859.  In
the present case, the opinion adopted by the Commission consists
almost entirely of a narration of the testimony followed by the
statement that "[t]he claimant did not sustain an injury arising
out of and during the scope of his employment on October 9, 1992."
     Although labeled a finding of fact, the quoted statement was
a conclusion of law.  See Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v.
Patterson, supra.  A claimant is entitled to know the factual basis
upon which his claim is denied, Jones v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 26 Ark.
App. 51, 759 S.W.2d 578 (1988), and cases lacking this degree of
specificity will be remanded for a decision based upon a specific
finding.  Belcher v. Holiday Inn, 49 Ark. App. 64, 896 S.W.2d 440
(1995).  Here, while it may be that the Commission determined that
appellant, apparently the only witness to the alleged accidental
injury, was not a credible witness, the opinion does not so state. 
As we are unable to determine the facts upon which the Commission
relied in reaching its conclusion, we reverse and remand for the
Commission to make specific findings of fact.
     Reversed and remanded.
     Cooper and Rogers, JJ., agree.