Rohrer v. Hart's Mfg. Co.

Sheila ROHRER v. HART'S MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation

CA 95-312                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                  Court of Appeals of Arkansas
                           Division II
                Opinion delivered March 20, 1996


1.   Workers' compensation -- employee fired for claiming workers'
     compensation benefits has common law action against his
     employer. -- An employee has a common law action against an
     employer who fires him for claiming workers' compensation
     benefits.  

2.   Workers' compensation -- meaning of the word injuries as used
     in section 41 of Act 796 of 1993. -- The word "injuries" as
     used in section 41 of Act 796 means that the date of the
     injury was the date the worker was discharged from employment. 
     
3.   Workers' compensation -- appellant discharged prior to act's
     effective date -- act inapplicable. -- Where appellant was
     discharged in December 1991, long before the effective date of
     Act 796, it was not applicable to her cause of action; the
     fact that her suit for damages was not filed until after the
     effective date of the Act was not determinative.  

4.   Workers' compensation -- claim not barred by language of joint
     petition -- trial court reversed and remanded. -- Appellant's
     claim was not barred by the language of the joint petition
     filed in the workers' compensation proceeding where the
     language in the joint petition relied upon by the appellee as
     a bar prohibited any other claim against appellant's employer
     or its' insurance carrier under the Arkansas Workers' Compen-
     sation Act; appellant's suit in circuit court was not a "claim
     under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act" and so appellan-
     t's cause of action for retaliatory discharge was not barred
     by the language of the joint petition; the decision of the
     trial court was reversed and the case remanded. 


     Appeal from  Clay Circuit Court; David Burnett, Judge;
reversed and remanded.
     Keith Blackman, for appellant.
     Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Cantrell, by:  Valerie Barnes
Speakman, or appellee.

     John E. Jennings, Chief Judge.
*ADVREPCA2*
                              DIVISION II



                                        CA 95-312
                                                                 
                                                                  
       March 20, 1996


SHEILA ROHRER                        APPEAL FROM CLAY COUNTY
          APPELLANT                  CIRCUIT COURT     

                                   
VS.
                                     HONORABLE DAVID BURNETT,
HART'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY,        CIRCUIT JUDGE
INC., A TENNESSEE CORPORATION      
          APPELLEE                   REVERSED AND REMANDED







                 John E. Jennings, Chief Judge.



     Sheila Rohrer, the appellant, was employed by the appellee,
Hart's Manufacturing Company, Inc.  In November 1990, she sustained
an on-the-job injury and subsequently filed a claim with the
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission.  In December 1991 she
was fired.  The parties settled appellant's workers' compensation
claim in December 1993 by way of joint petition.  In August 1994
appellant filed suit in Clay County Circuit Court, alleging that
she had been discharged in retaliation for the filing of her
workers' compensation claim and seeking damages.  In January 1995
the circuit court granted summary judgment for the appellee,
holding that the suit was barred by the language of the earlier
joint petition and barred by Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-107.  We
disagree and reverse and remand.
     In 1991 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991).  There the
court held that an employee has a common law action against his
employer who fires him for claiming workers' compensation benefits. 
The court has since followed its decision in Baysinger.  See e.g.,
Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); Leggett
v. Centro, Inc., 318 Ark. 732, 887 S.W.2d 523 (1994). 
     In 1993 the General Assembly passed Act 796, which eliminated
the cause of action for retaliatory discharge.  The Act, as
codified in Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-107 (Supp. 1995) provides, in
part:
               Any employer who willfully discriminates
          in regard to the hiring or tenure of work or
          any term or condition of work of any individu-
          al on account of the individual's claim for
          benefits under this chapter, or who in any
          manner obstructs or impedes the filing of
          claims for benefits under this chapter, shall
          be subject to a fine of up to ten thousand
          dollars ($10,000) as determined by the
          Workers' Compensation Commission.

          . . .

               A purpose of this section is to preserve
          the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically
          annul any case law inconsistent herewith,
          including but not necessarily limited to: Wal-
          Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239,
          812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne,
          306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and
          Thomas v. Valmac Industries, Inc., 306 Ark.
          228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).

     Section 41 of the Act provides that "the provisions of this
Act shall apply only to injuries which occur after July 1, 1993." 
The Act also declared its effective date to be July 1, 1993.  
     In Tackett v. Crain Automotive, 321 Ark. 36, 899 S.W.2d 839
(1995), the supreme court was faced with the question of the
meaning of the word "injuries" as used in section 41 of Act 796. 
A majority held that the date of the injury was the date the worker
was discharged from employment.  The dissenting justices argued
that the date of injury was the date the employee suffered a
compensable injury at work.
     In the case at bar, appellant was discharged in December 1991,
long before the effective date of the Act.  Therefore, by its
terms, it is not applicable to her cause of action.  The fact that
her suit for damages was not filed until after the effective date
of the Act is not determinative.  
     We also agree with the appellant that her claim is not barred
by the language of the joint petition filed in the workers'
compensation proceeding.  The language in the joint petition relied
upon by the appellee as a bar states: "It is further expressly
understood and agreed by the parties hereto that if this joint
petition be approved by the Commission, Claimant will have no other
claim against Hart's of Arkansas or Wassau Insurance Companies
under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act of any nature[.]"  The
short answer to the appellee's contention is that appellant's suit
in circuit court is not a "claim under the Arkansas Workers'
Compensation Act."  Appellant's cause of action for retaliatory
discharge is not barred by the language of the joint petition.  For
the reasons stated the decision of the trial court is reversed and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings.  
     Reversed and Remanded.
     ROBBINS and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree.