IN RE MH-2008-000867

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA En Banc IN RE MH-2008-000867 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Arizona Supreme Court No. CV-09-0297-PR Court of Appeals Division One No. 1 CA-MH 08-0022 Maricopa County Superior Court No. MH2008-000867 O P I N I O N Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County The Honorable Benjamin E. Vatz, Commissioner AFFIRMED ________________________________________________________________ Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One 222 Ariz. 287, 213 P.3d 1014 (2009) VACATED ________________________________________________________________ JAMES J. HAAS, MARICOPA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER By Tennie B. Martin, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for MH 2008-000867 Phoenix ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY By Anne C. Longo, Deputy County Attorney Geraldine Roll, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for State of Arizona Phoenix BARBARA LAWALL, PIMA COUNTY ATTORNEY Tucson By Barbara S. Burstein, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Barbara LaWall ________________________________________________________________ H U R W I T Z, Vice Chief Justice ¶1 The issue in this case is whether the superior court erred by allowing telephonically in an a evaluating mental physician health to commitment testify proceeding. Because the treatment order has expired, this case is arguably moot. We presented review. is nonetheless of accepted statewide review importance and because the capable of issue evading See In re Commitment of Alleged Mentally Disordered Person, 181 Ariz. 290, 292, 889 P.2d 1088, 1090 (1995). We have jurisdiction Arizona under Article 6, Section 5(3) of the Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ( A.R.S. ) § 12-120.24 (2003). I ¶2 In April 2008, Dr. L filed an application pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-520 (2009)1 seeking an involuntary evaluation of a 21-year old male ( Patient ). mental health The superior court granted the application and ordered inpatient evaluations. See A.R.S. evaluations, § 36-529 after ordered treatment. A.R.S. within § 36-535(B) six days (2009). which Dr. Drs. H F filed and a H performed petition for See A.R.S. § 36-533 (2009). (2003) of required filing the unless the court- At the time, petition to be heard Patient requested a 1 We cite the current version of the statutes absent any material change since the events in question. 2 continuance.2 The court heard in-person testimony from several lay witnesses and Dr. H. Section 36-539(B) (2003) requires the testimony of both evaluating physicians. Dr. F, however, was attending a professional conference on the day of the hearing. Patient did not agree to continue the hearing, and, over his objection, Dr. F testified telephonically. The trial judge found Patient had a mental disorder and was persistently or acutely disabled, see A.R.S. § 36-540(A) (Supp. 2009), and ordered up to 180 days of inpatient treatment. ¶3 The court of appeals vacated the commitment order, concluding that [t]he right to confrontation under procedural due process is similar to the right to confrontation under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re MH-2008-000867, 222 Ariz. 287, 291 ¶ 17, 213 P.3d 1014, 1018 (App. 2009). The court therefore held that absent a showing of true necessity, based on unavailability, telephonic testimony of a doctor at such a hearing violates the patient s rights. Id. at 292 ¶ 23, 213 P.3d at 1019. Noting that Dr. F was in the Phoenix metropolitan area at the time of the hearing and the trial judge had made no findings that telephonic testimony was necessary, id. at ¶ 21, the court of 2 The statute has since been amended to permit the state to request a continuance of up to three business days. 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 153, § 4. 3 appeals concluded that the order of involuntary commitment could not stand, id. at 293 ¶ 27, 213 P.3d at 1020. II ¶4 [F]or the ordinary citizen, commitment to a mental hospital produces a massive curtailment of liberty, consequence requires due process protection. and in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The question before us is whether the court of appeals properly concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commitment hearings mandates satisfy that the testimony requirements in of involuntary the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.3 ¶5 The court of appeals applied a two-pronged test derived from Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990), and held that telephonic testimony may be admitted only when necessary to further an important public policy and . . . the reliability of the testimony was otherwise assured. In re MH- 2008-000867, 222 Ariz. at 291 ¶ 18, 213 P.3d at 1018 (quoting In re MH-2004-001987, 211 Ariz. 255, 260 ¶ 21, 120 P.3d 210, 215 (App. 2005)). Craig, however, was a criminal case, in which the guarantees of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 3 Because Dr. F s testimony was presented telephonically during the hearing, this case does not involve, nor does Patient raise, any hearsay objection. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing ). 4 expressly apply. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ( In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . ). Mental health commitment proceedings, in contrast, are civil actions. In re MH 2008-001752, 222 Ariz. 567, 569 ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1024, 1026 (App. 2009) (declaring criminal case precedent inapposite because petitions for involuntary mental health treatment are civil actions). ¶6 In concluding that a Confrontation Clause analysis was nonetheless required, the court of appeals cited In re S.B., 639 N.W.2d 78, 83 (Neb. 2002). In re MH-2008-000867, 222 Ariz. at 292 1019. ¶¶ 22-23, 213 P.3d at As the court of appeals acknowledged, however, the Nebraska opinion is premised on a statute affording subjects of commitment hearings confrontation rights equivalent to those of criminal defendants. Id. at 292 ¶ 22 n.4, 213 P.3d at 1019 n.4 (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-954 (2008)). Arizona has no comparable statute. ¶7 The court of appeals also relied upon In re MH 2004- 001987, 211 Ariz. at 260 ¶ 21, 120 P.3d at 215, for the proposition that Patient s due process rights were similar to the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights of a criminal defendant. In re MH-2008-000867, 222 Ariz. at 291 ¶ 17, 213 P.3d at 1018; id. at 292 ¶ 22 n.4, 213 P.3d at 1019 n.4. But although the Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized 5 the need for procedural due process in civil commitment hearings, see, e.g., Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491-92, neither that Court nor any other, to our knowledge, has held that the Confrontation Clause applies to such cases. ¶8 Although civil commitment proceedings pose a potential loss of liberty, they differ from criminal proceedings in many important ways. As the Supreme Court has noted, a civil commitment proceeding should not be constitutionally equated to a criminal prosecution because the state is not acting in a punitive manner. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). The patient is provided treatment under terms and conditions specified by the court, rather than incarcerated or otherwise punished. least A.R.S. § 36-540(A). restrictive § 36-540(B). treatment And a The patient must be offered the alternative committed patient available. also is A.R.S. entitled to periodic judicial review to show changed circumstances, which can result in release. ¶9 We do not A.R.S. § 36-546(C) (2009). minimize the importance of liberty to an involuntarily committed patient. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (noting the loss of See Hamdi v. that the most elemental of liberty interests is the interest in being free from physical detention by one s own government ). than the Confrontation proceedings by the Clause Sixth analysis Amendment, 6 the demanded But, rather in appropriate criminal test to determine whether Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process has been afforded in this context is the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). one set forth in Under Mathews, three factors are considered when determining the specific dictates of due process in a civil proceeding: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335. ¶10 Although Mathews involved the deprivation of a property interest, id. at 332, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied Mathews in cases involving important liberty interests, see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (using Mathews analysis to determine due process required before assigning an inmate to a high-security facility); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 (using Mathews analysis to determine scope of process due combatants). to United Similarly, States in citizens determining detained whether as enemy civil mental health commitment proceedings afford basic Fourteenth Amendment due process, we must balance the liberty interests of the patient against the various interests of the state, and consider whether the procedures used or proposed alternatives will likely 7 lead to more reliable outcomes. See In re W.J.C., 369 N.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (applying Mathews analysis to civil commitment proceedings). III ¶11 In commitment proceedings, as in other civil cases, we start from the notion that testimony is ordinarily taken from witnesses orally in open court. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 43(f); see also A.R.S. § 36-539(D) (Supp. 2009) (providing that all rules of evidence followed in and the civil Arizona commitment rules of civil proceedings if with the statutory commitment procedures). procedure not are inconsistent But, as the court of appeals has noted, a cluster of civil rules contemplate the admission of testimony presented otherwise. See Sabori v. Kuhn, 199 Ariz. 330, 332-33 ¶¶ 11-13, 18 P.3d 124, 126-27 (App. 2001). When considering telephonic testimony, the initial inquiry should be whether good cause has been shown for its use. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (providing that testimony may, for good cause shown, be taken in open court transmission from a different location ). court did not make such a finding by contemporaneous Although the superior here, the conflicting professional obligation of Dr. F and the apparent unwillingness 8 of Patient to continue the hearing to a time when this necessary witness could be present furnished the requisite good cause.4 ¶12 We next consider whether admission testimony comported with due process. of telephonic As the Court noted in Mathews, [d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). context of an involuntary commitment Thus, in the proceeding, we must evaluate the individual liberty interest involved, the interests of the state, and the likely impact of telephonic testimony on the accuracy and fairness of the process. ¶13 Involuntary commitment curtailment of individual liberty. involves a significant In circumstances like those presented here, however, allowing telephonic testimony serves important governmental interests and does not increase the risks of an erroneous deprivation. significantly Although Dr. F was not physically present in the courtroom, he was subject to full cross-examination. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (due process requires opportunity to cross-examine 4 In determining whether good cause has been demonstrated, the court may consider whether the hearing can conveniently be continued to allow in-person testimony. It may also consider the costs of bringing experts or other witnesses to court, particularly in those counties in which there are relatively few mental health professionals available. 9 adverse witnesses decisions turn on [i]n almost questions every of setting fact ). Dr. where F s important report was provided to Patient in advance of the hearing, and his testimony largely duplicated courtroom. the that of Dr. H, who was present in the And, given that Patient did not assent to continue statutory deadline for the hearing to secure Dr. F s appearance, the State s important interest in protecting Patient and members of the public from potential physical harm would have been thwarted had telephonic testimony not been allowed. IV ¶14 We therefore conclude that the admission of Dr. F s telephonic testimony did not deprive Amendment procedural due process. Patient of Fourteenth We affirm the order of the superior court and vacate the opinion of the court of appeals. _____________________________________ Andrew D. Hurwitz, Vice Chief Justice CONCURRING: _____________________________________ Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice _____________________________________ Michael D. Ryan, Justice 10 _____________________________________ W. Scott Bales, Justice _____________________________________ A. John Pelander, Justice 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.