Kirkley v. Tyson Foods, Inc.
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Tyson Foods, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Blount Circuit Court to dismiss Reba Kirkley's action against it, brought in her capacity as administratrix of her father's estate, on the ground that Kirkley lacked standing. On April 15, 2008, Allen Hayes died in a workplace accident at the Tyson Foods plant in Blount County. A tractor operated by an employee of Tyson Foods hit Hayes, who was working as a security guard. His widow Mildred Hayes collected $40,964.19 in workers' compensation death benefits against the account of DSI Security Services, Allen's employer at the time of the accident. On June 26, 2008, Kirkley, the personal representative of Allen's estate and Allen and Mildred's daughter, filed a wrongful-death action against the Tyson petitioners, who answered and removed the case to federal court. In early March 2011, the federal court remanded the case to state court. The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss. Finding that Tyson did not demonstrate a clear legal right to the remedy it sought seek, the Supreme Court denied the petition.
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REL: 05/24/2013 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2012-2013 1110931 Ex p a r t e Tyson Foods, Inc., e t a l . PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In r e : Reba K i r k l e y , as a d m i n i s t r a t r i x o f the e s t a t e o f A l l e n Hayes, deceased v. Tyson Foods, Inc., e t a l . ) (Blount C i r c u i t Court, CV-2008-900082) MOORE, C h i e f Tyson (hereinafter Justice. Foods, Inc., referred to Ricky Walker, collectively and Mike as Graffino " t h e Tyson 1110931 petitioners") petition d i r e c t i n g the B l o u n t action against this Court for a writ C i r c u i t Court to dismiss them, brought in of mandamus Reba K i r k l e y ' s her capacity a d m i n i s t r a t r i x , i . e . , p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , of her as father's e s t a t e , on t h e g r o u n d t h a t K i r k l e y l a c k s s t a n d i n g . B e c a u s e t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s have n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t t o the I. remedy t h e y s e e k , we F a c t u a l and On deny t h e petition. History 15, April Procedural Allen 2008, Hayes died in a workplace a c c i d e n t a t t h e T y s o n Foods p l a n t i n B l o u n t C o u n t y . H a y e s , was w o r k i n g as operated Hayes by a s e c u r i t y g u a r d , was an employee of c o l l e c t e d $40,964.19 Tyson in h i t by Foods. workers' who a t r a c t o r being His widow Mildred compensation death b e n e f i t s a g a i n s t t h e a c c o u n t o f DSI S e c u r i t y S e r v i c e s , A l l e n ' s employer at Kirkley, the Allen and against the time personal Mildred's the of the accident. representative daughter, filed T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s , who On June 26, of A l l e n ' s e s t a t e a wrongful-death a n s w e r e d and c a s e t o f e d e r a l c o u r t . I n e a r l y M a r c h 2011, filed amended a n s w e r s and 2 and action removed the the f e d e r a l c o u r t remanded t h e c a s e t o s t a t e c o u r t . S i x months l a t e r , petitioners 2008, the Tyson a motion to dismiss on 1110931 the b a s i s t h a t K i r k l e y l a c k e d s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g the w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n . The t r i a l j u d g e , on K i r k l e y ' s m o t i o n , s t r u c k t h e amended a n s w e r s and d e n i e d t h e motion t o d i s m i s s . The T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s t h e n s o u g h t a w r i t o f mandamus f r o m t h i s C o u r t . Neither a wrongful-death w o r k e r s ' compensation Both are purely action death b e n e f i t s statutory causes nor existed an action for a t common l a w . of a c t i o n . The 1 statute p r o v i d i n g f o r a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n , § 6 - 5 - 4 1 0 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, a l l o w s o n l y a p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e d e c e a s e d ' s estate to bring such an a c t i o n . The w o r k e r s ' compensation s t a t u t e , by c o n t r a s t , a l l o w s t h e deceased employee's representative covered to bring employee dies a third-party without action dependents. only If personal when t h e dependents s u r v i v e , t h e r i g h t t o sue t h i r d p a r t i e s a l l e g i n g t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f t h e employee lies s o l e l y w i t h them. § 25-5-11, A l a . Code 1975; T u c k e r v. M o l d e n , 761 So. 2d 996, 998 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) ; and & Timber Johnson v. H u x f o r d P o l e Co., 983 So. 2d 1133, 1138-39 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 7 ) . U n d e r t h e w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n statute, Allen had o n l y one d e p e n d e n t a t the time of h i s " T h e r e was no r i g h t t o r e c o v e r f o r d e a t h a t common l a w . " A k i n s v. Drummond Co., 628 So. 2d 5 9 1 , 592 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . 1 3 1110931 d e a t h - - h i s w i f e M i l d r e d . K i r k l e y , b e i n g o v e r t h e age o f 19 a n d not incapacitated qualify a t the time of A l l e n ' s death, d i d not as a d e p e n d e n t . §§ 25-5-61 a n d - 6 5 , A l a . Code 1975. T h i s " q u i r k , " as t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s d e s c r i b e i t , meant t h a t Kirkley wrongful-death d i d not q u a l i f y to prosecute the action. In November time brought trial court this 2011, t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s f a c t to the a t t e n t i o n in their first f o r the first o f K i r k l e y and t h e amended a n s w e r s a n d a c o m p a n i o n motion t o dismiss. Emphasizing that the wrongful-death s t a t u t e had a s p e c i f i c two-year s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s , § 6-5-410(d), Ala. Code 1975, t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s a r g u e d t h a t t h e t i m e i n which M i l d r e d could be s u b s t i t u t e d w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n had e x p i r e d . trial court of a p r o p e r h a d no c h o i c e as t h e p l a i n t i f f i n the Thus, t h e y c o n t e n d e d , t h e but to dismiss the action f o r lack plaintiff. K i r k l e y responded t h a t t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' r e q u e s t f o r a d i s m i s s a l was b a r r e d did of not assert by t h e d o c t r i n e their rights until of laches because they a f t e r the two-year statute l i m i t a t i o n s f o r a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n had e x p i r e d . a l s o a s k e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o a d d M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f 4 She under 1110931 Rule 1 7 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., a n d t o e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n under Rule 15(a), A l a . R. C i v . P., t o s t r i k e t h e amended answers. On March 7, 2012, t h e t r i a l court struck t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' amended a n s w e r s , d e n i e d t h e i r m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , and g r a n t e d K i r k l e y ' s m o t i o n t o a d d M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f . On April 18, 2012, t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s filed a petition for a w r i t o f mandamus i n t h i s C o u r t , s e e k i n g an o r d e r d i r e c t i n g t h e trial c o u r t t o d i s m i s s t h e c a s e . The T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s that K i r k l e y lacked standing t o prosecute argued the wrongful-death a c t i o n a n d t h a t t h e m o t i o n t o a d d M i l d r e d as a p l a i n t i f f came too late. II. Standard o f Review T h i s C o u r t h a s p r e v i o u s l y a l l o w e d mandamus r e v i e w t o h e a r a challenge to standing. C o r p . , 974 So. 2d 288 See, e . g . , Ex p a r t e ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) ; Ex p a r t e Mgmt., I n c . , 929 So. 2d 1007, HealthSouth Chemical Waste 1010 ( A l a . 2005) . The t h r e s h o l d f o r g r a n t i n g t h e p e t i t i o n , however, i s h i g h : "Mandamus i s a d r a s t i c a n d e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t , t o be i s s u e d o n l y where t h e r e i s (1) a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t i n t h e p e t i t i o n e r t o t h e o r d e r s o u g h t ; (2) an i m p e r a t i v e d u t y upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o p e r f o r m , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a r e f u s a l t o do s o ; (3) t h e l a c k o f 5 1110931 a n o t h e r a d e q u a t e remedy; a n d (4) p r o p e r l y j u r i s d i c t i o n of the court." Ex p a r t e III. Integon, invoked 672 So. 2d 497, 499 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . Analysis A. Clear Legal Right The legal Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' r e q u e s t question this standing/capacity Inc., t o Order Sought: S t a n d i n g Court has right for relief referred implicates a to as to f i l e ( A l a . 1980) . I f t h e i s s u e o f a wrongful-death action i s one o f c a p a c i t y u n d e r R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . P., as s h e a r g u e s , than a question then Kirkley of standing, may well 3 prevail. Lack o f s t a n d i n g , rather as t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s i n s i s t , Lack of capacity a f f i r m a t i v e defense that i s waived i f not r a i s e d curable. "the d i c h o t o m y . " D a n i e l v . O.F. R i c h t e r & Sons, 385 So. 2d 1308, 1309 Kirkley's v. C a p a c i t y 2 i s an and i s o f t e n h o w e v e r , c a n n o t be w a i v e d a n d c a n "When a p a r t y d e s i r e s t o r a i s e an i s s u e as t o t h e ... c a p a c i t y o f a n y p a r t y t o s u e ... , t h e p a r t y d e s i r i n g t o r a i s e t h e i s s u e s h a l l do so b y s p e c i f i c n e g a t i v e a v e r m e n t " Rule 9 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. 2 See Rule 17(a), A l a . R. C i v . P. (providing that s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t " s h a l l have t h e same e f f e c t as i f t h e a c t i o n h a d b e e n commenced i n t h e name o f the r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t " ) . 3 6 1110931 be r a i s e d a t any t i m e . S e x t o n v. B a s s C o m f o r t C o n t r o l , I n c . , 63 So. 3d 656, 664 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 1 0 ) . This Court Compensation has Chapter employee h i m s e l f decided Tucker standing 761 So. 2d a t 998 however, i n Tucker. had limits stated that "the Workers' t o sue t o t h e i n j u r e d o r h e r s e l f o r h i s or her dependents T u c k e r v. M o l d e n , statement, previously 4 was dictum, No p a r t y standing; (emphasis added). unnecessary disputed nor d i d Tucker " that to the That issue the p l a i n t i f f i n discuss capacity. c o n t r a s t , i n A l a b a m a Power Co. v. W h i t e , 377 So. 2d 930 By (Ala. 1979), t h i s Court e x p r e s s l y h e l d t h a t s u r v i v i n g dependents of a d e c e a s e d e m p l o y e e have t h e c a p a c i t y t o b r i n g an a c t i o n a n d J u s t i c e Lyons, attempting to c l a r i f y the d i s t i n c t i o n between l a c k o f c a p a c i t y ( c u r a b l e ) and l a c k o f s t a n d i n g (incurable), noted that " [ i ] m p r e c i s i o n i n l a b e l i n g a party's i n a b i l i t y t o p r o c e e d as a s t a n d i n g p r o b l e m unnecessarily expands t h e u n i v e r s e of cases l a c k i n g i n subject-matter j u r i s d i c t i o n . " Hamm v. N o r f o l k S. Ry., 52 So. 3d 484, 499 ( A l a . 2010) ( L y o n s , J . , c o n c u r r i n g s p e c i a l l y ) . An A l a b a m a l a w p r o f e s s o r r e c e n t l y argued that standing, i f c a s u a l l y invoked, may w r o n g l y t r e a t a c u r a b l e c a p a c i t y q u e s t i o n as an i n c u r a b l e standing i s s u e , thus "rendering the f i l i n g of i l l - c o n c e i v e d but not irredeemable p r i v a t e law complaints not merely m i s t a k e n a c t s , r e p a r a b l e b y amendment, b u t v o i d a c t s , n o t r e p a r a b l e b y amendment." Jerome A. H o f f m a n , The Malignant M y s t i q u e o f " S t a n d i n g , " 73 A l a . Law. 360, 362 ( 2 0 1 2 ) . 4 7 1110931 that a defendant waives the challenge to capacity by n o t raising i t . "[W]e h o l d t h a t § 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 ( a ) [ , A l a . Code 1975,] b y the p h r a s e 'the employee, o r h i s dependents i n case o f h i s d e a t h , may p r o c e e d a g a i n s t t h e e m p l o y e r ' g i v e s t o t h e d e p e n d e n t s CAPACITY t o b r i n g suit a g a i n s t t h e e m p l o y e r u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . We h o l d t h a t dependency i s c a p a c i t y under § 25-5-11(a) w h i c h must be d e n i e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t b y s p e c i f i c n e g a t i v e averment " 377 So. 2d a t 936. As consistent with this App. the actual cases a r e 56 A l a . App. 426, 322 So. 2d 717 f a c i n g a motion t o dismiss A l a . R. C i v . at issue, as a (Civ. for lack s o u g h t t o amend t h e c o m p l a i n t t o j o i n h i s owner o f t h e p r o p e r t y Rule 17(a), other & Sewer C o m m i s s i o n e r s o f t h e C i t y o f 1975), t h e p l a i n t i f f , of s t a n d i n g , below, holding. In B o a r d o f Water M o b i l e v. M c D o n a l d , discussed wife, plaintiff. P., s t a t e s : "No a c t i o n s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t i s n o t p r o s e c u t e d i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t u n t i l a r e a s o n a b l e time has been a l l o w e d a f t e r o b j e c t i o n f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n o f commencement o f the a c t i o n by, o r j o i n d e r o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f , t h e real party i n i n t e r e s t ; and such ratification, j o i n d e r , o r s u b s t i t u t i o n s h a l l have t h e same e f f e c t as i f t h e a c t i o n h a d b e e n commenced i n t h e name o f the r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . " Rule the 17 a l l o w s same way the s u b s t i t u t i o n or joinder that Rule 15, A l a . R. 8 of p l a i n t i f f s i n C i v . P., p e r m i t s t h e 1110931 s u b s t i t u t i o n of defendants t o r e l a t e back t o the date o f the f i l i n g of the o r i g i n a l pleading. See R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . P. (Committee Comments on 1973 A d o p t i o n ) . Noting i n R u l e 15 t h a t "amendments a r e t o be a l l o w e d the admonition ' f r e e l y ... when j u s t i c e so r e q u i r e s , ' " M c D o n a l d , 56 A l a . App. a t 429, 322 So. 2d a t 720, t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s h e l d t h a t " t h e amendment was p r o p e r l y a l l o w e d e v e n i f i t w o r k e d t o a v o i d t h e s t a t u t e o f limitations." court applied 56 A l a . App. a t 430, 322 So. 2d a t 720. The the conditions amendments t o d e f e n d a n t s on the relation back of under Rule 15(c) t o t h e a d d i t i o n o f a r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t as a p l a i n t i f f under Rule 17(a): "An amendment c h a n g i n g p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f relates b a c k i f t h e c l a i m o f t h e new p a r t y a r o s e o u t o f t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n , c o n d u c t o r o c c u r r e n c e as t h a t s e t forth i n the o r i g i n a l pleading, and i f t h e defendant, w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e d by law f o r commencing t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i m (1) h a s r e c e i v e d s u c h n o t i c e o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n t h a t he w i l l n o t be p r e j u d i c e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g h i s d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , a n d (2) knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t , but f o r a mistake concerning the i d e n t i t y of the proper p a r t y , the s u b s t i t u t e d o r j o i n e d p a r t y would have b r o u g h t t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t h i m . " M c D o n a l d , 56 A l a . App. a t 430, 322 So. 2d a t 721. The then quoted " t h e sense of the r u l e " from a l e a d i n g treatise: "'As l o n g as d e f e n d a n t i s f u l l y a p p r i s e d o f t h e c l a i m a r i s i n g from s p e c i f i e d conduct and has f u l l y p r e p a r e d t o defend t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t him, h i s 9 court 1110931 a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f w i l l n o t be p r e j u d i c i a l l y a f f e c t e d i f a new p l a i n t i f f i s a d d e d , a n d he s h o u l d n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o i n v o k e a l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e . ' " Id. ( q u o t i n g 6 C h a r l e s A. W r i g h t & A r t h u r R. M i l l e r , Federal P r a c t i c e a n d P r o c e d u r e § 1501) . F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t a p p l i e d t h e relation-back rule t o the facts before was "no change i t , holding that i n t h e c l a i m as o r i g i n a l l y filed," there that the d e f e n d a n t "knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t t h e r e was a m i s t a k e in t h e name o f t h e p r o p e r p a r t y b r i n g i n g t h e o r i g i n a l as was e v i d e n t i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s own p l e a d i n g , claim" and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d s u f f e r e d no p r e j u d i c e . 56 A l a . App. a t 431, 322 So. 2d a t 7 2 1 . Applying t h e same reasoning to this case, we conclude t h a t t h e a d d i t i o n as a p l a i n t i f f o f M i l d r e d , A l l e n ' s d e p e n d e n t and the real claim party as o r i g i n a l l y i n interest, filed." created "no change As i s e v i d e n t i n the i n t h e amended a n s w e r s , t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s knew o r s h o u l d have known t h a t a mistake was made "concerning the i d e n t i t y of the proper p a r t y . " A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s were n o t p r e j u d i c e d in preparing their defense. e x p i r a t i o n of the wrongful-death 10 Thus, notwithstanding the statute of l i m i t a t i o n s , the 1110931 addition the of M i l d r e d original as pleading. a plaintiff 1985), approvingly 189-90 portions Court 1985), this McDonald, substitution of Moates, So. 2d to this 565 similarities v. C l e v e l a n d , quoted a t l e n g t h . I n Ex p a r t e (Ala. of this a and real-party 186 one, the So. 2d 497, McDonald 499 analysis So. again substantial quoted i t s p r i n c i p l e s to appellant. (Ala. 1990), the circuit c o n t r a r y t o law, s u b s t i t u t i o n was to S i n g l e t o n , 475 Court applying 473 w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n because the p e r s o n a l t h e d e c e a s e d was, r e l a t e d back 5 I n B l u e S t a r Ready M i x (Ala. properly In a allow the with v. many dismissed a representative of a nonresident attempted a f t e r the 186, Holyfield case court 2d of Alabama, limitations period The Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s a l s o argue t h a t the w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e c o n t a i n s i t s own l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d and t h u s i s a " s t a t u t e o f c r e a t i o n " n o t s u b j e c t t o t o l l i n g . See § 65-54 1 0 ( d ) , A l a . Code 1975; C o f e r v. E n s o r , 473 So. 2d 984, 991 ( A l a . 1 9 8 5 ) . T h i s f a c t , h o w e v e r , does n o t a f f e c t t h e c a p a c i t y a n a l y s i s . R u l e 17(a) does n o t t o l l t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s . " [ A ] p p l i c a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n b a c k does n o t e x t e n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d " but merely a l l o w s s u b s t i t u t i o n of a p a r t y i n a s u i t o t h e r w i s e t i m e l y f i l e d . Chumney v. U.S. R e p e a t i n g Arms Co., 196 F.R.D. 419, 427 (M.D. A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) . " [ I ] f t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s does n o t b a r t h e c o r r e c t i o n o f an ' i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l p l e a d i n g e r r o r ' from r e l a t i n g back, then n e i t h e r does t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e o f creation's l i m i t a t i o n period." Id. 5 11 1110931 had expired. This Court reversed the circuit court's d i s m i s s a l , n o t i n g t h a t " o u r h o l d i n g i s mandated b y R u l e 17(a), [ A l a . ] R. C i v . P." 565 So. 2d a t 189. As a u t h o r i t y , t h i s quoted a case decided for the Eleventh corresponding by t h e U n i t e d Circuit States Court Court of Appeals i n t e r p r e t i n g and applying the federal rule: "'The p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f [ R u l e 17, F e d . R. C i v . P.,] c l e a r l y p r o v i d e s t h a t when an a c t i o n i s b r o u g h t b y someone o t h e r t h a n t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t w i t h i n the limitations period and t h e r e a l party i n i n t e r e s t j o i n s or r a t i f i e s the a c t i o n a f t e r the limitations period h a s r u n , t h e amendment o r r a t i f i c a t i o n r e l a t e s b a c k t o t h e t i m e s u i t was originally filed and t h e a c t i o n need n o t be d i s m i s s e d as t i m e b a r r e d . ' " 565 So. 2d a t 189 (11th C i r . The here. (quoting Hess v . Eddy, 689 F.2d 977, 980 1982)). a p p l i c a t i o n of the relation-back Kirkley, although not the r e a l rule party i s t h e same in interest, b r o u g h t t h e a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d . The a d d i t i o n o f M i l d r e d as t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t a f t e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s period had run thus " ' r e l a t e s back t o the time suit was o r i g i n a l l y f i l e d a n d t h e a c t i o n n e e d n o t be d i s m i s s e d as t i m e barred.'" Civ. P. See 1991 A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e N o t e t o R u l e 15, F e d . R. (noting that the goal of relation-back p r i n c i p l e s i s 12 1110931 "to prevent p a r t i e s a g a i n s t whom c l a i m s a r e made f r o m t a k i n g u n j u s t advantage o f otherwise to sustain a limitations The trial court inconsequential pleading errors defense"). properly treated Kirkley's status as a c a p a c i t y i s s u e and g r a n t e d a c u r a t i v e motion f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 17, A l a . R. C i v . P., s t a t i n g : Mildred Hayes " [ K i r k l e y ' s ] M o t i o n t o Add a s an A d d i t i o n a l R e a l Party GRANTED b a s e d upon A l a b a m a R u l e o f C i v i l Miller v. J a c k s o n 2000)." in-fact, Hospital & Clinic, (Capitalization i noriginal.) proceeding under a power i n Interest i s P r o c e d u r e 17(A) 776 So. 2d 122 and (Ala. I n M i l l e r , an a t t o r n e y of attorney, improperly f i l e d an a c t i o n i n h i s own name r a t h e r t h a n i n t h e name o f t h e real party i n interest, injury. i . e . , t h e p a r t y who h a d s u f f e r e d t h e 776 So. 2d a t 125-26. The t r i a l court r e j e c t e d an amendment t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t o u t s i d e t h e limitations The period. plurality 776 So. 2d a t 123. T h i s opinion i n Miller Court reversed. quoted a case o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o u r t o f A p p e a l s f o r t h e Second Circuit: "'"The s u b s t i t u t i o n o f s u c h p a r t i e s a f t e r t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s may have r u n i s n o t s i g n i f i c a n t when t h e change i s m e r e l y f o r m a l a n d i n no way a l t e r s t h e known f a c t s a n d i s s u e s on w h i c h t h e a c t i o n i s b a s e d . The c o u r t s h a v e f r e e l y u p h e l d 13 1110931 the f i l i n g o f an circumstances."'" 776 So. 2d Bayfront quoting F.2d 127 Partners, (quoting Inc., complaint The 1263 F.3d 106 Magnetics, 19 11, (2d (7th C i r . "'for lack interest. of standing'" no 776 So. 2d plaintiff at F.3d in Miller 127. As not the r e a l such, t h a t he interest and the mislead the Accordingly, claim that a t 2 0 ) . The had "mistaken b e l i e f " The 1997), 529 i n Advanced Magnetics "'there d i s m i s s a l where " s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e A d v a n c e d M a g n e t i c s , 106 filing, Cir. filed could e r r o r was defendant in party (quoting p l u r a l i t y noted that the complaint represent the not r e l a t e back under real party d e l i b e r a t e and understanding even though the Miller opinion v a l i d where a " j u r a l to the the date of l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d had also stated did claim. that the in not Id. and the original run. Id. substitution r e l a t i o n s h i p " e x i s t e d between the 14 was plainly real Id. to party s u b s t i t u t i o n w o u l d be a l l o w e d u n d e r R u l e 17, would v. 1976)). i n i n t e r e s t i s necessary to avoid i n j u s t i c e . " ' " the Inc. p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n i n M i l l e r noted t h a t the motion s h o u l d be the these Advanced r e a l l y a c l a i m t h a t t h e named p l a i n t i f f was in under i n t u r n S t a r e n v. A m e r i c a n N a t ' l Bank & T r u s t Co., 1257, dismiss at amended was party 1110931 t h a t commenced t h e a c t i o n So. 2d a t 126. a n d t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . 776 In t h i s 6 with Mildred, the personal relationship" a dependent w o u l d be a r e c i p i e n t death as e s t a t e , had a " j u r a l representative of Allen's case, Kirkley, of Allen's and a b e n e f i c i a r y o f any funds r e c o v e r e d i n t h e w r o n g f u l - action. "Because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, s t a n d a r d by which t h i s Court reviews a p e t i t i o n of who mandamus clearly Co., i s t o determine [exceeded] i t s discretion." 775 So. 2d 805, 808 court's granting whether (Ala. the motion 2000) . discretion defense Constr. the as a trial plaintiff court d i d not exceed i t s Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s until they filed to Strike Amended A n s w e r s d i d not raise their first November 8, 2 0 1 1 , o v e r t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r asserted Flint has i n a d d i n g M i l d r e d as t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . B. T r i a l C o u r t ' s D i s c r e t i o n The court Because t o add M i l d r e d u n d e r R u l e 17 was p r o p e r , t h e t r i a l f o rthe writ the t r i a l Ex p a r t e the i n those answers "that a standing/capacity amended answers on t h e c a s e b e g a n . They [Kirkley] does n o t have " [ O ] u r r e l a t i o n s t o o u r f e l l o w men a r e commonly c a l l e d l e g a l (or j u r a l ) r e l a t i o n s . " A r t h u r C o r b i n , J u r a l R e l a t i o n s and T h e i r C l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 30 Y a l e L . J . 226, 227 ( 1 9 2 1 ) . 6 15 1110931 standing or capacity to bring t h i s answers, filed standing or July 30, 2008, capacity. The d i d not r a i s e trial d i s c r e t i o n to s t r i k e the f i r s t action." Their court original the issue of was within i t s amended a n s w e r s on t h e g r o u n d s o f undue d e l a y a n d a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . As t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "6. A l a b a m a R u l e o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e 15 a l l o w s t h e C o u r t d i s c r e t i o n t o s t r i k e Amended A n s w e r s , e i t h e r upon i t s own m o t i o n o r b y m o t i o n o f a n o t h e r p a r t y , when t h e p r o p o s e d amendment w o u l d r e s u l t i n a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e t o the opposing p a r t y or f o r reasons of undue d e l a y . "7. The [Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ] u n d u l y d e l a y e d filing t h e i r F i r s t Amended A n s w e r s . The d e l a y o f y e a r s i s i n e x c u s a b l e a n d w o u l d c a u s e a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e on t h e opposing p a r t y . " The t r i a l court's reasoning upholding trial the s t r i k i n g court disallowance acts echoes t h i s Court's standard f o r o f an amendment t o a p l e a d i n g . within i t s discretion so o f t h e amendment t o t h e p l e a d i n g s long "The as i t s i s b a s e d upon some v a l i d g r o u n d , s u c h as a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e o r undue d e l a y . " Ex p a r t e Thomas, 628 So. 2d 483, 486 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) . The T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s ' m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s on a l i m i t a t i o n s ground i s prima f a c i e evidence of the delay in filing o f a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e . The l e n g t h the amended answers is also i n d i s p u t a b l e . The t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d w e l l w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n 16 1110931 in deciding to strike t h e amended a n s w e r s a n d t o deny t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . See Thomas, 628 So. 2d a t 486 ( f i n d i n g delay o f s e v e n t o e i g h t months j u s t i f i e d court's that refusal to p e r m i t amendment t o p l e a d i n g s ) . IV. Conclusion The under trial Rule discretion court 17(a), A l a . R. legal Because right standing, added M i l d r e d C i v . P., as a and a c t e d within i t s to late and p r e j u d i c i a l t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s dismissal their petition of the for a writ case amendment of their do n o t have a clear on the ground o f mandamus i s d e n i e d . PETITION DENIED. Stuart, Parker, Main, and B r y a n , J J . , concur. Murdock and Wise, J J . , concur Bolin plaintiff u n d e r R u l e 1 5 ( a ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., i n s t r i k i n g t h e Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s ' answers. properly specially. a n d Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r i n t h e r e s u l t . 17 of 1110931 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e (concurring specially). I c o n c u r i n t h e main o p i n i o n . the main o p i n i o n "real party I believe interchangeable question is can dispositive uses both the term " c a p a c i t y " I note a question and t h e term e x i s t s as t o w h e t h e r t h e use o f t h e terms " c a p a c i t y " and " r e a l p a r t y i n appropriate. await conclusion Further another day, f o r purposes exploration however, of that in this the of the present t h a t t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s n o t one o f "standing." case i s 7 That s a i d , t h e p r i n c i p a l reason I w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y address an i s s u e regarding Code 1975, § 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 . the proper construction i s to of A l a . As i n d i c a t e d i n t h e m a i n o p i n i o n , o u r precedents appear t o stand to b r i n g that i n i n t e r e s t " i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o the term "standing." interest" I n so d o i n g , an a c t i o n a g a i n s t f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n that the r i g h t a t h i r d - p a r t y t o r t f e a s o r f o r the w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f an e m p l o y e e who a l s o i s e n t i t l e d t o b e n e f i t s under the Workers' Compensation A c t r e s i d e s e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the former dependents o f t h e deceased employee. I question A l s o , I e x p r e s s no v i e w as t o t h e i s s u e b r o a c h e d i n n o t e 5 o f t h e main o p i n i o n , i . e . , w h e t h e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s p e r i o d f o u n d i n § 6-5-410, A l a . Code 1975, i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a statute of l i m i t a t i o n s or a s t a t u t e of " c r e a t i o n . " So. 3d a t . 7 18 1110931 this u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f § 25-5-11 and i t s i m p a c t on death claims p r e s c r i b e d wrongful- by A l a . Code 1975, § 6-5-410. Claims u n d e r § 6-5-410 a r e f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e h e i r s as d e t e r m i n e d under our i n t e s t a c y 1 9 7 5 ) , and t h a t laws statute (see §§ 43-8-41 and -42, A l a . Code states that the r i g h t to f i l e c l a i m l i e s with the personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e estate. My definition Act, who concern i s rooted of see A l a . has an "dependents" of the decedent's i n the f a c t under that, the Workers' Code 1975, § 25-5-61 e t s e q . , t h e interest i n pursuing a claim such a given the Compensation "dependent" f o r death benefits u n d e r t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t may n o t q u a l i f y as an h e i r u n d e r o u r i n t e s t a c y l a w s and t h e r e f o r e may have no i n t e r e s t i n p u r s u i n g an a c t i o n u n d e r § 6-5-410 f o r t h e b e n e f i t who are h e i r s . The precedents that of those apparently contemplate s u c h an u n u s u a l , and a r g u a b l y u n w o r k a b l e , a r r a n g e m e n t and t h e manner Workers' i n which they have interpreted Compensation Act in a r r a n g e m e n t , however, have order n o t been § to 25-5-11 arrive c o n c u r i n t h e main Wise, J . , concurs. 19 at the this c a l l e d into question i n the p r e s e n t case. I, t h e r e f o r e , of opinion. 1110931 SHAW, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e This result). c a s e i n v o l v e s an a c t i o n u n d e r A l a . Code 1975, § 25¬ 5-11, a p r o v i s i o n o f t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t , A l a . Code 1975, § 25-5-1 e t s e q . , s e e k i n g employee. Section 25-5-11(a) his or her dependents the employer t o recover and a t t h e same t i m e , party to recover may Mike dismiss Reba K i r k l e y , for the injury the or or against chapter the ... other death " d e f e n d a n t s below, Tyson Foods, I n c . , Graffino (hereinafter as " t h e T y s o n p e t i t i o n e r s " ) , i n the t r i a l proceed b r i n g an a c t i o n a g a i n s t damages Ricky collectively "the employee, compensation under t h i s The and states that i n c a s e o f d e a t h , may (Emphasis added.) Walker, damages f o r t h e d e a t h o f an court, referred filed contending that to a motion to the plaintiff, a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of the deceased employee's e s t a t e , was n o t a " d e p e n d e n t " u n d e r § 25-5-11 and t h u s l a c k e d "standing" to prosecute the case. 8 The t r i a l court denied the motion t o d i s m i s s . "When a p a r t y action, the without trial standing court purports acquires Kirkley has since substituted e m p l o y e e ' s widow, as t h e p l a i n t i f f . 8 20 t o commence an no Mildred subject-matter Hayes, the 1110931 jurisdiction." So. 2d 1025, S t a t e v. 1028 Property ( A l a . 1999). a t 2018 Further, Rainbow D r i v e , "[m]andamus r e v i e w i s a v a i l a b l e where t h e p e t i t i o n e r c h a l l e n g e s jurisdiction of the alleged of standing lack trial H e a l t h S o u t h C o r p . , 974 So. court to 2d 288, Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s r e q u e s t e d t h a t mandamus d i r e c t i n g t h e action based on trial based bring 740 the the on subject-matter the plaintiff's lawsuit." Ex parte 292 ( A l a . 2007) . Thus, the this Court issue a writ of court to dismiss K i r k l e y ' s purported lack the underlying of subject-matter So. 2d jurisdiction. In Alabama 1979), t h i s Power Co. v. White, Court e x p l i c i t l y held 25-5-11(a) t h a t the 930 (Ala. requirement i n § "dependents" of a deceased employee b r i n g a c t i o n u n d e r t h a t Code s e c t i o n was n e e d n o t be that 377 proven i f not an i s s u e o f " c a p a c i t y " an that challenged: "[W]e h o l d t h a t § 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 ( a ) by t h e p h r a s e 'the employee, or h i s dependents i n case of h i s death, may proceed against the employer' g i v e s to the d e p e n d e n t s CAPACITY t o b r i n g suit against the employer under c e r t a i n circumstances. We h o l d t h a t d e p e n d e n c y i s c a p a c i t y u n d e r § 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 ( a ) w h i c h must be d e n i e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t by s p e c i f i c negative averment 377 So. 2d "capacity at to 936. sue" Black's as Law "[t]he D i c t i o n a r y has legal 21 ability of described a the particular 1110931 individual or e n t i t y B l a c k ' s Law t o sue D i c t i o n a r y 207 in ... ( 6 t h ed. the courts of a forum." 1990). " S t a n d i n g , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , t u r n s on 'whether t h e p a r t y has b e e n i n j u r e d i n f a c t and w h e t h e r t h e i n j u r y i s t o a l e g a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t . ' Romer v. B o a r d o f C o u n t y Comm'rs o f t h e C o u n t y o f P u e b l o , 95 6 P.2d 566, 581 ( C o l o . 1998) ( K o u r l i s , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) (emphasis added). 'One has s t a n d i n g t o b r i n g h i s complaint i n t o c o u r t " i f h i s stake i n the r e s o l u t i o n o f t h a t c o m p l a i n t assumes t h e p r o p o r t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t h a t he w i l l vigorously present his c a s e . " ' S m i t h v. P o t t s , 293 A l a . 419, 422, 304 So. 2d 578, 580 (1974) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . " Property at (citation distinct 2018 Rainbow omitted). "Standing" 966 740 So. 2d at and "capacity" 1027-28 are two i s s u e s : "There i s a d i f f e r e n c e between c a p a c i t y sue and s t a n d i n g t o s u e . " Bldg. Drive, & Constr. (Ala. Mobile, Alabama-Pensacola, T r a d e s C o u n c i l v. W i l l i a m s , 346 1977) (Faulkner, J., dissenting), to Florida So. 2d 964, cited with a p p r o v a l i n P e n i c k v. M o s t W o r s h i p f u l P r i n c e H a l l G r a n d Lodge F & A M o f A l a b a m a , I n c . , 46 So. noted in 2018 deprives the capacity in Rainbow trial an Drive, court supra, of a c t i o n under 3d 416, the ( A l a . 2010) . lack of § supra. 22 As standing jurisdiction. The 25-5-11(a), however, a f f i r m a t i v e defense subject to waiver. White, 426 lack of is an A l a b a m a Power Co. v. 1110931 In Tucker v. M o l d e n , the Tyson p e t i t i o n e r s 761 cite, t o b r i n g an a c t i o n u n d e r So. 2d 996 t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d the § 25-5-11 i n g e n e r a l t e r m s a q u e s t i o n o f " s t a n d i n g " ; h o w e v e r , i t was case that the person p e r s o n t o do s o . ( A l a . 2000), who filed the which ability as b e i n g undisputed i n that action was the proper The d e s c r i p t i o n i n T u c k e r o f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s a b i l i t y u n d e r § 25-5-11 t o p u r s u e t h e a c t i o n e m b r a c e d no r u l i n g and was legal not necessary to the r a t i o n a l e of t h i s Court's d e c i s i o n , which addressed a d i f f e r e n t l e g a l i s s u e . the d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g s t a n d i n g was Therefore, simply surplusage and d i c t a and does n o t c a l l i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e e x p l i c i t h o l d i n g i n A l a b a m a Power Co. v. W h i t e . Thus, u n d e r A l a b a m a Power Co. v. White, K i r k l e y ' s p u r p o r t e d l a c k of c a p a c i t y to f i l e the a c t i o n under § petition 25-5-11 i s due Bolin, i s not t o be a failure denied. of jurisdiction, and the 9 J . , concurs. O t h e r p r i o r a p p e l l a t e d e c i s i o n s have a t t i m e s u s e d t h e w o r d " s t a n d i n g " i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n u n d e r § 25-5-11. See R a g s d a l e v. A l t e c I n d u s . , I n c . , 456 So. 2d 54 ( A l a . 1984) ( u s i n g b o t h t h e t e r m s " s t a n d i n g " and " c a p a c i t y " t o d e s c r i b e t h e a b i l i t y t o sue u n d e r § 2 5 - 5 - 1 1 ) , and J o h n s o n v. H u x f o r d P o l e & T i m b e r Co., 983 So. 2d 1133 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2007) ( p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n ) ; h o w e v e r , like T u c k e r , and u n l i k e A l a b a m a Power Co. v. W h i t e , t h e s e c a s e s do n o t a n a l y z e o r r u l e on t h e p r e c i s e l e g a l n a t u r e o f a p a r t y ' s a b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n s u c h an a c t i o n . 9 23
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