Amy Hamilton, individually, and on behalf of her stillborn son v. Dr. Warren Scott et al.
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Rel: 05/18/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 1100192 Amy Hamilton, i n d i v i d u a l l y and on b e h a l f o f her s t i l l b o r n son v. Dr. Warren S c o t t e t a l . Appeal from DeKalb C i r c u i t Court (CV-06-149) On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g PARKER, Justice. This Court's and o p i n i o n o f F e b r u a r y 17, 2012, i s w i t h d r a w n , the following i s substituted therefor. 1100192 Amy son, H a m i l t o n , i n d i v i d u a l l y and on b e h a l f o f h e r s u e d Dr. Warren John B l a k e l y I s b e l l , Scott, Isbell, Dr. and the Coulter, sometimes r e f e r r e d t o Isbell Dr. Dr. Steven Coulter, Dr. Group Medical Scott, ("IMG") (Dr. and IMG as "the collectively stillborn are hereinafter defendants"), w e l l as s e v e r a l f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s , c l a i m i n g their negligent death of distress. in favor action child her The and son and wanton also the defendants, could not be died before h e l d t h a t H a m i l t o n was c o u l d not r e c o v e r caused wrongfully her holding maintained he was to caused suffer the emotional for that the viable. a death The wrongful-death of trial an "zone o f d a n g e r " and, damages f o r e m o t i o n a l distress. Facts and We also thus, reverse remand. Procedural H a m i l t o n ' s p r e g n a n c y and unborn court not i n the i n p a r t , a f f i r m i n p a r t , and A. had that D e K a l b C i r c u i t C o u r t e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t of who acts as medical History care 1 I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w i n an a p p e a l f r o m a summary j u d g m e n t and as n o t e d i n t h e " S t a n d a r d o f R e v i e w " s e c t i o n o f t h i s o p i n i o n , we have r e v i e w e d t h e r e c o r d i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o H a m i l t o n , t h e n o n m o v a n t ; t h e facts regarding Hamilton's pregnancy and treatment are p r e s e n t e d i n l i g h t of t h a t standard. Hobson v. A m e r i c a n C a s t I r o n P i p e Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) . 1 2 1100192 In December child, sought 2004, Hamilton, prenatal care pregnant from IMG, with which her had Hamilton with p r e n a t a l care d u r i n g her first Monday, 2005, contacted January 10, Hamilton second provided pregnancy. On IMG; she e x p l a i n e d t h a t she and h e r s e v e n - y e a r - o l d son had a r a s h t h a t she b e l i e v e d m i g h t be " f i f t h d i s e a s e , " an i n f e c t i o n c a u s e d human p a r v o v i r u s B19. The next day, H a m i l t o n h a d b l o o d drawn a t IMG and was n o t i f i e d of the r e s u l t s . January 11, 2005, t o l d t h a t she w o u l d On F r i d a y , J a n u a r y 14, 2005, an employee t o l d H a m i l t o n over the t e l e p h o n e t h a t H a m i l t o n been that, exposed to fifth consequently, disease she and needed to had by be IMG "had the p a r v o v i r u s " and immediately schedule an u l t r a s o u n d , t o be f o l l o w e d by an u l t r a s o u n d e v e r y 2 weeks f o r t h e n e x t 10 weeks. ultrasound Hamilton understood t h i s s c h e d u l e t o have b e e n o r d e r e d by I s b e l l confirmed t h i s every-two-weeks Dr. Isbell; Dr. i n his deposition. On Monday, J a n u a r y 17, 2005, H a m i l t o n went t o IMG f o r the f i r s t s c h e d u l e d u l t r a s o u n d as w e l l as a c o n s u l t a t i o n r e g a r d i n g treatment for fifth H a m i l t o n was a l s o unable disease. However, t h e d o c t o r w i t h whom s c h e d u l e d t o meet was u n a v a i l a b l e ; Hamilton was t o undergo the s c h e d u l e d u l t r a s o u n d because the t e c h n i c i a n was leaving early. H a m i l t o n ' s r e q u e s t t h a t she 3 be 1100192 s e n t t o t h e a d j o i n i n g h o s p i t a l f o r an u l t r a s o u n d was d e n i e d b y an IMG e m p l o y e e ; i n s t e a d , appointment two weeks Hamilton she was t o l d to wait f o r her next later. r e t u r n e d t o IMG two weeks J a n u a r y 31, 2 0 0 5 ; d u r i n g t h e appointment, with, Dr. C o u l t e r , listened later, on t h e d o c t o r she met t o the unborn c h i l d ' s heartbeat and t o l d H a m i l t o n t h a t an u l t r a s o u n d was u n n e c e s s a r y . explained disease to Hamilton and the p o t e n t i a l the procedure unborn c h i l d , Monday, He a l s o complications of for potential treatment fifth of her i f necessary. On F e b r u a r y 18, 2005, H a m i l t o n r e t u r n e d t o IMG f o r h e r n e x t s c h e d u l e d a p p o i n t m e n t ; she a g a i n r e q u e s t e d an u l t r a s o u n d , but the doctor u l t r a s o u n d was scheduled performed. met with, Dr. Scott, said that an unnecessary. On F e b r u a r y next she 25, 2005, H a m i l t o n appointment, at r e t u r n e d t o IMG f o r h e r which an ultrasound D u r i n g t h e u l t r a s o u n d , IMG's t e c h n i c i a n was noticed t h a t H a m i l t o n ' s u n b o r n s o n was n o t as l a r g e as t h e t e c h n i c i a n t h o u g h t he s h o u l d be a t t h a t s t a g e o f t h e p r e g n a n c y t h e r e was "a l i t t l e [the f o l d a t the back of h i s neck which w o r r i e d technician] a l i t t l e anemia." The and t h a t technician b i t because i t might told 4 Hamilton be a s i g n o f " n o t t o be alarmed 1100192 because [ s h e ] would probably for a second necessary, opinion" w o u l d be the looked at still t o l d her that Scott and that the and r e f e r r e d to a that ultrasound, a "nuchal nuchal fold from the f o l d [was] "was one of if any was Clinic." H a m i l t o n met photographs perinatologist treatment, a v a i l a b l e at " K i r k l i n Following who be with Dr. Scott, ultrasound. beginning the signs Dr. to of form" becoming s e v e r e l y a n e m i c and h a v i n g h y d r o p s , " w h i c h , he s a i d , "can lead to told congestive heart failure." H a m i l t o n t h a t h y d r o p s "can should wait ultrasound. two weeks However, reverse and itself" return Hamilton requested to Dr. Scott and that Hamilton IMG for another t h a t Dr. S c o t t r e f e r h e r t o "a p e r i n a t o l o g i s t a t K i r k l i n C l i n i c , " b u t Dr. S c o t t t o l d h e r that IMG told c o u l d "handle i t " at i t s o f f i c e . Instead, Dr. Scott H a m i l t o n t o come b a c k i n two weeks f o r a n o t h e r u l t r a s o u n d , he promised point, i f In her refer Hamilton to a perinatologist d a y s l a t e r , on M a r c h 8, 2005, H a m i l t o n v i s i t e d a s c h e d u l e d a p p o i n t m e n t b e c a u s e she d e p o s i t i o n , Hamilton described positive at that necessary. Eleven without to and f o r the f l u , Dr. Scott T y l e n o l f o r b o d y a c h e s , p a i n , and 5 how, was feeling after "prescribed she Extra IMG ill. tested Strength f e v e r , b e c a u s e he s a i d with 1100192 that particular situation, t h e r e ' s n o t h i n g you c a n do, you j u s t have t o wear i t o u t . " H a m i l t o n s u m m a r i z e d h e r symptoms as an " a c u t e On illness." March explained 10, 2005, Hamilton i n h e r d e p o s i t i o n , she was " f e e l i n g r e a l l y b a d " a n d "seemed t o be g e t t i n g w o r s e . " She h a d a l s o n o t i c e d movement" o f h e r u n b o r n c h i l d . determined r e t u r n e d t o IMG; as she that Hamilton's "decreased An u l t r a s o u n d p e r f o r m e d b y IMG unborn son had d i e d , probably i n t h e p r e v i o u s 24 o r 48 h o u r s ; l a b o r was i n d u c e d , a n d t h e c h i l d was s t i l l b o r n on M a r c h 11, 2005. D r . I s b e l l , D r . C o u l t e r , and Dr. unborn Scott viability, agree that which Hamilton's i s t o say t h a t , son had n o t reached i f h e r son had been a l i v e on t h a t d a t e , he was u n l i k e l y t o have s u r v i v e d born outside t h e womb. B. Hamilton's On April litigation 28, 2006, Hamilton filed a complaint i n the t r i a l c o u r t , a l l e g i n g t h a t the defendants had caused the death o f h e r u n b o r n s o n "and t h a t t h e d e a t h o f h e r u n b o r n s o n was w r o n g f u l w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e Alabama W r o n g f u l Death A c t , Ala. Code § 6-5-410 (1975)." 2 Hamilton later amended h e r I n h e r c o m p l a i n t , H a m i l t o n s t a t e d t h a t she was b r i n g i n g " t h i s a c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o [ t h e W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t ] as w e l l as 2 6 1100192 complaint t o a l l e g e t h a t the defendants' n e g l i g e n c e had caused her t o s u f f e r After "mental a n g u i s h and e m o t i o n a l completing discovery, summary-judgment m o t i o n on J u n e distress." the defendants 7, 2009, filed arguing that a this C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s i n G e n t r y v. G i l m o r e , 613 So. 2d 1241 ( A l a . 1993), a n d L o l l a r v. T a n k e r s l e y , 613 So. 2d 1249 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , d i d n o t p e r m i t a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n where a p r e v i a b l e c h i l d d i e d b e f o r e b i r t h : "The Supreme C o u r t o f A l a b a m a h a s h e l d t h a t a plaintiff cannot fetus not v i a b l e maintain to live a wrongful death action o u t s i d e o f t h e womb fora As s u c h , summary j u d g m e n t must be g r a n t e d on b e h a l f o f t h e D e f e n d a n t s in regard to the wrongful death claim of the fetus." The d e f e n d a n t s a l s o a r g u e d t h a t H a m i l t o n c o u l d n o t r e c o v e r damages for her emotional shown e i t h e r she distress because, they said, t h a t she had s u s t a i n e d p h y s i c a l was p l a c e d at risk o f immediate she had n o t injury physical harm or that by t h e t h e p r o v i s i o n s t h e M e d i c a l L i a b i l i t y A c t o f 1987, as amended, A l a . Code § 6-5-540 e t s e q . ( 1 9 7 5 ) . " The d e f e n d a n t s a l s o c i t e d t h e A l a b a m a M e d i c a l L i a b i l i t y A c t ("the AMLA") i n t h e i r a n s w e r a n d i n t h e i r m o t i o n s f o r a summary j u d g m e n t . Hamilton does n o t d i s p u t e t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e AMLA t o t h i s c a s e ; indeed, i n her r e p l y b r i e f , Hamilton acknowledged t h a t " c l a i m s a g a i n s t h e a l t h c a r e p r o v i d e r s , whether i n c o n t r a c t o r t o r t , a r e now subsumed i n t o one a c t i o n b y t h e A l a b a m a M e d i c a l L i a b i l i t y Act." H a m i l t o n ' s r e p l y b r i e f , a t 6. 7 1100192 defendants, Francis, as required 716 So. 2d 1141 by this (Ala. Court 1998). i n AALAR, L t d . v. The d e f e n d a n t s stated t h a t H a m i l t o n " f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t she was i n t h e 'zone o f d a n g e r ' as r e q u i r e d b y A l a b a m a l a w . " Dr. 3 I s b e l l and Dr. C o u l t e r s e p a r a t e l y moved f o r a summary judgment; Dr. I s b e l l argued that Hamilton had p r e s e n t e d argument o r e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t he h a d b r e a c h e d t h e of care standard i n h i s treatment of her. Hamilton responded O c t o b e r 1, 2010. a summary 'Motion no t o t h e summary-judgment motions on She c o n c e d e d t h a t Dr. I s b e l l was e n t i t l e d t o judgment, s t a t i n g t h a t she " h e r e b y a g r e e s t h a t t h e f o r Summary Judgment on B e h a l f o f Dr. J o h n Blakely I s b e l l ' i s due t o be g r a n t e d a n d c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e r e i s no s e t o f f a c t s t h a t , i f p r o v e d a g a i n s t Dr. I s b e l l , w o u l d e n t i t l e h e r to recover." motions filed Specifically, However, she a r g u e d t h a t by the other defendants t h e summary-judgment should be denied. she a r g u e d t h a t i n G e n t r y t h i s C o u r t h a d " b a s e d The d e f e n d a n t s a l s o argued i n t h e i r summary-judgment motion t h a t Hamilton had f a i l e d t o prove t h a t the death of her son was c a u s e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t s . H a m i l t o n r e s p o n d e d t o t h a t argument, and t h e d e f e n d a n t s r a i s e d i t a g a i n i n t h e i r r e p l y b r i e f to the t r i a l court. However, t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s o r d e r made no f a c t u a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g c a u s a t i o n ; t h e r e f o r e , the i s s u e of c a u s a t i o n i s not b e f o r e t h i s Court. For that r e a s o n , we do n o t d i s c u s s c a u s a t i o n i s s u e s i n t h i s o p i n i o n . 3 8 1100192 [its d e c i s i o n t o deny r e c o v e r y f o r the death of a u n b o r n c h i l d ] on t h e f a c t t h a t direction.' 613 So. 2d subsequent l e g i s l a t i v e 'there 1244." at i s no c l e a r Hamilton several decided statutes "provided argued that the courts with Specifically, "legislative direction." that Hamilton on a b o r t i o n clear legislative had p r o v i d e d actions that previable enacted since Gentry d i r e c t i o n i n d i c a t i n g that 'minor c h i l d ' c a n i n c l u d e n o n v i a b l e fetuses." argued was the term On t h e i s s u e o f damages f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s , H a m i l t o n a r g u e d t h a t t h e l o s s o f h e r u n b o r n c h i l d was a p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t h a t e n t i t l e d h e r t o r e c o v e r damages f o r h e r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s ; a l t e r n a t i v e l y , she a r g u e d t h a t she was e n t i t l e d t o damages f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s under T a y l o r v. B a p t i s t M e d i c a l (1981), i n which damages f o r emotional c h i l d during this Court C e n t e r , I n c . , 400 So. 2d 369 permitted distress a mother following to recover the death of her birth. On O c t o b e r 5, 2010, t h e d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d a r e p l y b r i e f i n support brief, of t h e i r they plaintiff viable argued that cannot maintain fetus otherwise." summary-judgment and motions. " t h e law i n Alabama In t h e i r remains reply that a a w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n f o r a non- t h e Alabama Specifically, l e g i s l a t u r e has the defendants 9 not argued declared that the 1100192 l e g i s l a t u r e ' s subsequent, justify argued overruling that, Hamilton of Gentry and Lollar. The i n s e e k i n g damages f o r h e r did "not g r a n t e d " because, Taylor" a b o r t i o n - r e l a t e d l e g i s l a t i o n d i d not state a claim upon defendants also emotional d i s t r e s s , which relief can be t h e y s a i d , she " m i s i n t e r p r e t s t h e h o l d i n g i n and h e r " i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m i s i n s u f f i c i e n t as a m a t t e r law." On October defendants' 15, 2010, the trial summary-judgment m o t i o n s , court granted concluding: " [ H a m i l t o n ] has c o n c e d e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t , Dr. J o h n B l a k e l y I s b e l l , i s due t o be g r a n t e d summary judgment. " [ H a m i l t o n ' s ] c l a i m s a r e f o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h and f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s s u f f e r e d by [ H a m i l t o n ] as a r e s u l t of b e i n g caused to d e l i v e r a s t i l l b o r n c h i l d . "The d e f e n d a n t s a s s e r t , and t h e c o u r t a g r e e s , t h a t [Hamilton] cannot m a i n t a i n a w r o n g f u l death a c t i o n f o r a f e t u s not v i a b l e to l i v e o u t s i d e the womb. G e n t r y v. G i l m o r e , 613 So. 2d 1241 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) ; L o l l a r v. T a n k e r s l e y , 613 So. 2d 1249 ( A l a . 1993) . The c o u r t c o n s i d e r s t h e G e n t r y and L o l l a r c a s e s c o n t r o l l i n g on t h i s i s s u e . The c o u r t i s u n c o n v i n c e d t h a t s t a t u t e s p a s s e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e subsequent t o t h o s e d e c i s i o n s have a l t e r e d t h e i r application. A c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s adjudged t h a t the d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t i s due t o be g r a n t e d as t o t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h c l a i m . "The defendants also assert that [Hamilton] c a n n o t m a i n t a i n a c l a i m f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s and m e n t a l a n g u i s h b e c a u s e she has f a i l e d t o p r o d u c e s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t she s u s t a i n e d a p h y s i c a l 10 the 1100192 i n j u r y o r was p l a c e d i n i m m e d i a t e r i s k o f p h y s i c a l harm by t h e c o n d u c t o f d e f e n d a n t s . [Hamilton] i n s i s t s t h a t t h e A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n T a y l o r v. B a p t i s t M e d i c a l C e n t e r , I n c . , 400 So. 2d 369 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) , i s c o n t r o l l i n g on t h i s i s s u e . In T a y l o r , the p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n a g a i n s t her p h y s i c i a n was based on allegations that the physician n e g l i g e n t l y f a i l e d to a t t e n d d u r i n g her l a b o r and h e r d e l i v e r y o f a c h i l d who e i t h e r was s t i l l b o r n o r d i e d w i t h i n moments o f b i r t h . "The Supreme C o u r t i n T a y l o r abandoned the ' p h y s i c a l i m p a c t ' t e s t t h a t had b e e n t h e law up u n t i l t h a t p o i n t and e x t e n d e d t h e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r t o t h o s e who suffered emotional d i s t r e s s without also s u f f e r i n g a corresponding physical i n j u r y . In a l a t e r c a s e , t h e Supreme C o u r t d i s c u s s e d three tests for evaluating claims alleging negligent i n f l i c t i o n o f e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s t h a t have d e v e l o p e d i n t h e common l a w : t h e p h y s i c a l i m p a c t t e s t ; the zone o f d a n g e r t e s t ; and t h e r e l a t i v e b y s t a n d e r test. I t t h e n d e c l a r e d the c u r r e n t s t a t e of Alabama law t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e 'zone o f d a n g e r ' t e s t , which l i m i t s recovery f o r emotional i n j u r y to those p l a i n t i f f s who s u s t a i n a p h y s i c a l i n j u r y as a r e s u l t of a defendant's n e g l i g e n t c o n d u c t , o r who are p l a c e d i n i m m e d i a t e r i s k o f p h y s i c a l harm by t h a t conduct. AALAR, L t d . , I n c . v. F r a n c i s , 716 So. 2d 1141 ( A l a . 1998). I n t h e AALAR d e c i s i o n , t h e C o u r t found the decision i n the Taylor case to be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t t e s t b e c a u s e i t was r e a s o n a b l y f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f w o u l d be p l a c e d a t r i s k o f p h y s i c a l i n j u r y by t h e p h y s i c i a n ' s f a i l u r e to a t t e n d her d e l i v e r y . " G i v e n t h a t t h e 'zone o f d a n g e r ' t e s t i s t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e of the law i n Alabama, t h i s court concludes that i t i s the test applicable to [ H a m i l t o n ' s ] c l a i m f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s and m e n t a l anguish. To s u p p o r t t h a t c l a i m , [ H a m i l t o n ] must establish by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence that i t was r e a s o n a b l y f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t she w o u l d be p l a c e d a t r i s k o f p h y s i c a l i n j u r y by t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' c o n d u c t . 11 1100192 The m a t e r i a l s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e c o u r t i n s u p p o r t o f and i n o p p o s i t i o n t o d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n s f o r summary j u d g m e n t a r e d e v o i d o f any s u c h e v i d e n c e , and t h e c o u r t f i n d s t h e e v i d e n c e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e an i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t as t o w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' a l l e g e d breach of care p l a c e d [Hamilton] w i t h i n the 'zone o f d a n g e r . ' "[Hamilton] argues t h a t the death of the f e t u s c o n s t i t u t e d ' p h y s i c a l i n j u r y ' t o her body, t h e r e b y e n t i t l i n g h e r t o c l a i m e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s and m e n t a l anguish. She s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e f e t u s was as much a p a r t o f h e r body as a l u n g , a k i d n e y , a s p l e e n , an arm, a l e g o r any o t h e r o r g a n . Our Supreme C o u r t , h o w e v e r , has q u o t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l h o l d i n g s i n c a s e s f r o m o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t t h e f e t u s o r embryo i s n o t a p a r t o f t h e m o t h e r , b u t r a t h e r has a s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n t h e body o f t h e m o t h e r . W o l f e v. I s b e l l , 291 A l a . 327, 280 So. 2d 768 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . The d e a t h o f a f e t u s does n o t , w i t h o u t more, c o n s t i t u t e a p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o t h e b o d y o f t h e m o t h e r , and t h e c o u r t f i n d s as a m a t t e r o f l a w t h a t [Hamilton] cannot r e c o v e r f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s or mental a n g u i s h b a s e d on s u c h c l a i m . "In c o n c l u s i o n , the c o u r t f i n d s t h a t [Hamilton] cannot m a i n t a i n a w r o n g f u l death c l a i m f o r the death of a n o n - v i a b l e f e t u s ; she cannot maintain an i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m f o r emotional d i s t r e s s because the e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t she was w i t h i n the 'zone o f d a n g e r , ' and she cannot claim a p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o h e r body as a r e s u l t o f t h e d e a t h o f t h e f e t u s . B a s e d on t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e c o u r t finds i t unnecessary to address the i s s u e of causation. "Accordingly, i t is adjudged that the defendants' motion f o r summary j u d g m e n t f o r a l l d e f e n d a n t s on a l l c l a i m s i s g r a n t e d , and [ H a m i l t o n ] s h a l l have no r e c o v e r y a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t s . " 12 1100192 Hamilton appealed defendants the o t h e r t h a n Dr. After briefing issued i t s decision 2011). summary judgment in favor of the Isbell. in this case was completed, i n Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. this Court 3d 597 (Ala. I n Mack, t h i s C o u r t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e f o r r e c o v e r y o f damages f o r t h e a c c i d e n t a l death of Gentry this and case supra), a previable Lollar; relied this unborn child, specifically i n those cases, which upon Court (see t h e had held trial that overruling the t r i a l court i n court's order, damages r e c o v e r e d f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f a c h i l d who being born a l i v e or r e a c h i n g v i a b i l i t y . could quoted not died without I n Mack, we stated: " I n sum, i t i s an u n f a i r and a r b i t r a r y e n d e a v o r t o draw a l i n e t h a t a l l o w s r e c o v e r y on b e h a l f o f a fetus injured before v i a b i l i t y that dies after a c h i e v i n g v i a b i l i t y b u t t h a t p r e v e n t s r e c o v e r y on b e h a l f o f a f e t u s i n j u r e d t h a t , as a r e s u l t o f t h o s e i n j u r i e s , does n o t s u r v i v e t o v i a b i l i t y . Moreover, i t i s an e n d e a v o r t h a t u n f a i r l y d i s t r a c t s f r o m t h e well established fundamental concerns of this S t a t e ' s wrongful-death j u r i s p r u d e n c e , i . e . , whether t h e r e e x i s t s a d u t y o f c a r e and t h e p u n i s h m e n t o f t h e w r o n g d o e r who b r e a c h e s t h a t d u t y . We cannot c o n c l u d e t h a t ' l o g i c , f a i r n e s s , and j u s t i c e ' c o m p e l the drawing of such a line; instead, 'logic, f a i r n e s s , and j u s t i c e ' c o m p e l t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s where p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s have c a u s e d d e a t h t o a f e t u s b e f o r e t h e f e t u s has a c h i e v e d t h e a b i l i t y t o l i v e o u t s i d e t h e womb. 13 be 1100192 " I n a c c o r d t h e n w i t h t h e numerous c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d i s c u s s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s o p i n i o n , and on t h e b a s i s o f t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s amendment o f A l a b a m a ' s h o m i c i d e s t a t u t e t o i n c l u d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r 'an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any s t a g e o f d e v e l o p m e n t , r e g a r d l e s s o f v i a b i l i t y , ' § 1 3 A - 6 - 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) , [ A l a . Code 1975,] we o v e r r u l e L o l l a r and G e n t r y , and we h o l d t h a t t h e W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t p e r m i t s an a c t i o n f o r t h e d e a t h of a p r e v i a b l e f e t u s . We t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e the summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f Carmack and remand t h e action for further proceedings consistent with t h i s opinion." 79 So. 3d a t Hamilton 611-12. 4 submitted copies of the Mack d e c i s i o n t o C o u r t as s u p p l e m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y i n h e r a p p e a l , a letter copies asking to the the c l e r k of t h i s members o f t h e a c c o m p a n i e d by Court to d i s t r i b u t e Court. The this those defendants f i l e d a motion to s t r i k e Hamilton's supplemental a u t h o r i t y or, i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , to grant the defendants p e r m i s s i o n to respond to that supplemental a u t h o r i t y . the motion to This Court denied ^ A d d i t i o n a l l y , we n o t e t h a t t h i s C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n Mack i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the D e c l a r a t i o n of R i g h t s i n the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t " a l l men a r e e q u a l l y f r e e and i n d e p e n d e n t ; t h a t t h e y a r e endowed by t h e i r C r e a t o r with c e r t a i n i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s ; t h a t among t h e s e a r e l i f e , l i b e r t y and the p u r s u i t of h a p p i n e s s . " A l a . C o n s t . 1901, § 1 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . These w o r d s , b o r r o w e d f r o m t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e ( w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t "[w]e h o l d t h e s e t r u t h s t o be s e l f - e v i d e n t , t h a t a l l men a r e c r e a t e d e q u a l , t h a t t h e y a r e endowed by t h e i r C r e a t o r w i t h c e r t a i n u n a l i e n a b l e R i g h t s , t h a t among t h e s e a r e L i f e , L i b e r t y and t h e p u r s u i t o f H a p p i n e s s " ) , a f f i r m t h a t e a c h p e r s o n has a G o d - g i v e n r i g h t t o l i f e . 14 1100192 strike, granted the defendants p e r m i s s i o n to respond to the s u p p l e m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y , and p e r m i t t e d H a m i l t o n t o r e p l y t o t h e defendants' response. Standard of Review " ' [ O ] n a p p e a l a summary j u d g m e n t c a r r i e s no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s , ' H o r n s b y v. S e s s i o n s , 703 So. 2d 932, 938 ( A l a . 1 9 9 7 ) . '"In r e v i e w i n g the d i s p o s i t i o n o f a m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t , we u t i l i z e t h e same s t a n d a r d as t h a t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n d e t e r m i n i n g whether the evidence b e f o r e the c o u r t made o u t a g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t " and w h e t h e r t h e movant was e n t i t l e d t o a j u d g m e n t as a matter of law.' Ex p a r t e G e n e r a l M o t o r s C o r p . , 769 So. 2d 903, 906 ( A l a . 1999) ( q u o t i n g B u s s e y v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) ) . 'Our review i s f u r t h e r s u b j e c t to the caveat t h a t t h i s C o u r t must r e v i e w t h e r e c o r d i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant and must r e s o l v e a l l r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t s a g a i n s t t h e movant.' Hobson v. A m e r i c a n C a s t I r o n P i p e Co., 690 So. 2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1997)." H a r p e r v. C o a t s , 988 So. 2d 501, 503 ( A l a . 2008). Discussion A. W h e t h e r Mack s h o u l d a p p l y i n t h i s case The d e f e n d a n t s p r e s e n t s e v e r a l a r g u m e n t s c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h i s C o u r t s h o u l d n o t a p p l y o u r r e c e n t h o l d i n g i n Mack i n t h i s case, which was pending on appeal when Mack was decided. However, t h e s e a r g u m e n t s a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h A l a b a m a "The g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t a c a s e p e n d i n g on appeal w i l l be s u b j e c t t o any change i n t h e s u b s t a n t i v e law. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t 15 law: 1100192 has s t a t e d , i n r e g a r d t o f e d e r a l c o u r t s t h a t a r e a p p l y i n g s t a t e law: '[T]he dominant p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t n i s i p r i u s and a p p e l l a t e t r i b u n a l s a l i k e s h o u l d c o n f o r m t h e i r o r d e r s t o t h e s t a t e law as o f t h e t i m e o f t h e e n t r y . I n t e r v e n i n g and c o n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i o n s w i l l t h u s c a u s e t h e r e v e r s a l o f j u d g m e n t s w h i c h were c o r r e c t when e n t e r e d . ' V a n d e n b a r k v. O w e n s - I l l i n o i s G l a s s Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543, 61 S.Ct. 347, 85 L.Ed. 327 (1941). See a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v. S c h o o n e r Peggy, 1 C r a n c h 103, 5 U.S. 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 ( 1 8 0 1 ) . Thus, c o u r t s a r e r e q u i r e d t o a p p l y i n a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e t h e law as i t e x i s t s a t t h e t i m e i t e n t e r s i t s f i n a l judgment: " ' [ I ] t has l o n g b e e n h e l d t h a t i f t h e r e i s a change in either the s t a t u t o r y or d e c i s i o n a l law b e f o r e f i n a l judgment i s e n t e r e d , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t must " d i s p o s e o f [ t h e ] c a s e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l a w as i t e x i s t s a t t h e t i m e o f f i n a l j u d g m e n t , and n o t as i t e x i s t e d a t t h e t i m e o f the a p p e a l . " T h i s r u l e i s u s u a l l y r e g a r d e d as b e i n g f o u n d e d upon t h e c o n c e p t u a l i n a b i l i t y o f a c o u r t t o e n f o r c e t h a t w h i c h i s no l o n g e r t h e l a w , e v e n t h o u g h i t may have been the law a t the time o f t r i a l , o r a t the time of the prior appellate proceedings.' "Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive A p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t s , 71 Y a l e L . J . 907, 912 (1962) ( q u o t i n g Montague v. M a r y l a n d , 54 Md. 481, 483 ( 1 8 8 0 ) ) . " A l a b a m a S t a t e Docks T e r m i n a l Ry. v. L y l e s , 797 (Ala. 2001) precedent (emphasis at Mack is now 611, and the of a p r e v i a b l e f e t u s , " Court i n that 16 case held 438 controlling on t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r " t h e W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t an a c t i o n f o r t h e d e a t h 3d added). So. 2d 432, permits Mack, 79 such an So. action 1100192 permissible. T h e r e f o r e , we w i l l a p p l y Mack i n d e c i d i n g t h i s appeal. B. Whether Wrongful Can D e a t h o f Her The the Hamilton first trial Recover Stillborn Damages erred must c o n s i d e r i s w h e t h e r i n holding that Hamilton m a i n t a i n a wrongful-death a c t i o n " f o r the death of viable fetus." Alleged Son s u b s t a n t i v e i s s u e we court f o r the could not [ h e r ] non- As s e t f o r t h i n Mack and as a p p l i c a b l e i n t h i s c a s e , A l a b a m a ' s w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e a l l o w s an a c t i o n t o be brought the f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f any u n b o r n c h i l d , child holding dies before i n Mack, q u o t e d judgment, insofar as reaching viability. s u p r a , we conclude i t held that e v e n when Applying t h a t the damages f o r the our summary wrongful d e a t h o f a p r e v i a b l e u n b o r n c h i l d were n o t r e c o v e r a b l e , must be r e v e r s e d and the case remanded f o r the trial court r e c o n s i d e r t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' summary-judgment m o t i o n s of this C o u r t ' s h o l d i n g i n Mack; t h e t r i a l to in light c o u r t may conduct s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s as i t deems n e c e s s a r y i n r e c o n s i d e r i n g those motions. C. Whether Hamilton Can Recover Distress 17 Damages for Emotional 1100192 The trial second court maintain issue erred an raised in in this holding appeal Hamilton that i s whether the "[could not] individual claim f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s because t h e e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t she was 'zone o f d a n g e r , ' and she cannot claim within a physical h e r body as a r e s u l t o f t h e d e a t h o f t h e the i n j u r y to fetus." I n t h e i r summary-judgment m o t i o n s , t h e d e f e n d a n t s argued t h a t H a m i l t o n c o u l d n o t r e c o v e r damages f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s because, t h e y s a i d , H a m i l t o n "was n o t p h y s i c a l l y i n j u r e d as a r e s u l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' a l l e g e d c o n d u c t " and H a m i l t o n never i n the 'zone o f d a n g e r . ' " In support of t h i s t h e d e f e n d a n t s c i t e d AALAR, 716 So. 2d a t 1148, "was argument, i n which this C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t i t "has n o t r e c o g n i z e d e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s as a c o m p e n s a b l e i n j u r y o r harm i n n e g l i g e n c e a c t i o n s o u t s i d e c o n t e x t of e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s r e s u l t i n g from a c t u a l the physical i n j u r y , o r , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f p h y s i c a l i n j u r y , f e a r f o r one's own physical injury." Bystanders for Comment on the Nature 477, 487 (Citing Negligently (1982)). Pearson, Inflicted Liability Emotional o f A r b i t r a r y R u l e s , 34 U. The defendants 18 noted that, Harm to -- A F l a . L.Rev. during her 1100192 deposition, "concerned In Hamilton f o r [her] her testified life." response to that she had not been 5 the defendants' summary-judgment m o t i o n s , H a m i l t o n s t a t e d t h a t she " [ d i d ] n o t d i s p u t e t h a t n e v e r f e a r e d f o r h e r own zone o f d a n g e r damages." is "entitled to mental she l i f e and i s t h e r e f o r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o However, H a m i l t o n c l a i m e d t h a t anguish damages" u n d e r this she Court's d e c i s i o n i n T a y l o r v. B a p t i s t M e d i c a l C e n t e r , s u p r a . H a m i l t o n argued t h a t T a y l o r " c a r v e [ d ] out a s p e c i f i c e x c e p t i o n " t o the zone-of-danger t e s t f o r c a s e s i n w h i c h a m o t h e r has suffered the l o s s of her unborn c h i l d . However, i n AALAR, t h i s explained Court that the test this had been Court applying with r e g a r d t o c l a i m s f o r e m o t i o n a l - d i s t r e s s damages, i n c l u d i n g t h e test applied danger' test Gottshall, i n T a y l o r , was discussed [512 U.S. 532 in "consistent with [Consolidated R a i l (1994)]." 716 So. C o n s o l i d a t e d R a i l C o r p . v. G o t t s h a l l , 512 U.S. U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t the stated that 'zone Corp. 2d a t 1147. 532 v.] In (1994), the " t h e zone o f t e s t l i m i t s recovery f o r emotional i n j u r y to those of danger plaintiffs S p e c i f i c a l l y , d u r i n g h e r d e p o s i t i o n , H a m i l t o n was a s k e d , " I mean, a t any t i m e i n t h i s p r o c e s s , were you e v e r c o n c e r n e d for your l i f e ? " H a m i l t o n a n s w e r e d , " I was n o t c o n c e r n e d f o r my l i f e . " 5 19 1100192 who sustain a physical impact negligent conduct, o r who physical harm that Hamilton's by assertion as a r e s u l t of a are p l a c e d i n immediate conduct." that defendant's 512 U.S. Taylor "carve[d] risk of at a out 547-48. specific e x c e p t i o n " to the zone-of-danger t e s t i s erroneous. The o n l y p h y s i c a l harm H a m i l t o n a l l e g e d i n h e r t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' summary-judgment m o t i o n s was her unborn son. She a r g u e d t h a t h e r u n b o r n h e r b o d y ; t h u s , she s a i d , h i s d e a t h was response the death of son was a p a r t of a physical injury to h e r t h a t a l l o w s h e r t o r e c o v e r damages f o r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s . We r e j e c t t h a t argument, however, because with this 330-31, Court's holding 280 So. 2d 758, i n Wolfe 768 v. i t i s incompatible Isbell, 291 A l a . 327, ( 1 9 7 3 ) , i n w h i c h we said "that f r o m t h e moment o f c o n c e p t i o n , t h e f e t u s o r embryo i s n o t a p a r t o f t h e m o t h e r , b u t r a t h e r has a s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n t h e body o f t h e Because zone of Taylor 6 this 6 Hamilton conceded danger created misplaced, mother." and damages" an and t h a t she was her exception to because, in argument the "not e n t i t l e d suggesting zone-of-danger response to the test to that is defendants' I n t h e i r b r i e f on a p p e a l , t h e d e f e n d a n t s c i t e W o l f e f o r same p r o p o s i t i o n . See d e f e n d a n t s ' b r i e f , a t 40 20 1100192 summary-judgment m o t i o n s , that she s u f f e r e d s h e p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e a physical injury as a showing result of the d e f e n d a n t s ' a c t i o n s , we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t i n s o f a r as i t c o n c e r n s c l a i m f o r damages f o r e m o t i o n a l Hamilton's distress. Conclusion Based on o u r r e c e n t h o l d i n g i n Mack, we c o n c l u d e H a m i l t o n was e n t i t l e d t o p u r s u e a c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e for the wrongful death o f h e r unborn son. that defendants Thus, as t o H a m i l t o n ' s w r o n g f u l - d e a t h c l a i m , we r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t Isbell, i n favor of a l l the defendants a s t o whom H a m i l t o n h a s n o t a p p e a l e d , except Dr. a n d we remand the case f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s opinion. However, b e c a u s e H a m i l t o n f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t s h e was entitled t o damages f o r emotional distress, summary j u d g m e n t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t s -- i n s o f a r a s i t d e n i e d H a m i l t o n ' s APPLICATION OVERRULED; we a f f i r m t h e -- o t h e r t h a n D r . I s b e l l c l a i m f o r s u c h damages. OPINION OF FEBRUARY 17, 2 0 1 2 , WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED I N PART; REVERSED I N PART; AND REMANDED. M a l o n e , C . J . , a n d W o o d a l l , S t u a r t , B o l i n , M u r d o c k , Shaw, Main, and Wise, J J . , concur. Parker, J . , concurs specially. 21 1100192 PARKER, J u s t i c e ( c o n c u r r i n g Today, children Court are protected regardless the this (1973), does the standard. the l i v e s separately i n Roe v. Wade, result we influence reach of Roe i s n o t c o n t r o l l i n g death, of unborn i t sviability Roe's viability statute, t o e x p l a i n why 410 U.S. today Roe's viability standard standard 113 and t o authority I conclude that, a t l e a s t with regard wrongful universally I. diminishing law, and because persuasive, of I write decision Because that by Alabama's w r o n g f u l - d e a t h not bar the emphasize abortion reaffirms of v i a b i l i t y . Supreme C o u r t ' s specially). beyond i s not t o the law should be abandoned. The u n c e r t a i n s t a t u s o f t h e v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d i n t o r t and c r i m i n a l l a w s i n c e Roe. S i n c e 1973, when Roe was d e c i d e d , i n j u r y , w r o n g f u l d e a t h , and f e t a l abandoned the v i a b i l i t y p r e n a t a l - i n j u r y law, prenatal injuries g e n e r a l l y holds either before laws r e g a r d i n g h o m i c i d e have i n c r e a s i n g l y standard expressed i n Roe. "every j u r i s d i c t i o n permits i f a true child regardless or a f t e r i s born alive. of v i a b i l i t y . majority of j u r i s d i c t i o n s also recognize In recovery f o r ... whether the i n j u r y the point 22 prenatal This occurred ... The a cause o f a c t i o n f o r 1100192 the wrongful death o f a s t i l l b o r n , v i a b l e G l a s s c o c k T r u c k i n g Co., 860 fetus." Crosby v. 340 S.C. 626, 634, 532 S.E.2d 856, (2000) ( T o a l , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( f o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d ) F a r l e y v. S a r t i n , (citing 195 W.Va. 6 7 1 , 466 S.E.2d 522 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ) . S t a t e s have b e e n s l o w e r t o abandon t h e v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d i n t h e area of wrongful death. I f the c h i l d i sstillborn, a m a j o r i t y o f s t a t e s and the D i s t r i c t o f Columbia a l l o w r e c o v e r y i f the injury occurred after v i a b i l i t y . See A k a v . J e f f e r s o n Hosp. , 344 A r k . 627, 637 n. 2, 42 S.W. 3d 508, (noting that damages f o r the wrongful Although 32 jurisdictions death some s t a t e s n e v e r death of a p r e v i a b l e c h i l d , permitted 7 the recovery of a viable permit 515 n. 2 (2001) unborn of child). recovery f o r the wrongful other states permit recovery i f S e e A k a , 344 A r k . a t 640, 42 S.W. 3 d a t 516-17; B o l i n v . W i n g e r t , 764 N.E.2d 201, 207 ( I n d . 2 0 0 2 ) ; Humes v . C l i n t o n , 246 K a n . 590, 596, 792 P.2d 1032, 1037 ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; K a n d e l v . W h i t e , 339 Md. 432, 433, 663 A . 2 d 1264, 1265 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; T h i b e r t v. M i l k a , 419 Mass. 693, 695, 646 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; F r y o v e r v . F o r b e s , 433 M i c h . 878, 446 N.W.2d 292 ( 1 9 8 9 ) ; B l a c k b u r n v . B l u e M o u n t a i n Women's C l i n i c , 286 Mont. 60, 86, 951 P.2d 1, 16 (1997) ( r e a f f i r m i n g Kuhnke v . F i s h e r , 210 Mont. 114, 119-20, 683 P.2d 916, 919 (1984) ( h o l d i n g t h a t an u n b o r n c h i l d i s n o t a "minor c h i l d , " as t h a t term i s d e f i n e d by s t a t u t e ) ) ; W a l l a c e v . W a l l a c e , 120 N.H. 675, 677, 421 A . 2 d 134, 136 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; M i l l e r v . K i r k , 120 N.M. 654, 657, 905 P.2d 194, 197 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ; LaDu v . Oregon C l i n i c , P.C., 165 O r . App. 687, 693, 998 P.2d 733, 736 (2000) ("[N]othing i n the s t a t u t o r y c o n t e x t i n d i c a t e s t h a t a n o n v i a b l e f e t u s i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d a 'person' f o r purposes o f t h e w r o n g f u l death 7 23 1100192 the p r e v i a b l e c h i l d i s born a l i v e and l a t e r dies. 8 s t a t u t e s . " ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 331 Or. 244, 18 P.3d 1099 ( 2 0 0 0 ) ; C o v e l e s k i v. B u b n i s , 535 Pa. 166, 170, 634 A.2d 608, 611 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; M i c c o l i s v. AMICA Mut. I n s Co., 587 A.2d 67, 71 ( R . I . 1991) ; C r o s b y , 340 S.C. a t 629, 532 S.E.2d a t 857; and Baum v. B u r r i n g t o n , 119 Wash. App. 36, 43, 79 P.3d 456, 459-60 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 151 Wash. 2d 1035, 95 P.3d 758 ( 2 0 0 4 ) . S e e , e.g., H o r n b u c k l e v. P l a n t a t i o n P i p e L i n e Co., 212 Ga. 504, 505, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1954) ("Where a c h i l d i s b o r n a f t e r a t o r t i o u s i n j u r y s u s t a i n e d a t any p e r i o d a f t e r c o n c e p t i o n , he has a c a u s e o f a c t i o n . " ) ; K e l l y v. G r e g o r y , 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697, 282 A.D. 542, 543-44 (1953) ( " [ L ] e g a l separability should begin where there is biological s e p a r a b i l i t y . We know s o m e t h i n g more o f t h e a c t u a l p r o c e s s o f c o n c e p t i o n a n d f o e t a l d e v e l o p m e n t now t h a n when some o f t h e common l a w c a s e s were d e c i d e d ; a n d what we know makes i t p o s s i b l e t o demonstrate c l e a r l y t h a t s e p a r a b i l i t y begins a t c o n c e p t i o n . " ) ; Simon v. M u l l i n , 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1977) ("The d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f l a w t h a t now p e r m i t s r e c o v e r y by o r on b e h a l f o f a c h i l d b o r n alive for prenatal injuries s u f f e r e d a t any t i m e after conception, without regard to the v i a b i l i t y of the fetus, i s a n o t a b l e i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e v i a b i l i t y o f o u r common l a w . " ) ; B e n n e t t v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 486, 147 A . 2 d 108, 110 (1958) ("We a d o p t t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e f e t u s f r o m t h e t i m e o f conception becomes a separate organism and remains so t h r o u g h o u t i t s l i f e . ... We h o l d t h e r e f o r e t h a t an i n f a n t b o r n a l i v e c a n m a i n t a i n an a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r f o r p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s i n f l i c t e d upon i t b y t h e t o r t o f a n o t h e r e v e n i f i t had n o t r e a c h e d t h e s t a t e o f a v i a b l e f e t u s a t t h e t i m e o f i n j u r y . " ) ; S m i t h v. B r e n n a n , 31 N . J . 353, 367, 157 A. 2d 497, 504 (1960) ("We s e e no r e a s o n f o r d e n y i n g r e c o v e r y f o r a p r e n a t a l i n j u r y b e c a u s e i t o c c u r r e d b e f o r e t h e i n f a n t was c a p a b l e o f s e p a r a t e e x i s t e n c e . ... W h e t h e r v i a b l e o r n o t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n j u r y , t h e c h i l d s u s t a i n s t h e same harm a f t e r b i r t h , a n d t h e r e f o r e s h o u l d be g i v e n t h e same o p p o r t u n i t y f o r r e d r e s s . " ) ; S i n k l e r v. K n e a l e , 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960) ("As f o r t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e c h i l d must h a v e b e e n v i a b l e when t h e i n j u r i e s were r e c e i v e d , w h i c h h a s c l a i m e d t h e a t t e n t i o n o f s e v e r a l o f t h e s t a t e s , we r e g a r d i t as h a v i n g 8 24 1100192 The most significant shift away from the viability standard, h o w e v e r , has b e e n i n t h e l a w o f f e t a l h o m i c i d e . At l e a s t 38 s t a t e s have e n a c t e d f e t a l - h o m i c i d e s t a t u t e s , and 28 of those statutes protect l i f e v. Courchesne, (2010) 296 Conn. 622, 689 n. 46, ("'[As o f M a r c h 2 0 1 0 ] , a t l e a s t have f e t a l h o m i c i d e l a w s . ' " of from c o n c e p t i o n . State Legislatures, (alterations in 998 See A.2d 1, 50 [thirty-eight] (quoting the N a t i o n a l Fetal State Homicide Laws n.46 states Conference (March 2010) Courchesne))). Alabama's h o m i c i d e s t a t u t e , f o r example, d e f i n e s "person" s p e c i f i c a l l y t o i n c l u d e "an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any of development, regardless A l a . Code 1975. As J u s t i c e See w r o t e i n a s p e c i a l c o n c u r r e n c e joined by Chief Smith, and then Parker of v i a b i l i t y . " J u s t i c e Nabers i n Ziade v. Koch, and 952 § stage 13A-6-1(a)(3), Justices So. 2d Stuart, 1072, 1082 l i t t l e t o do w i t h t h e b a s i c r i g h t t o r e c o v e r , when t h e f o e t u s i s r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g e x i s t e n c e as a s e p a r a t e c r e a t u r e f r o m t h e moment o f c o n c e p t i o n . " ) ; T o r i g i a n v. W a t e r t o w n New Co., 352 Mass. 446, 449, 225 N.E. 2d 926, 927 (1967) ("We are not impressed with the soundness of the arguments against recovery. They s h o u l d n o t p r e v a i l a g a i n s t l o g i c and j u s t i c e . We h o l d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s i n t e s t a t e was a ' p e r s o n ' " f o r t h e purposes of the wrongful-death s t a t u t e . ) ; and Day v. N a t i o n w i d e Mut. I n s . Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 ( F l a . D i s t . C t . App. 1976) ("We h o l d t h a t a c h i l d b o r n a l i v e , h a v i n g s u f f e r e d p r e n a t a l i n j u r i e s a t any t i m e a f t e r c o n c e p t i o n , has a c a u s e o f a c t i o n a g a i n s t the a l l e g e d t o r t f e a s o r . " ) . 25 1100192 (Ala. 2006), the homicide s t a t u t e " d e f i n e s an 'unborn c h i l d . ' that statute 'person' 1148, that, 26, l e g i s l a t u r e has when is killed." Aug. 2011) The an See 2011] 'unborn 'person' to thus recognized child' a l s o Ankrom v. So. ("Alabama's h o m i c i d e 3d ... is State, , statute include under killed, [Ms. CR-09- (Ala. Crim. does a p p l y a to App. unborn children."). N o t i n g t h a t A l a b a m a ' s h o m i c i d e s t a t u t e p r o t e c t s an u n b o r n child before viability, this Court recently held that, s i m i l a r l y , A l a b a m a ' s " W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t p e r m i t s an a c t i o n f o r the 597, death of a p r e v i a b l e 611 ( A l a . 2011). fetus." Mack v. In d e c i d i n g Carmack, 7 9 So. 3d t h a t , f o r purposes of the W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t , a " p e r s o n " i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d a t any stage of g e s t a t i o n , t h i s Court recognized "draw[ing] a line i n j u r e d before but that allows viability that prevents recovery recovery that dies Mack, 79 So. 3d a t 611. on behalf after achieving on b e h a l f as a r e s u l t o f t h o s e i n j u r i e s , the a r b i t r a r i n e s s of of a fetus viability of a f e t u s i n j u r e d t h a t , does n o t s u r v i v e t o viability." These d e v e l o p m e n t s i n A l a b a m a m a t c h a l a r g e r p a t t e r n ; c u r r e n t l y , at l e a s t nine other s t a t e s permit recovery f o r the w r o n g f u l death of p r e v i a b l e unborn c h i l d r e n , five judicial by construction 26 -- Missouri, Oklahoma, Utah, 1100192 S o u t h D a k o t a , a n d West V i r g i n i a Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, 9 -- a n d f o u r and Texas. 1 0 b y s t a t u t e -¬ Georgia and M i s s o u r i : C o n n o r v . Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1995) ("[W]e c a n n o t a v o i d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d the c o u r t s t o i n t e r p r e t 'person' w i t h i n the w r o n g f u l death s t a t u t e t o allow a n a t u r a l parent t o s t a t e a c l a i m f o r the w r o n g f u l death o f h i s o r h e r unborn c h i l d , even p r i o r t o v i a b i l i t y . " ) ; Oklahoma: P i n o v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 183 P.3d 1001, 1005 ( O k l a . 2008) ("Our c o n s t r u c t i o n o f [Oklahoma's w r o n g f u l d e a t h s t a t u t e ] a n d t h e Oklahoma C o n s t i t u t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t a remedy be a f f o r d e d f o r t h e d e a t h o f a f e t u s , w h e t h e r o r n o t v i a b l e and whether o r not b o r n a l i v e , and p r o h i b i t s a b r o g a t i n g s u c h an a c t i o n . " ) ; U t a h : C a r r a n z a v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , [No. 20090409, Dec. 20, 2011] P.3d , (Utah 2011) ( h o l d i n g " t h a t t h e s t a t u t e a l l o w s an a c t i o n f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f an u n b o r n c h i l d ; t h e t e r m 'minor c h i l d , ' as u s e d i n t h e s t a t u t e , i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d " a n d n o t i n g t h a t t h e language o f t h e s t a t u t e being i n t e r p r e t e d by t h a t court had s i n c e b e e n amended); S o u t h D a k o t a : Wiersma v . M a p l e L e a f Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.D. 1996) ("Based on o u r r e a d i n g of [ S o u t h D a k o t a C o d i f i e d Law] 2 1 - 5 - 1 , we c o n c l u d e t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c l e a r l y i n t e n d e d t o encompass n o n v i a b l e c h i l d r e n i n t h e t e r m 'unborn c h i l d . ' " ) ; West V i r g i n i a : F a r l e y v . S a r t i n , 195 W.Va. 6 7 1 , 683, 466 S.E.2d 522, 534 (1995) ("[W]e, t h e r e f o r e , h o l d t h a t t h e t e r m ' p e r s o n ' ... e n c o m p a s s e s a n o n v i a b l e u n b o r n c h i l d and, t h u s , p e r m i t s a c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r t h e t o r t i o u s death o f such c h i l d . " ) . 9 I l l i n o i s : 740 I l l . Comp. S t a t . 180/2.2 (2011) ("The s t a t e o f g e s t a t i o n o r d e v e l o p m e n t o f a human b e i n g when an i n j u r y i s c a u s e d , when an i n j u r y t a k e s e f f e c t , o r a t d e a t h , s h a l l n o t f o r e c l o s e m a i n t e n a n c e o f any c a u s e o f a c t i o n u n d e r t h e l a w o f t h i s S t a t e a r i s i n g f r o m t h e d e a t h o f a human b e i n g caused by wrongful act, n e g l e c t o r d e f a u l t . " ) ; L o u i s i a n a : L a . C i v . Code Ann. a r t . 26 (1999) ("An u n b o r n c h i l d s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d as a n a t u r a l p e r s o n f o r whatever r e l a t e s t o i t s i n t e r e s t s f r o m t h e moment o f c o n c e p t i o n . I f the c h i l d i s born d e a d , i t s h a l l be c o n s i d e r e d n e v e r t o have e x i s t e d a s a p e r s o n , except f o r purposes o f a c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g from i t s wrongful death."); N e b r a s k a : Neb. Rev. S t a t . § 3 0 - 8 0 9 ( 1 ) 1 0 27 1100192 M i s s i s s i p p i permit recovery of a "quick" prenatal unborn c h i l d i n j u r y and f e t a l from t h e v i a b i l i t y has II. slowly o f damages f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h previability. 1 1 Thus, the law of h o m i c i d e h a s moved d e c i d e d l y standard, while the law of wrongful away death followed. Roe's v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d i s notc o n t r o l l i n g authority i n wrongful-death law. (2010) ("Whenever t h e d e a t h o f a p e r s o n , i n c l u d i n g an u n b o r n c h i l d i n u t e r o a t any stage o f g e s t a t i o n , i s caused by t h e w r o n g f u l a c t , n e g l e c t , o r d e f a u l t ... t h e p e r s o n who ... w o u l d have b e e n l i a b l e i f d e a t h h a d n o t e n s u e d , i s l i a b l e i n an a c t i o n f o r damages, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e d e a t h o f t h e p e r s o n i n j u r e d . . . . " ) ; T e x a s : Texas C i v i l P r a c t i c e & R e m e d i e s Code Ann. § 71.001(2) a n d (4) (2011) ("'Person' means an i n d i v i d u a l . ... ' I n d i v i d u a l ' i n c l u d e s an u n b o r n c h i l d a t e v e r y stage o f g e s t a t i o n from f e r t i l i z a t i o n u n t i l b i r t h . " ) . See P o r t e r v . L a s s i t e r , 91 Ga. App. 712, 716, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955) ("'[A] s u i t may be m a i n t a i n e d b y t h e m o t h e r f o r t h e l o s s o f a c h i l d t h a t was " q u i c k " i n h e r womb a t t h e t i m e o f t h e h o m i c i d e . ... The c o u r t does n o t b e l i e v e i t n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c h i l d t o be " v i a b l e " p r o v i d e d i t was "quick", t h a t i s " a b l e t o move i n i t s m o t h e r ' s womb."'" ( q u o t i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t ) ) ; 66 F e d e r a l C r e d i t U n i o n v . T u c k e r , 853 So. 2d 104, 112 ( M i s s . 2003) ("[W]e h o l d t h a t o u r w r o n g f u l d e a t h s t a t u t e i n c l u d e s a f e t u s who i s ' q u i c k ' i n t h e womb as a ' p e r s o n ' w i t h i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h a t s t a t u t e . " ) . See a l s o S h i r l e y v . B a c o n , 154 Ga. App. 2 0 3 , 204, 267 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1980) ( e x p l a i n i n g t h a t " [ t ] h e mere f a c t t h a t [ t h e m o t h e r ] had n o t f e l t t h e movement o f t h e f e t u s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t t h e f e t u s d i d n o t move o r was n o t c a p a b l e o f movement a t t h e t i m e o f t h e u n b o r n c h i l d ' s d e a t h " ) . 11 28 1100192 Some s t a t e c o u r t s have a p p l i e d Roe's v i a b i l i t y standard t o w r o n g f u l - d e a t h l a w , c i t i n g Roe as p r o h i b i t i n g t h e r e c o v e r y of damages f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f a c h i l d who d i e s w i t h o u t reaching v i a b i l i t y . Roe 1 2 The C a l i f o r n i a limited California's children. 1 3 Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t criminal statutes protecting M i s r e a d i n g Roe, t h e s e c o u r t s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d i n Roe t h a t interest unborn i n protecting the l i f e s t a t e s have no o f an u n b o r n child before viability. Although conclusion; broadly written, the states Roe does are forbidden not support to protect that unborn S e e , e . g . , T o t h v . G o r e e , 65 M i c h . App. 296, 3 0 4 , 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (1975) ("There w o u l d be an i n h e r e n t c o n f l i c t i n g i v i n g t h e mother t h e r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e pregnancy y e t h o l d i n g t h a t an a c t i o n may be b r o u g h t on b e h a l f o f t h e same f e t u s u n d e r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t . " ) ; W a l l a c e v . W a l l a c e , 120 N.H. 675, 679, 421 A . 2 d 134, 137 (1980) ( " [ I ] t w o u l d be i n c o n g r u o u s f o r a m o t h e r t o have a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o d e l i b e r a t e l y d e s t r o y a n o n v i a b l e f e t u s ... a n d a t t h e same t i m e f o r a t h i r d p a r t y t o be s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y t o t h e fetus f o r h i s unintended but merely n e g l i g e n t a c t s . " ) . See a l s o A k a , 344 A r k . a t 641, 42 S.W.3d a t 517-18; J u s t u s v . A t c h i s o n , 19 C a l . 3 d 564, 577-78, 565 P.2d 122, 130-31 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , d i s a p p r o v e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , Ochoa v . S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 39 C a l . 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; Hamby v . M c D a n i e l , 559 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tenn. 1 9 7 7 ) ; a n d S t a t e e x . r e l . H a r d i n v . S a n d e r s , 538 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Mo. 1 9 7 6 ) . 12 P e o p l e v. Smith, 501 (1976) . 1 3 498, 59 C a l . App. 3d 7 5 1 , 129 C a l . R p t r . 29 1100192 children only Roe that held i n ways t h a t a pregnant conflict woman's with a woman's "right." " r i g h t of privacy ... i s b r o a d enough t o encompass a woman's d e c i s i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t t o terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. a t 153. See a l s o P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. C a s e y , 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) as " h o l d i n g terminate however, that the Constitution protects her pregnancy other than in i t s a woman indicated that a woman's r i g h t t o stages"). seeking pregnancy," possesses the " r i g h t " Roe early ( d e s c r i b i n g Roe to created No o n e , "terminate her i n Roe. N o t h i n g i n anyone o t h e r t h a n t h e p r e g n a n t woman h a s any r i g h t t o t e r m i n a t e h e r p r e g n a n c y a n d t h e r e b y t o c a u s e t h e death o f h e r unborn child. Roe does n o t p r o h i b i t s t a t e s f r o m p r o t e c t i n g u n b o r n human lives. To the contrary, i n Casey, t h e Supreme Court acknowledged t h a t "the S t a t e has l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s from t h e outset o f the pregnancy" i n protecting U.S. a t 846, a n d a " s u b s t a n t i a l s t a t e life throughout pregnancy." state's the law c o n f l i c t s with 505 U.S. a t 876. a woman's " r i g h t " 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) the inception Thus, u n l e s s a t o an a b o r t i o n , See a l s o Gonzales (noting that "the State, of the pregnancy," 30 c h i l d , 505 interest i n potential s t a t e l a w does n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h Roe. v. C a r h a r t , from t h e unborn h a s an i n t e r e s t " i n 1100192 protecting the Reproductive life" Health the Servs., H a r r i s v. McRae, 448 Roe's of U.S. statement unborn 492 297, 313 t h a t unborn U.S. child). Webster 490, (1989); 516 v. and (1980). children are not "persons" w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment i s i r r e l e v a n t to the state q u e s t i o n whether unborn c h i l d r e n law. recognized Because in Roe the is not are Fourteenth "persons" Amendment implicated unless under "right" state action v i o l a t e s a woman's " r i g h t " t o end a p r e g n a n c y , t h e o t h e r p a r t s of the superstructure standard, of Roe, including the are not c o n t r o l l i n g o u t s i d e a b o r t i o n viability law. Many s t a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t , in t h e c a s e o f a b o r t i o n , Roe civil protection of the except does n o t l i m i t s t a t e c r i m i n a l unborn child. 1 4 Justice or Maddox S e e , e.g., Wiersma v. M a p l e L e a f Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 7 792 (S.D. 1996) (Roe's v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; Commonwealth v. B u l l o c k , 590 Pa. 480, 491-92, 913 A.2d 207, 214 (2006) (Roe does n o t p r o h i b i t charging k i l l e r o f u n b o r n c h i l d w i t h m u r d e r ) ; S t a t e v. M a c G u i r e , 84 P.3d 1171, 1179-80 (Utah 2004) ( P a r r i s h , J . , c o n c u r r i n g ) (Roe does n o t p r o h i b i t c h a r g i n g k i l l e r o f u n b o r n c h i l d w i t h murder); 66 F e d e r a l C r e d i t U n i o n v. T u c k e r , 853 So. 2d 104, 113-14 ( M i s s . 2003) (Roe does n o t a p p l y t o a c t i o n brought under w r o n g f u l - d e a t h s t a t u t e ) ; F a r l e y v. S a r t i n , 195 W.Va. 671, 683-84 & n. 28, 466 S.E.2d 522, 534-35 & n.28 (Roe does n o t a p p l y t o w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; P e o p l e v. D a v i s , 7 C a l . 4 t h 797, 809, 872 P.2d 591, 598 (1994) (Roe's v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d does n o t a p p l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f f e t a l m u r d e r ) ; S t a t e 14 31 1100192 explained Gilmore, this distinction 613 So. 2d 1241, i n h i s dissent i n Gentry v. 1247 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) : "Roe a n d i t s p r o g e n y a d d r e s s t h e p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n a woman's r i g h t t o an a b o r t i o n a n d t h e State's i n t e r e s t i n t h e woman's h e a l t h a n d t h e fetus's l i f e . Roe i s n o t i m p l i c a t e d when, as i n t h i s case, both the State and t h e mother have congruent i n t e r e s t s i n p r e s e r v i n g l i f e and p u n i s h i n g its wrongful destruction. I conclude that the l e g i s l a t u r e has a r i g h t t o p r o t e c t n o n v i a b l e fetal l i f e when i t s i n t e r e s t i s c o n g r u e n t w i t h t h a t o f t h e mother." v. M e r r i l l , 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990) ("Roe v. Wade p r o t e c t s t h e woman's r i g h t o f c h o i c e ; i t does n o t p r o t e c t , much l e s s c o n f e r on an a s s a i l a n t , a t h i r d - p a r t y u n i l a t e r a l r i g h t t o d e s t r o y t h e f e t u s . " ) , c e r t . d e n i e d , 496 U.S. 931 (1990) ; S u m m e r f i e l d v. S u p e r i o r C o u r t , 144 A r i z . 467, 478, 698 P.2d 712, 723 (1985) (Roe does n o t a p p l y t o w r o n g f u l - d e a t h a c t i o n ) ; a n d O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983) ( n o t i n g t h a t Roe, " w h i l e h o l d i n g t h a t t h e f e t u s i s n o t a p e r s o n f o r p u r p o s e s o f t h e 1 4 t h amendment, does n o t mandate the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e f e t u s i s a n o n e n t i t y " ) . See a l s o C r o s b y , 340 S.C. a t 642, 532 S.E.2d a t 864 ( T o a l , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) ( " U n l i k e a b o r t i o n c a s e s , w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n s do n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y i m p l i c a t e any c o u n t e r v a i l i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l liberties. No one c a n a r g u e i n t h i s c a s e t h a t t h e s t a t e o r federal constitution shields the defendants' allegedly w r o n g f u l c o n d u c t . " ) ; L a w r e n c e v . S t a t e , 240 S.W.3d 912, 917-18 & n.24 (Tex. C r i m . App. 2007) (Roe does n o t p r o h i b i t s t a t e from c h a r g i n g k i l l e r o f unborn c h i l d w i t h c a p i t a l murder), c e r t . d e n i e d , 553 U.S. 1007 ( 2 0 0 8 ) ; S t a t e v . A l f i e r i , 132 O h i o App. 3d 69, 78-79, 724 N.E.2d 477, 483 (1998) (Roe d o e s n o t p r o h i b i t s t a t e from c r i m i n a l i z i n g f e t a l h o m i c i d e ) ; and People v. F o r d , 221 I l l . App. 3d 354, 368-69, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (1991) (Roe does n o t a p p l y t o t h i r d - p a r t y a s s a u l t o f p r e g n a n t woman, w h i c h k i l l s t h e u n b o r n c h i l d ) . 32 1100192 S c h o l a r s have a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h e l i m i t a t i o n s these reasons, III. Roe i s n o t c o n t r o l l i n g a u t h o r i t y i n t h i s For 15 case. Roe's v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d i s n o t p e r s u a s i v e . Numerous s c h o l a r s have c r i t i c i z e d Roe. of Roe. 16 Today, "there i s broad the v i a b i l i t y rule of academic agreement that Roe S e e , e . g . , C l a r k e D. F o r s y t h e , H o m i c i d e o f t h e U n b o r n C h i l d : The B o r n A l i v e R u l e a n d O t h e r L e g a l A n a c h r o n i s m s , 21 V a l . U. L. Rev. 563, 614 (1987) ("[Roe] does n o t a p p l y t o t h e c o n t e x t of nonconsensual t h i r d p a r t y a c t s a g a i n s t t h e unborn child."); J e f f r e y A. P a r n e s s , C r i m e s A g a i n s t t h e U n b o r n : P r o t e c t i n g a n d R e s p e c t i n g t h e P o t e n t i a l i t y o f Human L i f e , 22 H a r v . J . on L e g i s . 97, 112 (1985) ("The d e c i s i o n i n Roe does not p r e c l u d e the s t a t e from p r o t e c t i n g p r e v i a b l e f e t a l l i f e when s u c h p r o t e c t i o n i s r e a s o n a b l e a n d i n f r i n g e s upon no fundamental or other f e d e r a l or s t a t e r i g h t " ) ; and D a v i d K a d a r , The Law o f T o r t i o u s P r e n a t a l D e a t h S i n c e Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 639, 657 (1980) ("Roe v. Wade n e i t h e r p r o h i b i t s nor compels c o n s i s t e n c y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e meaning o f ' p e r s o n ' as b e t w e e n t h e f o u r t e e n t h amendment a n d w r o n g f u l death s t a t u t e s . " ) . 15 R a n d y B e c k , S e l f - C o n s c i o u s D i c t a : The O r i g i n s o f Roe v. Wade's T r i m e s t e r Framework, 51 Am. J . L e g a l H i s t . 505, 516-26 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; Randy B e c k , G o n z a l e s , C a s e y , a n d t h e V i a b i l i t y R u l e , 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 249, 268-70 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; P a u l B e n j a m i n L i n t o n , P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v . C a s e y : The F l i g h t From R e a s o n i n t h e Supreme C o u r t , 13 S t . L o u i s U. Pub. L. Rev. 15, 38-40 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; Mark T u s h n e t , Two N o t e s on t h e J u r i s p r u d e n c e o f P r i v a c y , 8 C o n s t . Com. 75, 83 (1991) ( " [ U ] s i n g t h e l i n e o f v i a b i l i t y t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e t i m e when a b o r t i o n i s p e r m i t t e d f r o m t h e t i m e a f t e r v i a b i l i t y when i t i s p r o h i b i t e d (as Roe v. Wade d o e s ) , i s e n t i r e l y p e r v e r s e . " ) ; J o h n H a r t E l y , The Wages o f C r y i n g W o l f : A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Y a l e L . J . 920, 924-25 (1973); and Mark J . B e u t l e r , A b o r t i o n and t h e V i a b i l i t y Standard -- Toward a More R e a s o n e d D e t e r m i n a t i o n of the State's Countervailing Interest i n Protecting Prenatal L i f e , 21 S e t o n H a l l L. Rev. 347, 359 (1991) ( " I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 16 33 1100192 failed rule." 103 to provide an a d e q u a t e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the v i a b i l i t y Randy B e c k , G o n z a l e s , C a s e y , a n d t h e V i a b i l i t y Nw. U. L. Rev. 249, 268-69 A. Roe m i s s t a t e d Rule, (2009). the protection o f t h e unborn child u n d e r t h e common l a w . Roe's v i a b i l i t y r u l e was b a s e d , i n s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t , on an i n c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t o f l e g a l h i s t o r y . Roe erroneously recognized U.S. that " t h e u n b o r n have i n t h e l a w as p e r s o n s a t 162. law." concluded The Supreme C o u r t i n i n t h e whole never been sense." 410 Roe a l s o r e f e r r e d t o " t h e l e n i t y o f t h e common 410 U.S. a t 165. However, scholars have repeatedly p o i n t e d t o i n a c c u r a c i e s i n Roe's h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t s i n c e Roe was decided i n 1973. 17 " [ T ] h e h i s t o r y e m b r a c e d i n Roe w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d why v i a b i l i t y s h o u l d be r e l e v a n t t o , much l e s s c o n t r o l , t h e measure o f a s t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g prenatal life."). See g e n e r a l l y D o u g l a s E. R u s t o n , The T o r t i o u s Loss o f a N o n v i a b l e F e t u s : A M i s c a r r i a g e Leads t o a M i s c a r r i a g e o f J u s t i c e , 61 S.C. L. Rev. 915 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ; J u s t i n C u r t i s , I n c l u d i n g V i c t i m s W i t h o u t a V o i c e : Amending I n d i a n a ' s C h i l d W r o n g f u l D e a t h S t a t u t e , 43 V a l . U. L. Rev. 1211 ( 2 0 0 9 ) ; and S a r a h J . L o q u i s t , The W r o n g f u l D e a t h o f a F e t u s : E r a s i n g t h e B a r r i e r B e t w e e n V i a b i l i t y a n d N o n v i a b i l i t y , 36 Washburn L . J . 259 ( 1 9 9 7 ) ; s e e a l s o t h e s o u r c e s c i t e d b y J u s t i c e Maddox i n h i s d i s s e n t i n G e n t r y v. G i l m o r e , 613 So. 2d a t 1248-49. See g e n e r a l l y Joseph D e l l a p e n n a , D i s p e l l i n g the Myths o f A b o r t i o n H i s t o r y ( C a r o l i n a A c a d e m i c P r e s s 2 0 0 6 ) ; J o h n Keown, A b o r t i o n , D o c t o r s a n d t h e Law: Some A s p e c t s o f t h e L e g a l R e g u l a t i o n o f A b o r t i o n i n E n g l a n d f r o m 1803 t o 1982 (Cambridge 17 34 1100192 n o t w i t h s t a n d c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n e v e n when Roe was Joseph 126 Dellapenna, ( C a r o l i n a Academic Press Sir William unborn children B l a c k s t o n e i n Roe, the legal entitled line Dispelling Law child: inherent Blackstone, persons. of the example, Although unborn describing "Life i s an nature by for of Persons." of h i s paragraph unborn 2006). recognized the that Court cited i t f a i l e d t o note t h a t B l a c k s t o n e addressed protection "The the Myths o f A b o r t i o n H i s t o r y Blackstone, were written." in I t also C o m m e n t a r i e s on a section i g n o r e d the opening the law's immediate every child gift within treatment of of God, individual." 1 t h e Laws o f E n g l a n d a the right William *129. 18 As U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1988). See a l s o P a u l B e n j a m i n Linton, P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. C a s e y : The F l i g h t f r o m R e a s o n i n t h e Supreme C o u r t , 13 S t . L o u i s U. Pub. L. Rev. 15 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; D e n n i s J . H o r a n , C l a r k e D. F o r s y t h e & E d w a r d R. G r a n t , Two S h i p s P a s s i n g i n t h e N i g h t : An I n t e r p r e t a v i s t Review of the W h i t e - S t e v e n s C o l l o q u y on Roe v. Wade, 6 S t . L o u i s U. Pub. L. Rev. 229, 230 n.8, 241 n.90 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; James S. W i t h e r s p o o n , R e e x a m i n i n g Roe: N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y A b o r t i o n S t a t u t e s and t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment, 17 S t . M a r y ' s L . J . 29, 70 (1985) ("In s h o r t , t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s i n Roe v. Wade o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t , p u r p o s e s , and t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s u n d e r l y i n g t h e n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a n t i a b o r t i o n s t a t u t e s , was f u n d a m e n t a l l y e r r o n e o u s . " ) ; and R o b e r t B y r n , An A m e r i c a n Tragedy: The Supreme C o u r t on A b o r t i o n , 41 Fordham L. Rev. 807 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . 18 See Dellapenna, at "[M]odern 200: r e s e a r c h has e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t by t h e c l o s e 35 1100192 Professor D a v i d K a d a r n o t e d i n 1980, " R i g h t s and p r o t e c t i o n s l e g a l l y a f f o r d e d t h e unborn c h i l d a r e o f a n c i e n t v i n t a g e . equity, property, continues Law Rev. crime, P r e n a t a l Death S i n c e 639, 639 (1980) B. and t o r t , t h e unborn has r e c e i v e d and to receive a legal personality." of Tortious (footnotes Roe m i s s t a t e d In D a v i d K a d a r , The Roe v . Wade, 45 Mo. L. omitted). the protection o f t h e unborn child under t o r t l a w and c r i m i n a l l a w . P r o f e s s o r K a d a r a n d o t h e r s have p o i n t e d o u t " t h e discussion tort w i t h i n Roe on t h e l e g a l law." Kadar, 45 Mo. status o f t h e unborn i n L. Rev. a t 652. d i s c u s s i o n i n Roe o f p r e n a t a l - d e a t h recovery mistaken The Court's "was p e r f u n c t o r y , and u n f o r t u n a t e l y l a r g e l y i n a c c u r a t e , a n d s h o u l d n o t be r e l i e d upon as t h e c o r r e c t v i e w of the law a t the time o f Roe v. of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y , the c r i m i n a l i t y of a b o r t i o n u n d e r t h e common l a w was w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . C o u r t s h a d r e n d e r e d c l e a r h o l d i n g s t h a t a b o r t i o n was a c r i m e , no d e c i s i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t a n y f o r m o f abortion was l a w f u l , a n d s e c o n d a r y a u t h o r i t i e s s i m i l a r l y uniformly supported the c r i m i n a l i t y of abortion. The only difference among these a u t h o r i t i e s had been t h e s e v e r i t y o f t h e crime (misdemeanor o r f e l o n y ) , an u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t , u n d e r Coke's i n f l u e n c e , began t o s e t t l e i n t o t h e p a t t e r n o f h o l d i n g a b o r t i o n t o be a m i s d e m e a n o r u n l e s s t h e c h i l d was b o r n a l i v e a n d t h e n d i e d f r o m t h e i n j u r i e s or p o t i o n s t h a t l e d t o i t s premature b i r t h . " 36 1100192 Wade." Jr., 45 Mo. L. Rev. a t 652-53. Roe v. Concerning Wade and Pregnancy, must r e s p e c t f u l l y understated the Traditional Legal Hopkin, Standards 47 Temp. L.Q. 715, 723 (1974) be p o i n t e d the extent See a l s o W i l l i a m R. out that Justice ("[I]t Blackmun has t o which t h e law p r o t e c t s t h e unborn child."). Roe's a d o p t i o n o f t h e v i a b i l i t y r e f l e c t American law. Viability law o f p r o p e r t y , h o m i c i d e , s t a n d a r d i n 1973 d i d n o t p l a y e d no r o l e i n t h e common or abortion. Homicide o f t h e Unborn C h i l d : C l a r k e D. F o r s y t h e , The B o r n A l i v e Rule and Other L e g a l A n a c h r o n i s m s , 21 V a l . U. L. Rev. 5 6 3 , 569 n.33 And there was no v i a b i l i t y standard (1987). i n wrongful-death law b e c a u s e t h e common l a w d i d n o t r e c o g n i z e a c a u s e o f a c t i o n f o r the w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f any p e r s o n . F a r l e y v. S a r t i n , 195 W.Va. at 674, 466 S.E.2d a t 525 ("At common l a w , t h e r e was no c a u s e of action f o r the wrongful Keeton e t a l . , at death of a person."); W. Page P r o s s e r a n d K e e t o n on t h e Law o f T o r t s § 127, 945 ( 5 t h e d . 1984) ("The common l a w n o t o n l y d e n i e d a t o r t recovery for injury once t h e t o r t victim had d i e d , i t also r e f u s e d t o r e c o g n i z e a n y new a n d i n d e p e n d e n t c a u s e o f a c t i o n i n t h e v i c t i m ' s d e p e n d a n t s o r h e i r s f o r t h e i r own l o s s a t h i s death."). 37 1100192 The viability s t a n d a r d was by B o n b r e s t v. K a t z , 65 F. case cause to recognize Bonbrest implied recognized F. of i n j u r y law, was but v. M e i e r , 33 I l l . App. of (1961-62). law law first injuries. would be reached v i a b i l i t y . a a d o p t e d by 2d 218, action 65 One decade courts w a n i n g by 178 in prenatal- 1961. see N.E.2d 691 See Daley (1961) (holding r e c o v e r damages f o r could of P r e n a t a l I n j u r y D o c t r i n e injury for prenatal cause i t s i n f l u e n c e was i n f a n t born a l i v e 361 a initially suffered before v i a b i l i t y ) ; Rev. (D.D.C. 1 9 4 6 ) , t h e action such i n t o American 140. Viability an that Supp. 138 o n l y i f t h e u n b o r n c h i l d had Supp. a t that a introduced injuries a l s o Note, Torts -- Extension t o N o n v i a b l e I n f a n t s , 11 D e P a u l L. thorough l e g a l before Roe was survey of decided prenatal- concluded that " [ t ] h e v i a b i l i t y l i m i t a t i o n i n p r e n a t a l i n j u r y cases i s headed for oblivion. Courts i l l o g i c a l and u n j u s t are to the coming to realize that c h i l d r e n a f f e c t e d and not amenable t o s c i e n t i f i c p r o o f . " C h a r l e s A. L i n t g e n , o f M e d i c a l K n o w l e d g e on t h e Law R e l a t i n g to Prenatal 110 U. C. Pa. L. Rev. 554, Roe's v i a b i l i t y 600 (1962). s t a n d a r d was 38 dictum. The i t is readily Impact Injuries, 1100192 The Beck, viability s t a n d a r d a d o p t e d i n Roe was d i c t u m . Self-Conscious Dicta: The O r i g i n s Randy o f Roe v . Wade's T r i m e s t e r Framework, 51 Am. J . L e g a l H i s t . 505, 516-26 (2011). I t was n o t a p a r t o f e i t h e r t h e T e x a s s t a t u t e a d d r e s s e d or t h e Georgia 179 (1973); fact, s t a t u t e addressed n e i t h e r case the v i a b i l i t y i n Doe v . B o l t o n , 410 U.S. was c o n d i t i o n e d on v i a b i l i t y . record a n d was n o t d i s c u s s e d arguments. Beck, 51 Am. rule In s t a n d a r d was a d o p t e d i n Roe w i t h o u t a n y evidentiary viability i n Roe was also J . Legal dictum i n the b r i e f s or Hist. a t 511-12. i n Casey because The the P e n n s y l v a n i a s t a t u t e a t i s s u e i n t h a t c a s e was n o t c o n d i t i o n e d on v i a b i l i t y b u t a p p l i e d t h r o u g h o u t 103 a woman's p r e g n a n c y . B e c k , Nw. U. L. Rev. a t 271-76. Additionally, " t h e Roe C o u r t ' s internal demonstrates t h a t the J u s t i c e s themselves viability standard "'unnecessary.'" 52 6; was not only recognized that the "'arbitrary,'" B e c k , 51 Am. J . L e g a l H i s t . s e e a l s o Randy B e c k , Rethinking V i a b i l i t y , correspondence" The E s s e n t i a l but also 505, 520, Holding 521, o f Casey: 75 UMKC L. Rev. 713, 713 (2007) ( q u o t i n g J u s t i c e B l a c k m u n ' s " I n t e r n a l Supreme C o u r t Memo," as q u o t e d i n D a v i d J . G a r r o w , L i b e r t y & S e x u a l i t y : The R i g h t t o P r i v a c y a n d the Making o f Roe v . Wade 580 (1994)) 39 ("'"You w i l l observe 1100192 that I have c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e end o f t h e f i r s t critical. point, This such trimester i s i s a r b i t r a r y , b u t perhaps any o t h e r as quickening or viability, is selected equally arbitrary."'"). D. Roe's v i a b i l i t y standard was incoherent. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s " n e v e r j u s t i f i e d " t h e viability terms." rule o f Roe a n d C a s e y " i neither l e g a l or moral Randy B e c k , 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. a t 249; s e e a l s o B e c k , 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. a t 253, 268-69 & n. 116 (and a u t h o r i t i e s cited therein). foundation Thornburgh Justice White f o r the v i a b i l i t y v. Gynecologists, American 476 U.S. explained standard College 747, of 794-95 the lack of i n h i s dissent in Obstetricians & (1986)(White, J., dissenting): "A s e c o n d , e q u a l l y b a s i c e r r o r i n f e c t s t h e C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n Roe v. Wade. The d e t a i l e d s e t o f r u l e s g o v e r n i n g s t a t e r e s t r i c t i o n s on a b o r t i o n t h a t t h e C o u r t f i r s t a r t i c u l a t e d i n Roe a n d h a s s i n c e r e f i n e d and e l a b o r a t e d presupposes n o t o n l y t h a t t h e woman's l i b e r t y t o c h o o s e an a b o r t i o n i s fundamental, but also that the State's countervailing interest i n protecting fetal life ( o r , as t h e C o u r t w o u l d have i t , ' p o t e n t i a l human l i f e , ' 410 U.S., a t 159) becomes ' c o m p e l l i n g ' only at the p o i n t a t which the fetus i s v i a b l e . As J u s t i c e O'Connor p o i n t e d o u t t h r e e y e a r s ago i n h e r d i s s e n t i n A k r o n v. A k r o n C e n t e r f o r R e p r o d u c t i v e H e a l t h , I n c . , 462 U.S. [ 4 1 6 ] , a t 461 [ ( 1 9 8 3 ) ] , t h e C o u r t ' s c h o i c e o f v i a b i l i t y as t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h 40 1100192 t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t becomes c o m p e l l i n g i s e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y . The C o u r t ' s ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' f o r t h e l i n e i t has drawn i s t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t becomes compelling at v i a b i l i t y 'because t h e f e t u s t h e n presumably has t h e c a p a c i t y o f meaningful life o u t s i d e t h e m o t h e r ' s womb.' 410 U.S., a t 163. As one critic o f Roe h a s o b s e r v e d , t h i s argument ' m i s t a k e s a d e f i n i t i o n f o r a s y l l o g i s m . ' E l y , The Wages o f C r y i n g W o l f : A Comment on Roe v . Wade, 82 Y a l e L . J . 920, 924 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . "The governmental i n t e r e s t at issue i s i n p r o t e c t i n g t h o s e who w i l l be c i t i z e n s i f t h e i r l i v e s a r e n o t e n d e d i n t h e womb. The s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f this interest i s i n no way d e p e n d e n t on t h e probability that t h e f e t u s may be c a p a b l e o f s u r v i v i n g o u t s i d e t h e womb a t a n y g i v e n p o i n t i n i t s d e v e l o p m e n t , as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f e t a l s u r v i v a l i s c o n t i n g e n t on t h e s t a t e o f m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e a n d technology, f a c t o r s t h a t a r e i n essence m o r a l l y and constitutionally irrelevant. The S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i s i n t h e f e t u s as an e n t i t y i n i t s e l f , a n d t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s e n t i t y does n o t change a t t h e point of v i a b i l i t y under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly, the State's interest, i f compelling after v i a b i l i t y , i s equally compelling before v i a b i l i t y . " Similarly, i n the a r t i c l e c i t e d by J u s t i c e White, J o h n H a r t E l y n o t e d t h a t Roe j u s t i f i e d t h e v i a b i l i t y Professor standard with a d e f i n i t i o n : "The Court's response here i s simply not adequate. I t agrees, indeed i t holds, t h a t a f t e r t h e p o i n t o f v i a b i l i t y (a c o n c e p t i t f a i l s t o n o t e w i l l become e v e n l e s s c l e a r t h a n i t i s now a s t h e technology of b i r t h continues t o develop) t h e interest i n protecting the fetus i s compelling. E x a c t l y why t h a t i s t h e m a g i c moment i s n o t made clear: Viability, as t h e C o u r t d e f i n e s i t ,i s a c h i e v e d some s i x t o t w e l v e weeks a f t e r q u i c k e n i n g . 41 1100192 (Quickening i s t h e p o i n t a t which the fetus begins d i s c e r n i b l y t o move i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e m o t h e r a n d t h e p o i n t t h a t h a s h i s t o r i c a l l y b e e n deemed c r u c i a l -- t o t h e e x t e n t a n y p o i n t b e t w e e n c o n c e p t i o n a n d b i r t h h a s b e e n f o c u s e d on.) B u t no, i t i s v i a b i l i t y that i s constitutionally critical: the Court's defense seems t o mistake a definition for a syllogism. "'With r e s p e c t t o t h e S t a t e ' s important and legitimate interest i n potential l i f e , the 'compelling' point i s a t v i a b i l i t y . This i s so because t h e f e t u s then p r e s u m a b l y has the c a p a b i l i t y o f meaningful l i f e o u t s i d e t h e m o t h e r ' s womb.' " W i t h r e g a r d t o why t h e s t a t e c a n n o t c o n s i d e r t h i s 'important and l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t ' prior to v i a b i l i t y , t h e o p i n i o n i s even l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y . " J o h n H a r t E l y , The Wages o f C r y i n g W o l f : A Comment on Roe v . Wade, 82 Y a l e L . J . 920, 924-25 at (1973) ( q u o t i n g Roe, 410 U.S. 163) ( f o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d ) . N e i t h e r Roe n o r a n y o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t c a s e s r e l y i n g on t h e v i a b i l i t y s t a n d a r d have p r o v i d e d any a l t e r n a t i v e to support Court that standard: " I n t h e decades h a s o f f e r e d no a d e q u a t e standard, notwithstanding critiques." Because limitation rationale rationale s i n c e Roe, the f o r the v i a b i l i t y persistent judicial and academic B e c k , 75 UMKC L. Rev. a t 740. of on Roe, v i a b i l i t y , the exercise p r o t e c t i n g t h e unborn c h i l d . of i n abortion the state's law, i s a interest O u t s i d e a b o r t i o n law, 42 in viability 1100192 has little significance. Viability is largely outcome s t a t i s t i c s a t a s p e c i f i c g e s t a t i o n a l age, an estimation of the technological based on coupled with capabilities of a p a r t i c u l a r f a c i l i t y i n m e d i c a l l y a s s i s t i n g premature c h i l d r e n . As the South Dakota Supreme C o u r t L e a f Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 792 s a i d i n Wiersma v. (S.D. a d e v e l o p m e n t a l t u r n i n g p o i n t was Maple 1996), " ' [ v ] i a b i l i t y ' embraced i n a b o r t i o n cases t o b a l a n c e the p r i v a c y r i g h t s of a mother a g a i n s t her child. purely For arbitrary any milestone existence." purpose, from (Footnote Viability prenatal other which viability to reckon a unborn child's the extent cause of p r e n a t a l death. legal of prenatal the existence injuries, or V i a b i l i t y i s i r r e l e v a n t to dies, the regardless cause of of viability i t s death can proving and, i f the unborn be determined by r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e c h i l d ' s g e s t a t i o n a l age. recovery family. There is no evidence autopsy V i a b i l i t y does n o t that the permitting o f damages f o r t h e w r o n g f u l d e a t h o f a c h i l d 43 be child a f f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s l o s s o f l i f e o r t h e damages s u f f e r e d by surviving of the c a u s a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e u n b o r n c h i l d ' s a n a t o m i c c o n d i t i o n can observed an omitted.) i s i r r e l e v a n t to determining injuries, is as before 1100192 v i a b i l i t y w i l l increase fraudulent l i t i g a t i o n . C r e d i t Union Quite v. T u c k e r , simply, the 853 So. 2d 104, use of viability p r e n a t a l - i n j u r y or wrongful-death 113 See 66 F e d e r a l (Miss. as a 2003). standard law i s i n c o h e r e n t . As in the West V i r g i n i a Supreme C o u r t c o n c l u d e d i n F a r l e y : " [ J ] u s t i c e i s denied when a tortfeasor i s permitted to walk away with i m p u n i t y because of the happenstance t h a t the unborn c h i l d not yet reached v i a b i l i t y a t 533. for law, at the time of death." 466 Though a number o f r a t i o n a l e s were o r i g i n a l l y the v i a b i l i t y the sole viability rule in prenatal-injury remaining justification i n wrongful-death law seems or of to had S.E.2d cited wrongful-death not be abandoning deference to l e g i s l a t i v e bodies, a rather strange r a t i o n a l e f o r caution i n abandoning a judicially S i n c e Roe scientific was medical watch the growth previous d e c i d e d i n 1973, advances i n m e d i c a l and t e c h n o l o g y have g r e a t l y e x p a n d e d o u r k n o w l e d g e o f prenatal l i f e . enhanced created rule. The development of u l t r a s o u n d t e c h n o l o g y and public understanding, us to and d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e u n b o r n c h i l d i n a way g e n e r a t i o n s c o u l d never allowing has have i m a g i n e d . Similarly, a d v a n c e s i n g e n e t i c s and r e l a t e d f i e l d s make c l e a r t h a t a new and u n i q u e human b e i n g i s f o r m e d a t t h e moment o f c o n c e p t i o n , 44 1100192 when two c e l l s , incapable of independent l i f e , a s i n g l e , i n d i v i d u a l human e n t i t y . is n o t y e t mature before that nonetheless consensus life human 1 9 Of c o u r s e , -- g r o w t h and development can s u r v i v e independently life. i n America, And t h e r e even b e f o r e merge t o f o r m t h a t new are -- life necessary but i t is has been a broad legal Roe, t h a t the l i f e of a S e e , e . g . , B r u c e M. C a r l s o n , Human E m b r y o l o g y a n d D e v e l o p m e n t a l B i o l o g y 3 (1994) ("Human p r e g n a n c y b e g i n s w i t h t h e f u s i o n o f an egg a n d a sperm . . . . " ) ; Ronan O ' R a h i l l y & F a b i o l a M u l l e r , Human E m b r y o l o g y a n d T e r a t o l o g y 8 (2d e d . 1996) ("Although l i f e i s a continuous p r o c e s s , fertilization i s a c r i t i c a l landmark because, under o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a new, g e n e t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t human o r g a n i s m i s t h e r e b y f o r m e d . T h i s r e m a i n s t r u e e v e n t h o u g h t h e e m b r y o n i c genome i s n o t a c t u a l l y a c t i v a t e d u n t i l 4-8 c e l l s a r e p r e s e n t , a t a b o u t 2-3 days."); K e i t h Moore, The D e v e l o p i n g Human: Clinically O r i e n t e d E m b r y o l o g y 2 ( 8 t h e d . 2008) (The z y g o t e " r e s u l t s f r o m t h e u n i o n o f an o o c y t e a n d a sperm d u r i n g f e r t i l i z a t i o n . A z y g o t e o r embryo i s t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a new human b e i n g . " ) ; E r n e s t B l e c h s c h m i d t , The B e g i n n i n g o f Human L i f e 16-17 (1977) ("A human ovum p o s s e s s e s human c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as g e n e t i c c a r r i e r s , not chicken or f i s h . T h i s i s now m a n i f e s t ; t h e e v i d e n c e no l o n g e r a l l o w s a d i s c u s s i o n as t o i f a n d when a n d i n what month o f o n t o g e n e s i s a human b e i n g i s f o r m e d . To be a human b e i n g i s d e c i d e d f o r an o r g a n i s m a t t h e moment o f f e r t i l i z a t i o n o f t h e ovum."); C.E. C o r l i s s , P a t t e n ' s Human E m b r y o l o g y : E l e m e n t s o f C l i n i c a l D e v e l o p m e n t 30 (1976) ( " I t i s t h e p e n e t r a t i o n o f t h e ovum b y a sperm a n d t h e r e s u l t a n t m i n g l i n g o f t h e n u c l e a r m a t e r i a l each b r i n g s t o t h e union t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s the culmination of the process of f e r t i l i z a t i o n and marks t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f t h e l i f e o f a new i n d i v i d u a l . " ) ; and C l i n i c a l O b s t e t r i c s 11 ( C a r l J . P a u e r s t e i n e d . 1987) ("Each member o f a s p e c i e s b e g i n s w i t h f e r t i l i z a t i o n -- t h e successful merging o f two d i f f e r e n t pools of genetic i n f o r m a t i o n t o f o r m a new i n d i v i d u a l . " ) . 19 45 1100192 human b e i n g begins unique individual and at conception. human An u n b o r n 2 0 being from child is a conception, and, t h e r e f o r e , he o r she i s e n t i t l e d t o t h e f u l l p r o t e c t i o n o f l a w at every stage of development. Conclusion Roe's v i a b i l i t y r u l e was b a s e d on i n a c c u r a t e h i s t o r y a n d was m o s t l y u n s u p p o r t e d by l e g a l precedent. Medical advances s i n c e Roe have c o n c l u s i v e l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t an u n b o r n is a u n i q u e human b e i n g a t every t o g e t h e r , Alabama's homicide stage statute, Court, and t h e s t a t u t e s and j u d i c i a l states make a b u n d a n t l y Justice rights Blackmun's clear words, t o the unborn." of development. child And the decisions of t h i s decisions from other t h a t t h e l a w i s no l o n g e r , i n "reluctant For these ... reasons, to accord legal Roe's v i a b i l i t y r u l e i s n e i t h e r c o n t r o l l i n g n o r p e r s u a s i v e h e r e a n d s h o u l d be S e e P a u l B e n j a m i n L i n t o n , P l a n n e d P a r e n t h o o d v. C a s e y ^ The F l i g h t From R e a s o n i n t h e Supreme C o u r t , 13 S t . L o u i s U. Pub. L. Rev. 15, 120-137 (1993) ("Appendix B: The L e g a l C o n s e n s u s on t h e B e g i n n i n g o f L i f e , " c i t i n g c a s e l a w a n d s t a t u t e s f r o m 38 s t a t e s a n d t h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a s t a t i n g t h a t t h e l i f e o f a human b e i n g s h o u l d be p r o t e c t e d b e g i n n i n g with conception). 20 46 1100192 r e j e c t e d by o t h e r s t a t e s u n t i l t h e day i t i s o v e r r u l e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Stuart, Bolin, Court. and W i s e , J J . , c o n c u r . 47
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