McGee v. McGee
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John McGee (Jack) appealed the grant of summary judgment and a judgment as a matter of law in favor of his brother Willis McGee individually and in his capacity as executor of their mother Elizabeth's estate. Wills appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees when his brother contested their mother's will. Shortly after Willis presented the will for probate, Jack filed suit to contest the will. He claimed it was not executed as required by law, Mrs. McGee lacked testamentary capacity, and that the will was the product of undue influence. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Willis on all counts of Jack's complaint except the undue-influence count, which was tried to a jury. However, at the close of Jack's case, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law (JML) in favor of Willis on that count, "with leave for [Willis] to prove reasonable costs and fees." Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed part, and reversed part of the trial court's decision. The Court found that Jack presented no credible evidence to support any ground upon which he challenged his mother's will. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court erred in refusing to award Willis fees and costs. The Court remanded the case with regard to an issue of whether Jack converted certain items from his mother's estate prior to her death, but in all other respects, affirmed the trial court's decisions.
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r e l : 01/13/2012 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012 1091798 John Coleman McGee v. Willis Banks McGee, i n d i v i d u a l l y and as e x e c u t o r o f t h e e s t a t e o f E l i z a b e t h Banks McGee 1100247 Willis Banks McGee, as e x e c u t o r o f t h e e s t a t e o f E l i z a b e t h Banks McGee v. John Coleman McGee Appeals f r o m Greene C i r c u i t (CV-05-037) Court 1091798; 1100247 WOODALL, Justice. In from c a s e no. 1 0 9 1 7 9 8 , J o h n C o l e m a n McGee a summary j u d g m e n t favor of his brother, individually and McGee, t h e i r mother Jack to Willis to trial and c o n s o l i d a t e d the opinion. In part, remand. and case I. On June 7, years. The Banks no. § McGee appeals fees In law ("Willis"), McGee of his request, the will purpose 1 1 0 0 2 4 7 , we Procedural 1100247, for i n the affirm provided, payment contest. We of w r i t i n g one in part, reverse reverse and in remand. a will, which substantive and was 30 relevant part: " I , E L I Z A B E T H BANKS M c G E E , ... b e i n g o f s o u n d mind and d i s p o s i n g memory, do hereby make and p u b l i s h t h i s , my L a s t W i l l and Testament, hereby r e v o k i n g a n y a n d a l l f o r m e r W i l l s made b y me. 2 of Background executed in by no. W i l l i a m s , her a t t o r n e y of a p p r o x i m a t e l y document in case denial f o r the 1 0 9 1 7 9 8 , we Mrs. of a c t i o n commenced 43-8-196, attorney I n c a s e no. 1 992, will. court's 1 975, F a c t u a l and d r a f t e d by C r a w f o r d a matter appeals of the e s t a t e of E l i z a b e t h Banks McGee's Code costs Willis as ("Mrs. M c G e e " ) , i n an the Ala. a judgment executor Mrs. appeals litigation have as contest pursuant and ("Jack") 1091798; 1100247 "ITEM TWO "I give, w i l l , d e v i s e and bequeath unto my b e l o v e d s o n , [ W i l l i s ] , my home, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e real estate upon w h i c h i t i s situated and a l l h o u s e h o l d f u r n i t u r e , f u r n i s h i n g s a n d a p p l i a n c e s ... t o be h i s a b s o l u t e l y . "ITEM THREE " I g i v e , w i l l , d e v i s e a n d b e q u e a t h t h e sum o f $25,000.00 cash t o each grandchild o f mine who s u r v i v e s me ( a n d who m i g h t b e b o r n w i t h i n n i n e (9) m o n t h s o f my d e a t h ) t o b e r e c e i v e d b y a n d t o b e h e l d by t h e i r p a r e n t ( s ) f o r such g r a n d c h i l d ' s needs as said parent(s), i n their own d i s c r e t i o n , might determine appropriate I n t h e e v e n t t h a t my s o n , [ J a c k ] , i s d i v o r c e d f r o m my d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w , CAROL S. McGEE, t h e n I d e s i g n a t e my d a u g h t e r - i n - l a w , CAROL S. McGEE, a s t h e ' p a r e n t ' t o r e c e i v e a n d h o l d s u c h sum a s b e q u e a t h e d t o my g r a n d c h i l d , K R I S T I N McGEE, f o r a l l p u r p o s e s u n d e r t h i s I t e m o f my W i l l . "ITEM FOUR "I give, will, d e v i s e and bequeath unto my b e l o v e d s o n , [ J a c k ] , t h e sum o f ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ( $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) c a s h t o b e h i s a b s o l u t e l y , i f he s u r v i v e s me. "ITEM FIVE "I g i v e , w i l l , d e v i s e and bequeath a l l t h e r e s t , r e s i d u e a n d r e m a i n d e r o f my p r o p e r t y , r e a l , p e r s o n a l a n d / o r m i x e d , w h e r e v e r s i t u a t e d , w h i c h I may own o r t o w h i c h I may b e e n t i t l e d a t t h e t i m e o f my d e a t h , o r t o w h i c h my e s t a t e may b e c o m e e n t i t l e d a f t e r my death, or over which I may h a v e any power o f d i s p o s i t i o n , u n t o my b e l o v e d s o n , [ W i l l i s ] , t o b e his absolutely. 3 1091798; 1100247 "ITEM SEVEN " I h e r e b y c o n s t i t u t e and a p p o i n t as E x e c u t o r o f this, my Last Will and Testament, my son, [Willis] " (Capitalization Mrs. signing in original.) McGee e x e c u t e d of the w i l l the w i l l were i n h e r home. W i l l i a m s and whom s i g n e d t h e d o c u m e n t Present at the Jim Wagstaff, as w i t n e s s e s . of had p l a y e d Willis both no r o l e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n s b e t w e e n W i l l i a m s a n d M r s . McGee d u r i n g the drafting stage the will signed. death, was Willis subsequently 15, last 2005, died offered were Jack amended, "invalid a n d he was sometime placed the w i l l not present before Mrs. when McGee's i n M r s . McGee's bank box. McGee testamentary However, allegedly safe-deposit Mrs. of the w i l l , on January the the a "complaint complaint b e c a u s e i t was 2005, for will issued to W i l l i s filed 18, and probate. Willis Letters i n February 2005. f o r contest of w i l l . " alleged not executed (1) that the On will June As was a s r e q u i r e d b y l a w " ; (2) t h a t M r s . McGee " l a c k e d s u f f i c i e n t t e s t a m e n t a r y c a p a c i t y " ; (3) that the w i l l the submission was the product of the w i l l o f undue f o r probate 4 influence; and (4) t h a t p e r p e t r a t e d a f r a u d on 1091798; the of 1100247 court. In the complaint a constructive trust over Jack a l s o sought the property the i m p o s i t i o n of the e s t a t e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , the complaint contained a conversion c l a i m , set f o r t h , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , as follows: "17. Willis McGee h a s a l s o w r o n g f u l l y taken a n d / o r w i t h h e l d a number o f i t e m s f r o m M r s . McGee's r e s i d e n c e w h i c h b e l o n g t o J a c k McGee. "18. currently otherwise [ a r e ] not The i t e m s b e l o n g i n g t o J a c k M c G e e , b u t r e t a i n e d , c o n t r o l l e d , d e s t r o y e d , sold or d i s p o s e d o f b y W i l l i s McGee i n c l u d e , b u t l i m i t e d t o , the f o l l o w i n g : "a. a 16 g a u g e shotgun; "b. an a u t o m a t i c "c. An "d. a 22 c a l i b e r "e. a 20 g a u g e "f. a 410 g a u g e "g. two 3 - b a r r e l g u n s ; "h. h i s g r a n d f a t h e r s ' guns; 22 c a l i b e r over/under pistol; shotgun; rifle; shotgun; shotgun; " i . a marble top; "j. two a n t i q u e bedroom "k. two w i n g b a c k antique " l . a rocking chair; "m. miscellaneous 5 suites; chairs; and family items. 1091798; 1100247 "19. D e s p i t e h i s o w n e r s h i p o f t h e s e i t e m s and J a c k ' s r e q u e s t f o r t h e i r r e t u r n , W i l l i s McGee h a s r e f u s e d and/or f a i l e d to r e t u r n s a i d items to Jack McGee." The trial Willis on influence court entered of the count, which was tried of Jack's matter of law of of a court, "submission however, f e e s , and On denied Willis appeal, motion Meanwhile, fees." to Willis The f o r payment trial of the court summary j u d g m e n t and t h a t the t r i a l t h e payment o f c o s t s and costs trial the JML, erred while in Willis court erred i n denying h i s request f o r fees. in large part, the "with d e n i e d by o p e r a t i o n and request a pursuant that contends address was fees Jack's 1091798). appealed contends both first the 1100247). entering appeal turn, that count, (1975)." costs Willis's also on ( c a s e no. Jack the ( c a s e no. prove undue- However, at r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s and Alabama to the of c o u r t e n t e r e d a j u d g m e n t as amend, o r v a c a t e t h a t j u d g m e n t l a w , a n d he a p p e a l e d filed and Code in favor except to a j u r y . ("JML") i n f a v o r o f W i l l i s 43-8-196, alter, complaint c a s e , the t r i a l leave f o r [ W i l l i s ] to prove § summary j u d g m e n t a l l counts close to a Because the m e r i t s of Willis's on t h e m e r i t s o f J a c k ' s a p p e a l , issues presented 6 i n case no. 1091798. we 1091798; 1100247 II. On Discussion appeal, C a s e No. J a c k c h a l l e n g e s t h e summary d i s p o s i t i o n b y of h i s u n d u e - i n f l u e n c e c l a i m . He judgment and on his c h a l l e n g e the eliminated execution by which we 982 Faulkner, "We will and review (2) I n any a on indistinguishable So. 2d 940 So. Constr. Co. 504, must d e c i d e Glass a jury determination." contention his 554, that light 560 the undue-influence v. 2007) most 236, to court claim. 7 erred a 246 the first of JML is which we Southern Bailey quoting (Ala. in v. turn 2004)). evidence, when plaintiff, A l a b a m a P o w e r Co. We claims 'standard by (quoting substantial favorable (Ala. 2002). trial 2d not invalid Birmingham So. was two for standard 904 there does alleged lack (Ala. 2006), warrant 2d the JML summary alleged motion 249 whether He " [ t ] h e de n o v o 247, in So. the Hall, v. the following McGee's a from (Ala. viewed 854 the 2d 506 (1) event, ruling claims. of the Mrs. a summary j u d g m e n t . ' " ' " R.R., Flint conversion judgment: capacity. "'materially review summary the testamentary by fraud also challenges summary d i s p o s i t i o n of 1091798 to v. A l d r i d g e , address i n e n t e r i n g the Jack's JML on 1 0 9 1 7 9 8 ; 1100247 A. JML Undue J a c k c o n c e d e s , as he claim to a jury" he Influence i n order the had must, t h a t of burden " [ t ] o submit producing e v i d e n c e of e a c h e l e m e n t of undue i n f l u e n c e . 24-25. Those elements his substantial Jack's b r i e f , at are: "'(1) that a confidential relationship existed b e t w e e n a f a v o r e d b e n e f i c i a r y a n d t h e t e s t a t o r ; (2) t h a t the i n f l u e n c e of or f o r the b e n e f i c i a r y was d o m i n a n t and c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p ; and (3) t h a t t h e r e was u n d u e a c t i v i t y on t h e p a r t o f t h e dominant p a r t y i n p r o c u r i n g the e x e c u t i o n of the will.'" F u r r o w v. Helton, added) (quoting 1988)). This 13 So. 3d Clifton v. C o u r t has 350, 353-54 Clifton, often 529 defined ( A l a . 2008) (emphasis So. 983 2d 980, a "favored (Ala. beneficiary" as " ' [ o ] n e who, i n the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of the p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , has been f a v o r e d over others having equal claim to the testator's bounty. An unnatural d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , l e a d i n g to a n a t u r a l i n f e r e n c e that a d v a n t a g e h a s b e e n t a k e n b y one i n p o s i t i o n so t o do; and shown t o h a v e b e e n b u s y i n g e t t i n g s u c h w i l l executed.'" Pirtle Cook v. v. Tucker, Morton, Assuming, 960 241 So. Ala. arguendo, favored beneficiary, "active interference 2d 188, 620, 192, that 629 1 So. the i t still 8 2d the be 2006) 890, proponent must in procuring (Ala. of shown execution (quoting 892 a that of (1941)). will is there the a was will." 1091798; Clifton in 1100247 v. Clifton, procuring and the interest (emphasis 960 117 Howard, 279 be ... 2d (Ala. at 631 "This and compliance 16, 21, the or activity 181 must more t h a n with So. 960 the 465 or 2d be activity obedience to testat[rix]." 85, 90 (1965) So. of [on the 2d Circumstances procurement 2d or v. "[a] in at the execution does Pirtle, So. 2d 'not in a 113, look at determining element of undue 632. "Evidence proving that there part of the the will of undue ( A l a . 1984) evidencing execution court 669 of [this] of 363 Sconyers, isolation supports existence 359, or c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence.'" execution So. procurement evidence evidence determination the However, undue a c t i v i t y procuring in (quoting A l l e n facts influence.'" Hodges, a Ala. p r o v e d by 1995)). individual was 984. added). may whether at untrammeled d i r e c t i o n s of the activity So. 2d of the w i l l r e f e r a b l e to "'Undue will So. execution t h e v o l u n t a r y and J o h n s o n v. 529 of undue a will named b e n e f i c i a r y ] i n is crucial influence." to Wall (emphasis in are those where beneficiary "'"was active in and about the execution and p r e p a r a t i o n o f s a i d w i l l s u c h as t h e i n i t i a t i o n of the p r o c e e d i n g s f o r the p r e p a r a t i o n of the w i l l , or 9 v. added). activity the the a 1091798; 1100247 participation i n such p r e p a r a t i o n , employing the draftsman, selecting the witnesses, excluding persons from the t e s t a t r i x a t or about the time of the e x e c u t i o n of t h e w i l l , c o n c e a l i n g t h e making of t h e w i l l a f t e r i t was made, a n d t h e l i k e "'" Reed v. Shipp, (quoting 210 293 A l a . appellants' brief, A l a . 401, insufficient The 413, her long-time a change $25,000 635, 647 attorney i n an e x i s t i n g increased t o $100,000. McGee r e q u e s t e d to So. i n turn (1923)). on a d r a f t and will. There i n this friend, The made That marked case. 1992 was t o r e c e i v e t h e changes up to substantive copy of t h e former w i l l her f o r her approval. was contacted in one t h e amount J a c k Williams (1975) Lewis v. M a r t i n , e v i d e n c e p r o d u c e d was t h a t M r s . McGee change she r e q u e s t e d from 98 quoting r e l e v a n t evidence of such a c t i v i t y only Williams, request 6 3 2 , 6 3 6 , 308 S o . 2 d 7 0 5 , 708 Mrs. and sent i t draft i s i n the record. It i s participate Mrs. the McGee actual undisputed i n , or attend and W i l l i a m s . execution He h a d n o t h i n g Indeed, that there Willis did not precipitate, any o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n s Neither of the w i l l , t o do w i t h s e l e c t i n g was no e v i d e n c e was W i l l i s a s we h a v e already the witnesses indicating foreknowledge of the will-making process. 10 present that between during stated. to the w i l l . Willis had any Moreover, there was 1091798; no 1100247 evidence will or indicating the whether fact there of was that W i l l i s subsequently i t s making. evidence of Thus, the evidence "crucial" two has failed c l a i m , because Jack 465 So. first to 2d two the the at 363 (even elements, jury in beneficiary ... the will or Jack out i n Mrs. access. These that testatrix 482 So. entered 2d on t h e r e was facts do had the not a court Willis's i n the the 1164 was "sufficient ... submit only involvement was any W a l l v. Hodges, of the 1985) named of i n an unsealed had indicating discussion with with to c o n s t i t u t e evidence of Smith and a v. Smith, judgment holding of undue i n f l u e n c e t o the jury"). that allow Because i n the p o s t - e x e c u t i o n process 11 a instructions (reversing to the to which W i l l i s contestant case the of i t " ) . of the w i l l . evidence the to present Evidence will does not f o r the the that found Jack. the (Ala. of procurement post-execution execution a jury verdict to will gave him consider evidence evidence with aid the c l a i m s h o u l d not have gone McGee's s a f e - d e p o s i t box, 1161, not See re-execution the i t away f o r s a f e k e e p i n g " undue a c t i v i t y do not elements sufficient of to that named b e n e f i c i a r y a n d "put absence [subsequent] envelope the assuming anything points element. undue-influence the "had third need first undue-influence on we concealed of 1 0 9 1 7 9 8 ; 1100247 allegedly the trial Willis placing court and t h a t the w i l l i n M r s . McGee's s a f e - d e p o s i t d i d not e r r i n entering and 1. next conversion i n favor of JML i s a f f i r m e d . B. Summary Jack a JML box, challenges Judgment t h e summary j u d g m e n t on h i s f r a u d claims. Fraud In t h i s Court, Jack explains h i s fraud theory "There a r e Willis offered authenticity. F McGee s a i d s h e W i l l i s i n equal as f o l l o w s : ... r e a s o n s why a j u r y c o u l d decide to probate a will of dubious irst, there i s evidence that Mrs. would l e a v e h e r e s t a t e t o Jack and portions. " S e c o n d , t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e t h a t M r s . McGee a n d those close to her stated that she changed h e r testamentary intentions. I n 1 9 9 6 , M r s . McGee t o l d h e r b e s t f r i e n d t h a t she h a d j u s t done h e r w i l l . At approximately t h e same t i m e , W i l l i s a d m i t t e d t o h i s t h e n m o t h e r - i n - l a w t h a t M r s . McGee w i s h e d t o t r e a t b o t h Jack and W i l l i s f a i r l y i n h e r w i l l , and t h a t any contrary intention 'was no l o n g e r t h e c a s e . ' Willis also expressed immediate regret that he shared that information. "... I n d e e d , t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d s h o w e d t h a t W i l l i s knew t h e 1 9 9 2 w i l l was n o t t h e t r u e l a s t w i l l a n d t e s t a m e n t o f M r s . M c G e e ; he a d m i t t e d a s much t o his then-mother-in-law. W i l l i s nevertheless offered t h e 1992 w i l l t o t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t . As s u c h , t h i s was a f r a u d on t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t , w h i c h i n j u r e d J a c k directly." 12 1091798; Jack's 1100247 brief, at 35-37 (footnote and citations to the record omitted). As we understand McGee e x e c u t e d her d i s p o s i t i o n of her Willis his Code 1992 this theory, will, e s t a t e and she i t is changed her 1975, presents § a cognizable 43-8-5, which after mind Mrs. about executed yet another w i l l , a l l e g e d l y suppressed or d e s t r o y e d . theory that, cause Jack of which contends action the under that Ala. provides: "Whenever fraud has been perpetrated in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h any p r o c e e d i n g o r i n any statement f i l e d under t h i s chapter or i f f r a u d i s used to a v o i d or circumvent the p r o v i s i o n s or purposes of t h i s c h a p t e r , a n y p e r s o n i n j u r e d t h e r e b y may obtain a p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f a g a i n s t the p e r p e t r a t o r of the f r a u d o r r e s t i t u t i o n f r o m any p e r s o n ( o t h e r t h a n a bona f i d e p u r c h a s e r ) b e n e f i t t i n g from the fraud, whether innocent or not. Any proceeding must be c o m m e n c e d w i t h i n one y e a r a f t e r t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e f r a u d o r f r o m t h e t i m e when t h e f r a u d s h o u l d h a v e b e e n d i s c o v e r e d , b u t no p r o c e e d i n g may be brought a g a i n s t one not a p e r p e t r a t o r of the f r a u d later than f i v e years a f t e r the time of the commission of the f r a u d . T h i s s e c t i o n h a s no b e a r i n g on r e m e d i e s r e l a t i n g t o f r a u d p r a c t i c e d on a d e c e d e n t d u r i n g h i s lifetime which affects the succession of his estate." Jack Willis will brief, insists that violated" executed at 34. he "presented this s e c t i o n by by Mrs. McGee We disagree. s u b s t a n t i a l evidence suppressing after 13 the 1992 or that destroying will. a Jack's 1091798; 1100247 This Court interpreted proposes, § as connection, the 43-8-5 an we and as Court a tolling independent recently of source Civil Appeals provision, of fraud not have as In law. Jack that said: " I n C h r i s t i a n [ v . M u r r a y , 915 So. 2d 23 (Ala. 2005)], t h i s Court i n d i c a t e d i t s agreement w i t h a prior decision of the Court of Civil Appeals, holding: " ' [ A ] p p r o p r i a t e r e l i e f f o r one i n j u r e d b y t h e f r a u d c o n t e m p l a t e d by A l a . Code 1975, § 43-8-5, would i n c l u d e the t o l l i n g of the time w i t h i n which to f i l e a w i l l contest when " t h e f a c t s u p o n w h i c h a c o n t e s t c o u l d be b a s e d w e r e m i s r e p r e s e n t e d and concealed by t h e f r a u d u l e n t a c t s o f t h e p r o p o n e n t s " of the w i l l . ' "Christian, 915 So. 2d a t 27 ( q u o t i n g Holway v. Wanschek, 690 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)). In d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r c o n d u c t amounts to f r a u d s u f f i c i e n t to t o l l the six-month l i m i t a t i o n s period for filing a will contest, this Court c o n c l u d e d t h a t 'the L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d that the f r a u d necessary to t o l l the time f o r f i l i n g a w i l l c o n t e s t m u s t be t h a t k i n d o f f r a u d t h a t w o u l d a l l o w r e l i e f f o r " f r a u d on a c o u r t . " ' C h r i s t i a n , 915 So. 2d a t 28." Johnson v. added). There are and, thus, Neal, there 39 no So. 3d 1040, 1044 timeliness issues i s no need f o r the provision. 14 ( A l a . 2009) (emphasis involved in this a p p l i c a t i o n of a case, tolling 1091798; 1100247 Substantively, echoed by the statements and Willis alleged others -- dispositional intentions missing In will. a revocation "'[i]t is supra of essence, the noted in [Weeks v . do 1992 this will McBeth McBeth, v. 14 the purpose importunity 353 So. 2d 190 Ala. Lawrence was will 1157. of 654, 1158 673-74, Allan "had The been offered by a son 474 (1848)], So. his of the will on a subsequent w i l l . " evidence the Allan, Scruggs, In probate. the acts stifling (1 9 1 4 ) ) . to Allan, Probate ground that 353 So. 2d i n d i c a t i n g that "his mother had t o l d him s e v e r a l y e a r s b e f o r e her d e a t h t h a t s h e h a d e x e c u t e d a new w i l l i n w h i c h s h e l e f t e v e r y t h i n g t o him i n s t e a d of t o h i s f a t h e r . ... A n e i g h b o r o f t h e A l l a n s a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t , some y e a r s b e f o r e h e r d e a t h , M r s . A l l a n t o l d h e r t h a t she h a d made a new w i l l i n w h i c h s h e l e f t e v e r y t h i n g to h e r son i n s t e a d of t o h e r h u s b a n d . " 15 ),] testators A l l a n v. 308 marriage show (1847 of A l l e n v. a However, and 301 , presented that to testamentary (quoting wife's 596 of their friends." ( A l a . 1977) 67 evidence Ala. -¬ McGee's i s advanced [11 misleading, r e v o k e d by contestant McBeth, McGee Mrs. a subsequent w i l l . touching r e l a t i v e s and 1157, contested of argument by Mrs. regarding constitute Ala. f r e q u e n t l y make d e c l a r a t i o n s "for not of the at 1091798; 353 1100247 So. 2d a t 1157-58. against the contestant "There i s no e v i d e n c e ... w i l l Id. court directed and Court affirmed, that the proponent this i n this case d e s t r o y e d a subsequent will i s instructive. involved evidence allegedly Allan Indeed, indicating 1 holding: of the "testified that unlike this likewise. [was] evidence no witnesses said F o r example, contest that such a jury's i sinsufficient to seen McGee's will. "[t]here which the i n the presence I d . a t 1158. consideration. i n this a post-1992 F o r these However, witnesses had executed of the t e s t a t r i x . " the evidence and a neighbor the instrument saw h a d b e e n e x e c u t e d d i d not warrant have e v e r seen the contestant i n 353 So. 2 d a t 1 1 5 7 - 5 8 . witnesses, nor that the presence Allan h e saw a n i n s t r u m e n t w i t h h i s m o t h e r ' s whatever they case, that witnesses had a c t u a l l y missing w i l l . testified in verdict made b y t h e t e s t a t r i x . " name o n i t a n d t h e names o f t w o o t h e r p e o p l e , " two a a t 1159. Allan the The t r i a l A of t h e same Thus, t h e fortiori, c a s e , w h e r e no o n e c l a i m s d o c u m e n t p u r p o r t i n g t o be M r s . reasons, Jack's fraud claim A d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t has been renamed as a judgment m a t t e r o f l a w . S e e R u l e 5 0 , A l a . R. C i v . P. 1 16 i s as a 1 0 9 1 7 9 8 ; 1100247 without merit, and, summary j u d g m e n t 2. conversion motion. that claim, that he the trial court's is affirmed. Jack insists sufficient "The to withstand property over another the and defiance that 444, 446 of and Young v. ownership or property of right to t a k i n g must Norfolk Southern conversion and Mut. I n s . Co. 2d Auto. 216, In 219 conversion the property h i s immediate r i g h t (1974) his to v. at Ry., time 712, words, of State 717, the Farm 304 So. to the added). summary-judgment claim, W i l l i s the other of p o s s e s s i o n . " W a g n o n , 53 A l a . A p p . (emphasis In be r e c o v e r u n d e r t h e c o u n t o f c o n v e r s i o n , p l a i n t i f f m u s t show himself 1997). a "to in App. have the taking So. title (Ala. Civ. of must such p r o p e r t y right." summary-judgment identifiable plaintiff of 705 legal 2d of the and evidence include a wrongful assumption separate Further, immediate possession an presented Willis's elements of c o n v e r s i o n specific dominion in to Conversion Finally, of as motion addressed stated, in pertinent part: " I n h i s Amended C o m p l a i n t , [Jack] a l l e g e s t h a t n u m e r o u s i t e m s o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n Ms. McGee's house a t t h e t i m e of her death had been g i v e n t o h i m b y Ms. McGee p r i o r t o h e r d e a t h . ... 17 1091798; 1100247 " [ J a c k ' s ] c l a i m s o f c o n v e r s i o n and d e t i n u e a r e without merit as a m a t t e r of law, because the subject matter of those claims r e m a i n e d i n Ms. McGee's possession at the time of her death. Therefore, no d e l i v e r y o c c u r r e d as r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h a v a l i d g i f t , and t h e p r o p e r t y a t i s s u e i s t h e p r o p e r t y o f Ms. M c G e e ' s E s t a t e . " (Emphasis added.) proposition the that possession Willis when then allegedly cited gifted authority property of the t e s t a t o r at the time death, i t i s regarded matter i s found i n of the t e s t a t o r ' s of law." Jack as " p a r t f o r the of the decedent's responded to the motion w h i c h he s t a t e d , i n pertinent with estate h i s own a f f i d a v i t , part: "In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e were s e v e r a l i t e m s i n h e r house t h a t s h e h a d g i v e n me t h a t I was k e e p i n g t h e r e u n t i l t h e r e m o d e l i n g on my h o u s e was d o n e , i n c l u d i n g t w o c h a i r s , a t a b l e and marble t o p and s e v e r a l p i c t u r e s . There were a l s o guns o f mine t h a t I had r e c e i v e d f r o m my g r a n d f a t h e r i n t h e h o u s e when s h e d i e d . "11. A t t h e t i m e t h a t mother d i e d , I h a d s e v e r a l i t e m s o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t h a t b e l o n g e d t o me t h a t w e r e l o c a t e d i n m o t h e r ' s h o u s e . Some o f t h e s e i t e m s w e r e g i v e n t o me b y m o t h e r , some w e r e g i v e n t o me b y others, a n d some w e r e i t e m s t h a t I h a d p u r c h a s e d myself. I took a c t u a l possession of a l l of these items before leaving them i n mother's house i n c l u d i n g t h e t h i n g s t h a t m o t h e r g a v e me a n d t h e g u n s I r e c e i v e d f r o m my g r a n d f a t h e r . A f t e r I took a c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n o f these t h i n g s , I asked mother i f I could store them i n h e r house while I was r e m o d e l i n g o u r house, w h i c h she s a i d I c o u l d . 18 as a in 1091798; 1100247 "12. A f t e r m o t h e r d i e d , I t r i e d t o go into m o t h e r ' s h o u s e t o s e e w h a t was t h e r e and retrieve c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y t h a t was mine. H o w e v e r , when I tried to get i n her house, I c o u l d not because W i l l i s had changed a l l the l o c k s . I a s k e d W i l l i s i f I c o u l d h a v e a k e y t o t h e h o u s e so t h a t I c o u l d go i n t o o u r m o t h e r ' s h o u s e a n d s e e w h a t was t h e r e and r e t r i e v e w h a t was mine. Willis t o l d me that he w o u l d n o t a l l o w me t o go i n t o t h e h o u s e n o r w o u l d he r e t u r n a n y o f my possessions." (Emphasis added.) According to Jack, he three classes of items that "his own property residence at had given been "items he was the Willis's claim that he of her time by persons given (emphasis added). He by Mrs. as to the Willis was third storing other (2) than McGee." -- motion that converted," death"; p o i n t s out summary-judgment only " o f f e r e d evidence at Mrs. "that McGee"; Jack's brief, we the Jack and at (3) 32-33 n o t e -- that conversion property. "'The [summary-judgment] movant has t h e i n i t i a l burden of making a prima f a c i e showing t h a t there i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t ; i f t h e m o v a n t makes t h a t s h o w i n g , t h e b u r d e n t h e n s h i f t s t o t h e nonmovant t o p r e s e n t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of each e l e m e n t o f t h e c l a i m c h a l l e n g e d by the movant.' H a r p e r v . W i n s t o n C o u n t y , 892 So. 2d 3 4 6 , 349 ( A l a . 2004) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . However, i f the movant does not satisfy his i n i t i a l burden, ' t h e n he i s not e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e n t . No d e f e n s e t o an i n s u f f i c i e n t showing i s r e q u i r e d . ' Ray v. M i d f i e l d P a r k , Inc., 19 (1) McGee's Mrs. challenged were namely, property correctly, c l a s s of there 1091798; 1100247 293 Ala. (emphasis White Sands 1054-55 60 9, 612 , added)." Group, (Ala. that conversion shifted to classes of erred, claim In to the trial 2d regarding" sufficiency of t h r e e by defend Mrs. the T h u s , we gifts that Jack's the two McGee," t h e as to property. to he burden the The other trial two court conversion items Jack allegedly received the Willis challenges to W i l l i s , legal are sufficiency of the as McGee. title the Jack's to the sufficiency affidavit allegedly McGee's p o s s e s s i o n i s t r u e , b e c a u s e , he affidavit never the According This property, only from Mrs. had Jack's discuss t h a t r e m a i n e d i n Mrs. death. 1042, court of c l a s s e s of challenge a l l e g e d l y converted affidavit. show of her So. agree. the t o one given that connection, property in Jack We challenged was relating vivos Jack's (1975) 998 that judgment 688 t h e r e f o r e , i n summarily d i s p o s i n g of Jack's evidence to he in toto. inter 68 6, I I , LLC, argues doing. c l a i m o n l y as "items PRS summary i n so Willis namely, v. 2d not c h a l l e n g e d i n the summary-judgment m o t i o n i t erred Because So. Jack granted c l a s s e s of items and L.L.C. 2008). "inexplicably 308 merely 20 says, conclusory, fails gifted at the the that of time statements i s , the 1091798; 1100247 affidavit any does not such g i f t gift, nor contain occurred, facts in Willis's principal So. 2d element donor order 1020, of a We to to constitute 1022-23 vivos a delivery] agree. To actual possession be a at 47 that and affidavit things (Emphasis "when a r e s p o n s e summary judgment conclusions tend for to prove summary genuine an ultimate or judgment, i t of fact." P.3d 849, 858 174 rel. Brown v. St. the is without death states: Ct. Dial, of "I the took l e a v i n g them i n to including State App. Hosp., to facts Farm Mut. 8 99 So. 2d that motion rise Auto. See for states give 2007). " a motion affidavit insufficient (Colo. Vincent's v. a l l e g a t i o n s made i n t h e O l s o n v. gift." t h a t m o t h e r g a v e me accompanying issues disprove issues Co., (Ala. on or Dial had revocation")). mother's house i n c l u d i n g the However, vivos "the of a l l of t h e s e items b e f o r e added.) such ( d e l i v e r y i s an e s s e n t i a l automatic Jack's any delivery inter (citing gift, i s an sure, surrounding valid ( A l a . 1992) inter " t o e s t a b l i s h when establish reply brief, valid [without the circumstances sufficient occurred 603 facts necessary to Ins. Brown 227, ex 238-39 2004). Thus, where the issue was whether " o f f e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t he 21 a property owner s u f f e r e d harm or l o s s as 1091798; a 1100247 result of the construction pedestrian bridge" when evidence the across [by a municipality] a highway adjacent offered in of [a] to h i s property, response to the properly s u p p o r t e d s u m m a r y - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n was t h e o w n e r ' s s t a t e m e n t i n his affidavit [to] that and e g r e s s the bridge [from]" "interfere[d] with h i s property, s u c h e v i d e n c e was m e r e l y c o n c l u s o r y . 672 So. 2d 1 2 8 5 , 1286 (Ala. 1995). this the ingress Court R e i d v. J e f f e r s o n Also, referring merely conclusory of the existence 31, 35 took to the other element of a marriage. possession" of a gift, -- Here is a not f a c t u a l Jack's substantial evidence he e v e r McGee. judgment insofar The that of the property trial as t o t h a t as the as was affiant's "his wife" court class summary the bare legal were 971 S o . 2 d statement conclusion support Consequently, possession party S a l t e r v. S t a t e , delivery. to Cnty., and d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ( A l a . C i v . App. 2007). actual that where t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r a common-law m a r r i a g e h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d , statements held as t o an f o r the element affidavit does not acquired title and a allegedly given of items judgment provide a right summary a l l e g e d l y converted d i d so, of him by Mrs. d i d not e r r i n entering 22 -- " I i t i s and, affirmed. 1091798; Insofar two 1100247 as i t entered classes of property, III. In erred a summary j u d g m e n t that Discussion Willis's appeal, i n denying h i s motion 43-8-196, which summary j u d g m e n t -- he regarding C a s e No. contends for costs the is other reversed. 1100247 that and the fees, trial court pursuant to § provides: "The c o s t s o f a n y c o n t e s t u n d e r t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s a r t i c l e m u s t be p a i d b y t h e p a r t y c o n t e s t i n g if he fails; otherwise, i t m u s t be p a i d by the plaintiff or out of the estate, or in such p r o p o r t i o n b y t h e p l a i n t i f f o r o u t o f t h e e s t a t e as t h e c o u r t may d i r e c t ; a n d f o r t h e c o s t s d i r e c t e d t o be p a i d b y t h e p l a i n t i f f o r d e f e n d a n t , e x e c u t i o n may be i s s u e d as i n o t h e r c a s e s ; a n d t h e c o s t s d i r e c t e d t o be p a i d o u t o f t h e e s t a t e may be c o l l e c t e d as o t h e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t an e s t a t e a r e c o l l e c t e d . " (Emphasis added.) Although authorizes a will an The has s e c t i o n speaks award contest. 1992). Court this of Hart contestant attorney v. specifically fees Jackson, is liable 607 as part So. " i f he of of 2d "costs," i t the 161, fails," (Ala. which this to mean t h a t " i f there e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by the contestant i n s u p p o r t of the contest, the attorneys' So. 2d 769, the 771 contestant fees of the ( A l a . 1982) i s not t o be proponent." (emphasis 23 i s some credible theory charged with Bleidt added) v. in 164 construed the costs of paying Kantor, 412 (construing the 1091798; 1100247 predecessor contest commenced influence to a statute and jury, favor of trial the pursuant § the This of the 197 of 2d the (1 967) a jury verdict the § Ala. that of the 42, tried Bleidt in the in attorney to the fees, Bleidt's sufficiency contest but did award. the fee C l a r k v. I") a w a r d on C l a r k , 280 (reversing contestant to the who undue and the on support So. of 43-8-196. proponent 247 attorneys in Clark by will Subsequently, Id. for f o r the insufficient contest" against now a c a s e was The $10,000 fee ("Clark was 287 the represented evidence will is reversed favor (holding will. grounds in Clark, grounds a t 770. the involved the verdict which judgment v. 2d proponents in Bleidt 447 on on a p r o p r i e t y of litigation entered the Bleidt involve a specific challenge Court So. So. of 43-1-76, evidence challenge 412 returned awarded to the Bleidt proponents a p p e a l d i d not of 43-8-196). Nell by § forgery. which court to 2d 361 represented I were e n t i t l e d the and rendering that and t o be a the Clark ("Clark "executor to a fee 644, judgment ground (1971) basis Ala. a contest); the the II") in the paid by contestant). Discussing Clark I and Clark explained: 24 II, the Court in Bleidt 1091798; 1100247 " [ C l a r k I I ] i n v o l v e d an a l l o w a n c e o f a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s under T i t l e 6 1 , § 5 9 , A l a b a m a C o d e o f 1 940, the p r e d e c e s s o r o f C o d e o f 1 9 7 5 , § 4 3 - 1 - 7 6 [now § 4 3 - 8 ¬ 196]. T h e r e t h i s C o u r t was dealing with a prior w i l l c o n t e s t w h i c h had been s u c c e s s f u l but w h i c h , u p o n r e v i e w , was f o u n d t o be b a s e d u p o n i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e . [ C l a r k I ] . In [ C l a r k I I ] d e a l i n g w i t h the a w a r d o f a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s a g a i n s t t h e c o n t e s t a n t as costs, this Court referred to [Clark I] as 'altogether without merit,' or frivolous. T h e r e f o r e , t h i s C o u r t h e l d the t r i a l c o u r t had e r r e d i n d e c r e e i n g t h a t t h e e x e c u t o r ' s a t t o r n e y s be p a i d f r o m t h e r e s i d u a r y e s t a t e 'and i n n o t t a x i n g s u c h f e e a g a i n s t t h e c o n t e s t a n t s as c o s t s i n t h e will c o n t e s t s u i t . ' [ C l a r k I I ] , s u p r a , 287 A l a . 4 2 , 48, 247 So. 2d 361. In other words, this Court construed § 59 (now [§ 4 3 - 8 - 1 9 6 ] ) as a u t h o r i z i n g attorneys' f e e s a g a i n s t t h e c o n t e s t a n t who fails o n l y when t h e c o n t e s t i s w i t h o u t m e r i t . That i s , i f there i s some c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e o f f e r e d by the c o n t e s t a n t i n support of the t h e o r y of the c o n t e s t , t h e c o n t e s t a n t i s n o t t o be c h a r g e d w i t h p a y i n g t h e a t t o r n e y s ' fees of the proponent. "An e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s r e c o r d c o n v i n c e s u s t h a t t h i s c o n t e s t was n o t ' a l t o g e t h e r w i t h o u t m e r i t . ' To the contrary, the contestant adduced credible evidence of undue i n f l u e n c e and forgery. The proponents of the w i l l produced evidence t e n d i n g to show an a b s e n c e o f u n d u e i n f l u e n c e o r f o r g e r y . The t r i a l c o u r t p r o p e r l y a l l o w e d the j u r y to r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t c r e a t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e o f b o t h s i d e s , and the j u r y found f o r the proponents. But t h e mere f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t e s t a n t l o s t c o u l d n o t u n d e r § 43¬ 1-76 [now § 4 3 - 8 - 1 9 6 ] a n d C l a r k [ I I ] , 287 A l a . 4 2 , 247 So. 2d 361 (1 9 7 1 ) , be used to charge the c o n t e s t a n t w i t h t h e p r o p o n e n t s ' a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s as p a r t of the c o s t s . " 412 So. 2d at 771-72 (emphasis 25 added). 1091798; In in 1100247 this support c a s e , we of McGee's w i l l . to a r e p r e s e n t e d w i t h no any The 2 award W i l l i s ground trial upon court erred, f e e s and summary, t h e and the case of conversion sources judgment challenged therefore, in of judgment i n case the than case items Mrs. no. no. Jack McGee. 1091798 allegedly In is as t o t h e the judgment a l l other affirmed. i s reversed respects, Of course, As and Wise, -- AFFIRMED M a l o n e , C . J . , and J J . , concur. Murdock, IN Stuart, J . , concurs the our f o r case the case no. is opinion. PART; REVERSED PART; AND Bolin, P a r k e r , Shaw, M a i n , and i n the IN from similarly remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s 1091798 REMANDED. issue received o f t h e f r a u d and u n d u e - i n f l u e n c e c l a i m s however, refusing 1091798 i s r e v e r s e d d i s p o s e s o f any need f o r a c o n s t r u c t i v e t r u s t . 1100247, in Mrs. Conclusion remanded f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s other disposition Jack evidence costs. IV. In which credible result. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , W i l l i s asks t h i s Court to o v e r r u l e B l e i d t . B e c a u s e o f o u r r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i s s u e i n f a v o r o f W i l l i s , we d e c l i n e to address that request. 2 26 1091798; 1100247 1100247 Malone, concur. Bolin, -- REVERSED AND REMANDED. C . J . , and S t u a r t , Murdock, and Wise, Parker, Shaw, and Main, J J . , J J . , concur i n the 27 result. 1091798; 1100247 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e I both concur case regarding and i n the no. separately as i n the result 1091798 to case and and case no. reached by to my 1977, i f not terms of three will contestant influence, proponent by thereby act of the t e s t a t o r . (Ala. 1977), this respect my in write concern influence f o r agreeing with to the f r a u d as claim. had elements that, i f proven, rise the to a begun the to speak would presumption burden to e s t a b l i s h that of proof the w i l l In P r u i t t v. P r u i t t , Court I t o undue cases shifting of the w i l l express our giving opinion 1100247. to reason main Influence before, distinct the no. opinion Undue By by 1091798 note the main result). reached the s t a t e o f our law w i t h conversion result (concurring 343 So. was of aid a undue to the the free 2d 4 9 5 , stated: "Our cases have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t when undue i n f l u e n c e i s a s s e r t e d i n a w i l l c o n t e s t , t h e contestant has the burden, i n order to r a i s e a p r e s u m p t i o n o f undue i n f l u e n c e , t o p r o v e a d o m i n a n t c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and undue a c t i v i t y i n t h e execution of the will by or for a favored beneficiary. In other words, evidence must e s t a b l i s h : (1) a c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a f a v o r e d b e n e f i c i a r y a n d t e s t a t o r ; (2) t h a t the i n f l u e n c e o f o r f o r t h e b e n e f i c i a r y was d o m i n a n t a n d controlling i n that r e l a t i o n s h i p ; and (3) undue activity on the part of the dominant p a r t y in p r o c u r i n g the execution of the w i l l . " 28 in 499 1091798; 343 So. 1100247 2 d a t 499 emphasis added). however, the presumption proof are ( c i t a t i o n and As 3 indicated "elements" of undue one original cases necessary influence thing; in the and definition emphasis such to to omitted as give shift of Pruitt, rise the and to a of influence undue burden is another. Not u n e x p e c t e d l y , as P r u i t t e x p l a i n e d , able to prove presumption, proving those he or elements she the p r i n c i p a l 499. as "undue i n f l u e n c e , " cases ... as, testator, the law as in "principal was and measure, a party creating f a r , of itself defined the assertion destroys should the in 343 2d So. known a t common l a w a n d of such free of that possess that course, i . e . , the wrongdoing prevents the e x e r c i s e requires of of undue i n f l u e n c e . " charge," simply t h i s : some f o r purposes have " g o [ n e ] charge at our That will i f a contestant i s as in "'influence agency of discretion essential the which to a S e e a l s o J o n e s v . B r o o k s , 184 A l a . 1 1 5 , 1 2 0 , 63 So. 9 7 8 , 979 ( 1 9 1 3 ) ( " A f t e r t h e c o n t e s t a n t m a k e s o u t a c a s e w h i c h w o u l d c a s t the burden upon the b e n e f i c i a r y , the b e n e f i c i a r y may o v e r t u r n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n by p r o o f of competent, independent a d v i c e and c o u n s e l , ' o r by any o t h e r e v i d e n c e w h i c h s a t i s f i e s t h e j u d i c i a l c o n s c i e n c e t h a t t h e g i f t was t h e v o l u n t a r y a n d w e l l - u n d e r s t o o d a c t of the t e s t a t r i x ' s mind.' S c a r b r o u g h v. Scarbrough, [185 A l a . 4 6 8 , 478 , 64 So. 1 0 5 , 109 (1 9 1 3 ) ] . " (emphasis a d d e d ) ) . 3 29 1091798; valid 1100247 testamentary (quoting stated 140, the w e l l disposition established o v e r 20 y e a r s e a r l i e r 81 S o . 2 d 6 7 0 , 673 the 1861 131, case 134 influence i s simply is v. Hall's necessary a showing will, and c o n s t r a i n e d than a f f e c t i o n , Dictionary relation 1666 to testator's its a "that free place" will and influence" then 109 U n d u e I n f l u e n c e to 38 A l a . demonstrate was equivalent undue exerted to moral o f p e a c e , o r some defines notes that added) "undue "[c]oercion "a may between the Law influence" in destroys a objectives in presumption arise other Black's that another's See a l s o 36 Am. i n Execution of W i l l the elements of a c l a i m of Facts 109 Executors, of "based influencer undue on the and the "[w]hen a b e n e f i c i a r y a c t i v e l y p r o c u r e s the of a w i l l . " 2d simply relationship person influenced" influence indicated i n he was u n a b l e t o r e s i s t . " and s u b s t i t u t e s (emphasis confidential execution as Court an i n f l u e n c e the desire ( 9 t h e d . 2009) will Id. h i m t o do t h a t w h i c h was a g a i n s t h i s but which, from f e a r , feeling o f undue As t h i s u p o n t h e m i n d o f t h e t e s t a t o r , w h i c h was coercion, property.'" i n L o c k e v . S p a r k s , 263 A l a . 1 3 7 , Heirs what his definition (1955)). of H a l l ' s (1861), of Undue J u r . Proof of Facts § 2 (19 8 3 ) ( d i s c u s s i n g o f u n d u e i n f l u e n c e ) ; 36 Am. Influence 30 2d i n Execution of J u r . Proof Will § 7 1091798; 1100247 (1983)(discussing of undue failure our cases the elements giving rise confusion, could, in example, So. 529 I believe given case, (1) a the (Ala. 983 (Ala. 1998)). between it the appears that may there (thereby means s i m p l y these present unjust (quoting the and the leads case, For requires the should F u r r o w v. Laying aside r e q u i r e the seem that v. the Helton, Clifton, even more r e l a t i o n s h i p to what should the b e n e f i c i a r y " and the influence recent cases i n order to shifting the have be a c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between have create testator, and testator. confused Indeed, the a presumption burden of p r o o f ) w i t h not factors of undue what i t f o r a t e s t a t o r to have been u n d u l y i n f l u e n c e d cases and result. Clifton and more shown the an i t would be the "favored that be influence that we " c o n f i d e n t i a l " one, in testator.'" 353 exerting maintain influence articulated 2008) party to c o n f i d e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between 350, i s that undue to now the 980, Pruitt of lead b e n e f i c i a r y and 2d required since i t has as f u n d a m e n t a l i s s u e o f why be presumption a p r e s u m p t i o n of undue i n f l u e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h "'a 3d So. to element favored 13 as a contestant a of between distinction factors elements f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g a influence). The to the sub silentio 31 overruled earlier and cases 1 0 9 1 7 9 8 ; 1100247 such as Little (1942). is by beneficiary procured, will Court (2), as f o r the any o f who may be above beneficiary." the 343 result simply of e x e r t i n g the Similarly, impose a as strict to of i t s execution. terms i n a w i l l s o m e o n e be his by guilty or her w i l l undue of unlike committing unduly without undue intention] is agent." In fact, appears to 499. being to "influence Why influence i n t e n t i o n be (3), of the w i l l of so would (i.e., any a why less unduly the than influence? element Not at the If i t is Pruitt, 2d will t o some p e r s o n o r e n t i t y o t h e r requirement physical preparation "If a i t . i t s reference So. 881 e s s e n t i a l that guilty from 866, because a p a r t y unduly i n f l u e n c e d t e s t a t o r to leave property party the 2d explained: [testamentary distinction with i n t e r f e r e d with) 8 So. procuring testandi quoted less 212, clearly would the t e s t a t o r ' s testamentary the 196, i n f l u e n c e , i t i s not animus regardless be Ala. p a r t i c i p a t e d i n thus acknowledge t h i s or 243 this undue the element of Sugg, In L i t t l e , procured absent, v. I question direct or the a party f r a u d on why involvement logistics who the we or obtains 32 in the mechanics favorable testator, could i n f l u e n c i n g a t e s t a t o r to directly should i n v o l v e d i n the not change ensuing 1091798; 1100247 mechanics of h i r i n g main opinion a lawyer, obtaining witnesses, etc.? The states: " C i r c u m s t a n c e s e v i d e n c i n g undue a c t i v i t y i n t h e p r o c u r e m e n t o r e x e c u t i o n o f a w i l l a r e t h o s e where a beneficiary "'"'was a c t i n g i n a n d a b o u t t h e e x e c u t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n o f s a i d w i l l s u c h as t h e initiation of the proceedings f o r the preparation of the w i l l , or p a r t i c i p a t i o n in such preparation, employing the draftsman, selecting the witnesses, e x c l u d i n g persons form the t e s t a t r i x a t or about the time of the e x e c u t i o n of the will, concealing the making of the w i l l a f t e r i t was made, a n d t h e l i k e . . . . ' " ' " R e e d v . S h i p p , 2 9 3 A l a . 6 3 2 , 6 3 6 , 308 S o . 2 d 7 0 5 , 708 (1975) ( q u o t i n g a p p e l l a n t s ' b r i e f , q u o t i n g i n t u r n L e w i s v . M a r t i n , 210 A l a . 4 0 1 , 4 1 3 , 98 S o . 6 3 5 , 647 (1923)). There was insufficient relevant evidence of such a c t i v i t y i n t h i s case." So. the 3d a t the free agency 2 d a t 499 ( q u o t i n g influence the relatively r e c e n t l y i n our h i s t o r y , that would serve to invalidate was, as s t a t e d above, t h e e x e r t i o n o f s u c h i n f l u e n c e as "'destroys in Until e s s e n c e o f undue i n f l u e n c e a will So. . of the t e s t a t o r . ' " Locke). Pruitt, I am a t a l o s s a s t o why u n d u e does n o t e x i s t whenever a testator's free will t h i s manner been overcome and, i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h a t testator mechanics then handles associated with 343 on h i s o r h e r own preparing 33 the and e x e c u t i n g has fact, physical the will 1091798; without see 1100247 any further Little, We undue rest not asked i n which influence of the framework result because by the "influencer." of our as Court, those in this cases stated case, however, articulate the i n Furrow. I review the elements. so three evidence" do not see to support in such The the a presented doing, record before claim. Fraud revisit the elements of Accordingly, like issues In to I us within concur r e a c h e d as t o t h e c l a i m o f u n d u e i n f l u e n c e I Again, supra. are manner involvement in in this the the the case "substantial 4 Claim I a l s o h a v e some c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e s t a t e m e n t i n t h e m a i n o p i n i o n t h a t " [ e ] v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the t e s t a t r i x had a p o s t - e x e c u t i o n d i s c u s s i o n w i t h a named b e n e f i c i a r y a n d g a v e him the will with instructions to 'put i t away for s a f e k e e p i n g ' does not c o n s t i t u t e e v i d e n c e o f undue a c t i v i t y i n the e x e c u t i o n of the w i l l . " So. 3d a t . Although I agree t h a t , i n the context of the present case, that s t a t e d f a c t , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , does not c o n s t i t u t e m e a n i n g f u l e v i d e n c e of undue i n f l u e n c e , I w o u l d not a g r e e t h a t e v i d e n c e o f s u c h p o s t - e x e c u t i o n i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h t h e t e s t a t o r c o u l d n o t , i n an appropriate case (e.g., here there i s other meaningful e v i d e n c e of undue i n f l u e n c e ) , c o n t r i b u t e t o a j u r y ' s a b i l i t y to i n f e r from the e v i d e n c e t h a t such i n f l u e n c e had i n f a c t occurred. C f . R e e d v . S h i p p , 293 A l a . 6 3 2 , 636, 308 So. 2 d 705, 708 (1975) (noting that post-execution activity in " c o n c e a l i n g t h e m a k i n g o f t h e w i l l a f t e r i t was made, a n d t h e l i k e , " may be e v i d e n c e o f u n d u e i n f l u e n c e ) . 4 34 1091798; 1100247 I concur Jack's fraud substantial i n the result claim evidence because t h e Dead I do of a missing The If a c h i e v e d b y t h e main o p i n i o n as t o Man's Conversion Statute not find i n the record will. Claim were still "alive" i n this S t a t e , t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d as t o t h e a l l e g e d i n t e r v i v o s from § M r s . McGee 12-21-163, Schoenvogel to Jack A l a . Code v. Venator likely would 1975 (Dead Group n o t be b e f o r e u s . Man's Retail, Statute); Inc., 5 see a l s o Court's "In c i v i l a c t i o n s a n d p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e r e must be no e x c l u s i o n o f a n y w i t n e s s b e c a u s e h e i s a p a r t y o r i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e i s s u e t r i e d , e x c e p t t h a t no p e r s o n having a pecuniary interest i n the result of the a c t i o n o r p r o c e e d i n g s h a l l be a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y t o whom h i s i n t e r e s t i s o p p o s e d a s to any t r a n s a c t i o n with, or statement by, the d e c e a s e d p e r s o n whose e s t a t e i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e result of the action or proceeding unless c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y t h e r e t o b y t h e p a r t y t o whom s u c h i n t e r e s t i s opposed o r u n l e s s t h e t e s t i m o n y o f such deceased person i n r e l a t i o n t o such t r a n s a c t i o n o r statement i s i n t r o d u c e d i n evidence by the party whose i n t e r e s t i s o p p o s e d t o t h a t o f t h e w i t n e s s o r has b e e n t a k e n a n d i s on f i l e i n the case. No p e r s o n who i s a n i n c o m p e t e n t w i t n e s s under this s e c t i o n s h a l l make h i m s e l f c o m p e t e n t b y t r a n s f e r r i n g his interest to another." (Emphasis added.) 35 See 895 S o . 2 d 2 2 5 , S e c t i o n 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 6 3 , w h i c h was a b r o g a t e d b y t h i s a d o p t i o n o f R u l e 6 0 1 , A l a . R. E v i d . , s t a t e s : 5 gifts 1091798; 258 1100247 ( A l a . 2004) Ala. Code Evid."); to be 1975, Rule a ("The A l a b a m a Dead Man's S t a t u t e , § has 601, witness been Ala. except rules."). For example, 254 So. 175, 178-79 the death of 2d property in an R. superseded Evid. as by i n B r o o k s v. the W a r d , 287 had an inter Ala. R. competent in Ala. w h i c h i n v o l v e d an estate is provided a l l e g e d d o n o r t o p r o v e an which 601, ("Every p e r s o n otherwise (1971), Rule 12-21-163, these 609, 614, attempt a f t e r vivos interest, gift this of Court stated: " I n o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s a p p e a l we h a v e n o t overlooked the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t of [the] ... Dead Man's Statute ... in rendering incompetent the testimony o f L o y d and H a z e l Ward p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e s t a t e m e n t o f Mr. B r o o k s c o n c e r n i n g the g i f t or the r e l e a s e of the note. "The fact that the Wards had a pecuniary i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome o f t h e s u i t , and t h e f u r t h e r f a c t t h a t Mr. B r o o k s ' e s t a t e w o u l d be a f f e c t e d b y t h e s u i t , w o u l d seem t o p l a c e t h e c o m p e t e n c y o f t h e W a r d s as w i t n e s s e s s q u a r e l y w i t h i n t h e t e r m s o f [ t h e D e a d Man's S t a t u t e ] . "... [ N ] e i t h e r the C h a n c e l l o r nor t h i s court can c o n s i d e r t h a t p a r t of the t e s t i m o n y o f Mr. and Mrs. Ward w h i c h i s w i t h i n t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e o f [ t h e D e a d Man's S t a t u t e ] . " See, e.g., 521, 523 Statute, Livingston (1952). v. The h o w e v e r , has now Powell, 257 Ala. effective repeal made p o s s i b l e t h e 36 38, of 42, the dispute 57 Dead So. 2d Man's before us 1091798; 1100247 in i t h a s made that possible the use alleged donee support o f a c l a i m o f an i n t e r v i v o s g i f t the deceased The f o l l o w i n g the death of testimony donor's elements of a g i f t surrender title 2) 3) [a]cceptance to, [d]elivery 1022 e s t a t e h a s an of a r e "1) and the of the alleged by t h e donee." [a]ni n t e n t i o n over, to i n which t o g i v e and the the D i a l v. D i a l , ( A l a . 1992) ( e m p h a s i s o m i t t e d ) . donor i n interest. dominion property of property of the property; donee; and 603 S o . 2 d 1020 , Further, proof of a g i f t must be a c c o m p l i s h e d by " c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . " e.g., First Bank 1104, 1111 51 Alabama ( A l a . 1980); S o . 2 d 5 0 6 , 508 o f M o n t g o m e r y v . Adams, DeMouy v . J e p s o n , (1951). 255 A l a . i s not s u s c e p t i b l e of such d e l i v e r y . a gift might subsequently be this shown regains Court even some 337, 339, (1969). has r e c o g n i z e d where physical the property See G a r r i s o n v . G r a y s o n , A l a . 2 4 7 , 2 5 0 , 224 S o . 2 d 6 0 6 , 6 0 8 - 0 9 Nevertheless, 382 S o . 2 d Also, the d e l i v e r y required f o r a g i f t m u s t b y an a c t u a l , p h y s i c a l d e l i v e r y , u n l e s s 284 See, that d e l i v e r y of the donor control maintains over the gifted property: "A g i f t o f s e c u r i t i e s may b e s u s t a i n e d w h e r e , a f t e r d e l i v e r y , they are placed i n a safe to which b o t h donor and donee have a c c e s s , o r i n a s a f e t y 37 or 1091798; 1100247 d e p o s i t box r e n t e d by t h e d o n e e , and t o w h i c h the d o n o r has a c c e s s by a u t h o r i t y o f t h e d o n e e . ... But t h i s o n l y c o n t e m p l a t e s s t o r a g e a f t e r d e l i v e r y . We d o u b t n o t h o w e v e r t h a t a d e l i v e r y may be e f f e c t e d by t h e d o n o r p l a c i n g t h e s e c u r i t i e s i n s u c h box with the mutual understanding that thereby their ownership, custody, c o n t r o l , management and use c o m p l e t e l y p a s s t o t h e d o n e e , who a l s o a c c e p t s t h e m as h i s own." Livingston, 257 Ala. emphasis added). at See 43, 57 So. 2d 38 Am. Jur. 2d also at 524-25 (final G i f t s § 27 (2010): "A donor's retention of actual physical p o s s e s s i o n of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y n e g a t e a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e d o n o r h a s made a g i f t o f the p r o p e r t y . Where g o o d r e a s o n e x i s t s f o r the physical retention by the donor of the subject m a t t e r o f a g i f t , a g o o d d e l i v e r y c a n be s h o w n b y other circumstances. M o r e o v e r , i f a g i f t has b e e n f u l l y e x e c u t e d , the r e t u r n of the p r o p e r t y by the donee to the donor f o r a p u r p o s e not inconsistent w i t h the g i f t w i l l not r e n d e r the g i f t invalid." (Footnotes As to decedent his that and the the time emphasis issue of of summary-judgment i s i n the of the this at omitted assertion rebuttable possession possession is the or motion not presumption by property his decedent's estate of as a added.) her that the death, possession Willis allegedly a decedent is statement established at the 38 time gifted of by law. the death: a in property as Standing of of asserted i s "regarded a m a t t e r of law." correct decedent in part alone, Only fact a of 1091798; 1100247 "Personal property found i n one's p o s s e s s i o n or u n d e r h i s d o m i n i o n and c o n t r o l a t t h e t i m e o f h i s d e a t h i s p r e s u m e d t o b e l o n g t o him and t o c o n s t i t u t e a s s e t s of h i s e s t a t e ; but t h i s presumption i s of course rebuttable by evidence appropriate and c o m p e t e n t t o show t h a t s u c h p r o p e r t y d i d n o t b e l o n g t o t h e d e c e d e n t a n d was n o t an a s s e t o f h i s e s t a t e . " Sewell v. Sewell, (1917) (emphasis Further, physical before factual died of of which, reason returned he had 242 , note the 243-44 , a gift. or 17 So. 2d 343, 344 a to before these done so, Mrs. Delivery factual to the issue, and not a the main affidavit is more than list three affidavit, h i s mother d i e d items of this issue, McGee as i t does the i s one took conclusion" Jack's that according from in addressing "ultimate extent ever question in Jack issue. address an whether Thus, Further, 6 that items factual does the took possession had of law to of is a suggests. conclusory he would affidavit opinion items I elements question Ala. added). delivery she Jack's 199 her i . e . , that and for his particular Jack physically then e x p l a i n s safekeeping own house and was that the being I t a p p e a r s t o me that i f Jack's a f f i d a v i t had simply s t a t e d t h a t he " h a d r e c e i v e d a g i f t " o f t h e i t e m s i n q u e s t i o n , this would have been testimony as to the "ultimate conclusion." 6 39 1091798; 1100247 remodeled. affidavit In short, as m e r e l y by any f a c t u a l v. Bass A n g l e r s 2000)), matter given found assertions." I cannot a s s e r t i o n s ' " as u r g e d Sportsman the fact Jack's ... ' n o t s u p p o r t e d by W i l l i s (citing Dudley S o c i e t y , 777 S o . 2 d 1 3 5 , 140 that the statements affidavit (Second) details of i n testimony Property: this "factual of Donative "d. M a n i f e s t e d i n t e n t i o n o f d o n o r t o make g i f t of e n t i r e i n t e r e s t i n p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y t o s i n g l e donee. The proof that the personal property d e l i v e r e d by t h e d o n o r i s t o an i n t e n d e d donee, o r to a t h i r d person f o r an i n t e n d e d donee, must be found i n l e g a l l y a d m i s s i b l e evidence. For example, t h e s o - c a l l e d d e a d man's s t a t u t e may p r e v e n t t h e u s e o f o r a l s t a t e m e n t s made b y t h e d o n o r t o t h e i n t e n d e d donee i f t h e donor i s dead a t t h e time p r o o f o f what the donor i n t e n d e d i s i n t r o d u c e d (see I l l u s t r a t i o n s 3 a n d 5 ) . The p r o o f t h a t i s a d m i s s i b l e , h o w e v e r , may r e l a t e t o a n i n t e n t i o n t h e d o n o r h a d b e f o r e , a t the time of, or after the delivery. The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d may i n d i c a t e t h a t a g i f t f r o m one t o t h e o t h e r w o u l d be a n o r m a l expectation, and, i f so, this circumstance c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e f i n d i n g o f a n i n t e n t t o make a gift. I f t h e d e l i v e r y i s made t o o n e o n h i s o r h e r b i r t h d a y , t h i s f a c t may j u s t i f y a f i n d i n g t h a t a gift i s intended. Any o t h e r circumstance in connection with the delivery that suggests the reason f o r the d e l i v e r y i s r e l e v a n t i n determining t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e d o n o r t o make o r n o t t o make a gift. 40 (Ala. regarding a r e , themselves, Any l a c k o f a d d i t i o n a l Compare Restatement T r a n s f e r s § 31.1 ( 1 9 9 2 ) : 7 to characterize "conclusory statements i n Jack's 7 agree 1091798; this 1100247 nature normally determinations than would go t o t h e c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e made b y t h e f a c t - f i n d e r t o t h e competence of the and weight at t r i a l rather evidence. fl " [ I l l u s t r a t i o n ] 12. O has a diamond r i n g on h e r f i n g e r , a n d s h e t a k e s i t o f f a n d h a n d s i t t o h e r d a u g h t e r D, s a y i n g : ' I g i v e t h i s r i n g t o y o u . ' The r i n g i s t o o s m a l l f o r D, b u t i t i s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r i n g c o u l d b e e n l a r g e d t o f i t D's f i n g e r . O then says: ' L e t me t a k e i t a n d w e a r i t f o r a w h i l e l o n g e r , b u t i t i s your r i n g and you c a n h a v e i t w h e n e v e r y o u want i t . ' O dies a n d D demands the ring from O's executor. I f D's t e s t i m o n y t h a t O made t h e quoted statement i s admissible and i s believed, the conclusion i s j u s t i f i e d that t h e g i f t o f t h e r i n g t o D was c o m p l e t e d when O h a n d e d D t h e r i n g . The r e t u r n o f the r i n g by D t o O t o a l l o w O t o wear i t u n t i l D should request i t d i d not terminate D's a c q u i r e d o w n e r s h i p . O's e x e c u t o r i s r e q u i r e d t o d e l i v e r t h e r i n g t o D." (Emphasis added.) See a l s o , e . g . , F r i e n d v . M o r r o w , 558 S.W.2d 7 8 0 , 7 8 3 - 8 4 (Mo. C t . A p p . 1 9 7 7 ) ( i n v o l v i n g i n t e r v i v o s gift and deceased donor and s t a t i n g : "The r e t u r n o f t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f a c o m p l e t e l y e x e c u t e d g i f t by t h e donee t o the donor f o r a purpose not i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e g i f t , such as s a f e k e e p i n g , w i l l n o t r e n d e r t h e g i f t i n v a l i d . " ) ; R o g e r s v . R o g e r s , 2 7 1 Md. 6 0 3 , 6 0 8 , 3 1 9 A . 2 d 1 1 9 , 122 ( 1 9 7 4 ) (involving i n t e r v i v o s g i f t and deceased donor and s t a t i n g : "Where a n actual delivery t o a donee o c c u r s , a d e l i v e r y back t o the d o n o r , where t h e d o n o r i s a c t i n g as t h e d o n e e ' s a g e n t f o r a l i m i t e d p u r p o s e , does n o t i m p a i r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e g i f t . " ) . 41 1091798; 1100247 Nonetheless, as t h i s the standard of proof i s demanding. i n circumstances I n Thomas v . T i l l e y , 41 S o . 8 5 4 , 855 ( 1 9 0 6 ) , we f i n d this such 147 A l a . 1 8 9 , 1 9 5 , expression of the rule: " R e a l i z i n g how e a s y i t i s , a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f the supposed donor, to gather up detached expressions, particularly i n the presence of i n t e r e s t e d w i t n e s s e s , we r e c o g n i z e t h e w i s d o m o f t h e r u l e t h a t s t r i c t p r o o f s h o u l d b e made o f a l l t h e i n g r e d i e n t s o f a p e r f e c t e d g i f t b e f o r e t h e same c a n be e s t a b l i s h e d . " (Emphasis 309, added.) F u r t h e r , i n D a v i s v . W a c h t e r , 224 A l a . 3 0 6 , 140 S o . 3 6 1 , 3 6 3 ( 1 9 3 2 ) , this Court stated: " W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f , we a r e p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e r u l e t h a t one c l a i m i n g as donee must carry that burden by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g p r o o f , a n d when t h e g i f t i s i n t e r v i v o s , a n d t h e d o n e e m a k e s no a s s e r t i o n o f o w n e r s h i p until a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f t h e d o n o r , t h e same m e a s u r e a n d c h a r a c t e r o f p r o o f i s r e q u i r e d a s when i t i s c a u s a mortis." 8 "'A g i f t causa m o r t i s i s a g i f t of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y made i n t h e i m m e d i a t e apprehension of death, subject to the conditions, expressed or implied, that i f t h e d o n o r s h o u l d n o t d i e , as e x p e c t e d , o r i f t h e donee s h o u l d d i e f i r s t , o r i f t h e donor should revoke t h e g i f t b e f o r e death, t h e g i f t s h o u l d be v o i d ' (14 Am. & E n g . E n c y . Law [ 2 d E d . ] 1 0 5 2 ) ; o r a g i f t made 'in e x p e c t a t i o n of death, then imminent, and upon t h e e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y s h a l l b e l o n g f u l l y t o t h e donee, i n case t h e donor d i e s , as a n t i c i p a t e d , l e a v i n g t h e donee s u r v i v i n g h i m , and t h e g i f t i s n o t i n t h e meantime r e v o k e d , b u t 42 1091798; 1100247 (Emphasis added.) Unfortunately f o r present purposes, the salutary effect adoption of Rule a n d no d o u b t o w i n g t o o f A l a b a m a ' s D e a d Man's S t a t u t e u n t i l 601 effective January 1, 1996, the there is l i t t l e Alabama c a s e l a w e x p l a i n i n g what "measure and c h a r a c t e r " of testimony proof" to from "clear a donee i s s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y the and c o n v i n c i n g " e v i d e n t i a r y s t a n d a r d p h y s i c a l d e l i v e r y and o t h e r elements first c l a i m e d by t h e donee That precise said, rule comfortable character" presented evidence and w i t h o u t f o r general with of after a attempting conclusion i n the case before us. to a r t i c u l a t e that must be otherwise.' 20 C y c . a more juncture, I the "measure greater I f the law found than am and that sufficient no m o r e c o m p e l l i n g t h a n t h a t p r e s e n t e d h e r e , not gift of the donor. at this today the r e q u i r e d proof i n regard o f an i n t e r v i v o s the death application "strict i twould 1228. "It i s e s s e n t i a l to the v a l i d i t y of a gift causa mortis that the property be d e l i v e r e d t o the donee, e i t h e r a c t u a l l y or constructively." B a r n e s v. (1911). Barnes, 174 A l a . 1 66, 43 168-69, 56 So. 958 , 959 1091798; 1100247 r i s k t h e i n j e c t i o n o f much u n c e r t a i n t y and c o n f u s i o n i n regard t o t e s t a m e n t a r y d i s p o s i t i o n s , a n a r e a w h e r e t h e common l a w a n d our l e g i s l a t u r e have a t t e m p t e d t o impose r e q u i r e m e n t s to produce Mortg. certainty Co., 276 and Ala. order. 72, (19 6 3 ) ( " ' " G i f t s c a u s a m o r t i s It i s f a rbetter fail than that fraud 588, v. K e l l e y , much convincing causa revocation the ("The (quoting 206 A l a . cannot f o r these pro tanto, of a dangerous of be taken, donations the alleged donor, kind nature.'" kind should 235 A l a . (quoting Wells 2d G i f t s proof until gifts amount wills, f o r c e where t h e g i f t , i s not asserted (1921) [involving and, not being 38 Am J u r . to a subject they v. are Tucker, § 79 (2010) of a whether gift inter a f t e r the death of the p o s s i b i l i t y 44 ... on t h e m o s t do i n e f f e c t and c o n v i n c i n g i n view 193 as t o e n c o u r a g e v. Eshelman, f o r nuncupative of clear or causa mortis, 191, of t h i s in insisting of t h i s ( P a . ) 3 6 6 , 370 ( 1 8 1 1 ) ) ; requirement 2d (Gardner, J . ,d i s s e n t i n g ) ) ; of written w i l l s ; prescribed Jefferson 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , 89 S o . 2 7 5 , 277 i n cases p e r t a i n s w i t h even g r e a t e r vivos So. v. n o t t o be e n c o u r a g e d . Smith 3 1 3 , 317 ( 1 9 3 8 ) evidence forms certainly 3 Binn care mortis]; ought 159 t h e r u l e s o f l a w be so r e l a x e d 5 9 2 , 180 S o . ("'Too 75, Benson occasionally a gift and p e r j u r y . " ' " Reedy to that See intended of fraud or 1091798; 1100247 pretension added)); to i n such a case." (footnotes 38 Am J u r . 2 d G i f t s establish title § 84 to property omitted (2010) and emphasis ("[E]vidence adduced t h r o u g h an i n t e r v i v o s g i f t , against the estate force. Furthermore, the evidence required to e s t a b l i s h a g i f t causa mortis vivos gift." Finally, reverse of a decedent, may be g r e a t e r (footnotes I have t h e judgment m u s t be o f g r e a t as probative t h a n t h a t n e e d e d t o p r o v e an omitted)). 9 an a d d i t i o n a l m e a s u r e of the t r i a l inter court of reluctance on this to conversion c l a i m s t e m m i n g f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t o do s o w o u l d i n d i c a t e t h a t an affidavit of the nature f r o m upon w h i c h has "clearly against 9 here a jury could conclude and c o n v i n c i n g l y " an e x e c u t o r would shouldered C o m p a r e Thomas v . T i l l e y , proved be a s u f f i c i e n t that a will a claim by law w i t h of basis contestant conversion the o b l i g a t i o n to 147 A l a . a t 1 9 5 , 41 S o . a t 8 5 5 : "While i n this case the proposed donee had possession of the paper, yet i t i s proved at the same t i m e t h a t he h a d a l l t h e o t h e r p a p e r s o f t h e d e c e d e n t i n t h e same t r u n k , m e r e l y f o r s a f e - k e e p i n g , and, while i t i s not, i n every sense, a b s o l u t e l y necessary t h a t a n o t e s h o u l d be i n d o r s e d (to pass f r o m one t o a n o t h e r ) , y e t i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h i s c a s e as a c i r c u m s t a n c e . I n a d d i t i o n , i t may b e n o t e d t h a t even t h e d e c l a r a t i o n s , such as t h e y a r e , were c o n t r a d i c t o r y . We h o l d t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e g i f t , and t h e d e c r e e o f t h e c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d . " 45 1091798; 1100247 marshal and to pending judicial secure the physical or o t h e r d i s p o s i t i o n 46 assets of of those the decedent assets.
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