Ex parte Alabama High School Athletic Association and Steven P. Savarese, its Executive Director. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: The Jefferson County Board of Education et al. v. Alabama High School Athletic Association)

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I N THE SUPREME COURT OF A L A B A M A N o v e m b e r 3, 2 0 1 1 1110131 Ex p a r t e Alabama H i g h S c h o o l A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n a n d S t e v e n P. S a v a r e s e , i t s E x e c u t i v e D i r e c t o r . P E T I T I O N FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: C I V I L ( I n r e : The J e f f e r s o n County Board o f E d u c a t i o n e t a l . v. Alabama High School A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n ) ( J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court: CV-2011-002105). 1110132 Ex p a r t e Alabama H i g h S c h o o l A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n a n d S t e v e n P. Savarese, Executive Director. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: C I V I L ( I n r e : Gadsden C i t y Board o f E d u c a t i o n , f o r and on b e h a l f o f Gadsden C i t y H i g h S c h o o l v. Alabama H i g h S c h o o l A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n a n d S t e v e n P. S a v a r e s e ) (Etowah C i r c u i t C o u r t : CV-2011-900623). 1110133 Ex p a r t e Alabama H i g h S c h o o l A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n and S t e v e n P. Savarese, Executive Director. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: C I V I L (In r e : Decatur C i t y Board o f Education, f o r the b e n e f i t o f A u s t i n High School v. Alabama High School Athletic Association) (Morgan C i r c u i t C o u r t : CV-2011-900413) . ORDER P e t i t i o n e r s , Alabama High School A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n and S t e v e n P. S a v a r e s e , h a v i n g p r e s e n t e d t o t h e C o u r t a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f mandamus, s u p e r s e d e a s , s t a y , i n j u n c t i o n , o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e r e m e d y , a n d t h e same h a v i n g b e e n d u l y e x a m i n e d b y the Court, 2d A n d i n S c o t t v . K i l p a t r i c k , 286 A l a . 1 2 9 , 1 3 2 - 3 2 , 237 S o . 6 5 2 , 655 ( 1 9 7 0 ) , t h i s C o u r t h a v i n g h e l d : " P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n h i g h s c h o o l a t h l e t i c s i s an e x t r a c u r r i c u l a a c t i v i t y s u b j e c t zo r e g u l a t i o n s a s t o eligibility. Engaging i n these a c t i v i t i e s i s a p r i v i l e g e w h i c h may b e c l a i m e d o n l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d s s e t up f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 1110131, 1110132, N o v e m b e r 3, 2 0 1 1 Page 1110133 "The member s c h o o l s a r e i n b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o promulgate rules governing participation i n high s c h o o l a t h l e t i c s t h a n anyone e l s e , and a r e f u l l y cognizant o f the reasons u n d e r l y i n g such r u l e s . "If o f f i c i a l s of a school desire to associate with other schools and p r e s c r i b e conditions of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r s t u d e n t s who a r e t o b e c o m e m e m b e r s of the school's athletic t e a m s , a n d t h e member schools vest f i n a l enforcement o f the a s s o c i a t i o n ' s rules i n boards of c o n t r o l , then a court should not i n t e r f e r e i n such i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n o f the a f f a i r s of the a s s o c i a t i o n . "Of c o u r s e , i f t h e a c t s o f a n a s s o c i a t i o n a r e the result of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, collusion, or a r b i t r a r i n e s s , the courts will i n t e r v e n e t o p r o t e c t an i n j u r e d p a r t i e s r i g h t s . " A n d i n AHS7\A v . R o s e , Court having held: 4 4 6 S o . 2 d 1, 5 ( A l a . 1984), this " [ A ] s K i l p a t r i c k a n d K u b i s z y n f v . AHSAA, 374 S o . 2d 256 ( A l a . 1979) i n d i c a t e , t h e b u r d e n on t h e c h a l l e n g e r t o overcome t h e p r e s u m p t i o n f a v o r i n g t h e A s s o c i a t i o n ' s absolute a u t h o r i t y i n the conduct o f i t s own a f f a i r s i s a h e a v y o n e . We r e a f f i r m t h e Kilpatrick test to the e f f e c t that the Court's j u r i s d i c t i o n i n s u c h m a t t e r s i s i n v o k e d when, a n d o n l y when, t h e a v e r m e n t s o f f r a u d , c o l l u s i o n , o r a r b i t r a r i n e s s a r e supported by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g evidence; and t h e t r i a l court's acceptance of j u r i s d i c t i o n w i l l be a f f i r m e d o n l y where i t s o r d e r makes an u n e q u i v o c a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g o f one o r more of t h o s e narrow, r e s t r i c t i v e grounds, founded upon c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g evidence." A n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t t h e N o v e m b e r 1, 2 0 1 1 , o r d e r o f t h e J e f f e r s o n County C i r c u i t Court r e s t r a i n i n g the enforcement o f t h e o r d e r o f t h e ASHAA, d o e s n o t c o m p l y w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d s e t out i n K i l p a t r i c k and r e a f f i r m e d i n Rose, 1110131, November Page 3 1110132, 3, 2 0 1 1 1110133 I T I S ORDERED, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e o r d e r o f N o v e m b e r 1, 2011, o f t h e C i r c u i t Court o f J e f f e r s o n County, Alabama, i n CV-11-0021205, be and h e r e b y i s d e c l a r e d t o be n u l l and v o i d . I t f u r t h e r a p p e a r i n g t h a t t h e C i r c u i t Court o f Etowah County and t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f Morgan County d i d n o t a c q u i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o enter orders purporting t o r e s t r a i n the order of t h e J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court, IT I S ORDERED t h a t t h e o r d e r o f N o v e m b e r 2, 2 0 1 1 , o f t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f Etowah County, Alabama, i n CV-11-900623, and t h e o r d e r o f N o v e m b e r 2, 2 0 1 1 , o f t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f M o r g a n County, Alabama, i n CV-11-900413, a r e h e r e b y d e c l a r e d t o be n u l l and v o i d . Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Wise, J J . , concur. Shaw, J . , c o n c u r s Bolin, writing. in Stuart, Parker, Main, and i n the result. J . , concurs Murdock, J . , concurs part, with writing. i n part and d i s s e n t s i n the result i n part i n part, with and d i s s e n t s I Robert G. Esdale, Sr., as Clerk of the Supreme Court of Alabama, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct CODV of thp instrument(s) herevi/lth set out as same appear(s) of record in said Witness my hand t h i s S i . day nfA/QV/fm^?^ )1 Cle.% Supreme Court ot Alabama BOLIN, J u s t i c e I hereby 2 a n d 3, w h i c h and (concurring the concur i n this Circuit however, from concerns the Jefferson this trial scope of requirement However, School Court, Court's respectively; order Circuit as to paragraph the reasons i n a Court dissent, 1, which Court. restraining Court, Athletic I entered a temporary R u l e 6 5 ( d ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., s e t s a that this i n part). C o u r t ' s o r d e r as t o paragraphs c o u r t i n J e f f e r s o n County restraining order. the and d i s s e n t i n g concern t h e o r d e r s o f t h e Etowah C i r c u i t Morgan The i n part order, and forth i t contains no f o r i t s i s s u a n c e be s e t f o r t h . case Association enjoining from t h e Alabama enforcing a High ruling, has stated: "[T]he Court's j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such matters i s i n v o k e d when, a n d o n l y when, t h e a v e r m e n t s o f fraud, collusion, or a r b i t r a r i n e s s are supported by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e ; and t h e t r i a l court's acceptance of jurisdiction will be affirmed only where i t s order makes an u n e q u i v o c a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g o f one o r more o f t h o s e narrow, r e s t r i c t i v e grounds, founded upon c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e . " Alaama (Ala. High School 1984) Rule (emphasis 65(d)(2), injunctions, injunction Athletic and shall Ass'n v. Rose, 44 6 S o . 2 d 1, 5 added). A l a . R. requires set forth C i v . P., that sets "[ejvery the reasons out the form order granting of an f o r i t si s s u a n c e , " which, i f the c o u r t an County injunction, to s h o u l d be I have and, allowed i s not Morgan C i r c u i t day the i n court trial on hearing that The a and that an order that complies the with trial court in preliminary plaintiffs i f the p r e l i m i n a r y i n j u n c t i o n the apparent Court or grounds set j u r i s d i c t i o n by t h o s e arbitrariness, courts, the believe a the should trial be court preliminary i s granted, both be Rose and either the alleged any acceptance of 6 5 ( d ) (2) . It of would allow t o h a v e a h e a r i n g on a r e q u e s t e d enter to set their allowed here d i d so, t o comply w i t h Rose. has and injunction, Rule court opportunity Jefferson allowed trial or that the out any Rose of those for constitutional courts in Court the courts, i . e . , fraud, collusion, therefore, never acquired orders plaintiffs Etowah C i r c u i t in trial the are deprivation, jurisdiction. v o i d and should or those Accordingly, be vacated. MURDOCK, Justice dissenting (concurring i n the result i n part and i n part). Introduction As to this the Jefferson County respondents note i n their Court: "5. T h e r e i s no d i s p u t e i n t h e c a s e that: The student i n [Clay only after Chalkville both [at High enrolling completing meaning Exception AHSAA to ("CCHS")] fide move' bylaws from the enrolled Restoration 'bona 3) District School i n a of issue] the (Rule Academy and within the 1, Birmingham Jefferson County § 12, School School District; ¢ CCHS complied eligibility reporting with verification, requirement School Association No AHSAA bylaw that affirmative recordkeeping, imposed High recommends every by [ t h e Alabama ("the AHSAA")] requires any and bylaws; or investigation even be brief undertaken to s-anding' less verify Neither Board attended h i s previous t h e AHSAA Code nor the of o r e x p l a i n the term much before Birmingham Student Conduct 'good s t a n d i n g , ' or i n time i ti st o determined or v e r i f i e d ; Nothing i n the records A c a d e m y t o CCHS provided information Restoration Academy b y Huffman identify or enrolled an the when a problem a t HHS. alleged student that suggest disciplinary the while; CCHS AHSAA r e f e r r i n g sent by was Restoration on HHS' student's provided High School existence the officials disciplinary a t Huffman letter by which included the transcript of school, school; how, b y whom, o r a s w h a t p o i n t be 'good by t h e student bylaws of Education define student's at h i s or her previous at a school attending a of student only problem October a was learned involving 24, 2 0 1 1 , principal to hisdisciplinary to to the hearing at HHS was AHSAA. "6. provided supporting any the ostensible officials by t h e i s no a l l e g a t i o n ( a n d no evidence allegation) CCHS student, or improperly evidence otherwise rule. u n k n o w n t o CCHS h e a d prior that ignored ineligibility, v i o l a t e d any e l i g i b i l i t y was CCHS ... There recruited to of h i s knowingly In fact, the student f o o t b a l l coach Jerry Hood t o t h e summer o f 2 0 1 1 . "7. T h e AHSA.^ d e t e r m i n e d ineligible bylaws s o l e l y on t h e b a s i s (Rule [']A I , § 16) t h a t transfer standing with the student t o be of a provision i ni t s state as student must the follows: be student's i n good previous s c h o o l . ['] Although member the rules schools distinction and elsewhere nonmember distinguish schools, i s made i n t h e p r o v i s i o n . " between no such Discussion Section Athletic student 16 of of ( " t h e AHSAA") must be i n good s t a n d i n g (Emphasis transfer student previous schools," standing "with For the bylaws Association school." within" of the Merits added.) t h e Alabama states with Section reason, concerning authority and on the Jefferson to 16 c o u l d with o r that a t r a n s f e r student attended some p r e s c r i b e d p e r i o d o f t i n e . this that address respondents as respectfully the basis Circuit the rights members of a state previous that a "the student's must be i n good by.the student I t d o e s n o t d o so.-^ of Court's of School "a t r a n s f e r the student's must be i n good s t a n d i n g any and a l l schools High sound principles jurisdiction the Jefferson voluntary and County association, I dissent. ^To p u t § 16 i n p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e A H S A A a n d i t s m e m b e r s might w e l l have chosen t o adopt a r u l e p e r m i t t i n g a p l a y e r t o participate i n inter-scholastic athletics so l o n g as t h e p l a y e r was m e r e l y i n g o o d s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e s t u d e n t ' s current school. A l t h o u g h t h e AHSAA d i d n o t c h o o s e t h i s r o u t e e i t h e r , t h e p o i n t i s t h a t n o t h i n g p r e v e n t e d t h e AHSAA f r o m adopting such a r u l e , and t h e r e would have been n o t h i n g i n h e r e n t l y u n r e a s o n a b l e a b o u t i t d o i n g s o . A f o r t i o r i , t h e r e was n o t h i n g t h a t p r e v e n t e d t h e AHSA?^ f r o m a d o p t i n g a r u l e , a n d t h e r e was nothing unreasonable about i t doing so, that hinges a s t u d e n t ' s e l i g i b i l i t y on w h e t h e r he o r s h e i s i n g o o d s t a n d i n g with h i s or her current school and t h e school attended immediately prior to the current school. For a l l appearing f r o m t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f § 1 6 , t h a t i s w h a t t h e AHSAA a n d i t s members h a v e d o n e . As to language give the language of i s t o be deemed i ti t s plain, Borrowing the bylaw unambiguous, ordinary, at we a n d commonly from p r i n c i p l e s o f s t a t u t o r y issue, i f that are obligated to understood meaning. construction, a court s h o u l d i n t e r p r e t p l a i n l a n g u a g e " t o mean e x a c t l y w h a t i t s a y s and t o engage i n j u d i c i a l the statute 535 ( A l a . 2001) . i s ambiguous." ""Words their used plain room So.2d and V. 344, that 347, 349 813, then there i s no construction....' Eng'g Assocs. (Ala.1992). criminal (Ala.1993) 817 i s bound t o of the Systems 346 where exactly i s unambiguous, Corp. So.2d and t o mean Corp., 602 i s well '"[I]t statutes "extended by c o n s t r u c t i o n . " ' " 434 given I f the language forjudicial established So.2d be meaning, language i t says. statute 815 So. 2 d 532, ordinary, plain, must language i s used a court that i f the language i n Pratt, statute understood interpret what only Ex p a r t e i n a natural, commonly "IMED construction should Ex p a r t e (quoting (Ala.1983), n o t be Mutrie, Ex p a r t e quoting 658 Evers. i n turn Locklear v. State, 50 Ala. App. 679, 282 So.2d 116 (1973)). Ex parte Bertram, 884 The language at certain conduct. depriving So. 889, issue As a party 2d in such, 891 § i t 16 quoted To 256 that that conducts extent, p r i n c i p l e concerning Thus, i n M e d i c a l by c o n s t i t u t i o n and d i d so by are a i n the penal forfeiture of in statutes'is place, is better their construed, character, So. the that above- instructive. statutes 2d 202 and of of are (1952) . to own upon the fact "no s e t t l e d , as a a l l penal operate to F u l l e r v. no 257 and they produce further State, mere laws e s p e c i a l l y when reach an its rights". meaning than t h e i r words. 60 of t r i a l court association relying expressly strictly valuable ""Penal 502, a p p l i c a t i o n of r e v e r s a l by voluntary first m u s t be summary for thereby in violation u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n , than that regulations basis & S u r g i c a l S o c i e t y v. W e a t h e r l y , 7 5 A l a . 24 8, interpretation axiom of a prohibit a s s o c i a t i o n and itself the (1883), the Court upheld the principle, to of r i g h t s i t would o t h e r w i s e have under i t s a party prohibition. purports establishes c o n t r a c t u a l agreement w i t h a v o l u n t a r y penalizing ( A l a . 2003) . in Ala. a ""One within the who conmiits t h e words o f a c r i m i n a l general and w o r d s , when t h e y be an a c t w h i c h punished according to understanding merely the policy supra, statute, n o t come of those a r e not used t e c h n i c a l l y , i s not t o thereunder, contravene State, popular does citing because t h e a c t may of the statute. [Young v. S t a t e l . Fuller 58 A l a . v. 358 (1877) . ""No statutes their the Bertram, So. person by accused. F u l l e r v. S t a t e , school with attended. comport w i t h On t h e o t h e r hand, v. S t a t e . 370 added). i f we are to t o b e u n a m b i g u o u s , we c a n o n l y understanding a p l a i n reading i n favor of principles, i t to reference No o t h e r penal concerning Clements (emphasis the bylaw i n question to supra.'" (quoting the foregoing understand subject are t o predominate 884 S o . 2 d a t 8 9 1 s o i f we made and a l l doubts 2 d 7 2 3 , 725 ( A l a . 1979)) consider to implication interpretation Consistent do i s t o be simply the previous o f i t c o u l d be said o f i t s language. i f we a r e t o u n d e r s t a n d the language o f t h e b y l a w a s a m b i g u o u s s o t h a t we c a n e n g a g e i n t h e a c t o f further i n t e r p r e t i n g i t t o mean "previous problem, s c h o o l s . , " we w i l l neimely that a reference have the bylaw to a run ourselves could not then into student's another be deemed t o g i v e n o t i c e w i t h s u f f i c i e n t d e f i n i t e n e s s as t o what c o n d u c t i s prohibited. "'"As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with s u f f i c i e n t definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct i s p r o h i b i t e d a n d i n a manner t h a t does n o t e n c o u r a g e a r b i t r a r y and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y enforcement." Kolender V. L a w s o n . 4 6 1 U.S. 3 5 2 [ 3 5 7 ] , 1 0 3 S. C t . 1 8 5 5 , 1858, 75 L . E d . 2 d 903 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ( c i t a t i o n s omitted). A s t a t u t e c h a l l e n g e d f o r v a g u e n e s s must t h e r e f o r e be s c r u t i n i z e d t o determine whether i t provides both f a i r n o t i c e t o the p u b l i c that c e r t a i n conduct i s p r o s c r i b e d and minimal g u i d e l i n e s t o a i d o f f i c i a l s in the enforcement of that proscription. See Kolender, supra; Grayned v. C i t y o f Rockford, 4 08 U.S. 1 0 4 , 92 S. C t . 2 2 9 4 , 33 L . E d . 2 d 2 2 2 (1972).'" Lansdell v. S t a t e . 2007) (quoting Crim. App. 2003); Cohen, 25 S o . 3 d 1 1 6 9 , 1 1 7 5 - 7 6 i n Vaughn v. S t a t e . further (referencing the due s t a t u t e s must a p p r i s e 880 S o . 2 d 1 1 7 8 , 1 1 9 5 ( A l a . citations 696 So. 2 d 4 3 5 , 439-440 process ( A l a . Crim. App. omitted); (Fla. Dist. requirement c f . State v. C t . App. 1997) that o r d i n a r y p e r s o n s o f common criminal intelligence what i s p r o h i b i t e d ) . "'"'A v a g u e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t g i v e a d e q u a t e " n o t i c e o f t h e r e q u i r e d c o n d u c t t o o n e \srho w o u l d a v o i d i t s p e n a l t i e s , " B o y c e M o t o r L i n e s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 342 U.S. 3 3 7 , 3 4 0 , 72 S. C t . 3 2 9 , 3 3 0 , 96 L . E d . 3 6 7 , 371 (195 [ 2 ] ) , i s not " s u f f i c i e n t l y focused to forewarn o f b o t h i t s reach and coverage," United s t a t e s V . N a t i o n a l D a i r y P r o d u c t s C o r p o r a t i o n , 372 U.S. a t 3 3 , 83 S. C t . a t 5 9 8 , 9 L . E d . 2 d a t 5 6 6 , and "may t r a p t h e i n n o c e n t b y n o t p r o v i d i n g fair w a r n i n g , " G r a y n e d v . C i t y o f R o c k f o r d , 408 U.S. 1 0 4 , 1 0 8 , 92 S. C t . 2 2 9 4 , 2 2 9 8 , 33 L . E d . 2 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 7 - 2 8 (1972) . "'"'As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t o b s e r v e d i n W i n t e r s v . New Y o r k , 3 3 3 U.S. 5 0 7 , 68 S. C t . 6 6 5 , 92 L . E d . 8 4 0 ( 1 9 4 8 ) : " ' " ' " T h e r e mus~ b e a s c e r t a i n a b l e s t a n d a r d s o f g u i l t . Men o f common i n t e l l i g e n c e c a n n o t be r e q u i r e d t o g u e s s a t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e enactment. T h e v a g u e n e s s may b e from uncertainty i n regard t o persons w i t h i n the scope o f t h e a c t , o r i n regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt."'"'" Vaughn v. S t a t e , 2003) ( q u o t i n g McCall Crim. App. 1990); The 880 So. 2 d 1 1 7 8 , 1194-95 AHSAA v. S t a t e , that a singular phrase "thestudent's possible status 565 So. 2 d 1 1 6 3 , 1165 further citations argues f o ra student by one s c h o o l who previous t o a second good s t a n d i n g and then remaining is three days before not the circumstance issue i s presented s c h o o l " w o u l d make i t i n a the operation school with which he o r s h e i s i n transferring to a third i n this i n this disciplinary o f t h e r u l e by enrolled there presented (Ala. application of the has been p l a c e d to avoid App. omitted). literal transferring only (Ala. Crim. case, for period of school. That however; no case as t o whether t h e student's transfer to c a n n o t be Restoration considered I n any event, A c a d e m y was a apply adopted a to t h e AHSAA a n d rule situation. Until neither the pursuit of society, until that AHSAA o r circumstance. must the AHS7\A i s f r e e t o a l t e r face Society, 76 so, however, any court observe Ala. A u t h o r i t y of does question not apply § they to 16 the the i s what matter form." how laudable. c o n s t i t u t i o n and W e a t h e r l y v. doing i t is i s f r e e t o make m o r e o f i t s own 567 rule this of i t s following proper procedures for i t changes them i n l e g a l Surgical or prior Instead, its a p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e , no too, sham i t s members c o u l d h a v e on f u t u r e by i t does a adopted a r u l e that without present Likewise, bylaws i n the so. the as legitimate transfer.^ to the events i n question would undertaken and i t in "The laws, Medical & (1884) . Jefferson Circuit Court ^In a f o o t n o t e i n i t s b r i e f t o t h i s C o u r t , t h e AHSAA b r i e f l y s t a t e s t h a t i t was " l a t e r d i s c o v e r e d " t h a t t h e s t u d e n t d i d not c o m p l e t e t h e s p r i n g 2011 semester at Restoration Academy. For a l l appearing i n the m a t e r i a l s before us, h o w e v e r , no e v i d e n c e t o t h i s e f f e c t was presented to the J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t C o u r t , no s u c h e v i d e n c e s e r v e d a s t h e b a s i s f o r t h e AHSAA's d e c i s i o n i n t h i s m a t t e r , and, despite i t s receipt o f d o c u m e n t a t i o n f r o m R e s t o r a t i o n Academy, ClayChalkville High School was not made a w a r e o f any such evidence. The f o o t n o t e d o e s n o t a s s e r t o t h e r w i s e a n d d o e s n o t e x p l a i n "who" i t was t h a t l a t e r l e a r n e d o f t h i s s u p p o s e d f a c t o r when t h e y " l a t e r " l e a r n e d o f i t . I turn Jefferson address Circuit an overstates of next to entertain the matter injustice. I the degree o f deference believe of the a t hand and the majority owed t o t h e g o v e r n i n g Society of Mobile County v. Walker. 1 4 0 , 16 S o . 2 d 3 2 1 , 3 2 5 ( 1 9 4 4 ) , mandamus and i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f body 24 5 A l a . t h i s Court held that that are available to correct acts t h e p a r t o f a v o l u n t a r y s o c i e t y i f done i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e constitution, "A c o u r t bylaw, rules, of equity w i l l literal them leaving the party with chance 140, so f a r as they performance suffer to depart of their from S o . 2 d 652 (1970), their v;hom t h e y o f a n y damage w h i c h 16 S o . 2 d a t 3 2 5 . and r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e s o c i e t y . endeavor t o the extent b i n d men's c o n s c i e n c e and 237 of the authority t h e AHST^A. 135, to Court alleged In Medical on to the question c a n be bound t o a t r u e agreements, contracts and w i l l at have c o n t r a c t e d a j u r y may assess". I n S c o t t v. K i l p a t r i c k . this o f i t s powers Court explained not pleasure, t o t h e mere 245 A l a a t 286 A l a . 129, that " [ i ] f o f f i c i a l s o f a school desiire t o a s s o c i a t e w i t h other schools and prescribe conditions of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r s t u d e n t s who a r e t o b e c o m e m.embers of the school's athletic t e a m s , a n d t h e member schools vest f i n a l enforcement o f the a s s o c i a t i o n ' s r u l e s i n boards o f c o n t r o l , then a court should not i n t e r f e r e i n such i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n o f t h e a f f a i r s of the a s s o c i a t i o n . " 286 A l a . at Nonetheless, 132, 237 the Court So. 2d added at 655 (citations omitted) that " i f t h e a c t s o f an a s s o c i a t i o n a r e t h e r e s u l t o f fraud, lack of jurisdiction, collusion, or arbitrariness, the courts w i l l intervene to protect an injured [party's] rights. See 6 A m . J u r . 2 d . , A s s o c i a t i o n s a n d C l u b s , S e c . 27, p. 4 5 3 . " 286 Ala. In Court a t 132-33, Medical considered 237 S o . 2 d a t 6 5 5 . ^ & Surgical Society t h e me^aning and proper written c o n s t i t u t i o n of a medical association. constitution The C o u r t was v. Weatherly, supra, application of the society, a private acknowledged that " i n the nature of a the that contract voluntary association's between i t s ^The m a j o r i t y r e l i e s u p o n t h e s t a t e m e n t i n A l a b a m a H i g h S c h o o l A t h l e t i c A s s ' n v . R o s e . 446 S o . 2 d 1, 5 ( A l a . 1 9 8 4 ) that the Court "reaffirm[ed] the K i l p a t r i c k test to the effect that the C o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n such m a t t e r s i s invoked when, and o n l y when, the averments of fraud, c o l l u s i o n , o r a r b i t r a r i n e s s a r e supported by c l e a r and convincing evidence; and t h e t r i a l court's a c c e p t a n c e o f j u r i s d i c t i o n w i l l be a f f i r m e d only where i t s o r d e r makes an u n e q u i v o c a l f a c t u a l f i n d i n g o f one o r more o f t h o s e n a r r o w , r e s t r i c t i v e g r o u n d s , founded upon c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g evidence." The o p i n i o n i n K i l p a t r i c k c o n t a i n s explicit or unequivocal finding e v i d e n c e and t h e Rose o p i n i o n c i t e s statement o f such a t e s t . In this t h e AHSAA's a c t i o n i s e v i d e n c e d b y question. no s t a t e m e n t r e q u i r i n g an by c l e a r and convincing no o t h e r a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s case, the a r b i t r a r i n e s s of the wording o f the bylaw i n members, that they are bound by i t s p r o v i s i o n by reason of express assent i n assuming the o b l i g a t i o n s of membership." 75 Ala. at 256. Nonetheless, of the trial court reversing required a a the Court upheld exercising jurisdiction decision summary by the society expulsion of one the over that of decision the dispute and i t s constitution i t s members. The Supreme C o u r t o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e a s s o c i a t i o n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n " i s equally binding ... corporate contained the Id. at capacity." principles upon decision i n favor of i n the the society, 256. It as then such, in i t s applied the following analysis in issuing i t s excluded a s s o c i a t i o n memJoer: "We c a n e n t e r t a i n no d o u b t o f t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts of t h i s State to i n t e r f e r e , i n a l l p r o p e r c a s e s , b y mandamus, a s a n a p p r o p r i a t e r e m e d y f o r the wrongful d i s f r a n c h i s e m e n t or amotion of a c o r p o r a t o r , and t o r e s t o r e him t o t h e enjoyment o f a f r a n c h i s e o f w h i c h he h a s b e e n i l l e g a l l y d e p r i v e d . This r i g h t of s u p e r v i s i o n over bodies corporate i s one o f g r e a t a n t i q u i t y i n o u r l a w , and i s r e g a r d e d as derived from the visitatorial power, always i m p l i e d l y r e s e r v e d by t h e S o v e r e i g n o r t h e S t a t e i n g r a n t i n g c o r p o r a t e c h a r t e r s , and w h i c h i s e x e r c i s e d t h r o u g h t h e c o u r t s o f common l a w j u r i s d i c t i o n . H i g h o n E x t r . Rem. §§ 2 9 1 , 293. The modern and better view i s , that this right of judicial v i s i t a t i o n i s not c o n f i n e d to p u b l i c c o r p o r a t i o n s , b u t e x t e n d s as w e l l t o t h o s e o f a p u r e l y p r i v a t e nature. Nor i s i t l i m i t e d t o s u c h as a r e o r g a n i z e d s t r i c t l y f o r business purposes, or pecuniary p r o f i t , b u t i s made a p p l i c a b l e a l s o t o c o r p o r a t i o n s f o r m e d for eleemosynary, r e l i g i o u s , s c i e n t i f i c , or other l i k e purposes. A n g e l l & Ames' C o r p . § 7 0 4 ; State V. M i l w a u k e e Cham. C o m m e r c e , 4 7 W i s . 670 [, 3 n.W. 760 (1879)]. The F:ing, u n d e r o u r a n c i e n t l a w , was the l e g a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d v i s i t o r of a l l c o r p o r a t i o n s . w h o s e f r a n c h i s e s may h a v e b e e n g r a n t e d t o s u b j e c t s by h i s g r a c e and a u t h o r i t y , a j u r i s d i c t i o n , which was e x e r c i s e d t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m o f t h e c o u r t s , a n d t h e c h i e f f u n c t i o n o f w h i c h was 'to render their charters, or c o n s t i t u t i o n s , ordinances and b y - l a w s o f p e r f e c t o b l i g a t i o n , and generally to maintain t h e i r peace and good government.' A n g e l l & Ames' C o r p . ( 1 1 t h Ed.) § 6 8 4 ; 2 K e n t , Com. 300. The just reason i s that a corporate franchise i s property, i n c o r p o r e a l , i t i s t r u e , b u t deemed none t h e l e s s v a l u a b l e i n t h e eye o f t h e law. Each i n d i v i d u a l member, a s r e m a r k e d b y S i r W i l l i a m B l a c k s t o n e , is s a i d i n s u c h c a s e s t o be t h e o w n e r o f t h e f r a n c h i s e , a n d h i s p r i v i l e g e o f m e m b e r s h i p , we may a d d o n h i g h a u t h o r i t y , i s , t h e r e f o r e , p r o p e r l y s u b j e c t to the p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t s as v a l u a b l e , a l t h o u g h i t may h a v e no a c t u a l m a r k e t v a l u e . 2 Black. Com. 3 7 ; S t a t e v . The G e o r g i a M e d i c a l S o c i e t y . 38 Ga. 608 [ ( 1 8 6 9 ) ] ; M o s e s o n Mandamus, p. 1 8 4 ; [[Trustees of] D a r t m o u t h C o l l e g e v . W o o d w a r d . 4 W h e a t . 518 [17 U.S. 518 (1819)] . "The purposes f o r which t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n i s commonly e x e r c i s e d is left i n no doubt by the authorities. I n H i g h , on E x t r a o r d i n a r y R e m e d i e s , § 2 9 4 , i t i s s a i d t o b e now a w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e , t h a t 'mandamus w i l l l i e t o r e s t o r e t o h i s c o r p o r a t e rights a member o f a c o r p o r a t i o n who has been i m p r o p e r l y d i s f r a n c h i s e d or i r r e g u l a r l y removed from his connection w i t h the c o r p o r a t i o n . And w h i l e t h e court will not inquire into the merits of the d e c i s i o n of corporate a u t h o r i t i e s i n e x p e l l i n g or removing a corporator i n the r e g u l a r course of proceedings, y e t , i f the a m o t i o n has been c o n d u c t e d w i t h o u t due a u t h o r i t y , t h e c o u r t s w i l l i n t e r f e r e by mandamus t o c o m p e l t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f t h e member t o his corporate franchise.' The same rule is declared, in substance, in Angell & Am.es on Corporations ( 1 1 t h E d . ) , § 695,, w h e r e i t i s s a i d that this jurisdiction will be exercised for c o m p e l l i n g c o r p o r a t i o n s g e n e r a l l y 'to observe the o r d i n a n c e s o f t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n , and t o r e s p e c t t h e r i g h t s of those e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e i r privileges.' ' I f a c o r p o r a t o r has been u n j u s t l y o r i r r e g u l a r l y amoved o r s u s p e n d e d f r o m h i s o f f i c e , o r d i s f r a n c h i s e d , the c o u r t , ' i t i s added, mandamus t o r e s t o r e h i m . ' lb.. § 704. 'will ... grant II " I t i s not denied t h a t the r e l a t o r , Weatherly, was i n d e f a u l t b y r e a s o n o f h i s f a i l u r e t o make punctual payment o f h i s a n n u a l dues. I t i s true t h a t f o r t h i s he o f f e r s a n e x c u s e , b u t w i t h the s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h i s we h a v e n o t h i n g t o d o , t h e m e r i t or demerit of i t being a matter w i t h i n the p e c u l i a r cognizance of the s o c i e t y . Our i n q u i r y i s c o n f i n e d t o the mere l e g a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e foregoing provisions of the c o n s t i t u t i o n i m p o s e d by this s o c i e t y u p o n i t s e l f f o r i t s own o r d e r l y g o v e r n m e n t , a n d w h i c h m u s t be t a k e n a s t h e l a w o f t h e c a s e , s o f a r a s t h e y a r e v i o l a t i v e o f no r u l e o f l a w o r c a n o n of reason. In t h i s work of c o n s t r u c t i o n , however, there are c e r t a i n c a r d i n a l r u l e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which must be constantly kept in mind. No p r i n c i p l e , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , i s b e t t e r s e t t l e d , as a mere a x i o m o f u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n , t h a n t h a t a l l penal laws and regulations must be strictly c o n s t r u e d , e s p e c i a l l y when t h e y a r e summary i n t h e i r character, and o p e r a t e t o p r o d u c e a f o r f e i t u r e of valuable rights. "The g e n e r a l p o l i c y o f t h e law,' m o r e o v e r , as o b s e r v e d by a l e a r n e d J u s t i c e , s p e a k i n g f o r t h e New Y o r k C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , i n The P e o p l e v . The M e d i c a l S o c i e t v o f t h e C o u n t v o f E r i e , 32 N.Y. 187 [(1865)], ' i s opposed to s h a r p and summary judgment, where the party whose r i g h t s are in j e o p a r d y h a s no o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e h e a r d i n h i s own defense.' T h i s has b e e n p r o p e r l y u r g e d by counsel as a c o n t r o l l i n g and pivotal principle in the decision of this cause. It i s applicable to ordinances of sovereign conventions, constitutions o f government. F e d e r a l and S t a t e , t h e s t a t u t e l a w s of a l l civil polities, whether republican or monarchical, t h e o r d i n a n c e s o f m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , and to the by-laws and regulations of voluntary s o c i e t i e s , whether incorporated or unincorporated." Ala. at 252-56. The principles contained i n the foregoing analysis support the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t Court i n the dispute under c o n s i d e r a - i o n The here. A u t h o r i t y o f the Etowah and Morgan C i r c u i t F i n a l l y , with respect to the apparent confusion from the fact that State appear t o have matter, 465 t h i s Court's (Ala. 2010), three different exercised circuit courts jurisdiction Courts resulting i n this over t h e same h o l d i n g i n Ex p a r t e M c M i c h a e l , 62 S o . 3 d i s applicable: " I n Ex p a r t e L i b e r t y N a t i o n a l L i f e I n s u r a n c e Co., 631 S o . 2 d 8 6 5 ( A l a . 1 9 9 3 ) , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d : "'"It i s uniformly held that where two o r more c o u r t s have c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e one which f i r s t takes cognizance of a cause has t h e e x c l u s i v e r i g h t t o entertain and exercise such jurisdiction, to the final d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n and the enforcement o f i t s judgment or decrees.... "'"... ' It i s a familiar p r i n c i p l e t h a t when a c o u r t o f c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n h a s become possessed o f a case i t s a u t h o r i t y continues, subject only to the appellate authority, u n t i l the m a t t e r i s f i n a l l y and c o m p l e t e l y disposed o f , a n d no c o u r t of co-ordinate authority i s at liberty to interfere with i t s action.... ' "'"... recognize ' A l l theauthorities the importance of c a r e f u l l y p r e s e r v i n g the boundary l i n e between c o u r t s o f c o n c u r r e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n , i n order to prevent conflicts, and t o p r e s e r v e i n harmony t h e i r r e l a t i o n s t o each other.'" " ' E x p a r t e B u r c h . 2 3 6 A l a . 6 6 2 , 6 6 5 , 184 S o . 6 9 4 , 697 ( 1 9 3 8 ) . "'These p r i n c i p l e s numerous t i m e s : have been restated "'"[Wlhere two c o u r t s have equal and c o n c u r r e n t jurisdiction, the court that f i r s t comjTiences t h e e x e r c i s e o f i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n a matter has t h e p r e f e r e n c e and i s n o t t o be obstructed i n the legitimate e x e r c i s e o f i t s powers bv a c o u r t of c o o r d i n a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . " "'Ex p a r t e S t a t e ex r e l . U s s e r v , 285 A l a . 279, 2 8 1 , 231 So.2d 314, 315 (1970) '" "631 So. 2d a t 867." McMichael, The [the] 62 S o . 3 d a t 4 7 1 - 7 2 Jefferson cause" jurisdiction generally and Morgan issue to Court here the Circuit Courts and indeed and subject action Circuit first cognizance exercised of this of i t s dispute A l l o w i n g t h e Etowah judgments affecting the one o f t h e two p a r t i e s i n t o not abide Court,, w o u l d took matter to enter directing added). "first a n d t h e AHSAA i n p a r t i c u l a r . Jefferson Jefferson at as same m a t t e r , the Circuit (emphasis by clearly t h e judgment enable of the t h e Etowah and Morgan Circuit Court "in the fundamental and the harmonious that postjudgment, P., but may be i n the t h e y may pending its powers" effective operation of the have the right to intervene, even i n order courts due to o b s t r u c t the t o be vindicate A l a . R. a coordinate judgments entered are to g e n e r a l l y R u l e 24, intended the ruling Morgan of have the r i g h t to ask courts i n those the this by Jefferson action Accordingly, in well-established principles and have, see t h e y do n o t Morgan C i r c u i t of Circuit affected c o u r t may c o u r t t o e n t e r an o r d e r order. Jefferson s y s t e m . P a r t i e s s u c h as t h e E t o w a h and Jefferson Circuit rights the exercise State's j u d i c i a l any "obstruct" of to respondents to legitimate contravention essential Courts by circuit first the Civ. court's Etowah vacated, and the 3 of the final and actions dismissed. Conclusion To of the the the extent Court's order today above-expressed a u t h o r i t y on in that clauses this achieve conclusions a result regarding t h e p a r t o f t h e Etowah and matter, respectfully 2 and I concur dissent. in that paragraph consistent the lack Morgan C i r c u i t result. with of courts Otherwise, I

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