Ex parte Patsy Patton d/b/a Korner Store. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Lana T. Brown v. Patsy Patton d/b/a Korner Store)

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REL:04/22/2011 N o t i c e : This o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011 1080960 Ex p a r t e P a t s y P a t t o n d/b/a K o r n e r Store PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF C I V I L APPEALS (In re: Lana T. Brown v. Patsy P a t t o n d/b/a K o r n e r Store) ( B i b b C i r c u i t C o u r t , CV-06-152; C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s , 2070810) SHAW, Justice. Lana d/b/a T. B r o w n , Korner Store the p l a i n t i f f ("Korner below, Store") sued Patsy seeking Patton worker's 1080960 compensation judgment Court the benefits. i n favor of C i v i l trial Brown v. (Ala. Civil Appeals. Patton, of [Ms. and Korner Brown Brown w a l k e d cup. and entered a summary Brown a p p e a l e d to c o u r t r e v e r s e d the d e c i s i o n 2070810, A p r i l We render Store worked Korner to 17, 2009] So. Store p e t i t i o n s review the decision this the of of a judgment and the Court a of Korner a gas deli One day, while counter to r e f i l l When B r o w n b e g a n w a l k i n g b a c k t o t h e f r o n t b r e a k i n g her w r i s t . filed a c l a i m f o r worker's Store denied because, Civil Store. station/convenience cashier. to the s t o r e ' s she i n e x p l i c a b l y f e l l , of of Procedural History operated as i n favor 3d Court f o r r e v e r s e the judgment of the Court Facts where court Store, That 2009). certiorari Appeals. Appeals of Korner trial c o u r t and remanded t h e c a s e f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . C i v . App. a writ The compensation i t contended, 2 on store duty, her coffee of the store, Brown s u b s e q u e n t l y b e n e f i t s , which Brown's fall was Korner either 1080960 attributable t o an i d i o p a t h i c characteristic 1 o r was due t o some u n e x p l a i n e d , b u t n o t w o r k - r e l a t e d , c a u s e . Brown filed b e n e f i t s ; Korner on the Court Inc. held, 830 on "the conclusion employment" compensation judgment, Byrom, similar compensation to identify in the record the t r i a l Stores, ( A l a . C i v . App. that, [did] not injury arose entitle 2002), because a w o r k - r e l a t e d cause [the employee's] benefits, Relying i n Wal-Mart facts, and d i d n o t , t h e r e f o r e , Court worker's decision S o . 2 d 7 4 1 , 746 evidence summary-judgment The Appeals' markedly that seeking S t o r e moved f o r a summary j u d g m e n t . e m p l o y e e was u n a b l e fall, action of C i v i l v. Morgan, which an the f o rher support out her to a of her worker's court granted Korner Store's motion. of C i v i l concluding that 895 S o . 2 d 942 Appeals this reversed the t r i a l Court's decision court's i n Ex p a r t e ( A l a . 2004), "We u s e t h e w o r d ' i d i o p a t h i c ' ... t o mean ' p e c u l i a r t o the individual' a n d n o t ' a r i s i n g f r o m an unknown c a u s e . ' Idiopathic refers t o an e m p l o y e e ' s preexisting physical w e a k n e s s o r d i s e a s e . 1 L a r s o n , W o r k m e n ' s C o m p e n s a t i o n Law § 12.00." E x p a r t e P a t t e r s o n , 561 S o . 2 d 2 3 6 , 238 n.2 ( A l a . 1990). 1 3 1080960 "deemed c o n t r o l l i n g l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n e d i n a f o o t n o t e i n Ex p a r t e T r i n i t y I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . , 680 So. 2d 262 (Ala. 1 9 9 6 ) , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t an e m p l o y e e who claims to have been i n j u r e d by 'a sudden and t r a u m a t i c e x t e r n a l e v e n t ' t h a t w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e 'an " a c c i d e n t " i n the c o l l o q u i a l sense' need o n l y , i n order to demonstrate legal causation, 'produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged "accident" occurred' (680 So. 2 d a t 266 n. 3)." Brown, So. 3d a t the of Civil Court evidence was was that one ___ . which arose foregoing "conclude[d] t e n d i n g t o show t h a t out Store this B a s e d upon the Appeals presented Korner review, . of her substantial [Brown's] employment." petitioned Court that rationale, this accident So. Court for 3d at certiorari granted. Standard of Review "'In r e v i e w i n g a d e c i s i o n of the Court o f C i v i l A p p e a l s on a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of certiorari, this Court "accords no p r e s u m p t i o n of c o r r e c t n e s s to the legal c o n c l u s i o n s of the i n t e r m e d i a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . T h e r e f o r e , we m u s t a p p l y de n o v o t h e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w t h a t was a p p l i c a b l e i n the Court of Civil Appeals." Ex parte T o y o t a M o t o r C o r p . , 684 So. 2d 1 3 2 , 135 (Ala. 1996).' "Ex p a r t e E x x o n (Ala. 2005)." Ex parte Mobil Nathan Rodgers Corp., Constr., 2008). 4 92 6 Inc., So. 1 So. 2d 3d 303, 46, 308 49 (Ala. 1080960 Discussion In its correctly noted Compensation Act"), was opinion at in that Act, issue § Brown, causation 25-5-1 in this et the Court under seq., the Ala. of Civil Alabama Code Appeals Workers' 1 975 case: " U n d e r §§ 25-5-51 and 2 5 - 5 - 7 7 ( a ) , A l a . Code 1975, taken together, an employer must pay c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r , a n d p r o v i d e m e d i c a l b e n e f i t s as to, i t s e m p l o y e e ' s i n j u r y t h a t i s c a u s e d by 'an a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g out o f and i n t h e c o u r s e o f [ h i s o r her] employment' w i t h o u t r e g a r d to the n e g l i g e n c e of the employer or the employee. T h e r e i s no dispute t h a t the employee's a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d ' i n the course of' her employment, i . e . , w i t h i n the period of employment at a place where the employee would reasonably be and while she was reasonably fulfilling employment d u t i e s or engaged i n doing something incident to i t . Rather, the issue presented i s whether the employee's a c c i d e n t arose o u t o f h e r e m p l o y m e n t , i . e . , w h e t h e r t h e r e was 'a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p between the injury and the employment.' D u n l o p T i r e & R u b b e r Co. v . Pettus, 623 So. 2 d 3 1 3 , 314 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1993). "The principal 'fault line' that has been r e v e a l e d by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e ' a r i s i n g out o f ' r e q u i r e m e n t by A l a b a m a c o u r t s i s t h e distinction between accidents that are at least partially attributable to an affirmative employment c o n t r i b u t i o n and t h o s e t h a t a r e a t t r i b u t a b l e s o l e l y to what a r e c a l l e d ' i d i o p a t h i c ' f a c t o r s , a t e r m t h a t 'refers to an employee's preexisting physical weakness or disease' that is ' " p e c u l i a r to the i n d i v i d u a l " ' employee. Ex p a r t e P a t t e r s o n , 561 So. 2d 236, 238 n.2 ( A l a . 1 990). Thus, a f a l l may, under the appropriate circumstances, properly be d e e m e d an a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g o u t o f e m p l o y m e n t . ... I n contrast, a fall may, under the appropriate 5 ("the 1080960 circumstances t e n d i n g t o show an i d i o p a t h i c f a c t o r , n o t be an a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g o u t o f e m p l o y m e n t . ... " I n [ W a l - M a r t S t o r e s , I n c . v . ] M o r g a n , [830 So. 2 d 741 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2002),] t h i s court reversed a judgment t h a t had been e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of a r e t a i l c a s h i e r seeking b e n e f i t s under the Act under factual circumstances s i m i l a r to those present in t h i s case. A f t e r c i t i n g various cases i n which t h i s c o u r t had c o n s i d e r e d the ' a r i s i n g out o f ' e l e m e n t of c o m p e n s a b i l i t y , we c o n c l u d e d i n M o r g a n t h a t b e c a u s e t h e c a s h i e r d i d n o t know w h a t h a d c a u s e d h e r t o l o s e her balance and had admitted t h a t the workplace probably had nothing t o do w i t h t h e a c c i d e n t in which she was i n j u r e d , no s u b s t a n t i a l evidence supported the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the c a s h i e r ' s i n j u r y a r o s e o u t o f h e r e m p l o y m e n t . ... " Brown, So. determined that mandates a judgment Court Civil the of law 3d at . Morgan in Appeals regarding As noted above, controlled in favor held causation of this Korner that, after the case Store. Morgan trial and that However, was i t the decided, changed: " J u s t o v e r two y e a r s a f t e r M o r g a n was d e c i d e d , the A l a b a m a Supreme C o u r t i s s u e d i t s d e c i s i o n i n Ex p a r t e B y r o m , 895 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2004). In Byrom, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that an automotive-service m a n a g e r who had been injured while using a telephone d u r i n g an e l e c t r i c a l s t o r m by an electrical surge stemming from a b o l t of l i g h t n i n g h a d s u f f e r e d an ' a c c i d e n t a l ' i n j u r y . Most pertinently, Byrom deemed controlling language contained in a footnote in Ex parte Trinity I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . , 680 So. 2 d 262 ( A l a . 1 9 9 6 ) , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t an e m p l o y e e who claims to have been i n j u r e d b y 'a s u d d e n a n d t r a u m a t i c e x t e r n a l e v e n t ' that would constitute 'an "accident"' in the c o l l o q u i a l sense need o n l y , i n o r d e r to demonstrate 6 court 1080960 legal causation, 'produce substantial evidence tending to show that the alleged "accident" occurred' (680 S o . 2 d a t 2 6 6 n . 3 ) . I n t h e w o r d s o f Byrom, T r i n i t y 'does n o t r e q u i r e p r o o f b e y o n d t h e f a c t of the accident i t s e l f that the accident arose out o f t h e employee's employment.' 895 S o . 2 d a t 947 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . "That Byrom has s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r e d t h e p o s t Morgan l e g a l l a n d s c a p e i s a f a c t t h a t has not been l o s t u p o n a t l e a s t one j u d g e o f t h i s c o u r t , w h o s e s p e c i a l o p i n i o n i n G o o d y e a r T i r e & R u b b e r Co. v . Muilenburg, 990 S o . 2 d 434 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) , i l l u s t r a t e s t h e e f f e c t o f Byrom: "'In this case, as i n Byrom, the e m p l o y e e i s c l a i m i n g t h a t he was i n j u r e d i n an " a c c i d e n t . " The r e c o r d c o n t a i n s v a r i o u s v e r s i o n s o f how t h i s " a c c i d e n t " h a p p e n e d , but i t i s undisputed t h a t w h i l e w o r k i n g the employee u n e x p e c t e d l y f e l l , i m m e d i a t e l y and severely injuring his left leg. Having p r o v e n t h a t he h a d s u s t a i n e d a n " a c c i d e n t " while working, the employee, according to Byrom, d i d n o t need t o p r o v e any a d d i t i o n a l facts in order to satisfy the " a r i s i n g - o u t - o f - t h e - e m p l o y m e n t " requirement. " ' I f u l l y r e c o g n i z e t h a t Byrom d i d n o t involve an injury caused by a fall. However, t h e h o l d i n g o f Byrom i s p h r a s e d so b r o a d l y t h a t I can conclude o n l y t h a t the supreme c o u r t i n t e n d e d t h a t i t w o u l d a p p l y to a l l " a c c i d e n t a l " i n j u r i e s . I am a l s o f u l l y aware t h a t a l i n e o f d e c i s i o n s from t h i s c o u r t t h a t were i s s u e d b e f o r e Byrom r e j e c t e d a l e g a l t e s t s i m i l a r t o t h e one a d o p t e d i n B y r o m when d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r an i n j u r y s u f f e r e d a s t h e r e s u l t o f a f a l l is compensable. See Casteel ex r e l . J o h n s o n v . W a l - M a r t S t o r e s , I n c . , 860 S o . 2d 348 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) ; P i t t s b u r g & 7 1080960 M i d w a y C o a l M i n i n g Co. v . R u b l e y , 882 S o . 2 d 335 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2002 ) (accord); W a l - M a r t S t o r e s , I n c . v . M o r g a n , 830 S o . 2 d 741 ( A l a . C i v . App. 2 0 0 2 ) ; and Slimfold M f g . Co. v . M a r t i n , 417 S o . 2 d 199 ( A l a . Civ. App. 1 9 8 1 ) , w r i t q u a s h e d , Ex p a r t e Martin, 417 So. 2d 203 ( A l a . 1982) (declining to use "but-for" test to determine c o m p e n s a b i l i t y of f a l l at work). Although I agree t o t a l l y w i t h the r e a s o n i n g i n t h o s e c a s e s , and a l t h o u g h I d i s a g r e e t o t a l l y w i t h t h e a n a l y s i s u s e d i n Byrom, unless and until our supreme court o v e r r u l e s i t , t h i s c o u r t must f o l l o w Byrom. See A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , § 1 2 - 3 - 1 6 . ' "990 S o . 2 d a t 440 (Moore, J . , c o n c u r r i n g i n t h e result). Thus, as Judge Moore has i n t i m a t e d , Byrom eliminates any r e q u i r e m e n t that might have been a p p l i e d i n M o r g a n t o r e q u i r e an e m p l o y e e who falls a t w o r k , s u c h a s t h e e m p l o y e e i n t h i s c a s e , t o show l e g a l c a u s a t i o n beyond the f a l l itself." Brown, So. 3d a t the of Court Civil . Under t h i s Appeals held interpretation that Brown o f Byrom, had produced s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t h e r a c c i d e n t was one "arose for out of her employment" Korner S t o r e was As t h e C o u r t thus of C i v i l and that t h e summary that judgment improper. Appeals noted i n Brown, i t i s well e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t our c o u r t s have h i s t o r i c a l l y r e j e c t e d a " b u t for" test in workers' "causal-connection" Martin, 417 So. 2d test. 199, compensation See, 202 e.g. cases in Slimfold ( A l a . C i v . App. 8 favor Mfg. 1981) of Co. a v. ("The 1080960 but-for test Alabama's on is clearly not the test Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t . the claimant to establish a between t h e work and t h e i n j u r y . " ) . for causation Instead, definite under the burden i s connection rationale The causal underlying t h e d e c i s i o n t o a p p l y t h e " c a u s a l - c o n n e c t i o n " t e s t i s b a s e d on the language of the A c t , which r e q u i r e s employee's injury o r d e a t h t o be both i n the course of that Roden, 2 60 justify injury A l a . 606, recovery rational 417 mind 611 , under must So. be the able 2d 71 2d Workmen's trace See 802, and n o t by 80 6 the out Wooten (1954 ) Act, v. ("To the personal employment, some o t h e r a g e n c y . " ) . In Morgan, succinct also resultant t o a p r o x i m a t e cause s e t i n m o t i o n by occur and a r i s e Compensation the f o r an i t must employment a t 200. So. to i n order compensable, of the employee's employment. that, supra, explanation the Court of C i v i l Appeals provided of the requirements of the A c t : " W a l - M a r t a r g u e s on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t Morgan's i n j u r y a r o s e out of h e r e m p l o y m e n t . I n o r d e r f o r M o r g a n ' s i n j u r y t o be compensable under the Workers' Compensation A c t , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 , § 2 5 - 5 - 1 e t s e q . , i t m u s t be ' c a u s e d b y "an a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g o u t o f a n d i n t h e c o u r s e o f " ' her employment. Meeks v. Thompson T r a c t o r Co., 686 S o . 2 d 1 2 1 3 , 1215 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 9 6 ) (quoting § 2 5 - 5 - 5 1 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ) . W a l - M a r t a r g u e s t h a t M o r g a n ' s i n j u r y was n o t c o m p e n s a b l e u n d e r t h e A c t b e c a u s e , i t a r g u e s , she d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h a c a u s a l 9 a 1080960 c o n n e c t i o n between t h e i n j u r y and h e r employment. The p a r t i e s do not dispute that Morgan's fall occurred i n the course of her employment, but Wal-Mart argues t h a t Morgan's injuries were not caused by an accident that arose out of her employment. In o r d e r f o r Morgan's i n j u r i e s t o ' a r i s e o u t o f ' h e r e m p l o y m e n t , t h e r e must be 'a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e i n j u r y and t h e employment.' D u n l o p T i r e & R u b b e r Co. v . P e t t u s , 623 S o . 2 d 3 1 3 , 314 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 9 3 ) . M o r g a n h a s ' t h e b u r d e n o f proving that [her] i n j u r y arose out of [her] e m p l o y m e n t . ' E x p a r t e P a t t e r s o n , 561 S o . 2 d 2 3 6 , 238 ( A l a . 1 9 9 0 ) ( c i t i n g S o u t h e r n C o t t o n O i l Co. v . Wynn, 266 A l a . 3 2 7 , 96 S o . 2 d 159 (1957))." 830 So. 2d a t This So. 2d Court's 262 include 743-44. ( A l a . 1996), language conflict with causation in this a case I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . , 680 decided before Morgan, footnote that appears and well established the Trinity Industries, between Court, to an in an to rule compensation which employee's effort "[d]etermining stroke duties as an i n s i t u a t i o n s where employee and 10 the and his illustrate the whether the "the complained-of of cases. concerned to did directly a causal has been e s t a b l i s h e d between t h e p e r f o r m a n c e claimant's injury" a Act attendant relationship the the connection employment, problems in in Trinity i n a c c i d e n t a l - i n j u r y workers' Specifically, causal decision of complained-of i n j u r y was not 1080960 p r o d u c e d by 2d at 266, some s u d d e n a n d included the traumatic external event," f o l l o w i n g language i n note 680 So. 3: "An e m p l o y e e c l a i m i n g t o have been i n j u r e d by a s u d d e n a n d t r a u m a t i c e x t e r n a l e v e n t (an 'accident' i n t h e c o l l o q u i a l s e n s e , e.g., being s t r u c k by a f a l l i n g hammer on a c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e o r slipping o f f a ladder) need o n l y produce s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g t o show t h a t t h e a l l e g e d ' a c c i d e n t ' occurred and tending to e s t a b l i s h 'medical causation,' by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e ' a c c i d e n t ' was a c o n t r i b u t i n g cause of the complained-of injuries and complications." 68 0 So. 2d at 2 66 n.3. Nonetheless, p e r f o r m the r e q u i s i t e c a u s a t i o n from Slimfold that source and cause determining A l a . App. demonstrated the language to this by Co. the injuries had (indeed, of Alabama both included Court's i t was not 318 legal nothing Muilenberg, more than So. and 680 2d City 729 So. dicta opinion and of at in 268, and test for Tuscaloosa v. employee causation. Because not Trinity essential Industries as c o r r e c t l y o b s e r v e d i n Goodyear T i r e & Rubber 434, 439 ( A l a . C i v . App. was not binding 11 the the therefore, holding 2d 2d (1975), medical a p p l i c a b l e ) , i t was, 990 So. to rule e m p l o y m e n t m u s t be by i n n o t e 3 was, ultimate proceeded two-part causation established Judge Moore's c o n c u r r i n g v. the accident,'" 701, then a n a l y s i s , r e i t e r a t i n g the t h a t , p u r s u a n t to the nonaccidental H o w a r d , 55 "'[i]n we in 2008), subsequent 1080960 cases. 2002) to not See Ex p a r t e t h e judgment of the court the law of the case n.3 which established v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e f i n i n g ( A l a . 2009) 2004) d e f i n e s delivering the 838 S o . 2 d 1028 , ("Because o b i t e r d i c t u m i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , also Carr 957 Williams, ("Black's by t h a t opinion, i n the case not e s s e n t i a l the dictum, i t judgment."). i s See & M f g . C o . , 13 S o . 3 d 9 4 7 , Dictionary o b i t e r d i c t u m a s : 'A j u d i c i a l a judicial decision Law states 1031 ( A l a . b u t one t h a t 409 (8th. comment made ed. while i s unnecessary to ' " ) . In Byrom, t h i s C o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y r e i t e r a t e d , b u t d i d n o t apply, the "but-for" reasoning expressed in Trinity Industries: " W h i l e Ex p a r t e T r i n i t y I n d u s t r i e s does n o t r e q u i r e proof beyond the f a c t of the accident i t s e l f that the a c c i d e n t arose out of t h e employee's employment, the e v i d e n c e i n Byrom's c a s e meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f [ A m e r i c a n F u e l & C l a y P r o d u c t s Co. v . ] G i l b e r t [ , 221 A l a . 4 4 , 4 6 , 127 S o . 5 4 0 , 541 ( 1 9 3 0 ) (concluding t h a t c o m p e n s a t i o n i s d u e when ' t h e h a z a r d o f t h e accident "was p e c u l i a r t o t h e employment as a c o n t r i b u t i n g c a u s e , " and f l o w e d f r o m t h a t s o u r c e as a rational consequence')], f o r proof that the a c c i d e n t d i d i n f a c t a r i s e out o f t h e employment, t o whatever extent such requirements survived or accompanied the opinion issued in Gilbert on rehearing." 895 to So. 2d a t 947-48. endorse a "but-for" Therefore, while once a g a i n test, Court a c t u a l l y applied the this 12 appearing 1080960 "arising-out-of" causation analysis requirements necessary under the Trinity Industries, the dicta. See Williams, 2 Ex parte Regardless, that the "but-for" with and compensation present case, Byrom, completely causation: at i n which in such causation Such an language element as 1981),] the beyond the interpretation of of with any the i n order Act, to employee fall Byrom was in was in the prior Civil body of caselaw in the dealing arena i s evident Appeals, element this I n c . v.] require in this of legal So. to show Brown, So. 3d both prescribes be a the 2d falls contravenes to have e m p l o y e e who case, the applying M o r g a n [ , 830 an of in requirement that might clearly injury statutory a n a l y s i s , i t appears the itself." which f o r an in with Court dispensed App. language confusion [Wal-Mart S t o r e s , (Ala. Civ. work, the i t confusion That "Byrom e l i m i n a t e s been a p p l i e d 741 creating law. as espoused i n Byrom c o n f l i c t s workers' Thus, foregoing language is the supra. Court's opinion causation meet Act. "but-for" b a s e d upon the to legal at . plain causal-connection deemed c o m p e n s a b l e , and I t does not a p p e a r t h a t t h i s C o u r t has y e t c i t e d Byrom as a u t h o r i t y on t h i s p o i n t , n o r , u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , h a s i t had the o p p o r t u n i t y to a d d r e s s w h e t h e r Byrom improperly r e l i e d on d i c t a . 2 13 1080960 the rationale rejected a authority "but-for" compensation negates of cases. the s t a t u t o r y test this Court for causation utilization The 3 i n which of requirement that, a explicitly in workers' "but-for" t o be c o m p e n s a b l e , i n j u r y o r d e a t h " a r i s e " out o f employment and i n s t e a d o n l y one p a r t o f t h e s t a t u t o r y t e s t - - t h a t the course (noting of employment." that, See i n affirming an causation despite the t r i a l claimant the h a d n o t met appellate fiat c o u r t would an e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t and i t s progeny to the decisions, In noted Ex effectively that parte compensation Mitchell, conflicts "'"[c]ourts must 989 "'"such So. 2d liberally law 'to e f f e c t u a t e 2d a t 202 a finding of on f i n d i n g that "the causation," "abrogate by judicial [the] A c t " ) . of p r o o f under Byrom requires So. of e s t a b l i s h i n g Slimfold language with i t i s due t o b e , a n d i s h e r e b y , that however, based c o r r e c t l y apply the p l a i n extent 417 court's implicit her burden an the i n j u r y occur " i n Slimfold, award test 1083 of the A c t ; those previous overruled. ( A l a . 2008), construe the we workers' i t sb e n e f i c e n t purposes'"'"; a c o n s t r u c t i o n m u s t b e one t h a t the language W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f Judge Moore's s p e c i a l c o n c u r r e n c e in Muilenburg, supra, the Court of C i v i l Appeals' opinion i n B r o w n a p p e a r s t o be t h e o n l y p u b l i s h e d d e c i s i o n explicitly i n t e r p r e t i n g Byrom i n t h i s manner. 3 14 1080960 of the statute 2 d a t 1090 2003), 'fairly and ( q u o t i n g E x p a r t e W e a v e r , 871 quoting other liberally cases). construed the "beneficent purposes," the Act i n order provides reasonably' supports."'" that to Thus, Act accomplish workers' order out that compensation 1975 Section i s not compensation suffers dispense and In injury with the ambiguous. benefits "arising consideration be of the a p p l i e d by the Court from dicta contravenes Accordingly, hereby the judgment r e v e r s e d and a It i t s language a r e due only i n [the employee's] (emphasis paid the of the foregoing, of C i v i l added). states t o an that employee the judgment 15 we conclude rendered clearly that i n Brown i s language Court JUDGMENT RENDERED. would To Act. Appeals clear of clearly requirement Store. R E V E R S E D AND has Act clearly t o be to r e w r i t e rule Court out o f " h i s or her employment. "arising-out-of" i m p e r m i s s i b l y -- and are (Ala. c a u s e d b y an a c c i d e n t § 2 5 - 5 - 5 1 , A l a . Code workers' the ... employment...." 25-5-51 in 824 So. achieve The benefits of -- and goal. course who of to change the p l a i n "case[s] of p e r s o n a l i n j u r y or death arising 2d 820, although this in i t cannot So. 989 of of Civil i n favor the drawn the Act. Appeals of is Korner 1080960 Cobb, C . J . , and W o o d a l l , Wise, Stuart, Bolin, J J . , concur. Murdock, J . , concurs specially. 16 Parker, Main, and 1080960 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e I fully (concurring agree with specially). the main opinion's rejection of s o - c a l l e d " b u t - f o r " t e s t of c a u s a t i o n under Alabama's compensation of the law requirement connection a the a relate to § 25-5-1(9), The as the Co. of first one what in motion Wooten v. causal injury.'" M a r t i n , 417 cases in So. So. 2d by the and how two 3d 199, at 202 I believe term "causal other these determining A l a . Code tests two other whether any of these 1975. other tests i s w h a t may "To justify the r a t i o n a l resultant personal injury by and the employment, R o d e n , 260 a l s o Ex definite t h a t " a r i s e s out o f " employment f o r p u r p o s e s (quoted w i t h a p p r o v a l See embrace d i s c u s s i o n of another "set-in-motion" test: the opinion's "'a i s meant i n our Workmen's C o m p e n s a t i o n A c t , trace of the v. n e c e s s i t a t e s some " a c c i d e n t " i s one of and that workers' I w r i t e s e p a r a t e l y because t h a t have been e x p r e s s e d tests showing work 1981)). understanding connection" a corollary, S l i m f o l d Mfg. C i v . App. full as for between (quoting (Ala. and, the parte A l a . 606, to not 611, 71 Indus., 17 referred recovery under m i n d m u s t be a proximate by So. 2d Inc., able cause some o t h e r 680 802, 806 3d a t So. 2d to the to set agency." So. i n the main o p i n i o n , Trinity be (1954) 262, ). 265 1080960 n.2 to (Ala. 1996)(reiterating that a proximate cause some o t h e r Grantham, I the agency'" 263 also (quoting take note employee [the employee] that to which lives." City Ex test. prove to a people parte As 732 a that are on Civ. App. the Supreme "nonaccidental sake Court's of simplicity" Trinity Industries definition Act. in 895 of "accident" So. § 25-5-1(7) 2d a t 940. applied v. 2d 204, 207 risk (1955))). to i n our cases as test requires employment "exposed materially exposed i n excess in their Inc., 68 0 55 A l a . A p p . of Civil So. 701, Appeals, J., concurring of of everyday 2d at 705, 2 67 ; 318 So. the in 3 and terms the "accident" sense and accompanying conflict I observed that t o an 18 in a So. 2 d 932 ( A l a . with the i n the Alabama Workers' simply I noted i n the r e s u l t ) , in a "colloquial" i n note was T e x t i l e Prods. Corp. I n c . v . B y r o m , 895 use injuries" by 1975). Court 2002)(Murdock, not increased-risk Indus., s p e c i a l w r i t i n g i n Ceasco, the employment, h i s or her Howard, the So. normally Trinity traceable i s referred or ( A l a . C i v . App. judge 82 The danger o f T u s c a l o o s a v. 729, 183, " ' m u s t be by Alabama o f what "increased-risk" the 2d set i n motion A l a . 179, that injuries that and " f o r the text of statutory Compensation the term "accident" "unexpected or unforeseen 1080960 event, happening restricted external and to events force accompanying suggestion Byrom caused by the t o t h e human b o d y . " result)(emphasis in s u d d e n l y and v i o l e n t l y " text omitted). i n the main "that (Murdock, legal and " t h e r e f o r e i s not traumatic 895 So. a p p l i c a t i o n of 2d a t 940-41 n.6 concurring in the Accordingly, 4 J., I disagreed with the opinion of the Court causation i s never of C i v i l at issue Appeals in a case i n v o l v i n g what t h e Supreme C o u r t c o l l o q u i a l l y r e f e r [ r e d ] t o as an 'accident'" (Murdock, Trinity J., in Trinity concurring Industries, legislature's intent enough to have in the to a allow 895 So. 2d at 941 the Court in not result). As explained, i t was an "to recover itself, our w o r k e r s ' compensation lucky Industries. employee s t a t u t e merely because d i s a b l i n g event the under he o r s h e resulting from was [a] On c e r t i o r a r i r e v i e w , t h i s C o u r t a g r e e d t h a t t h e t e r m s " a c c i d e n t " and " n o n a c c i d e n t a l i n j u r y " as u s e d i n n o t e 3 and the accompanying of t e x t of T r i n i t y I n d u s t r i e s c o n f l i c t e d w i t h the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of the term " a c c i d e n t " i n § 25-51(7), a t l e a s t t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t h e l d t h a t Byrom's i n j u r y had b e e n i m p r o p e r l y v i e w e d by t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s as a "nonaccidental" injury. See Ex p a r t e B y r o m , 895 So. 2d 9 4 2 , 947 ( A l a . 2004). T h i s C o u r t w e n t on t o a n a l y z e t h e c l a i m b e f o r e i t under the " i n c r e a s e d - r i s k " t e s t . I d . at 948-49. (I q u e s t i o n t h e manner i n w h i c h t h i s C o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e r e c o r d i n Ex p a r t e Byrom s u p p o r t e d t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e " i n c r e a s e d - r i s k " t e s t had been s a t i s f i e d and w h e t h e r that reasoning improperly r e l i e v e d the p l a i n t i f f of h i s burden of p r o o f i n t h i s r e g a r d , an i s s u e n o t p r e s e n t e d here.) 4 19 1080960 natural 2d cause occur at 267. at the place i n the colloquial sense f o r the employment ... h a v e b e e n t h e c a u s e a n d s o u r c e agency.'" by of must the Court Industries compensation -- that be t r a c e a b l e t o a t h e employment, 680 S o . 2 d a t 2 6 5 n . 2 not normally employment injuries, n o t by operation c a n be c o n s i d e r e d "'the other 263 A l a . other been s e t i n m o t i o n by cause" of that i s proximate some ( q u o t i n g Grantham, as h a v i n g i s the "proximate however, nonetheless considered i t of the accident 1 8 3 , 82 S o . 2 d a t 2 0 7 ) . When a n " a c t o f G o d " o r some force the recovery the resultant injuries s e t i n motion i n Trinity i n what necessary the dicta referenced today at as an " a c c i d e n t " o r a " n o n a c c i d e n t a l recognizes cause 680 S o . as t o any " a c c i d e n t " as d e f i n e d i n § 25- 5 - 1 ( 7 ) -- w h e t h e r i n v o l v i n g and " 5 In o t h e r words, injury" o f employment of t h e employee's f o r c e upon t h e employee t o have been " s e t i n motion by employment" where t h e employment i n c r e a s e s t h e employee's I f a l l t h a t was n e c e s s a r y t o s a t i s f y t h e l e g a l - c a u s a t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t was p r o o f t h a t a n a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t o f some e x t e r n a l f o r c e o p e r a t i n g u p o n t h e e m p l o y e e w h i l e t h e e m p l o y e e was a t w o r k , t h e n e m p l o y e e s s u f f e r i n g w h i l e a t w o r k , b u t i n common w i t h o t h e r s i n t h e i r c o m m u n i t i e s , a s a r e s u l t o f a n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r , e.g., a f l o o d or a h a i l s t o r m , would always be able to recover compensation under the Workers' Compensation A c t f o r any p e r s o n a l injury caused by such disaster. 5 20 1080960 exposure that t o which lives, for t o , or r i s k people t o , that reason, reported Alabama strike, f o r example, case that this o t h e r t h a n Byrom r e q u i r e d p r o o f o f an " i n c r e a s e d suffering force are n o r m a l l y exposed i . e . , when t h e i n c r e a s e d - r i s k t e s t this of of exposure a lightning i n excess of i n their everyday i ssatisfied. Court, i n the only involving risk" It i s a lightning t o t h e employee strike: "'[I]f the position which the workman must necessarily occupy i n connection with h i s work r e s u l t s i n e x c e s s i v e e x p o s u r e t o t h e common r i s k ... or i f the continuity or exceptional amount o f e x p o s u r e a g g r a v a t e s t h e common r i s k ... t h e n i t i s open t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t d i d n o t a r i s e o u t o f t h e common r i s k , b u t o u t o f t h e e m p l o y m e n t . ' " American Fuel & Clay Prods. Co. v . G i l b e r t , 127 540, (quoting So. Parramore, United Likewise, (1930) 2 6 3 U.S. States employee's 541 418 , Supreme being 425 Court h i t by i n the early case (1 923) Cudahy Packing (a c a s e consistently lightning 221 A l a . 44, 46, as i n which referred an o f Pow v . S o u t h e r n Co. v. the to the "accident")). 6 Construction It i s a l s o b a s e d on t h i s r e a s o n i n g t h a t t h e l e a d i n g n a t i o n a l t r e a t i s e on w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e i n c r e a s e d - r i s k t e s t s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o c a s e s i n v o l v i n g i n j u r y or death by l i g h t n i n g , 1 A r t h u r L a r s o n a n d L e x K. L a r s o n , L a r s o n ' s W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n Law § 5 . 0 1 [ 1 ] ( 2 0 0 1 ) , a s d o e s a t r e a t i s e on A l a b a m a w o r k e r s ' c o m p e n s a t i o n l a w , 1 T e r r y A. M o o r e , A l a b a m a W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n § 10:10-11, pp. 329-31 (1998). 6 21 1080960 Co., 235 Court in explained which being A l a . 580, required an So. 288 (1938 ), the Alabama the use of the i n c r e a s e d - r i s k t e s t a death considered 288 from pneumonia to work "accident" resulting outside arising in from Supreme in a case an e m p l o y e e ' s wet conditions out of the was employment. The p r o o f o f f e r e d b y t h e e m p l o y e e a s t o t h e " a c c i d e n t " i n the present nor the case satisfies "increased-risk" requisite employee's "causal neither test. connection" injuries the "set-in-motion" I therefore agree between t h e employment has not been 22 shown. that test the and t h e

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