Jefferson County Commission et al. v. Jessica Edwards et al.

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REL: 05/14/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1090437 J e f f e r s o n County Commission e t a l . v. J e s s i c a Edwards e t a l . 1090517 J e f f e r s o n County Commission e t a l . v. J e s s i c a Edwards e t a l . Appeals from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t (CV-07-900873) Court 1090437; 1090517 LYONS, J u s t i c e . The Travis Jefferson Hulsey, collectively the 15, 2010. "the 23 as the County") the we Ala. to 1967, Acts the 1967 impose ("the 1967 or Jefferson Ordinance No. occupational order, we 7, Collins, referred to entered by orders 2 0 0 9 , and January heard o r a l 2010. As to the part, and reverse in reverse and remand. Act No. Background enacted Act"), authorizing Jefferson business-license to pay part, Legislature person engaging i n a business required April in Factual Alabama Fine t h e p r o c e e d i n g s and on 15 from December 23, affirm January Bettye (hereinafter appeal 1 C o u r t on I. In Smallwood parties order, to Commission, Court expedited from December J.T. Circuit This arguments remand; and as Jefferson County and occupational f o r w h i c h he taxes o r she was 406, County upon not a l i c e n s e or p r i v i l e g e t a x to e i t h e r the County. 1120, tax In which, authorized 1987, for by Jefferson the the first 1967 County time, Act. then State enacted imposed There any the followed C o l l i n s i s a c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r f o r J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y and the p r e s i d e n t of the J e f f e r s o n County Commission, Hulsey i s t h e d i r e c t o r o f r e v e n u e o f J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y and t h e acting d i r e c t o r o f f i n a n c e , and S m a l l w o o d i s t h e t a x c o l l e c t o r f o r J e f f e r s o n County. 1 2 1090437; a 1090517 complex sequence of legislative litigation that i s discussed an appeal earlier C o m m i s s i o n v. 3d Jessica Edwards of taxpayers Jefferson authorized 1999. unrelated legislature separation is of a the that trial of action County the been r e p e a l e d court on this Court pass powers, 2 a in 2007 of a class taxpayers"). The "the the by A c t J a n u a r y 12, there holding had bill concluded So. behalf on because 2009] filed occupational unlawful of whether to class (hereinafter t a x , had determinations County County I " ) . was opinion related Jefferson ("Jefferson alleged The See 1080496, A u g u s t 25, taxpayers the and i n an o p i n i o n i s s u e d i n proceeding. against County in detail [Ms. proceeding composed Acts this Edwards, ( A l a . 2009) This the in enactments been 1967 No. levied Act, by which 99-669, A l a . 2009, r e l y i n g on an that after-the-fact sufficient violated that tax by the the votes in doctrine of judgment in See Birmingham-Jefferson C i v i c C t r . A u t h . v. C i t y of B i r m i n g h a m , 912 So. 2 d 204 (Ala. 2005), h o l d i n g that pursuant to t h e s e p a r a t i o n - o f - p o w e r s d o c t r i n e s e t f o r t h i n § 43 o f t h e Alabama Constitution of 1901, the judicial branch of government does not have j u r i s d i c t i o n to i n t e r p r e t the r u l e s and p r o c e d u r e s o f t h e l e g i s l a t i v e b r a n c h and t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n grants the legislature the power to e s t a b l i s h the r u l e s of i t s p r o c e e d i n g s , the determination w h e t h e r a b i l l i s p a s s e d w i t h a s u f f i c i e n t number o f votes according to those rules is a nonjusticiable political 2 3 1090437; 1090517 Jefferson No. County Employees' A s s o c i a t i o n CV-00-0297, insufficient declaring votes, jurisdiction. The language i n Act was No. the collection void trial the tax, of the that the 1967 trial court payments No. 1120 be No. 99-669 had During while oral the a argument in that 7 of Act resume c o l l e c t i n g No. the was 1967 tax on Act unambiguous to hold pursuant that to the A f t e r the illegal. of the an injunction received by Jefferson i n escrow. trial court's the 1967 called case, for subject-matter relied continuance in Jefferson 2009-811, A l a . Acts Section then invalid of entered repealed specially appeal want County, 2009 a d j o u r n e d w i t h o u t the enactment placed t h i s Court u p h e l d the Act Act Jefferson 99-669 occupational f o r the tax Ordinance I, providing the for court regular l e g i s l a t i v e session statute No. 99-669 r e p e a l i n g a u t h o r i t y g r a n t e d i n the a Act v. In 2009-811 4 County under County session in p e n d i n g and effective t a x e s as question. required Jefferson legislature authorized occupational of that Act. C o u n t y I was 2 0 0 9 , w h i c h was that judgment d e c l a r i n g legislative the collection of enacted before Act A u g u s t 14, Jefferson of the 2009, No. 2009. County effective to date 1090437; 1090517 of act that ratified the and, and § severance 10 of any any saving I, calculation refunds the County December filed to i n Act the County's motion Act No. the to 99¬ permitting the found expressly the be not stated e f f e c t of Act trial court's in No. No. in judgment light 2009-811, filed a motion escrow The filed vacate the escrow a to trial January clarify the escrow entered an d i s s o l v e the 95 of the 5 12, the motion The the court for order, to J e f f e r s o n County. enforce the i n the been p l a c e d County in of administrator due. 2009-811 v i o l a t e s § to portions settlement a motion 2009, We Act to No. remaining taxpayers, i n j u n c t i o n , to a motion 23, the the r e l e a s e the escrowed taxes subsequent 2009-811 I that t a x p r o c e e d s t h a t had of the filed No. and us. of court-appointed approved taxes clause the County provisions to r e l e a s e the then Act then before County a savings of affirmance retroactivity dissolve portion while not our Jefferson to appeal, 99-669; § 9 r e p e a l e d a in Jefferson 2 0 0 9 - 8 1 1 was fund this constitutional infirmity. opinion After No. included unconstitutional having to J e f f e r s o n County's c o l l e c t i o n of e f f e c t i v e date of Act 669; our relevant to and to taxpayers 2009, order; period. order On denying injunction, holding that Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1 0 9 0 4 3 7 ; 1090517 1901 prohibiting the enactment cause of a c t i o n a f t e r been f i l e d . to interest trial the moneys accrued, administering collected i n the to a between January escrow the 12, from the a l s o r e q u i r e d the fund, special of together master taxes August has with the with County had 2009. The 14, o f December 23, a County charged Jefferson 2009, and order t a k i n g away t h a t cause of a c t i o n court's order refunds County appealed legislation a s u i t b a s e d on The transfer of 2009 (case no. 1090437). On January purporting to 15, certify pursuant to Rule ordered the during the 2010, the the December 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. County to pay the pendency of t h i s order of January 15, Applicability We that in a r e met of at the several the 23, C i v . P. appeal. 3 entered 2009, The an order as final court also order trial interest accruing The County appealed no. (case from 1090517). Analysis Doctrine t h r e s h o l d by instances court postjudgment 2010 II. A. trial former of E s t o p p e l the or taxpayers' counsel for Waiver contention the County T h e D e c e m b e r 2 3 , 2 0 0 9 , o r d e r was a p p e a l a b l e u n d e r R u l e 4 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( A ) , A l a . R. A p p . P., b e c a u s e i t was an i n t e r l o c u t o r y o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e C o u n t y ' s m o t i o n t o d i s s o l v e an i n j u n c t i o n a n d e n t e r i n g an i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o u n t y . 3 6 1090437; 1090517 a d m i t t e d t h a t § 95 2009-811 v o i d . counsel's from taking a the waiver the estoppel position in taxpayers takes i t argue this doctrine Ex parte 2003), 750-51 in of proceeding this this We estoppel County In has the the waived conclude nor No. former the County appeal. so in either Bank, New Hampshire Court recognized party that a judicial later the first such circumstance proceeding application for previously not noted, before us So. that doctrine of an e x i s t s here. of second Nor can in I, perception was the 2009-811 and an prior misled. C o u n t y be County e f f e c t of Act County 7 No. i n the of inconsistent court Jefferson in Jefferson asserting to a s s e r t rehearing the 742 , the the Act of U.S. an create on issue 532 for based the 1244 successful would the 1236, e s s e n t i a l element acceptance or 2d Maine, attacked proceeding court 883 v. p o s i t i o n must have been this was of proceeding. the to have w a i v e d i t s p o s i t i o n f o r f a i l i n g of in light prevents that judicial Alabama estoppel--the inconsistent position First quoting (2001), judicial that judicial of Act applies. In (Ala. retroactive feature taxpayers contend that, contrary position neither No The admission, alternative, the rendered the any No. held mootness in I. its As 2009-811 argument on 1090437; 1090517 rehearing asserting the applicability violated our rule would have being argued f o r the have been c o n s i d e r e d . 2d B. 1058, Act No. prohibiting new matters time See C h i s m on r e h e a r i n g and v. J e f f e r s o n second 2009-811 would County, 954 sentence o f A c t No. not So. o f § 95 o f t h e A l a b a m a 2009-811 Constitution 1901 p r o v i d e s : "After suit h a s b e e n c o m m e n c e d on a n y c a u s e of a c t i o n , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l h a v e no p o w e r t o t a k e away s u c h c a u s e o f a c t i o n , o r d e s t r o y a n y e x i s t i n g defense to such s u i t . " Section from ( A l a . 2006). Challenge to the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y The of 1106 first of 7 o f A c t No. 2009-811 p r o v i d e s : " A l l a c t i o n s of the g o v e r n i n g body i n c o n t i n u o u s l y l e v y i n g , c o l l e c t i n g and e n f o r c i n g t h e l e v y o f t h e c o u n t y o c c u p a t i o n a l and l i c e n s e t a x e s p u r s u a n t t o [ t h e 1967 A c t ] s i n c e t h e t i m e o f t h e i n i t i a l levies t h e r e o f , p a r t i c u l a r l y from and a f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f A c t 9 9 - 6 6 9 ; 1999 S e c o n d Special Session ( A c t s 1 9 9 9 , p . 168) a r e h e r e b y r a t i f i e d , v a l i d a t e d , and c o n f i r m e d . T h i s a c t i s t h e r e f o r e i n t e n d e d t o be r e t r o a c t i v e and c u r a t i v e t o November 29, 1999; and a l l t h e e x e m p t i o n s o r i g i n a l l y p r o v i d e d i n [ t h e 1967 Act] shall remain in effect, except f o r the e x e m p t i o n f o r any p e r s o n r e q u i r e d t o pay a p r i v i l e g e or l i c e n s e t a x t o t h e s t a t e o r t h e c o u n t y by A r t i c l e 1, C h a p t e r 2 0 , T i t l e 51 o f t h e C o d e o f A l a b a m a 1 9 4 0 , w h i c h s h a l l e x p i r e J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 1 0 , a n d t h e r a t e o f t a x s h a l l b e t h e r a t e a t w h i c h t h e t a x was l e v i e d on the e f f e c t i v e date of t h i s a c t u n t i l January 1, 2 0 1 0 , a t w h i c h t i m e t h e maximum s h a l l b e t h e r a t e s p e c i f i e d i n S e c t i o n 6. On a n d a f t e r J a n u a r y 1, 2010, the county g o v e r n i n g body shall have no 8 1090437; 1090517 authority 1967 to levy an occupational tax under [the Act]." (Emphasis added.) r e p e a l s A c t No. Section 99-669, 9 of Act No. the act the t r i a l 2009-811 court expressly and t h i s C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t o have e l i m i n a t e d J e f f e r s o n County's a u t h o r i t y t o impose the occupational tax. Section 10 o f A c t No. 2009-811 provides: " I f a n y p r o v i s i o n o f t h i s a c t i o n s h a l l be h e l d b y a n y c o u r t o f c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o be i n v a l i d , such invalidity shall not affect any other p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s a c t a n d t h e a c t s h a l l be g i v e n full force and effect as c o m p l e t e l y as i f the i n v a l i d p r o v i s i o n had not been i n c l u d e d . " We the e x a m i n e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f A c t No. presumption Montgomery March 5, that Highway, 2010] i t I n c . v. So. 3d is 2009-811 constitutional. City of Hoover, , See [Ms. ( A l a . 2010): "'"Our r e v i e w of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e s to legislative enactments i s de novo." R i c h a r d s v. I z z i , 819 S o . 2 d 2 5 , 29 n.3 (Ala. 2001). A d d i t i o n a l l y , acts of the legislature are presumed constitutional. S t a t e v . A l a b a m a Mun. I n s . C o r p . , 730 S o . 2 d 1 0 7 , 110 ( A l a . 1 9 9 8 ) . See a l s o D o b b s v . S h e l b y C o u n t y E c o n . & I n d u s . Dev. A u t h . , 749 So. 2d 425, 428 ( A l a . 1999) ("In reviewing the constitutionality of a l e g i s l a t i v e act, this Court w i l l sustain the act '"unless i t i s clear beyond r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t i t i s v i o l a t i v e of the fundamental law."' W h i t e v. R e y n o l d s M e t a l s C o . , 558 S o . 2 d 3 7 3 , 383 ( A l a . 1 9 8 9 ) 9 with 15 6 8 1070531, 1090437; 1090517 ( q u o t i n g Alabama S t a t e Fed'n of L a b o r v. M c A d o r y , 246 A l a . 1, 9, 18 So. 2 d 8 1 0 , 815 (1944))."). We a p p r o a c h t h e q u e s t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a l e g i s l a t i v e act " ' " w i t h e v e r y p r e s u m p t i o n and i n t e n d m e n t i n f a v o r o f i t s v a l i d i t y , and seek t o s u s t a i n r a t h e r t h a n s t r i k e down t h e e n a c t m e n t o f a coordinate branch of the government."'" M o n r o e v . H a r c o , I n c . , 762 So. 2 d 8 2 8 , 831 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Moore v. Mobile I n f i r m a r y A s s ' n , 592 So. 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n M c A d o r y , 246 A l a . a t 9, 18 So. 2 d a t 8 1 5 ) . "'Moreover, i n o r d e r to overcome the presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , ... t h e p a r t y a s s e r t i n g the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e A c t ... b e a r s t h e b u r d e n " t o show t h a t [the A c t ] i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys. of M o n t g o m e r y v . T a l l e y , 291 A l a . 307 , 310 , 280 So. 2 d 5 5 3 , 556 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . See a l s o T h o r n v . J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , 375 S o . 2 d 7 8 0 , 787 (Ala. 1979) ("It i s the law, of c o u r s e , t h a t a p a r t y a t t a c k i n g a s t a t u t e has t h e burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality " ) . ' " S t a t e ex r e l . K i n g v. M o r t o n , (Ala. 2006)." 955 So. Section 43, which separation executive 95 of elaborates powers branches of among on § the judicial, 2d 1012, calls 1017 for the legislative, and government: "In the government of t h i s s t a t e , except i n the instances i n this Constitution hereinafter expressly d i r e c t e d or p e r m i t t e d , the l e g i s l a t i v e department shall never e x e r c i s e the executive and judicial powers, o r e i t h e r o f them; t h e e x e c u t i v e s h a l l n e v e r e x e r c i s e the l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l powers, or 10 1090437; 1090517 e i t h e r of them; t h e j u d i c i a l s h a l l n e v e r e x e r c i s e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e and e x e c u t i v e powers, or e i t h e r o f t h e m ; t o t h e e n d t h a t i t may be a g o v e r n m e n t o f l a w s and n o t o f men." Section matters taking that away construe 95 restricts are w i t h i n the legislature a pending cause beyond i t s intended of action. sphere of to impose case, the a u t h o r i t y a retroactive tax General Motors Acceptance 2002); B l o c k b u s t e r , South Cent. 2000). Bell A similar of Congress. (1994), that that e.g., the retroactive process and legislature. legislature question. See, e.g., So. 2 d 67 ( A l a . 819 So. 2 d 43 State, 789 So. ( A l a . 2001); 2d on U n i t e d S t a t e s v. C a r l t o n , Court upheld subjected d i d not Limitations v. certain theretofore the t a x have been the 147 (Ala. closing 11 of U.S. 26 a loophole taxpayers ability r e c o g n i z e d where The 512 acts to a tax exist. legislature's of law are i m p l i c a t e d . by cannot r e s u l t has been r e a c h e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o retroactively liability I n c . v. W h i t e , we operation of the C o r p . v . D u b o s e , 834 T e l . Co. See, i n which i s beyond on system However, t h e r e b y e n c r o a c h upon t h e l e g i t i m a t e power o f t h e In the c o n t e x t of t h i s acting the b r e a s t of the j u d i c i a l 95 § from to impose concerns Court of C i v i l over a due Appeals i n 1090437; 1090517 IEC Alabama, Arab (Ala. C i v . App. Inc. v. 2008), City of Arab, 7 So. 3d 370 , 374 stated: "Turning to the i s s u e of the constitutional c h a l l e n g e t o t h e r e t r o a c t i v i t y p r o v i s i o n , we noted that retroactive tax legislation had been historically upheld by the courts. [Monroe v. V a l h a l l a C e m e t e r y Co., 74 9 So. 2d 470 , 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999), overruled on other grounds, P a t t e r s o n v . G l a d w i n C o r p . , 835 So. 2d 1 3 7 , 153 (Ala. 2002)]. When a c o u r t i s c a l l e d on t o c o n s i d e r whether r e t r o a c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , its f o c u s i s on w h e t h e r t h e r e t r o a c t i v i t y o f the legislation denies due process. Id. at 473-74 (quoting United S t a t e s v. C a r l t o n , 512 U.S. 26, 3 0 - 3 1 , 114 S. C t . 2018 , 129 L. E d . 2 d 22 (1994 ) ) . In C a r l t o n , 'the [ U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme] C o u r t s e t f o r t h the t e s t to determine whether r e t r o a c t i v e tax legislation denies due process: first, the legislation m u s t be "supported by a legislative p u r p o s e f u r t h e r e d by r a t i o n a l means," and second, the period of retroactivity m u s t be "modest."' V a l h a l l a C e m e t e r y Co., 749 So. 2 d a t 474 (quoting C a r l t o n , 512 U.S. a t 3 1 , 114 S. C t . 2 0 1 8 ) . " Whether l i m i t s on t h e e x t e n t b a s e d u p o n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f due 2009-811 of a f i e l d an process of o p e r a t i o n tax, of r e t r o a c t i v e t a x as tax, opposed to i s a question renounced than the in the contention adjustment not trial before court at a hearing i n the of us. any t h a t A c t No. of a c t i o n i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n stated i n that 12 No. i t constitutes a new rate The taxpayers for i n an existing expressly challenge other 2 0 0 9 - 8 1 1 t o o k away o f a c a u s e o f § 95. trial could deprive Act the basis liability Counsel f o r the court: taxpayers 1090437; 1090517 "If I may, the o n l y r e a s o n we're d o i n g the s e r v i n g t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l i s s u e t o be p e r f e c t l y h o n e s t r e g a r d s A r t i c l e I V , S e c t i o n 95, t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n o f A r t i c l e I V , S e c t i o n 95, may call i n t o q u e s t i o n an as a p p l i e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of S e c t i o n 7 of Act 2009-811. We h a v e no interest i n c h a l l e n g i n g t h e v a l i d i t y o f A c t 2009-811 i n any other respect except as i t applies to the retroactivity provisions specifically tailored to o u r c l i e n t s a n d no o t h e r s . " This Court w i l l any valid legal whether that rejected, rule to Nat'l Ins. was trial an Co. P.C., taxpayers' based the resurrect Found., judgment of the ground presented ground by Life a f f i r m the 881 the or however, omitted on of even do i f not i t 2d 1013, Alabama 1020 this Liberty Health (Ala. was apply a f f i r m a t i v e defense. U n i v e r s i t y of So. we court regardless record, considered, court; v. by trial Servs. 2003). The o p p o s i t i o n to the motion to d i s s o l v e the i n j u n c t i o n on Act No. 2009-811 is unconstitutional. described a challenge t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e r e l i e d upon by the seeking Ex party parte Surtees, 239 1981). relief 6 So. Enforcement Ass'n 2d 2 0 0 9 - 8 1 1 was of 3d as 1157 Mobile (Ala. 1991); K i t t r e l l Based on the met an with claim have We a often C o u n t y v. of No. See Deputy S h e r i f f s Mobile Benjamin, abandonment 13 Act a f f i r m a t i v e defense. (Ala. 2008); v. that 396 County, So. a l l grounds 2d 590 93 other Law So. (Ala. than § 1090437; 95, we 1090517 do grounds not for theories consider affirming of phrase analyzed As alleged that tax, had taxpayers immunity Act from a that taxes the 2009-811 illegally different noted, 1967 retroactive 2009-811 does action," provided with that which suit the has § 95 protects been f i l e d , taxpayers' levied by by the complaint J e f f e r s o n County the 99-669, and, The complaint liability. not our conflict holding "there shall pursuant be must No. therefore, did not to be a presented assert 4 with the taxpayers' statute, i n J e f f e r s o n County c o r r e c t i n such would on the tax does were collected question based were c o l l e c t e d under a r e p e a l e d i t conflict taxpayers judgment A c t , the law t h a t a u t h o r i z e d refund. No. alternative of the cause of a c t i o n f i l e d been r e p e a l e d by A c t that the claim of occupational tax claimed be 95. previously u n l a w f u l because the might court's encroachment a f t e r the nor § i n the context taxpayers. there trial cause "any from l e g i s l a t i v e was the independent The be whether claim. no Had recovery repealed because Act of No. taxes statute," such I a language Whether such a s s e r t i o n would c o n s t i t u t e a statement of a c l a i m u p o n w h i c h r e l i e f c o u l d be g r a n t e d i s a q u e s t i o n n o t b e f o r e u s ; we m e r e l y n o t e t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y s u c h c l a i m i n t h e taxpayers' complaint i n this proceeding. 4 14 1090437; would 1090517 have indeed asserted--that was unlawful tax, had the taken occupational because the been repealed Act of impact in Southern in in which pendency of Court that cases 167 the 95 this So. kind at an 53 invalid Oklahoma identical 794, levy was legislature. to § 95, the Jefferson that to 95 of Ala. was 324, the recognized So. 729 during the this vote " I am 167 to also has no taxation." attain of the 232 Ala. concurring P. 918, 919 Applying a i n Lusk at 327, i s Lusk an constitutional in act v. which of the provision stated: "[The c u r a t i v e a c t ] p r o b a b l y w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a c o m p l e t e a n s w e r i f t h i s c a u s e had n o t b e e n commenced b e f o r e the passage of the c u r a t i v e a c t . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r i g h t s o f t h e p l a i n t i f f seem t o 15 to specially). (1916), r e t r o a c t i v e l y c u r e d by a opinion application J u s t i c e Anderson's opinion 158 with J u s t i c e of One concurring C.J., was enacted a refund. Constitution court County statutes taxation statute observed, 798, here authorized curative Webb, 232 (Anderson, to Chief Okla. tax the he law § r e l a t i n g to 731 D i r e c t l y contra Starkey, of the action 99-669. seeking necessary of t a x l e v i e d by context v. cause No. curative In d o i n g so, section of a Ry. litigation added majority. i n the the Act, by retroactive (1936), 1967 inapplicability The dicta away 1090437; 1090517 be protected Constitution, by s e c t i o n 52, which provides: "'After suit cause of a c t i o n , no p o w e r t o t a k e o r d e s t r o y any suit.'" The Oklahoma cause of court action 5, Williams' h a s b e e n c o m m e n c e d on a n y the L e g i s l a t u r e s h a l l have away s u c h c a u s e o f a c t i o n , e x i s t i n g defense to such offered set art. no forth analysis in the of the do so We would broaden authority the nor did i t r e t r o a c t i v e tax d e c l i n e to f o l l o w such precedent, the b e y o n d our a u t h o r i t y , and the of complaint, c o n s i d e r the power of the l e g i s l a t u r e to enact legislation. scope language of § 95, an because act that simultaneously impermissibly of the legislature, to Act No. an act also to is curtail beyond our authority. Returning 2 0 0 9 - 8 1 1 , we remains a problem w i t h a p o r t i o n of the act " r a t i f i e d , taxes v a l i d a t e d , and determined to be contrary action to in authority no the § to recovery illegal 95. impose However, that there S e c t i o n 7 of the the c o l l e c t i o n of the is the l e g i s l a t i v e determination that of these prohibition act. confirmed" e q u i v a l e n t o f an i m p e r m i s s i b l e t h e r e c o u l d be conclude and, illegally against in taking light r e t r o a c t i v e taxes, 16 therefore, of collected away the we a taxes, cause of legislature's cannot read the 1090437; portion 1090517 o f § 7 o f A c t No. confirming the c o l l e c t i o n isolation that retroactive that the and provisions repeal portion Act curative legislature rendered effect, "[t]his the i n Act is collection o f A c t No. In other 99-669 recover, other impermissibly portions of County at t h i s time to c o l l e c t are l e f t be and § the statute illegal. for repeal and 9, i n By the retroactive l e v y o f a new b y t h e t e r m s o f A c t No. defeats the the taxpayers' act, not 2009-811, right to to the subject Jefferson additional occupational validity tax. effect taxes. of the escrow fund This and anomaly i s d i c t a t e d to the r e t r o a c t i v e feature the p r o v i s i o n f o r repeal notwithstanding a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e 1967 2009-811. authority to give § 7 and reinstated Jefferson i m p o s e d by § 95, a u t h o r i z e with the continued simultaneous 811, to 1999," one p o r t i o n o f A c t No. infirmity of 2009-811 intended the taxes the taxes constitutional Our in 99-669, retroactively words, w h i l e alone, the and the l e g i s l a t u r e imposed a r e t r o a c t i v e t a x , because the standing We 29, A c t No. 2009-811 County's a u t h o r i t y to c o l l e c t Act. c o l l e c t e d taxes therefore of validating, o f § 7 o f A c t No. t o November repealed No. ratifying, of the i l l e g a l l y from the other provides which 2009-811 the in § constitutional 17 9 o f A c t No. infirmity 2009¬ of the 1090437; 1090517 offending portion 2009-811 may and sever of § 7, is recognized in s e t t l e d precedent. any provision rather unconstitutional of than in § 10 of Nevertheless, Act No. No. this Court i t finds 2009-811 declaring Act the entire act unconstitutional. "If a portion of a l e g i s l a t i v e enactment i s d e t e r m i n e d t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b u t t h e r e m a i n d e r i s f o u n d t o be e n f o r c e a b l e without i t , a court may s t r i k e t h e o f f e n d i n g p o r t i o n and l e a v e t h e r e m a i n d e r i n t a c t and i n f o r c e . C o u r t s w i l l s t r i v e t o u p h o l d acts of the legislature. The inclusion of a severability clause is a clear statement of l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t to t h a t e f f e c t , but the absence of such a c l a u s e does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e the l a c k o f s u c h an i n t e n t or r e q u i r e a holding of inseverability." City of 1987). Birmingham We 2009-811 therefore ratifying, collection of legislative into collected the trial discussed. Smith, strike as authority No. which 507 that validating, taxes remainder of Act fund v. So. portion and forth in County of § 1315 7 subject H o w e v e r , as to the restraint 95, but we § in force. placed the modifications the No. illegal the i s c a l l e d f o r by 18 Act the t a x e s r e m a i n s i n t a c t f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n as court, of (Ala. with 2009-811 i n t a c t and Jefferson 1312, confirming inconsistent set 2d leave The on the escrow illegally ordered by hereinafter remainder of Act 1090437; 1090517 No. 2009-811, the r e t r o a c t i v e tax C. the i s not barred by authorized the conclusion No. Act necessitate that r e t r o a c t i v e tax unconstitutional it County does not vacatur the eliminate of the the order must dealing reach with t r a n s f e r of the the amount the additional those aspects issues of e s c r o w e d f u n d s as The dispute to the fund § 8-8-10, A l a . Code 1. pursuant included Amount trial in court's between the Included order the p a r t i e s as and administering raised order the December 23, as in 2009-811 the does escrow the fund, compelling of 5 County the of interest Fund 2009, r e s o l v e d amount J e f f e r s o n County interest, by accrual Escrow The with No. t r a n s f e r r i n g the c o l l e c t e d i n t a x e s b e t w e e n J a n u a r y 12 period, Act erred 1975. to the total court escrow fund, nor had c a l c u l a t e d the by Fund i t r e l a t e s to computation i n the of collecting 2009-811. trial authorized fund to a s p e c i a l master charged with we from M a t t e r s A p p l i c a b l e to the Escrow B e f o r e the T r i a l Court Because declaring Jefferson and County A u g u s t 14, amount c o l l e c t e d d u r i n g $37,796,302.06; the a 2009. that taxpayers W h e t h e r t h e f u r t h e r s e r v i c e s o f a m a s t e r a r e r e q u i r e d on r e m a n d i s a m a t t e r we l e a v e t o t h e s o u n d d i s c r e t i o n o f the trial court. 5 19 1090437; 1090517 calculated the t o t a l $47,812,627.95. of calculation The t r i a l County the County complied argues master with that within that t h e amount between taxes 14, t h e e f f e c t i v e contends methodology contends those that the that even under date t h e amount c o l l e c t e d , but i t also the t r i a l court's of taxing activities should be f a c t u a l l y undisputed, collected a total business-license the moneys after a n y new included The taxpayers Jefferson County's the t r i a l t a x was court's authorized i n the escrow the taxpayers fund. attributed t o be d e p o s i t e d to the injunction to the escrow 20 order by t h e It is say, that J e f f e r s o n County of $47,812,627.95 i n o c c u p a t i o n a l fees the and r e q u i r e d t h e total proceeds The methodology, that legislature injunction, irrational argue and b e f o r e levied an used t o o much. 12 County fund court t h a n $10 m i l l i o n January of i t s 2009-811. t o p a y more of days o f A c t No. County occupational additional court's c o u r t m i s c a l c u l a t e d t h e amount o f t h e r e f u n d the as method the escrow Jefferson trial for calculating 15 of J a n u a r y 12, t h e d a t e o f t h e t r i a l County period order. include August that t o pay the should and only during court adopted the taxpayers' to the s p e c i a l The C o u n t y The collected and o r d e r e d $10,016,325.89 order. amount fund. taxes and ordering 1090437; It 1090517 i s unnecessary trial court taxpayers erred rather b e c a u s e we a g r e e trial the court escrow than erred h a s become and a f t e r as u s e d January by refund requiring levied the received not be however, received 13. Under court, legal court's order of Jefferson t h e "when received" after l e v y and t a x e s paid after l e v y are both approximately $10 refunded. in taxes while 2009, when levied, and taxes levied $10 m i l l i o n thereafter i s recovery. If those before By August tax receipts t h a t date should t h e same token, 13, 2009, s h o u l d be i n c l u d e d i n t h e e s c r o w 21 i n taxes a double fund. before million received then 12 b u t l e v i e d i n the escrow thereafter $10 m i l l i o n i n paid o f an i n v a l i d 13, January included those the County the taxes and a l l o w s t h e t a x p a y e r s after by by t h e 12, 2009, and r e c e i v e d t h e r e a f t e r , August t a x was argued the law of the case, a refund of approximately before inconsistent to the t r i a l of a v a l i d of l e v i e d before January also approximately the t r i a l 13 a s a r e s u l t a argued whether the t o l e v y an o c c u p a t i o n a l t a x b e f o r e August 12 a s a r e s u l t Requiring the methodology i n including According approach to decide w i t h t h e County t h a t under e i t h e r method, t h e fund. 12 Court the methodology had the a u t h o r i t y January August i n using 12, w h i c h January County for this but fund. 1090437; 2. The 1090517 Interest trial Pursuant court's t o § 8-8-10, A l a . Code December 23 order also 1975 required the C o u n t y t o p a y p o s t j u d g m e n t i n t e r e s t o f 1 2 % on t h e t a x r e c e i p t s it had i n c l u d e d postjudgment issues No interest a final final i n the escrow the t r i a l court time the County that County until f o r a f i x e d amount entered until The accrue cannot judgment j u d g m e n t was fund. the occupational-tax i n this entered satisfied the argues trial o f money case, receipts court damages. the County t h e D e c e m b e r 23 o r d e r , the judgment. that says, at which The t a x p a y e r s deposited argue i n t o the escrow f u n d f r o m J a n u a r y 12, 2009, u n t i l A u g u s t 13, 2009, s h o u l d interest court at the rate properly amount required i n the escrow Section o f 12%, and, t h e r e f o r e , the County t o pay that the interest on fund. 8-8-10, A l a . Code 1975, provides: " J u d g m e n t s f o r t h e p a y m e n t o f money, o t h e r t h a n c o s t s , b a s e d upon a c o n t r a c t a c t i o n , b e a r i n t e r e s t f r o m t h e d a y o f t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n , a t t h e same r a t e o f i n t e r e s t as s t a t e d i n s a i d c o n t r a c t ; a l l other judgments s h a l l bear i n t e r e s t at the r a t e of 12% per annum, the provisions of § 8-8-1 notwithstanding, provided that fees allowed a trustee, executor, a d m i n i s t r a t o r , o r a t t o r n e y , and t a x e d as p a r t o f t h e c o s t o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g , s h a l l bear i n t e r e s t a t a l i k e r a t e from t h e day o f e n t r y . " 22 bear trial the 1090437; 1090517 The c o u r t h e l d i n i t s D e c e m b e r 23 o r d e r t h a t t h e trial owed b y t h e C o u n t y no less order than the t o t h e t a x p a y e r s became f i x e d amount o f J a n u a r y 15, reported 2010, each the t r i a l month." court "amount i n an amount Then, in i t s stated: " T h i s C o u r t has d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e amount o f the taxes on which postjudgment interest has a c c r u e d , and t h e d a t e s f r o m w h i c h s u c h i n t e r e s t has a c c r u e d t h e r e o n , s h o u l d be c a l c u l a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o the amounts and d a t e s of t h e C o u n t y ' s c e r t i f i c a t i o n s f i l e d w i t h the Court or p r o v i d e d to the [taxpayers'] a t t o r n e y s p u r s u a n t t o t h e O r d e r o f M a r c h 20, 2009. It i s the County's c e r t i f i c a t i o n s which ' f i x ' the amount(s) on which postjudgment interest has accrued. "In t h e O r d e r o f December 23, 2009, t h i s C o u r t found that the County underreported by $ 1 0 , 0 1 6 , 3 2 5 . 8 9 t h e amount r e c e i v e d b e t w e e n January 1 2 , 2 0 0 9 , a n d A u g u s t 14, 2 0 0 9 . Accordingly, the O r d e r o f December 23, 2009, f i x e d t h e c o r p u s o f t h e S e t t l e m e n t Fund at $47,812,627.95. Postjudgment i n t e r e s t i s , t h e r e f o r e , deemed t o h e r e a f t e r a c c r u e on t h e c o r p u s o f t h e s a i d F u n d at the rate of $15,719.22 p e r day." "Section the payment 8-8-10 a p p l i e s o n l y when t h e j u d g m e n t of money, i.e., a 'money i s one f o r judgment.'" Alabama Dep't o f C o n s e r v a t i o n & N a t u r a l Res. v. Exxon Mobil So. defined 3d 194, judgment as 203 ( A l a . 2008). This C o u r t has Corp., a follows: "'A f i n a l j u d g m e n t i s a t e r m i n a t i v e d e c i s i o n b y a c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n which demonstrates 23 11 final 1090437; 1090517 t h e r e has been c o m p l e t e a d j u d i c a t i o n o f a l l m a t t e r s in controversy between the litigants within the c o g n i z a n c e of t h a t c o u r t . T h a t i s , i t must be conclusive and certain in itself. (citations omitted) A l l m a t t e r s s h o u l d be d e c i d e d ; damages should be assessed with specificity leaving the p a r t i e s w i t h n o t h i n g t o d e t e r m i n e on t h e i r own. A j u d g m e n t f o r d a m a g e s t o be f i n a l m u s t , t h e r e f o r e , be for a sum c e r t a i n determinable without r e s o r t to extraneous facts. (citations omitted)'" Moody v. State (quoting J e w e l l v. 623, (Ala. 625 The order judgment. held Act an Jackson 351 So. 2d 547, 551 & W h i t s i t t Cotton (Ala. Co., 331 1977) So. 2d 1976)). of January No. was taxes described the order County's second 12, not 99-669 injunction occupational County r e l . Payne, That order that entered ex 2009, clearly was had repealed requiring motion an the the 1967 County injunction in their for a final a "money j u d g m e n t " ; i n s t e a d , i t an emergency Act, to c o l l e c t e d i n an e s c r o w f u n d . as not The and place in the Jefferson I: "Upon [ t h e t a x p a y e r s ' ] M o t i o n f o r Summary J u d g m e n t , the trial court r u l e d , on January 12, that the Alabama L e g i s l a t u r e v a l i d l y r e p e a l e d the [County's] authority to impose and collect the subject occupational and business license taxes. Even t h o u g h the t r i a l c o u r t had c l e a r l y r u l e d t h a t the [County's] taxing authority had been lawfully r e p e a l e d by t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t e n t e r e d an i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n j u n c t i o n t o m a i n t a i n t h e s t a t u s quo d u r i n g a p p e a l a l l o w i n g [ t h e C o u n t y ] t o i m p o s e 24 the taxpayers response to stay i t 1090437; 1090517 and c o l l e c t o c c u p a t i o n a l and b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e s t a x e s i n J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , so l o n g as t h e c o l l e c t e d f u n d s are d e p o s i t e d i n t o a secure escrow account." Taxpayers' response, continued to injunction in their p. (emphasis the describe 2 January appellees' added). 12, brief The 2009, in this taxpayers order as an appeal: "Here, the trial court was faced with a d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t a c t i o n , f i l e d p u r s u a n t t o A. R. Civ. P. R u l e 57. In r e s p o n s e , the trial court d e c l a r e d t h a t the County's a u t h o r i t y to exact an o c c u p a t i o n a l t a x had been v a l i d l y r e p e a l e d by Act 99-669. I n an a b u n d a n c e o f c a u t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d an i n j u n c t i o n , i n a c c o r d w i t h A. R. C i v . P. R u l e 65, a l l o w i n g t h e C o u n t y t o c o l l e c t t h e s u b j e c t taxes d u r i n g the pendency of the a n t i c i p a t e d appeal a n d , t h u s , p r o t e c t t h e T a x p a y e r s ' common l a w c o u n t f o r money h a d a n d r e c e i v e d . ... The t r i a l court d e c l a r e d t h a t the monies c o l l e c t e d pursuant to i t s Rule 65 injunction were the property of the Taxpayers." Taxpayers' The brief fact at 34-35 t h a t the (emphasis a m o u n t owed b y f u n d became f i x e d e a c h month does n o t into a final Exxon, in judgment in judgment. which ordering December 2003 language of the 3d at 198. the added). This trial Exxon County to the transform the Court r e j e c t e d that court t o pay "'according had the to l e a s e s ' " between the A f t e r Exxon p a i d the the 25 issued State the State royalties a escrow injunction reasoning in declaratory royalties beginning plain, unambiguous and 11 Exxon. i n 2008, the So. State 1090437; 1090517 requested postjudgment royalties. "did In not this "adjudicate State by that explaining constitute 8-8-10," i t Court money amount of compute rejected judgment had the r o y a l t y p a y m e n t as The trial court satisfied reasoning issue for judgment prosecute of judgment of the Court Civil "not its satisfaction appeal [the beyond ... ; r a t h e r , 3d at the the The the the Exxon to the 203. The declaratory each monthly State's trial right court erred monthly deposits i n r e q u i r i n g the December whether whether 202. not the County to pay the pendency of t h i s appeal a f t e r the determining is at also erred of So. § fund. postjudgment i n t e r e s t during it 11 thus f i x i n g a w a r d i n g p o s t j u d g m e n t i n t e r e s t on escrow 3d did according judgment in the So. of informed into that those payments. C o u n t y made t o 11 simply that to judgment r o y a l t i e s owed royalties i t came d u e , " the purposes argument "incorporat[ed] of judgment future jury." State's for the judgment future i n t e r p r e t e d by the the amount declaratory judgment f i x an Rather, the 2003 that to as the stated Exxon. leases a why on Court or was interest 23. Appeals a that defendant] the date agree w i t h the defendant i t i s whether 26 We dispositive has ... of satisfied continued the moneys the a to purported owed b y [the 1090437; 1090517 defendant] to [the plaintiff] available to [the plaintiff] condition not Ctr., Inc. 2004). the it v. The 12 to pay. of Ragona, Cosgrove, County January means found i n the satisfying 561 into payment So. 2d a in reverse which the collection the 1098 that aspect court pursuant of the to 2009-811 aspect of transfer the of collection judgment the reverse the January 15, ordered the County to pay proceedings Act No. on of the i n which escrowed is not (Ala. Civ. App. fund established trial court court ordered is a County by proper Comm'n v. 1990). funds 2010, 2009, we the 2009-811 strike that ratifying, illegal the to order a of we court special i n which the interest. be portion affirm of and that ordered the master. We trial In trial court further determination u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , the tax to validating, tax, trial postjudgment 27 judgment retroactivity remand, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the 2009-811 Pain No. Act No. the or Birmingham December 23, declared Section confirming made restriction 545 the were Conclusion because Act 538, Elmore (Ala. but, of any amount t h e unconstitutional, 7 judgment escrow judgment." 1092, trial 2d o f money i n t o III. We without So. i n j u n c t i o n the "The the judgment i t s e l f . " 896 paid under that court, 1090437; whether in 1090517 o r not i t uses the d i s t r i b u t i o n County's liability the services of the escrowed exclusive 12, 2 0 0 9 , b u t l e v i e d p r i o r to pay i n t e r e s t of a master pursuant 1090437--AFFIRMED funds, shall of taxes c o l l e c t e d thereto, to assist i t compute t h e after January and w i t h o u t t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o § 8-8-10, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. 1090517--REVERSED AND Cobb, C . J . , and S t u a r t , Parker, Woodall, J . ,concurs Bolin, REMANDED. Smith, a n d Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . i n the result. and Murdock, J J . , 28 recuse themselves. 1090437; 1090517 PARKER, J u s t i c e I concur differing in § New to in the of main the recognized regard to has inherent with be Sec. take the 81 A l a . 110, under our t o New that England taxes v. 111, 1 So. current Mortgage may be having a income of profits or 30, of Revenue 31 of (1886). constitution, S e c u r i t y Co., the assessment." this quoted Court above, retroactively certain conditions: " I n New E n g l a n d M t g . S e c u r i t y Co. v . B o a r d o f R e v e n u e o f M o n t g o m e r y C o u n t y , 81 A l a . 1 1 0 , 1 So. 30 [ ( 1 8 8 6 ) ] , i t was o b s e r v e d : ' I t may be c o n c e d e d , t h a t t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y has power t o impose taxes, h a v i n g a r e t r o a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n ; a n d may take the p r o f i t s or income of a b u s i n e s s f o r a p r e c e d i n g year as t h e m e a s u r e o f a s s e s s m e n t . ' 29 the taxes Board imposed of that impose Co. 1901, application f o r a p r e c e d i n g y e a r as t h e m e a s u r e o f Mortgage of conceded to may the existing power retroactive " I t may power of 1901. the taxes opinion, limits of the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n o p e r a t i o n ; and 1929, explain of limitations. M o n t g o m e r y Co., returned A l a . Const. Assembly England In by power impose certain a business reached interpretation adoption to retroactive result the had legislature General to 95, the Court within the result). legislative on Before this in o n l y as prohibition lawsuits ( c o n c u r r i n g i n the under 1090437; 1090517 "And i n P e r r y C o u n t y v . S e l m a , M. & M. R. Co., 58 A l a . 546 [ ( 1 8 8 7 ) ] , i t was h e l d t h a t a t a x l e v i e d at the r e g u l a r August term of c o u r t f o r the current t a x y e a r was a v a l i d l e v y . See, also, Opinion of A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , R e p o r t 1 9 1 4 - 1 6 , p. 270. "And i n L e a h a r t e t a l . v . D e e d m e y e r e t a l . , 158 A l a . [ 2 9 5 , ] 2 9 8 , 48 So. [ 3 7 1 , ] 372 [ ( 1 9 0 9 ) ] : ' I t may be s t a t e d , as a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , t h a t t h e r e i s no s e c t i o n i n o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h p r o h i b i t s t h e enactment of a retroactive law. Aldridge v. T u s c u m b i a , e t c . , R.R., 2 S t e w . & P. 1 9 9 , 23 Am. Dec. 307 [(1832)]; L i n d s a y v. United States Savings, e t c . , A s s ' n , 120 Ala. [ 1 5 6 , ] 168, 24 So. 171, 42 L.R.A. 783 [ ( 1 8 9 8 ) ] . S e c t i o n 22 o f o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1901 e x p r e s s e s the o n l y l i m i t a t i o n i n t h a t line a n d o u r c o u r t s h a v e h e l d t h a t "ex p o s t f a c t o " l a w s a r e n e c e s s a r i l y p e n a l l a w s ; so t h a t , u n l e s s a law impairs the o b l i g a t i o n of a c o n t r a c t , or deprives t h e c i t i z e n o f some v e s t e d r i g h t , o r i s o b n o x i o u s t o some o t h e r p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e m e r e fact that i t i s r e t r o a c t i v e does not render i t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . ' S e e , a l s o , C a r r o l l v . W r i g h t , 131 Ga. 728, 63 S.E. 260 [ ( 1 9 0 8 ) ] ; F l i n t v. S t o n e T r a c y Co., 220 U.S. 107, 31 S. C t . 3 4 2 , 55 L. E d . 389, Ann. Cas. 1 9 1 2 B , 1312 [ ( 1 9 1 1 ) ] ; B i l l i n g s v. United S t a t e s , 232 U.S. 2 6 1 , 34 S. C t . 4 2 1 , 58 L. E d . 596 [(1914)]." A l e x a n d e r v. 391-92 § 110, case p r e s e n t s a c l a s h between t h a t l e g i s l a t u r e and 95, Ala. 112, 121 So. 390, (1929). This the B o a r d o f R e v e n u e , 219 the which provides, c o m m e n c e d on any cause no take away power to inherent power of express c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n i n in pertinent of action, such cause 30 part: the of "After has been legislature shall have action, or suit destroy any 1090437; 1090517 e x i s t i n g d e f e n s e of such s u i t . " H e r e t o f o r e , the pronouncements of the power this Court on the intersection of l e g i s l a t u r e to enact tax l e g i s l a t i o n with with The the main p r o h i b i t i o n i n § 95 opinion relies on the Anderson i n Southern 729, 731 (1936), i n which Chief also of the opinion application to Ry. have not v. that cases solo of 95 this J u s t i c e A n d e r s o n o f f e r e d no meant by Justices q u a l i f i c a t i o n of dissented separately. plurality dissenters on the Justice main opinion, Ala. basis Gardner, stated of the kind Chief his w r i t i n g of clarity. Chief 324, 327, Justice 167 J u s t i c e Anderson stated: section So. "I am C o n s t i t u t i o n has no relating to taxation." f u r t h e r i n s i g h t i n t o what "cases of § of 95, writing the this but the position he kind." Three did write not three-Justice of the thusly: "Justices Thomas, Bouldin, and Brown dissent t h e r e f r o m . They e n t e r t a i n the o p i n i o n , however, t h a t the curative act of 1931, hereinafter cited, v a l i d a t e d t h e e l e c t i o n as t o t h e one-mill county tax, and of consequence p l a i n t i f f cannot recover e x c e p t as t o t h e a m o u n t r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e c o m p l a i n t o f $ 5 6 3 . 6 5 , w h i c h s u i t was p e n d i n g when t h e c u r a t i v e s t a t u t e was p a s s e d , and which, i n t h e i r opinion, c o u l d n o t be a f f e c t e d t h e r e b y b e c a u s e o f s e c t i o n 95 o f o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n . The C h i e f J u s t i c e e x p r e s s e s h i s views i n a s p e c i a l concurring opinion hereinafter set out. As to the other questions hereinafter considered, a l l the J u s t i c e s concur." 31 the a retroactive effect been models of Webb, 232 of three 1090437; 232 1090517 Ala. at plurality 326, 167 opinion, So. joined v. that Webb r e p r e s e n t s the affect curative a pending Chief Justice, application Two to § 95 h a s not define of this any 30 , 34 , 97 not Justice, the one could the Constitution r e l a t i n g to and was In 181, 121 "Moreover, i f the denial the § 95, In So. has same e r a imply view right nor v. contended of the to the v. Court i t did not 'definitive of d o e s i t t a k e away any to the i t the the to was is f o r by Co. do act (1929), state 32 (1923), yet section Youngstown 552 regard Lumber in operation, offensive 550, in indicate that t a x p a y e r , nor not any, Miller-Brent further State So. i f no taxation." the 97 , 1 0 0 - 0 1 defense, r i g h t s ' o f any Constitution of t o mean of retrospective existing action, 178, o f § 95 there then Southern of Court during legislation. " I t i s unnecessary to of the opinion kind l i m i t a t i o n s of Ala. substantive of Therefore, in question 95 tax 210 destroy Ala. section Gardner's a p p l i c a t i o n i n cases r e l a t i n g to t a x a t i o n but h i g h l y r e m e d i a l and cause the the retroactive said: and other cases from t h i s that State, "that Justices Justices' reading legislation lawsuit cases other Justice m e n t i o n § 95. three tax 730-31. two by seven-member C o u r t , d i d not Ry. at 95 Mining the Co., Court receiver collect of 219 said: for the past-due and 1090437; 1090517 accrued excise or nonperformance), Constitution, tonnage taxes (not a mere the p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n s as t o r i g h t s of pending penalty for 95 a n d 100 o f t h e suits, and d e n y i n g r i g h t of r e s c i s s i o n or r e l e a s e of o b l i g a t i o n or l i a b i l i t y by the state against persons, w o u l d n o t be o b s e r v e d . " written by a s s o c i a t i o n s , or Both of these J u s t i c e T h o m a s , who Webb, a n d w e r e j o i n e d b y C h i e f solo opinion find i t impossible qualified of these I, relied statement three authority power of retroactive i n Southern were Ry. v. J u s t i c e A n d e r s o n , who w r o t e t h e i n the main to predicate o f one corporations, opinion here. Thus, I t h e m e a n i n g o f § 95 u p o n t h e J u s t i c e w r i t i n g alone i n just one prohibition on cases. instead, legislative upon held unanimous o p i n i o n s dissented the the effect would in § interpret 95 in legislature to the relation enact to tax the inherent statutes with as e m b o d y i n g "the p r i n c i p l e t h a t s t a t e l e g i s l a t i v e bodies possess a l l t h e l a w m a k i n g power i n h e r e n t i n any s o v e r e i g n t y , e x c e p t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t such power i s a b r i d g e d by the constitution, and t h a t a constitution i s a l i m i t a t i o n o f t h e power o f a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e , as distinguished from the effect of the Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h i s a g r a n t o f power t o C o n g r e s s . 3 " Heckman v . C u s t e r C o u n t y , 7 0 M o n t . 84, [87,] 223 P. 9 1 6 [ , 917] ( 1 9 2 4 ) [ ( ' O u r l e g i s l a t i v e a s s e m b l y 3 33 1090437; 1090517 has a l l t h e l a w - m a k i n g power w h i c h i n h e r e s i n any i n d e p e n d e n t s o v e r e i g n t y , e x c e p t o n l y so f a r a s t h a t power i s a b r i d g e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e s t a t e o r t h e supreme law o f t h e l a n d . ' ) ] ; Robb v. C i t y o f T a c o m a , 175 Wash. 5 8 0 , [ 5 8 6 - 8 7 , ] 28 P.2d 3 2 7 [ , 330], 91 A.L.R. 1010 (1933)[('when an act of the legislature is assailed, the court looks to the s t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n only to a s c e r t a i n whether any limitations have been imposed upon such power.')(Emphasis i n o r i g i n a l . ) ] . " 56 Am. J u r . 2d M u n i c i p a l C o r p o r a t i o n s Cooley § 550 (2000). As Judge wrote: " I n c r e a t i n g a l e g i s l a t i v e d e p a r t m e n t and c o n f e r r i n g u p o n i t t h e l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r , t h e p e o p l e m u s t be understood t o have c o n f e r r e d t h e f u l l and c o m p l e t e p o w e r as i t r e s t s i n , a n d may be e x e r c i s e d b y , the s o v e r e i g n power o f any c o u n t r y , s u b j e c t o n l y t o s u c h r e s t r i c t i o n s as t h e y may have seen f i t to impose, and t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h a r e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " 1 175 Thomas M. (8th Cooley ed. A 1927). legislature is legislative power the express in to concur i n the § on the by 95 of Constitutional Limitations inherent the the authority express of the prohibition on constitution in regard l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n h e r e n t power i s to abridged prohibition. Nevertheless, regard Here limited p e n d i n g l a w s u i t s . The by Treatise existing though suits result I differ relating reached on to i n the 34 the meaning taxation, I main opinion. of § 95 in nonetheless

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