Ex parte State of Alabama and Governor Bob Riley. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: E. Lamar Little and Surfside Development Corporation v. State of Alabama and Governor Bob Riley)

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Rel: 02/26/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1090026 Ex p a r t e S t a t e o f Alabama and G o v e r n o r Bob R i l e y PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In r e : E . Lamar L i t t l e and S u r f s i d e Development C o r p o r a t i o n v. S t a t e o f Alabama and G o v e r n o r Bob R i l e y ) (Baldwin PARKER, Circuit Court, CV-09-900631) Justice. The S t a t e o f A l a b a m a a n d G o v e r n o r B o b R i l e y , in his o f f i c i a l capacity who was s u e d (hereinafter referred to collectively 1090026 as "the State mandamus action d i r e c t i n g the filed Corporation, to defendants"), by E. petition Baldwin Lamar Circuit Little collectively issue Court and as the for a writ of transfer an to Surfside a Mississippi corporation Development (hereinafter referred " S u r f s i d e " ) , to Montgomery County, they argue, venue i s p r o p e r . For we this Court the where, reasons presented below, writ. Background On J u n e 5, 2009, C i r c u i t Court seeking to the deed to State by contains its Surfside filed to recover an action real property i n the i t had a w a r r a n t y d e e d d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 20, a provision that the land was Baldwin conveyed 1962. conveyed The subject use " s o l e l y f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e o f a r e s i d e n c e f o r the Governor of the S t a t e of Alabama. Any a t t e m p t e d s a l e , or use of s a i d p a r c e l of land f o r any o t h e r p u r p o s e s h a l l , w i t h o u t f u r t h e r n o t i c e , cause the s a i d p a r c e l of l a n d to r e v e r t to the Grantor, i t s successors and assigns." Surfside's complaint stated devoted to i t s intended reversionary title and On clause 14, the purposes since should, i n t e r e s t i n the July that 2009, the property 1996 t h e r e f o r e , be land should State 2 and given revert had not t h a t the been above e f f e c t and a l l to Surfside. d e f e n d a n t s moved t h e Baldwin 1090026 Circuit Court for a change of venue to Montgomery County, arguing: " W h e r e an o f f i c i a l o f t h e s t a t e i s a d e f e n d a n t , venue i s p r o p e r o n l y i n Montgomery County, ' a b s e n t specific s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y to the contrary or w a i v e r o f o b j e c t i o n t o v e n u e ' and ' e v e n where t h e case arguably i s one involving real estate in a n o t h e r c o u n t y . ' S e e , Ex p a r t e N e e l y , 653 So. 2d 945 (Ala. 1 9 9 5 ) ; Ex p a r t e A l a b a m a P o w e r Co., 640 So. 2d 921 ( A l a . 1 9 9 4 ) ; Ex p a r t e C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 507 So. 2 d 471 ( A l a . 1 9 8 7 ) ; A l a b a m a Y o u t h S e r v i c e s B o a r d v. E l l i s , 350 So. 2 d 405 ( A l a . 1977 ) ; B o s w e l l v. C i t r o n e l l e - M o b i l e G a t h e r i n g , I n c . , 292 A l a . 3 4 4 , 294 So. 2 d 428 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; T r i - S t a t e C o r p . v . S t a t e ex r e l . G a l l i o n , 272 A l a . 4 1 , 128 So. 2 d 505 (1961)." Surfside change of responded venue, to the arguing County because "the of is located its this action real argument, Surfside Section 6-3-2(a)(1) 1 State that property defendants' venue § proper which i s the i n Baldwin cited is motion subject County." 6-3-2, Ala. in In Code for a Baldwin matter support of 1975, and 1 provides: "(a) In p r o c e e d i n g s individuals: of a legal nature against "(1) A l l a c t i o n s f o r the r e c o v e r y of l a n d , of the p o s s e s s i o n t h e r e o f or f o r a t r e s p a s s t h e r e t o m u s t be c o m m e n c e d i n t h e c o u n t y where the l a n d or a m a t e r i a l p a r t thereof lies." In i t s r e s p o n s e to the p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f mandamus, S u r f s i d e c o n c e d e d t h a t § 6-3-2 a p p l i e s only to a c t i o n s against i n d i v i d u a l s and t h u s does n o t a p p l y here. 3 1090026 Wesson v. Wesson, where t i t l e the Brown, the 215 the a the Ala. real 205, real exceptions to the 19 8 7 ) ( h o l d i n g i s at i s s u e , the lawsuit 110 and the action i s l o c a t e d ) , and So. 384, an 386-87 action against that real property i s located). Although is must be Davidson v. (192 6 ) ( h o l d i n g county admitting or official capacity is i n the c o u n t y of the o f f i c i a l residence of in his or her a State that agency official defendants' (Ala. a deed i s p r o p e r l y brought i n the rule i s that State 947 property 209, agency or o f f i c i a l , State 2d the property properly maintained the of to c a n c e l general against matter where that a suit where So. to r e a l property subject brought 514 S u r f s i d e argued i n i t s response to motion general that the courts have found numerous rule: " I n B o s w e l l v. C i t r o n e l l e - M o b i l e G a t h e r i n g , Inc., [292 A l a . 344,] 294 So. 2 d 428 (1974), the court recognized an e x c e p t i o n to the general rule for i n s t a n c e s i n w h i c h an a l t e r n a t i v e f o r u m was provided by s t a t u t e . In [Ex p a r t e ] Dothan-Houston County A i r p o r t A u t h o r i t y , [282 A l a . 316,] 211 So. 2 d 451 ( 1 9 6 8 ) , t h e c o u r t f o u n d an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e where t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c y by i t s a c t i o n s w a i v e s o b j e c t i o n s t o v e n u e . I n AU H o t e l , LTD v. Martin, 677 So. 2d 1160 ( A l a . 1996), the court c r e a t e d another e x c e p t i o n , h o l d i n g t h a t the jointd e f e n d a n t v e n u e p r i n c i p l e e s t a b l i s h e d b y R u l e 82 o f the Alabama Rules of C i v i l Procedure, a l l o w i n g f o r an a c t i o n t o be m a i n t a i n e d a g a i n s t a l l d e f e n d a n t s i f v e n u e was p r o p e r as t o one defendant, a p p l i e d to g o v e r n m e n t a l a g e n c i e s . The c o u r t n o t e d t h a t , w h e r e 4 the 1090026 a governmental o f f i c e r was s u e d i n h i s i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y as w e l l i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y , venue could p r o p e r l y l i e i n a county other than that of the employee's o f f i c i a l r e s i d e n c e . I d . fi " P u r s u a n t t o A l a b a m a l a w , an a c t i o n s u c h as t h e p r e s e n t one i s a l o c a l a c t i o n o r i n rem a c t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n a t r a n s i t o r y o r i n personam a c t i o n . As such, venue i s proper i n Baldwin County. The Defendants have failed t o meet t h e i r burden of proof, and t h u s , a transfer o f venue i s not w a r r a n t e d . The D e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n s h o u l d b e d e n i e d . " Without Court denied providing the State v e n u e on A u g u s t petition i t s reasoning, defendants' the Baldwin motion for a 2 5 , 2 0 0 9 . The S t a t e d e f e n d a n t s f o ra writ o f mandamus d i r e c t i n g change then f i l e d the Baldwin Court to vacate i t s order denying t h e i r motion Circuit well "Our standard settled: f o ra change o f of Review of review i n mandamus cases i s "'Mandamus i s a drastic and e x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t , t o be i s s u e d o n l y where t h e r e i s (1) a c l e a r l e g a l r i g h t i n t h e petitioner to the order sought, (2) a n imperative duty upon t h e r e s p o n d e n t to p e r f o r m , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a r e f u s a l t o do s o , (3) t h e l a c k o f a n o t h e r a d e q u a t e remedy, and (4) p r o p e r l y i n v o k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t . E x p a r t e I n t e g o n C o r p . , 672 S o . 2 d 4 9 7 , 4 9 9 ( A l a . 1 9 9 5 ) . ... We a p p l y t h e 5 this Circuit venue. Standard of 1090026 abuse-of-discretion standard when c o n s i d e r i n g a mandamus p e t i t i o n c h a l l e n g i n g a v e n u e r u l i n g , a n d we w i l l n o t i s s u e the w r i t u n l e s s the t r i a l c o u r t e x e r c i s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n an a r b i t r a r y a n d capricious manner. I d . ' " Ex parte 2003) 2d Kia Motors America, (quoting 954, 956-57 Ex p a r t e Court 881 Brookwood Health So. 2d 396, Servs., 399 Inc., (Ala. 781 So. ( A l a . 2000 ) ) . Legal This Inc., has analysis stated: " A g e n c i e s a n d o f f i c e r s o f t h e s t a t e m u s t be s u e d i n the county of t h e i r o f f i c i a l residence absent specific statutory authority to the contrary or w a i v e r o f o b j e c t i o n t o v e n u e . H a r d i n v. Fullilove Excavating Co., 353 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 1977); B o s w e l l v . C i t r o n e l l e - M o b i l e G a t h e r i n g , I n c . , 292 A l a . 344, 294 So. 2d 428 ( 1 9 7 4 ) ; T r i - S t a t e C o r p . v. S t a t e , 272 Ala. 4 1 , 128 So. 2d 505 (1961). This r u l e i s adhered t o e v e n w h e r e t h e c a s e a r g u a b l y i s one involving real estate i n another county. Tri-State Corp., s u p r a ; A l a b a m a Y o u t h S e r v i c e s B o a r d v. E l l i s , 35 0 So. 2d 405, 408 (Ala. 1977): 'Moreover, the a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h i s case p e r t a i n i n g to the l o c a t i o n of r e a l e s t a t e i n J e f f e r s o n County, w h i l e they may r e s o l v e a v e n u e q u e s t i o n i n an o r d i n a r y c a s e , do n o t c o n t r o l a c a s e s u c h as t h i s w h e r e t h e a c t i o n i s one against a s t a t e agency.'" Ex parte C i t y of Birmingham, 507 So. 2d 471 , 474 ( A l a . 1987 ). 2 As p a r t of i t s h o l d i n g i n Ex p a r t e C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , t h i s C o u r t r u l e d t h a t , where a m u n i c i p a l i t y i s sued, p r o p e r venue i s i n the county i n which the seat of municipal g o v e r n m e n t was l o c a t e d . The l e g i s l a t u r e s u b s e q u e n t l y e n a c t e d § 6 - 3 - 1 1 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 , t h a t d e f i n e s the a p p r o p r i a t e venue 2 6 1090026 Thus, two e x c e p t i o n s that State rule have been propounded t o t h e g e n e r a l m u s t be s u e d i n t h e c o u n t y o f t h e i r official venue officials residency: t o be p l a c e d Citronelle-Mobile 428 (1974), Hardin v. parte State whom venue o f venue by Co., Ltd., i s proper of the State this jointly with county So. 2d v. So. 2d as i n 77 9 ( A l a . a third exception i n 677 S o . 2 d 1 1 6 0 in a i n Boswell the defendant, 353 allows ( A l a . 1996), other other defendants than the when a as t o official official. Court t o h o l d that because r e a l estate i n v o l v e d , i t s a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e d e f e n d a n t s i s an " i n rem" Ltd., or " l o c a l " action. Surfside, citing contends that t h i s Court State agency i s involved, local action s t i l l AU the case I n c . , 292 A l a . 3 4 4 , 294 Excavating i s sued S u r f s i d e asks a a s was appears t o have a l l o w e d AU H o t e l , residence is Gathering, Fullilove official statutory authority that elsewhere, and a w a i v e r 1977). This Court Ex specific Hotel, Ex p a r t e Hotel, t h e r e i n d i c a t e d t h a t , e v e n when the p r i n c i p l e applies to determine proper L t d . , however, AU i s readily o f an i n rem o r venue. Ex p a r t e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ; the i n such c a s e s , s u p e r s e d i n g t h a t p a r t o f t h e r u l i n g i n Ex p a r t e C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m . S e e E x p a r t e C i t y o f H a l e y v i l l e , 827 S o . 2 d 7 7 8 , 782 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) . 7 1090026 president capacity for of A u b u r n U n i v e r s i t y was and in his confining situated is § individuals. 961-62 venue the action 6-3-2; See Ex of actions contracts, i t against equitable is must be course, those individuals" in his Hotel, official the presented 1975, of the 544 basis land is against So. 2d 960, 6-3-2, p r o v i d e s Part (a) trespass apply to distinguishes lands, actions.' which land only the is for actions Part subject (b) matter ... actions to located. Of against H e r e , G o v e r n o r R i l e y was capacity; therefore, president and § the actions Co., personal where provisions to Coal official statutory where only or actions, brought sued i n both h i s o f f i c i a l The of in his The county individuals. (emphasis added). i n which does not Code ' a l l other that land, the Pickens for recovery and capacity. applies parte provides only to (Ala. 1989)("Alabama between a c t i o n s on individual sued both of Auburn unlike Ex sued parte University AU had his individual change § 6-3-2 capacity, motion been apply. State defendants' sufficient g r a n t e d . The demonstrates State a legal for justification defendants' p e t i t i o n clear legal a right 8 under f o r the of venue motion to be f o r a w r i t o f mandamus the law to a writ of 1090026 mandamus against because the State defendants Baldwin for no the action a n d an d i d not waive County, there the misapprehended Article I, § to object defendants jurisdiction, of law or equity." This to bring Circuit Court defendants' never as a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l subject-matter b e made a Court has r u l e d guaranteed p r i n c i p l e of sovereign bar, precludes jurisdiction. a court Without a c o u r t h a s no p o w e r t o a c t a n d m u s t d i s m i s s t h e R y . v . L y l e s , 797 S o . 2 d 435 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) . B e c a u s e t h e c o u r t s over cases State Surfside shall 432, we and t h e r e i s C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1901, of Alabama a c t i o n . " Alabama S t a t e Docks T e r m i n a l dismiss, State i n the action the State 14, o f t h e A l a b a m a exercising the o f venue. that "[the] c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y acting i s one t o venue i n County. Thus, t h e B a l d w i n defendant i n any c o u r t from right C o u n t y w o u l d be p r o p e r , "[t]hat the State immunity, transfer of the State, t h e l a w when i t d e n i e d f o r a change provides their to statutory authority permitting a c t i o n i n Baldwin motion officer a r e no o t h e r whom v e n u e i n B a l d w i n specific i t seeks brought order o f Alabama against the State the Baldwin Circuit as a d e f e n d a n t 9 h a v e no jurisdiction of Alabama, Court except to dismiss i n the underlying to the action. 1090026 We Riley. grant the p e t i t i o n The B a l d w i n and i s s u e Circuit Court the writ as t o i s directed Governor to vacate i t s o r d e r o f August 25, 2009, d e n y i n g t h e S t a t e d e f e n d a n t s ' for a change Montgomery of Circuit venue and Court to with transfer Governor the Riley case as motion to the the sole defendant. P E T I T I O N GRANTED; WRIT Cobb, C . J . , and L y o n s , Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . Murdock, J . , concurs ISSUED. Woodall, Stuart, i n the result. 10 Smith, B o l i n , and

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