Debra Weatherspoon v. Tillery Body Shop, Inc.

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REL: 02/12/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1081131 Debra W e a t h e r s p o o n v. Tillery Appeal LYONS, Inc. Weatherspoon appeals dismissal ("Tillery"). finding from T u s c a l o o s a C i r c u i t (CV-05-444) Court Justice. Debra Court's Body Shop, I n c . that they of her claims The t r i a l from the Tuscaloosa against court Tillery dismissed were preempted by f e d e r a l l a w . Circuit Body Shop, the claims, We affirm. 1081131 Factual On April Horton, and complaint Background 9, 2005, several alleged Weatherspoon the following of Hale County, utility vehicle Weatherspoon's restaurant Tuscaloosa was an the parking On towed for lot. the Blazer, Tillery auction. An and did compliance with the and, without lot of to the tow knowledge t h a t contacted reported auction that a days. Blazer i t from so. the notice weeks t h a t Tuscaloosa C i r c u i t 2002, parking determined was the held in Court that requirements 2 the the Blazer The Blazer on Horton purchased the B l a z e r from T i l l e r y . the December directed Tillery published consecutive sport- Blazer the a Blazer where i t remained f o r s e v e r a l Weatherspoon and Her Weatherspoon, In i t in Dennis defendants. Chevrolet the 2002, w i t h o u t Department 2003, used left Tillery, facts. Department Tillery D e c e m b e r 30, three public son knowledge, Police named Blazer"). abandoned v e h i c l e Sheriff's April adult History sued o w n e d a 1995 ("the i n Tuscaloosa, The Procedural fictitiously resident Weatherspoon's and Tillery Hale County missing. In Tuscaloosa News w o u l d be April 26, had sold at 2003, and reported Tillery Blazer had to been s o l d i n o f A l a . Code 1975, § 32-13-1 1081131 et seq., which J a n u a r y 2005, governs an e n t i t y n o t i f i e d Weatherspoon that the Blazer approximately unclear Action the would sold at towing from the complaint Horton's abandoned unless storage was acting her negligence complaint, and negligent claims breach investigate the requirements of the on of that or on stated claims of possession sale § had of c h a t t e l i n and and 32-13-4, of the and of wanton of of supervision; theories, standard identity Blazer; of and several the fraudulent-suppression Tillery is Weatherspoon based her negligence suppression. wantonness notice It independently Weatherspoon wantonness; depravation conversion; fraudulent selling paid alleged B l a z e r u n d e r § 6-5-260, A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ; r e c o v e r y alleged she and behalf. In specie; Towing fees. whether Weatherspoon Towing In of the Blazer auction and vehicles. A u t o m o t i v e and i t had p o s s e s s i o n be in A u t o m o t i v e and of known a s A c t i o n that $3,000 sale the of A l a . Code claim, a duty to d i s c l o s e 3 care Blazer's failing abandoned including in Tillery's failing to improperly comply to owner; with the regarding the Regarding the alleged that 1975, vehicles. Weatherspoon to her that i t had possession 1081131 of the Blazer, a duty arising, she alleged, T i l l e r y had by v i r t u e o f t h e v e h i c l e - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n tag of from number entities the such as Blazer $50,000 complaint. she was in Alabama p r e s u m e d t o be damages the owner o f as to the and claim Blazer and that upon the sale Weatherspoon asserted she Horton each answered the 1 2 ( h ) ( 3 ) , A l a . R. lacked claims regarding abandoned." each 2008, T i l l e r y moved t o d i s m i s s court law placed and in her was entitled to of i t . Tillery Rule requirements number Weatherspoon a l s o sought a judgment d e c l a r i n g t h a t possession 9, "the [ T i l l e r y ] by o f v e h i c l e s t h a t are sought and notice C i v . P. subject-matter against i t because, the complaint. claims On against i t under T i l l e r y argued t h a t the 1 jurisdiction i t over argued, June trial Weatherspoon's those claims were p r e e m p t e d by t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A u t h o r i z a t i o n Act of ("the 1994 ("the ICCTA"). 2009, the trial Tillery, finding FAAAA") a n d Weatherspoon court the ICC Termination responded, dismissed and, on Act On 1995 February Weatherspoon's claims t h a t t h e y were p r e e m p t e d . of April 11, against 14, 2009, Rule 12(h)(3) provides: "Whenever i t appears by s u g g e s t i o n of the p a r t i e s or otherwise t h a t the c o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n of the s u b j e c t matter, the c o u r t s h a l l dismiss the a c t i o n . " 1 4 1081131 at Weatherspoon's request, the trial court certified i t s F e b r u a r y 1 1 , 2 0 0 9 , o r d e r as f i n a l p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 4 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P. this Weatherspoon filed a timely notice of appeal to Court. Standard of Review "In Newman v . S a v a s , 878 So. 2 d 1147 (Ala. 2003), t h i s Court s e t out the s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter j u r i s d i c t i o n : "'A r u l i n g on a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s i s reviewed without a presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s . N a n c e v . M a t t h e w s , 622 So. 2 d 2 97 , 2 99 ( A l a . 1993). This Court must a c c e p t t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o f t h e c o m p l a i n t as t r u e . C r e o l a L a n d Dev., I n c . v . B e n t b r o o k e H o u s i n g , L . L . C . , 828 So. 2 d 2 8 5 , 288 ( A l a . 2002). Furthermore, i n reviewing a r u l i n g on a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s we w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r whether the p l e a d e r w i l l u l t i m a t e l y p r e v a i l but whether the pleader may possibly p r e v a i l . N a n c e , 622 So. 2 d a t 2 9 9 . ' "878 So. 2d at 1148-49." P o n t i u s v. S t a t e Farm Mut. (Ala. So. 2005). 2d 17, 21 See also States I n s . Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 563 Ex p a r t e A l a b a m a D e p ' t o f T r a n s p . , 978 ( A l a . 2007). 49 Section Auto. 601 of the U.S.C. § 14501(c) FAAAA a m e n d e d T i t l e C o d e t o , among o t h e r t h i n g s , 5 add 49 of the U n i t e d § 11501(h), which was 1081131 l a t e r r e c o d i f i e d as relevant § 14501(c). Section 14501(c) p r o v i d e s , in part: "(1) General rule.--Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political s u b d i v i s i o n of a S t a t e , or p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y of 2 o r more S t a t e s may not e n a c t or e n f o r c e a law, r e g u l a t i o n , or o t h e r p r o v i s i o n h a v i n g the f o r c e and e f f e c t of law r e l a t e d to a p r i c e , r o u t e , or s e r v i c e of any motor carrier ... or any motor private c a r r i e r , b r o k e r , or f r e i g h t f o r w a r d e r w i t h respect to the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of p r o p e r t y . "(2) Matters not covered.--Paragraph (1)-- "(C) does not a p p l y to the authority of a S t a t e or a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of a State to enact or enforce a law, r e g u l a t i o n , or o t h e r p r o v i s i o n r e l a t i n g to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, i f such transportation i s performed without the p r i o r c o n s e n t or a u t h o r i z a t i o n of the owner or o p e r a t o r of the motor v e h i c l e . " (Emphasis added.) "[W]here fields the of 'federal traditional "assumption that were not to the clear Div. of be and Labor law state the Standards said to regulation, historic s u p e r s e d e d by manifest is the purpose ... state we Federal of Act the unless Congress."'" v. action have worked p o l i c e powers of Enforcement 6 bar Dillingham in on States that was California Constr., 1081131 N.A., I n c . , 5 1 9 U.S. Conference Co., Fe ( 1 9 9 7 ) ( q u o t i n g New Elevator Corp., has, (2008). 3 3 1 U.S. however, 14501(c)(1) Hampshire York State o f B l u e Cross & B l u e S h i e l d P l a n s v. T r a v e l e r s I n s . 514 U.S. 6 4 5 , 655 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n Court § 3 1 6 , 325 Motor i s broad Transp. 2 1 8 , 230 concluded (1947 ) ) . 552 U.S. Santa The Supreme preemption that and f a r - r e a c h i n g . Ass'n, R i c e v. under S e e Rowe v. New 3 6 4 , 128 S. C t . 989 2 R e l y i n g on C i t y o f C o l u m b u s v . O u r s G a r a g e & W r e c k e r S e r v . , I n c . , 536 U.S. 4 2 4 , 4 2 9 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , t h e d i s s e n t contends that § 14501(c) i s concerned with only the "economic regulation" of tow-truck operators. In C i t y o f Columbus, t h e Supreme C o u r t n o t e d t h e g e n e r a l p r e e m p t i o n u n d e r § 14501(c) o f " s t a t e and l o c a l r e g u l a t i o n ' r e l a t e d t o a p r i c e , r o u t e , o r s e r v i c e o f any motor c a r r i e r , ' " 536 U.S. a t 4 2 9 , a n d n o t e d t h a t t h i s preemption under § 14501(c) a p p l i e s t o tow t r u c k s , 536 U.S. a t 4 3 0 . The S u p r e m e C o u r t t h e n d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a c i t y ' s t o w i n g o r d i n a n c e was n o t p r e e m p t e d because i t fell w i t h i n an e x p r e s s e x e m p t i o n to preemption r e l a t i n g to the s a f e t y - r e g u l a t o r y a u t h o r i t y o f t h e s t a t e s f o u n d i n 49 U.S.C. § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 2 ) ( A ) . A l t h o u g h t h e Supreme C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e economic purposes o f § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 1 ) , i t d i d not l i m i t t h e broad scope o f preemption t o economic regulations. 2 an The S u p r e m e C o u r t i n Rowe r e c e n t l y a d d r e s s e d a n d r e j e c t e d a r g u m e n t s i m i l a r t o t h a t made b y t h e d i s s e n t , e x p l a i n i n g : " [ T h e S t a t e o f ] M a i n e s u g g e s t s t h a t [§ 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ' s ] h i s t o r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t C o n g r e s s ' p r i m a r y c o n c e r n was not w i t h t h e s o r t o f law i t has enacted, b u t i n s t e a d w i t h s t a t e 'economic' r e g u l a t i o n . S e e , e . g . , H.R. Conf. Rep., a t 88; s e e a l s o Columbus v . Ours Garage & W r e c k e r S e r v i c e , I n c . , 536 U.S. 4 2 4 , 440 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . But i t i s frequently difficult to distinguish 7 1081131 Based on t h e l a n g u a g e decisions, t h e Supreme of § 14501(c)(1) Court i n Rowe reaching nature of the preemption Discussing 374 (1992), language §§ Morales a v. Trans decision from the A i r l i n e 1302(a)(4) a n d on i t s e a r l i e r discussed the broad- e f f e c t u a t e d by t h e s t a t u t e . World Airlines, interpreting I n c . , 504 U.S. identical preemption D e r e g u l a t i o n A c t o f 1 9 7 8 , 49 U.S.C. and 1 3 0 2 ( a ) ( 9 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t explained: "In Morales, the Court determined: (1) t h a t ' [ s ] t a t e enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference t o ' c a r r i e r '"rates, routes, or services" are pre-empted,' 504 U.S., at 384 (emphasis added); (2) t h a t such pre-emption may o c c u r e v e n i f a s t a t e l a w ' s e f f e c t on r a t e s , r o u t e s or services ' i s only indirect,' i d . , a t 386 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n m a r k s o m i t t e d ) ; (3) t h a t , i n respect to pre-emption, i t makes no difference whether a state law i s 'consistent' or 'inconsistent' with federal regulation, i d . , at 3 8 6 - 3 8 7 ( e m p h a s i s d e l e t e d ) ; a n d (4) t h a t p r e - e m p t i o n o c c u r s a t l e a s t where s t a t e laws have a ' s i g n i f i c a n t impact' related to Congress' d e r e g u l a t o r y and pre-emption-related objectives, i d . , a t 3 9 0 . The Court d e s c r i b e d Congress' overarching goal as between a State's 'economic'-related and ' h e a l t h ' - r e l a t e d m o t i v a t i o n s , see i n f r a , at , and, i n d e e d , t h e p a r t i e s v i g o r o u s l y d i s p u t e Maine's actual m o t i v a t i o n f o r t h e laws at issue here. Consequently, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that Congress declined to insert the term 'economic' into the o p e r a t i v e l a n g u a g e now b e f o r e u s , d e s p i t e h a v i n g a t one time considered doing s o . S e e S. R e p . No. 9 5 - 6 3 1 , p . 171 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ( r e p r i n t i n g S e n a t e b i l l ) . " 552 U.S. a t , 128 S. C t . a t 9 9 7 . ( e m p h a s i s 8 added). 1081131 helping assure transportation rates, routes, and services that reflect 'maximum reliance on competitive market forces,' thereby stimulating ' e f f i c i e n c y , i n n o v a t i o n , and l o w p r i c e s , ' as w e l l as 'variety' and ' q u a l i t y . ' I d . , a t 378 (internal q u o t a t i o n marks o m i t t e d ) . M o r a l e s h e l d t h a t , given these p r i n c i p l e s , f e d e r a l law pre-empts States from enforcing their consumer-fraud statutes against d e c e p t i v e a i r l i n e - f a r e a d v e r t i s e m e n t s . I d . ,a t 391. See A m e r i c a n A i r l i n e s , I n c . v . W o l e n s , 513 U.S. 2 1 9 , 226-228 (1995) ( f e d e r a l l a w p r e - e m p t s a p p l i c a t i o n o f a S t a t e ' s g e n e r a l c o n s u m e r - p r o t e c t i o n s t a t u t e t o an a i r l i n e ' s frequent f l y e r program)." 552 U.S. a t Morales, the , 128 S. C t . a t 9 9 5 . t h e Supreme C o u r t B a s e d on t h e a u t h o r i t y o f determined same m a n n e r , p r e e m p t e d the state that regulation B a s e d on t h e l a n g u a g e o f § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 2 ) , Supreme Court carrier[s] has agreed that of property'" City o f Columbus U.S. 4 2 4 , 430 term 'motor v. Ours transportation before i t . the United States q u a l i f y as 'motor the meaning of § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 1 ) . Garage & Wrecker Serv., I n c . , 53 6 See a l s o (2002). carrier' "tow t r u c k s within § 14501(c)(1), i n 49 U.S.C. § 1310 2(14)("The means a person providing motor vehicle f o r compensation."). Analysis The "[t]he trial state [Tillery] court tort i n the present claims constitute action concluded brought by [Weatherspoon] enforcement of state 9 law that against within the 1081131 m e a n i n g o f t h e p r e e m p t i v e p r o v i s i o n o f 49 U.S.C. § The trial Tillery court were preempted subject-matter appeal, should concluded that Weatherspoon's and jurisdiction that over the be r e v e r s e d unconstitutional because, the claims. she argues: and t h e T e n t h Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d in enacting In her b r i e f on court's decision States C o n s t i t u t i o n ; 2) state-law claims; 3) Alabama court claims are finding of preemption rights leave preemption; under § fifth, Alabama the fact first a n d 6) does and authority circumstances her 5) a finding the not sixth on presented exempt Tillery a from waived i t s of preemption cite authority arguments. the issue here, of i n Alabama; to would support Regarding the lack preemption Weatherspoon merely that preemption under § 14501(c)(1) impression mandates a remedy. Weatherspoon third, 4) an 14501(c)(2)(C); to preemption; her without from ICCTA, A r t . I , § 8, c . 3 , Congress d i d not i n t e n d t o preempt p r i v a t e , authority the lacked States binding and court United no FAAAA against 1) § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 1 ) i s u n d e r t h e Commerce C l a u s e , the claims trial Weatherspoon contends that the t r i a l 14501(c)." of the identifies i s a question of she does n o t c i t e 10 under her any a u t h o r i t y 1081131 for the proposition that an A l a b a m a a p p e l l a t e a question of there court first m u s t be before the impression. binding trial authority court Regarding can from resolve Weatherspoon's argument t h a t T i l l e r y waived i t s r i g h t to a s s e r t p r e e m p t i o n a defense with the because state law, proposition preempted Weatherspoon that acting is preemption would the language of the authority remedies to her reversal of or does not under a attempted cite a state waiver of any the to by leave her FAAAA a n d support an without the in a right to assert a finding examines does not for trial court a dismissing claims. This Court has cite act of Congress c o n s t i t u t e s a ground the that field of of argument she she for denial judgment her a remedy, ICCTA, b u t comply, authority statute any to R e g a r d i n g Weatherspoon's argument t h a t of any complied, Congress by preemption. Tillery as stated: " R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. App. P., r e q u i r e s t h a t a r g u m e n t s i n an a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f c o n t a i n 'citations t o t h e c a s e s , s t a t u t e s , o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s , and p a r t s of the record r e l i e d on.' Further, ' i t is well settled that a failure to comply with the r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) r e q u i r i n g c i t a t i o n of authority i n support of the arguments presented provides t h i s Court with a basis for disregarding those arguments.' S t a t e F a r m M u t . A u t o . I n s . Co. v . M o t l e y , 909 So. 2d 806, 822 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) ( c i t i n g Ex 11 her 1081131 p a r t e S h o w e r s , 812 S o . 2 d 2 7 7 , 2 8 1 ( A l a . 2001 ) ) . This i s so, because ' " i t i s not the f u n c t i o n of t h i s C o u r t t o do a p a r t y ' s l e g a l r e s e a r c h o r t o make a n d address legal arguments f o r a party based on u n d e l i n e a t e d g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s not supported by s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y o r argument."' B u t l e r v . Town o f A r g o , 871 S o . 2 d 1, 20 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) ( q u o t i n g D y k e s v . L a n e T r u c k i n g , I n c . , 652 S o . 2 d 2 4 8 , 2 5 1 ( A l a . 19 9 4 ) ) . " J i m m y Day P l u m b i n g (Ala. 2007). her third, A l a . R. A p p . P. We i n detail 14501(c)(1) authority to adequately arguments as required A c c o r d i n g l y , we w i l l consider support by Rule not consider Weatherspoon's o f 49 U.S.C. § argues the under 964 S o . 2 d 1, 9 remaining below. Constitutionality Weatherspoon § will I n c . v. Smith, has f a i l e d and s i x t h arguments. arguments I. Weatherspoon fifth, 28(a)(10), those & Heating, that United the in States Commerce 14501(c)(1) enacting Congress Clause, 49 U.S.C. exceeded i t s A r t . I, § 8, c.3. Weatherspoon a l s o argues that § 14501(c)(1) v i o l a t e s the Tenth Amendment responds, to citing Cir. 1995), for the Tenth In the the United States K e l l e y v. U n i t e d Constitution. States, a d e c i s i o n of the United Tillery 69 F . 3 d 1 5 0 3 ( 1 0 t h States Court of Appeals Circuit. Kelley, the attorneys I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood general of Michigan and Kansas, o f Teamsters, and s e v e r a l 12 other 1081131 organizations declaratory ("the plaintiffs") and i n j u n c t i v e relief, filed an arguing action that for § 601 o f t h e FAAAA, i n c l u d i n g w h a t i s now c o d i f i e d a t 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The p l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d e d t h a t § 601 o f t h e FAAAA v i o l a t e d t h e C o m m e r c e C l a u s e a n d t h e T e n t h Amendment to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . The f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t dismissed the p l a i n t i f f s ' the decision Tenth to the United Circuit. the d i s t r i c t c l a i m s , and t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' The T e n t h States Circuit Court Court of Appeals of Appeals c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n and c o n c l u d e d court appealed f o r the affirmed t h a t § 601 was n o t unconstitutional. Regarding the p l a i n t i f f s ' FAAAA, i n c l u d i n g w h a t the Commerce Clause, argument i s now c o d i f i e d the Tenth that § 601 at § 14501(c), Circuit Court of of the violated Appeals explained: "The Commerce Clause of the United States C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o v i d e s t h a t Congress s h a l l have t h e P o w e r ' [ t ] o r e g u l a t e Commerce ... among t h e s e v e r a l S t a t e s , ' A r t . 1, § 8, c l . 3, a n d ' [ t ] o make a l l L a w s which s h a l l be n e c e s s a r y and proper for carrying i n t o E x e c u t i o n t h e f o r e g o i n g Powers ' A r t . 1, § 8, c l . 1 8 . " R e c e n t l y , i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v . L o p e z , 514 U.S. 5 4 9 , 115 S. C t . 1 6 2 4 , 131 L. E d . 2 d 626 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t i d e n t i f i e d three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) 'the use of channels of 13 1081131 i n t e r s t a t e c o m m e r c e ' ; (2) ' t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce'; and (3) 'activities that s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f f e c t i n t e r s t a t e c o m m e r c e . ' 514 U.S. a t 5 5 8 - 5 9 , 115 S. C t . a t 1 6 2 9 - 3 0 . W i t h r e s p e c t t o the t h i r d c a t e g o r y of a c t i v i t y , t h e C o u r t emphasized t h a t i t had r e p e a t e d l y 'upheld a wide v a r i e t y of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic a c t i v i t y where [ i t had] c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y substantially affected interstate commerce.' 514 U.S. a t 5 5 9 , 115 S. C t . a t 1 6 3 0 . " H e r e , we f i n d t h a t t h e a c t i v i t y a t i s s u e , state regulation of i n t r a s t a t e motor c a r r i e r activities, f a l l s squarely within the t h i r d category of a c t i v i t y c i t e d i n L o p e z . I n e n a c t i n g § 6 0 1 , C o n g r e s s made e x p r e s s f i n d i n g s , s e t f o r t h i n s u b s e c t i o n (a) o f § 601, that state regulation of i n t r a s t a t e motor carrier a c t i v i t i e s substantially affects interstate commerce: "'(1) [T]he r e g u l a t i o n transportation of property has on "'(A) i m p o s e d an u n r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r s t a t e commerce; "'(B) impeded the f r e e t r a f f i c and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n commerce; and the " P u b . L . No. certain process burden flow of trade, of i n t e r s t a t e "'(C) p l a c e d an u n r e a s o n a b l e A m e r i c a n consumers; and "'(2) regulatory "We of i n t r a s t a t e by t h e S t a t e s cost on aspects of the State s h o u l d be p r e e m p t e d . ' 103-305. believe these findings 14 are rational. See 1081131 H o d e l v. V i r g i n i a S u r f a c e M i n . & R e c l . A s s n . , 4 5 2 U.S. 2 6 4 , 2 7 6 , 101 S. C t . 2 3 5 2 , 2 3 6 0 , 69 L. E d . 2 d 1 (1981). Granted, t h e r e are undoubtedly various s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t a f f e c t and p e r t a i n o n l y t o p u r e l y i n t r a s t a t e motor c a r r i e r a c t i v i t i e s , and have little or no effect on interstate commerce. Nonetheless, Congress rationally determined the r e g u l a t i o n of i n t r a s t a t e motor c a r r i e r activities, c o n s i d e r e d as a w h o l e , does i n f a c t impact and impede i n t e r s t a t e commerce." Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1507-08. Having concluded that i n t r a s t a t e m o t o r - c a r r i e r impact federal Circuit that interstate commerce and regulation under Court of Appeals § 601 was overly the that they are thus Commerce Clause, c o n s i d e r e d the p l a i n t i f f s ' activities subject the Tenth arguments broad: " [ T ] h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r ' t h e means c h o s e n by [ C o n g r e s s ] [ a r e ] r e a s o n a b l y a d a p t e d t o t h e e n d p e r m i t t e d b y t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . ' H o d e l , 452 U.S. a t 27 6, 101 S. C t . a t 2 3 6 0 . P l a i n t i f f s s e t f o r t h s e v e r a l r e a s o n s why § 601 i s n o t r e a s o n a b l y a d a p t e d to t h e end sought by C o n g r e s s . F i r s t , plaintiffs c l a i m § 601 i s o v e r l y b r o a d a n d p r e e m p t s n o t o n l y s t a t e economic r e g u l a t i o n of i n t r a s t a t e trucking, but a l s o 'state t o r t laws, state a n t i t r u s t laws, s t a t e consumer p r o t e c t i o n laws, s t a t e laws r e g a r d i n g c a r g o l o s s a n d damage c l a i m s , s t a t e l a w s g o v e r n i n g the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f s o l i d and h a z a r d o u s w a s t e , and s t a t e uniform commercial codes.' A p p e l l a n t s ' br. at 20. S e c o n d , p l a i n t i f f s a r g u e t h a t t h e o v e r b r e a d t h o f § 610 'has c r e a t e d a d i s j o i n t e d t w o - t i e r e d s y s t e m o f regulation,' in which interstate carriers are regulated by Congress, but in which purely intrastate carriers remain wholly unregulated. A p p e l l a n t s ' b r . at 21-22. F i n a l l y , p l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t § 601 i s i m p r o p e r b e c a u s e i t p r e e m p t s s t a t e l a w 15 to 1081131 'in favor of nothing.' Appellants' b r . a t 23. "Notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments, the means c h o s e n b y C o n g r e s s a r e r e a s o n a b l y a d a p t e d t o the ends sought by Congress. First, § 601's preemption of state regulations pertaining to ' p r i c e [ s ] , r o u t e [ s ] , or s e r v i c e [ s ] ' of i n t r a s t a t e motor carriers clearly serves to eliminate the 'patchwork' of varying state regulations that concerned Congress. Second, although § 601 undoubtedly preempts a wide range of state r e g u l a t i o n s , i t i s f a r from c l e a r that i t s impact i s as f a r - r e a c h i n g a s p l a i n t i f f s w o u l d h a v e t h e c o u r t believe. ... T h i r d , assuming the r a t i o n a l i t y of Congress' findings with respect to the negative i m p a c t o f s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s on i n t e r s t a t e c o m m e r c e , what c h o i c e d i d Congress have e x c e p t t o enact a s t a t u t e t h a t preempts a f a i r l y broad range of s t a t e economic r e g u l a t i o n s ? I n any e v e n t , t h e Supreme Court rejected the notion of second-guessing Congress by b e l a t e d l y reviewing other possible legislative options. See South Carolina State H i g h w a y D e p t . v . B a r n w e l l B r o s . , 303 U.S. 1 7 7 , 1 9 0 , 58 S. C t . 5 1 0 , 5 1 6 - 1 7 , 82 L. E d . 734 (1 938 ) . F i n a l l y , a l t h o u g h § 601 may h a v e h a d some u n i n t e n d e d e f f e c t s , s u c h a s f r e e i n g t h e r e i n s on i n t r a s t a t e t o w i n g and w r e c k e r s e r v i c e s , p l a i n t i f f s have n o t c i t e d any cases h o l d i n g t h a t u n i n t e n d e d e f f e c t s o f legislation, by themselves, serve t o make the legislation irrational f o r purposes o f Commerce Clause a n a l y s i s . "For these r e a s o n s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t § 601 d o e s n o t v i o l a t e t h e Commerce Clause." Kelley, 69 F . 3 d a t 1 5 0 8 - 0 9 . Consistent argues that powers under with the p l a i n t i f f s i n enacting the i n Kelley, § 14501(c)(1) Commerce Clause 16 Congress because, Weatherspoon exceeded i t s she argues, § 1081131 14501(c)(1) interstate Appeals regulates commerce. noted substantially intrastate However, in Kelley, affect as commerce, the intrastate interstate Tenth not Circuit motor-carrier commerce, simply Court activities and c o n g r e s s i o n a l r e g u l a t i o n of i n t r a s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s e l i m i n a t e s the c r e a t i o n a patchwork States 514 we of s t a t e law. We agree, and, bound by 549 ( 1 9 9 5 ) , as adopt the r e a s o n i n g of the in Kelley argument The to the r e a c h o f t h e Commerce Tenth in i t s interpretation that § 14501(c) plaintiffs does regarding § the Tenth Addressing 14501(c), Amendment that the argument, the t h e Commerce also that to Court of Lopez, Clause, Appeals o f L o p e z as t o W e a t h e r s p o o n ' s violates in Kelley Circuit of the U n i t e d Supreme C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. U.S. of contended, § 601 United Tenth of as the States Circuit Clause. Weatherspoon FAAAA violated Constitution. Court of Appeals explained: "The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that ' [ t ] h e powers not d e l e g a t e d to the U n i t e d S t a t e s by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , nor p r o h i b i t e d by it to the States, are reserved to the States r e s p e c t i v e l y , or to the people.' " I n New Y o r k v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 505 U.S. 144, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , 112 S. C t . 2 4 0 8 , 2 4 1 7 , 120 L. E d . 2 d 120 ( 1 9 9 2 ) , t h e Supreme C o u r t n o t e d t h a t ' [ i ] n a c a s e ... involving the d i v i s i o n of a u t h o r i t y between f e d e r a l and s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t s , ' the i n q u i r i e s under 17 1081131 t h e Commerce C l a u s e a n d t h e T e n t h Amendment ' a r e mirror images of each o t h e r . ' S p e c i f i c a l l y , the C o u r t n o t e d as f o l l o w s : " ' I f a power i s d e l e g a t e d t o C o n g r e s s i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e T e n t h Amendment e x p r e s s l y d i s c l a i m s any r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h a t power t o t h e S t a t e s ; i f a power i s an a t t r i b u t e o f s t a t e s o v e r e i g n t y r e s e r v e d by t h e T e n t h Amendment, i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y a p o w e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n h a s n o t c o n f e r r e d on Congress.' "Id. "Thus, even i f p l a i n t i f f s a r e c o r r e c t i n t h e i r assertion that § 601 intrudes upon a domain traditionally left to the states, i t i s constitutional as l o n g as i t f a l l s within the c o m m e r c e p o w e r . G r e g o r y v . A s h c r o f t , 501 U.S. 4 5 2 , 460, 111 S. C t . 2 3 9 5 , 2 4 0 0 - 0 1 , 115 L. E d . 2 d 410 [ ( 1 9 9 1 ) ] ( h o l d i n g t h a t C o n g r e s s may i m p o s e i t s w i l l on t h e s t a t e s a s l o n g a s i t i s a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e powers g r a n t e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ; U n i t e d States v. L o p e z , 2 F . 3 d 1 3 4 2 , 134 6-47 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 993), a f f ' d , 514 U.S. 5 4 9 , 115 S. C t . 1 6 2 4 , 131 L. E d . 2 d 626 ( 1 9 9 5 ) . H a v i n g c o n c l u d e d t h a t § 601 was a p r o p e r e x e r c i s e o f t h e commerce power by C o n g r e s s , t h e o n l y remaining question we must decide i s whether C o n g r e s s , i n e n a c t i n g § 6 0 1 , somehow ' c o m m a n d e e r [ e d ] the l e g i s l a t i v e p r o c e s s e s o f t h e S t a t e s . . . . ' Hodel [v. V i r g i n i a S u r f a c e M i n i n g & R e c l a m a t i o n Ass'n], 452 U.S. [ 2 6 4 , ] a t 2 8 8 , 101 S. C t . [ 2 3 5 2 , ] a t 2 3 6 6 [(1981)]. " P l a i n t i f f s a r g u e t h a t § 601 v i o l a t e s t h e T e n t h Amendment b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t g i v e the states a choice between r e g u l a t i n g i n a f a s h i o n consistent w i t h f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n of motor c a r r i e r s or h a v i n g t h e i r s t a t e r e g u l a t o r y scheme p r e e m p t e d by a f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r y scheme, b u t i n s t e a d c o m p e l s t h e s t a t e s n o t t o r e g u l a t e a t a l l . ... 18 1081131 " [ P ] l a i n t i f f s ' arguments [arenot] m e r i t o r i o u s . I n New Y o r k , t h e C o u r t r e a f f i r m e d t h a t C o n g r e s s may not exercise i t s Article I plenary powers to '"commandee[r] the l e g i s l a t i v e processes of the States by d i r e c t l y compelling them t o e n a c t and e n f o r c e a f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r y p r o g r a m . " ' 505 U.S. a t 1 4 5 , 112 S. C t . a t 2 4 2 0 ( q u o t i n g H o d e l , 452 U.S. a t 288 , 101 S. C t . a t 2 3 6 6 ) . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g these l i m i t a t i o n s , however, C o n g r e s s does e n j o y ' s e v e r a l options short of imposing a coercive regulatory d i r e c t i v e on t h e s t a t e s . ' P o n c a T r i b e o f O k l a . v . O k l a h o m a , 37 F . 3 d 1 4 2 2 , 1 4 3 3 ( 1 0 t h C i r . 1 9 9 4 ) . ... C o n g r e s s may, u n d e r t h e S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e , 'preempt an e n t i r e f i e l d o f r e g u l a t i o n a n d t h e r e b y deprive the s t a t e s o f any r e g u l a t o r y r o l e . ' I d . "Here, Congress has c l e a r l y chosen ... t o preempt the e n t i r e f i e l d o f p r i c e , s e r v i c e , and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities. Although p l a i n t i f f s have a t t e m p t e d t o otherwise characterize Congress' actions, i t i s c l e a r t h a t Congress has not c o m p e l l e d t h e s t a t e s t o voluntarily a c t by e n a c t i n g or administering a federal r e g u l a t o r y program. R a t h e r , Congress has s i m p l y i m p o s e d r u l e s on t h e s t a t e s v i a i t s S u p r e m a c y C l a u s e p o w e r s . ... "We a f f i r m the d i s t r i c t court's denial of p l a i n t i f f s ' T e n t h Amendment c h a l l e n g e t o § 6 0 1 . " Kelley, 69 F . 3 d a t 1 5 0 9 - 1 0 . Under t h e b i n d i n g conclude that Commerce Clause under the regarding property. authority of United Congress acted i n enacting Supremacy again § Clause, the p r i c e , route, We within adopt 14501(c), and s e r v i c e the reasoning v. Lopez, i t s powers preempted 19 States and the under Congress field of motor the has, of carriers of the United we law of States 1081131 Court of Appeals f o r the Tenth C i r c u i t argument United that II. Constitution. therefore, § conclude that § next Claims argues preempt her p r i v a t e s t a t e - l a w general F.3d We, i s n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l as W e a t h e r s p o o n c o n t e n d s . Weatherspoon stated Weatherspoon's t h e T e n t h Amendment t o t h e Preemption of State the to § 14501(c) v i o l a t e s States 14501(c) as law in Cliff 1113 regarding v. § claims 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 1 ) does against express and implied Cir. does not 2004), Weatherspoon expressly preempt price, and does route, not Citing preemption and s e r v i c e of motor impliedly preempt contends private c l a i m s , does not i m p l i e d l y preempt t h e f i e l d the Tillery. not P a y c o G e n e r a l A m e r i c a n C r e d i t s , I n c . , 363 (11th 14501(c) that that state-law of law r e l a t e d to carriers by conflict the Tenth of property, her state-law claims. As Appeals stated above, concluded that in Kelley § regarding price, property. See K e l l e y , 69 F . 3 d a t 1 5 0 9 - 1 0 clearly service, chosen and activities."). route, 14501(c) preempts ... route to and service preempt regulation the of Furthermore, other 20 of Circuit Court the f i e l d motor of of law carriers of ("Here, C o n g r e s s has entire field intrastate federal of motor courts price, carrier have held 1081131 that § 14501(c)(1) r e l a t i n g to price, property. Inc., expressly route, state-law claims misrepresentation and billing practices of Trading Post, 665 money motor (N.D. Ga. against a carrier, where related to the c a r r i e r ' s a price, private See also route, carrier, Ware or and carrier Parcel the subject prices, and received Serv. Serv., negligent related Deerskin law t o r t matter routes, to of America, I n c . , state a connection service Parcel of property); 1997)("[A] or a i r c a r r i e r v . Tow fraudulent had state enforcement a c t i o n having to claims (holding that § 14501(c)(1) of I n c . v. U n i t e d Supp. tort or s e r v i c e a g a i n s t motor c a r r i e r s of 557 F . 3 d 849 ( 8 t h C i r . 2 0 0 9 ) F. state See, e.g., Data Mfg., I n c . v. U n i t e d preempted 972 preempts action of the action i s or s e r v i c e s , i s a with or reference o f any motor carrier, motor f o r purposes of the FAAAA."). Pro Custom Towing & Hauling, 3 I n c . , 289 The dissent correctly notes that neither Data Manufacturing nor Deerskin Trading Post involved claims against tow-truck operators. The d i s s e n t a l s o n o t e s that A . J . ' s W r e c k e r S e r v i c e o f D a l l a s , I n c . v . S a l a z a r , 165 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App. 2005), d i s c u s s e d i n f r a , d i d n o t i n v o l v e f a c t s p r e c i s e l y on p o i n t w i t h t h o s e i n t h i s c a s e . However, because the law r e l a t i n g t o preemption under § 14501(c) a p p l i e s t o tow-truck operators such as T i l l e r y , see, e.g., C i t y of Columbus, s u p r a , t h e l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s and c o n c l u s i o n s s t a t e d in Data M a n u f a c t u r i n g , Deerskin Trading Post, and A.J.'s Wrecker r e l a t i n g t o the scope of preemption under § 14501(c) are nonetheless i n s t r u c t i v e to our a n a l y s i s . 3 21 1081131 Fed. in Appx. the (6th Federal claims sale 852 a (not Reporter)(finding against of C i r . 2008) a towing presumably § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 1 ) and selected that for publication state-law conversion company f o r n o n c o n s e n s u a l abandoned a f f i r m i n g on vehicle and preempted by a l t e r n a t i v e ground the trial court's d i s m i s s a l of the p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n s u m e r - p r o t e c t i o n claim without addressing whether an were towing that claim W r e c k e r S e r v . o f D a l l a s , I n c . v. App. 2005)(finding conversion, action civil dissent causes of claims of . First, State, (No. published States storage vehicles F. District considered not Rhode after cases ML, Court for 14501(c) charged by they were i t says and Towing So. in "that 3d at v. 1997)(not the United Rhode of state Nothing an Inc. Ass'n, opinion, companies in d i s p o s i t i o n of Island regulation for storage that preempts t r a d i t i o n a l 22 hold 1997)(D.R.I. District tow-truck i n v o l v e s whether § 14501(c) a vehicle). § 14501(c). preempted towed. 14501(c)(1) storage 28, (Tex. chattel, of unpublished the to § that Public Feb. an § to Island Supp.), whether rates two A.J.'s S.W.3d 444 trespass tow p r e e m p t e d by" CV-96-454 in on action relating in 165 t h e f t p r e e m p t e d by relies towed v e h i c l e s are preempted); Salazar, involving allegedly wrongful The state and state-law was of of decision state causes 1081131 of action carriers Agency 4th for conversion, Corp. 1034, 34 v. Sevel's Cal. Rptr. determined service had excepted 24-Hour 3d that overcharged we address Weatherspoon's that preparation fees was sufficiently fraud The but not to claim conclude statute Nothing price, in CPF fraud vehicles against are tow preempted. carriers Agency the towing not apply of A p p e a l s the or of expressly regarding route, for App. 14501(c)(2)(C), does Court a was to also lien-sale- fees were not s e r v i c e of the addresses t r a d i t i o n a l s t a t e causes of a c t i o n f o r c o n v e r s i o n , and CPF Cal. that fees preempted because the 132 U.S.C. § California tow the C a l i f o r n i a Court storage § 49 against Second, i n Serv., plaintiff's state related company. (2005), under below a Towing i t for claims. determined 120 the from preemption section towing and f o r t h e i r h a n d l i n g of towed v e h i c l e s . Appeals a negligence, whether negligence, handling of towed 4 The d i s s e n t a l s o notes i t s concern t h a t "the f e d e r a l s t a t u t o r y s c h e m e c o n t a i n s no p r o v i s i o n g r a n t i n g t h e o w n e r o f a w r o n g f u l l y d i s p o s e d o f v e h i c l e any remedy a t a l l f o r s u c h t o r t i o u s conduct." So. 3d a t . The United States Supreme Court has rejected similar arguments against p r e e m p t i o n b a s e d on t h e f a i l u r e o f C o n g r e s s t o p r o v i d e an a l t e r n a t i v e remedy. See, e.g., S e a r s , R o e b u c k & Co. v . San D i e g o C o u n t y D i s t . C o u n c i l o f C a r p e n t e r s , 436 U.S. 180, 203 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ("To a l l o w t h e e x e r c i s e o f s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n i n c e r t a i n contexts might create a s i g n i f i c a n t r i s k of m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 4 23 1081131 We agree Deerskin in Trading deciding price, courts, with Post, conclusion Ware, and state route, as the tort or service political and of in Data Manufacturing, A.J.'s Wrecker, statutory claims a motor c a r r i e r subdivisions of a supra, relating of p r o p e r t y State, enforce that to the state laws o f f e d e r a l law and t h e c o n s e q u e n t p r o h i b i t i o n o f protected conduct. In those circumstances, i t m i g h t be r e a s o n a b l e t o infer that Congress preferred the costs inherent in a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l h i a t u s to the f r u s t r a t i o n of n a t i o n a l l a b o r policy which might accompany the exercise of state jurisdiction." (emphasis added)). See also Smith v. Dunham-Bush, I n c . , 959 F.2d 6, 11 (2d C i r . 1 992) ( " O t h e r c i r c u i t s a d d r e s s i n g t h i s i s s u e have h e l d t h a t the p r e c l u s i o n of remedy does not bar the o p e r a t i o n of ERISA p r e e m p t i o n . " ) . A d d i t i o n a l l y , i n K e l l e y , supra, the Tenth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals noted the p l a i n t i f f s ' argument " t h a t § [14501] i s i m p r o p e r [ u n d e r t h e Commerce C l a u s e ] b e c a u s e i t p r e e m p t s s t a t e law ' i n f a v o r of n o t h i n g . ' " 69 F.3d a t 1508. The Tenth C i r c u i t responded to t h i s argument s t a t i n g : " F i n a l l y , a l t h o u g h § [ 1 4 5 0 1 ] may have had some u n i n t e n d e d e f f e c t s , s u c h as f r e e i n g t h e r e i n s on i n t r a s t a t e t o w i n g a n d w r e c k e r s e r v i c e s , p l a i n t i f f s h a v e n o t c i t e d any c a s e s h o l d i n g t h a t u n i n t e n d e d e f f e c t s of l e g i s l a t i o n , by t h e m s e l v e s , s e r v e t o make the legislation irrational for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis." 69 F . 3 d a t 1509. The T e n t h C i r c u i t , therefore, was a w a r e o f t h e p l a i n m e a n i n g o f t h e s t a t u t e now c o d i f i e d a t § 14501 a n d i t s f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e an a l t e r n a t i v e r e m e d y u p o n p r e e m p t i o n , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e was not u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and t h a t i t p r e e m p t e d t h e e n t i r e f i e l d o f law r e l a t e d t o t h e p r i c e , r o u t e , and s e r v i c e o f m o t o r c a r r i e r s o f property. As n o t e d a b o v e , W e a t h e r s p o o n h a s not c i t e d any a u t h o r i t y to support her a r g u m e n t on t h i s g r o u n d , a n d , in l i g h t o f t h e a u t h o r i t y o f S e a r s , R o e b u c k , S m i t h , and K e l l e y , we c a n n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e f a i l u r e o f C o n g r e s s t o p r o v i d e an a l t e r n a t i v e remedy upon p r e e m p t i o n i s a b a s i s f o r f i n d i n g t h a t Weatherspoon's c l a i m s are not preempted. 24 1081131 related to the property. ("[A] or Based ... law, regulation, purpose Dillingham is law of City Columbus, Weatherspoon's law including § possession of care by Blazer with of the after the a et seq. third a and duty Blazer; to of Tillery party; § that, r e q u i r e m e n t s of service "clear and carrier See, of e.g., apparent from seek enforcement upon to from sold Tillery Code i t s tow her 1975. of the the i t that had standard of the the and of services, Ala. identity § 32-13-4, A l a . 25 is breached Blazer that the preempted. 14501. 6-5-260, improperly and or Tillery's Tillery the be motor It disclose that towed § to to i n v e s t i g a t e the i t a claims alleged enact having i t i s the is 430. her not 325. related Weatherspoon l o t ; that to that may claims of 14501(c)(1) provision such at at § a p r i c e , route, Tillery U.S. policies failing Blazer parking 536 had other provisions complaint Tillery ... that U.S. that the 32-13-1 Specifically, Blazer, to and of conclude that 519 a motor c a r r i e r a State, or Congress" undisputed subject state we of language r e l a t e d to Constr., property of service express motor c a r r i e r . " ) , It the the or s u b d i v i s i o n of e f f e c t of manifest See a and o f any on political enforce force p r i c e , route, owner restaurant delivered failed Code 1975, of to the comply regarding 1081131 the notice concludes of that 'regulate' least scope to So. that conduct the to Tillery's her; abandoned vehicle Tillery's and h a n d l i n g i.e., owed under state of fall towed of the implicitly within law; vehicle towed and of as from agree against fall the with the Tillery within transportation alleged claims trial relate the scope court to of relate i t tows, i t transports, of duties We, Weatherspoon's Tillery's claims and property. that an Tillery's the v e h i c l e s the property without Tillery's These the claims vehicle requirements regarding vehicles. at towed Weatherspoon's a handling regarding not to operators, the dissent of Alabama [FAAAA] disposition do dissent seek the enforcement of s t a t e laws r e l a t e d to therefore, therefore claims sale to T i l l e r y ' s stemming claims The tow-truck disagree. of abandoned i t s service expressly We of Thus, retention to comply w i t h specifically . Weatherspoon's notifying failure vehicles. wrongful 3d a t of § 14501(c)(1). relate tow abandoned tortious respect vehicles." concludes of "Congress d i d not undertake i n the the with sale service preempted and by § 14501(c)(1). III. The § 14501(c)(2)(C) Section 14501(c)(2)(C) Exception provides 26 that the preemption 1081131 m a n d a t e d by § 14501(c)(1) "does not a p p l y t o the a u t h o r i t y of a S t a t e or a p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of a S t a t e to enact or e n f o r c e a law, r e g u l a t i o n , or o t h e r p r o v i s i o n r e l a t i n g to the p r i c e of f o r - h i r e motor v e h i c l e transportation b y a tow t r u c k , i f s u c h t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i s p e r f o r m e d w i t h o u t the p r i o r consent or a u t h o r i z a t i o n of the owner or o p e r a t o r of the motor v e h i c l e . " (Emphasis added.) Weatherspoon's The "claims do trial not court f i t within concluded ... the t o p r e e m p t i o n f o u n d i n 49 U.S.C. § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ( 2 ) . " argues and on appeal that her exception her opinion from of Appx. at an (not Reporter)("It is did non-consensual majority's regarding charged anomalous the for clear that, of storage, result a is in § cites state impound, to 27 only the to within § a in the To dissenting Ware, States 289 the Fed. Federal 14 5 0 1 ( C ) ( 2 ) ( c ) , relating However, to the under the In state laws administrative and the concluding United preempted vehicle. contrary fall See laws vehicles. Weatherspoon i n so publication Congress towed of pursuant exemption[] 14501(c)(2)(C). Circuit. for preempt towing such do decision Sixth construction, the Tillery Weatherspoon selected not erred found unpublished for court against argument, 859 trial preemption Appeals Congress the claims from support Court that that fees my plain view, meaning such an of the 1081131 statute as dissenting This a whole." in part)). Court has (Griffin, J . , concurring i n part and 5 stated: "'The fundamental principle of statutory construction i s t h a t w o r d s i n a s t a t u t e must be given t h e i r p l a i n meaning.' Mobile I n f i r m a r y Med. C t r . v . H o d g e n , 8 84 S o . 2 d 8 0 1 , 814 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) . 'When a c o u r t c o n s t r u e s a s t a t u t e , " [ w ] o r d s u s e d i n [ t h e ] s t a t u t e must be g i v e n t h e i r n a t u r a l , p l a i n , o r d i n a r y , and commonly u n d e r s t o o d meaning, and where p l a i n language i s used a c o u r t i s bound t o i n t e r p r e t t h a t l a n g u a g e t o mean e x a c t l y w h a t i t s a y s . " ' E x parte Berryhill, 801 S o . 2 d 7, 10 ( A l a . 2001 ) ( q u o t i n g IMED C o r p . v . S y s t e m s E n g ' g A s s o c s . C o r p . , 602 S o . 2 d 3 4 4 , 346 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ) . " Trott v. B r i n k s , The I n c . , 972 S o . 2 d 8 1 , 85 construction of a f e d e r a l question. See, e.g., Holyfield, 4 90 U.S. the general indication statute statute 2007). presents a federal M i s s i s s i p p i Band o f Choctaw I n d i a n s v. 30 , 43 assumption (1989) that to the contrary, i s not making (Ala. ("We ' i n the ... start, absence Congress the a p p l i c a t i o n of when however, of a with plain i t enacts the federal a act Weatherspoon also speculates that " i f [Tillery] argues t h a t , i n a b r o a d s e n s e , t h e p r i c e s i t c h a r g e s f o r what i t does a r e r e l a t e d t o p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y t h a t may a r i s e f r o m n o t doing those things w e l l or i n accordance with the law, then the e x c e p t i o n t o preemption i s t r i g g e r e d . " However, T i l l e r y h a s made no s u c h a r g u m e n t , a n d W e a t h e r s p o o n d o e s n o t c i t e a n y authority to support her supposition. See R u l e 28(a)(10), A l a . R. A p p . P. 5 28 1081131 dependent 318 on law.'" 101, U.S. state 104 (1943))). principles United of (quoting statutory States Code. in e.g., See, s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s the e.g., 1 677, 1673, Watt 68 Congress used the ordinarily effect 45 F.3d By the to each 400, (11th of Alaska, 451 80 charged any § and and we read C i r . 1995) language, nonconsensual for selling those the § that preemption under they Blazer, The Weatherspoon's § Conclusion 29 the 259, for statute 265, We assume are 101 commonly that and give States v. McLymont, full curiam)."). r e l a t e s only by a to the tow has price not from the p l a i n court, 14501(c)(2)(C). point to truck. r e l a t e to i t s s e r v i c e of not claims Inc., to Weatherspoon trial DBB, the statute transportation a u t h o r i t y mandating a departure determined U.S. the (per v. of 14501(c)(2)(C) services. 14501(c)(2)(C). similar starting (1 98 1 ) . Weatherspoon's claims against T i l l e r y towing apply interpreting language i t s provisions. United i t s plain price v. ("The w o r d s i n a s t a t u t e as of 401 C i r . 1999) L.Ed.2d understood, States, States United all S.Ct. (11th United construction F.3d See, 1281 v. federal courts 180 itself. 1277, The Jerome therefore, are not Tillery presented language of correctly exempted from 1081131 Because Weatherspoon's preempted by prevail. See P o n t i u s , trial court Tillery. those § claims 14501(c) (1), Weatherspoon 915 S o . 2 d a t 5 6 3 . correctly dismissed Therefore, claims. against we a f f i r m Tillery may not p o s s i b l y Accordingly, the Weatherspoon's claims the t r i a l are court's against dismissal of 6 AFFIRMED. Cobb, and C . J . , and W o o d a l l , Stuart, Smith, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . Murdock, J . ,dissents. The d i s s e n t d i s c u s s e s t h e nature of preemption under § 14501(c) and q u e s t i o n s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s characterization o f t h e d i s m i s s a l o f W e a t h e r s p o o n ' s a c t i o n as b e i n g f o r lack of s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n and p r e f e r s a d i s m i s s a l based upon f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a c l a i m . So. 3d a t . However, Weatherspoon has not c h a l l e n g e d T i l l e r y ' s a s s e r t i o n of l a c k of s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n and t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s dismissal on t h a t b a s i s e i t h e r b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r on a p p e a l . A c c o r d i n g l y , we do n o t r e a c h t h e m e r i t s o f t h e t r i a l court's d i s m i s s a l f o r l a c k o f s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n . See, e.g., Muhammad v . F o r d , 986 S o . 2 d 1 1 5 8 , 1 1 6 5 ( A l a . 2 0 0 7 ) ( " ' A n a r g u m e n t n o t made on a p p e a l i s a b a n d o n e d o r w a i v e d . ' A v i s R e n t A C a r S y s . , I n c . v . H e i l m a n , 876 S o . 2 d 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 4 n.8 ( A l a . 2003)."). The a r g u m e n t s i n t h e d i s s e n t r e g a r d i n g § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) and the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the concepts of choice-of-law or choice-of-forum p r e e m p t i o n as r e c o g n i z e d i n International L o n g s h o r e m e n ' s A s s ' n v . D a v i s , 476 U.S. 380 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , m u s t a w a i t a c a s e where s u c h i s s u e i s p r o p e r l y b e f o r e us and r e s o l u t i o n of t h e i s s u e i s t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e d . 6 30 1081131 MURDOCK, J u s t i c e (dissenting). Preemption As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t "'[i]n a l lpre-emption cases, which Congress has " l e g i s l a t e d have traditionally and t o be clear , that The Federal S.Ct. 1187, § 14501 f o r the wrongful Aviation of which addressing Wyeth 1194-95 reflects a v. (2009). "clear I and § 14501 to n o t i f y their or to or d u t i e s manifest statutory of a towed vehicle. those to provide retrieve d i s p o s i n g of ("the of tow-truck their them. 31 owners those operators the r i g h t f u l to determine towed v e h i c l e s , opportunities cannot i s a p a r t , i s d e v o i d o f any p r o v i s i o n s to e f f o r t s vehicles, disposition the Levine, Administration Authorization Act the o b l i g a t i o n s respect otherwise of Congress."'" t h a t was b y C o n g r e s s t o p r e e m p t s t a t e common-law and claims with , 129 "start the Federal Act unless purpose 49 U.S.C. tort Act"), by we the States were superseded ... in the U.S. purpose" i n those ... i n a f i e l d w h i c h occupied," year, with and m a n i f e s t agree particularly last t h a t the h i s t o r i c p o l i c e powers o f t h e S t a t e s assumption not stated just owners of of the whereabouts of owners with v e h i c l e s before reasonable selling or 1081131 "The p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h p r e e m p t i o n may a r i s e ... may b e s u m m a r i z e d a s follows: f i r s t , when a c t i n g w i t h i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s , C o n g r e s s has e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d an i n t e n t i o n to preempt there i s preemption; second, though i t has not expressly preempted a field or an i d e n t i f i a b l e portion thereof, preemption e x i s t s i f C o n g r e s s h a s a d o p t e d a 'scheme o f f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n ... s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e t o make r e a s o n a b l e the i n f e r e n c e t h a t C o n g r e s s l e f t n o r o o m ... f o r s u p p l e m e n t a r y s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n ; ' a n d f i n a l l y , 'where the f i e l d i s one i n w h i c h " t h e f e d e r a l i n t e r e s t i s so dominant t h a t t h e f e d e r a l s y s t e m w i l l be assumed t o p r e c l u d e e n f o r c e m e n t o f s t a t e l a w s o n t h e same subject,"' o r 'when " c o m p l i a n c e w i t h b o t h federal and s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n i s a p h y s i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y , " ' t h e r e w i l l be p r e e m p t i o n . [Hillsborough County v. A u t o m a t e d Med. L a b s . , 4 7 1 U.S. 7 0 7 , 7 1 3 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ] . In applying these p r i n c i p l e s , though, i t i s important t o b e a r i n m i n d t h a t 'where t h e s t a t e ' s p o l i c e p o w e r is involved, preemption will n o t be presumed.' C h r y s l e r C o r p . v . R h o d e s , 416 F . 2 d 3 1 9 , 3 2 4 , n. 8 (1st C i r . 1969)." Specialized Carriers 1152, (4th C i r . 1986)(emphasis 1155 National Solid Wastes (1992)(reiterating In § 14501, and t o preempt and service" & Rigging state Supreme Court added) . Ass'n, 505 795 F . 2 d See Gade 88, U.S. v. 98 expressed i t s intention to l e g i s l a t e regulation of motor expressed v. V i r g i n i a , t h e same p r i n c i p l e s ) . Congress Congress Mgmt. Ass'n carriers i t sconcern terms "economic 32 regarding the "price, of property. with what so doing, the United States regulation" In route, of tow-truck 1081131 operators. Inc. , 536 problem U.S. economic 439-41 (2002) the congressional regulation'" i n § 14501(c)(2)(A) of S t a t e s ' and & Wrecker (explaining conferees that i s to ensure that attended "Congress' that Serv., "the was clear i t s preemption economic a u t h o r i t y over motor c a r r i e r s o f p r o p e r t y , § 14501(c)(1), state 424, to which '[s]tate purpose C i t y o f Columbus v. Ours Garage 'not r e s t r i c t ' p o l i c e power over t h e p r e e x i s t i n g and t r a d i t i o n a l safety" (emphasis added)). 7 The A c t I c a n n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t , i n i t s d e c i s i o n i n Rowe v . New H a m p s h i r e M o t o r Transportation Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 , 128 S . C t . 989 ( 2 0 0 8 ) , intended to d i s t a n c e i t s e l f i n t h e manner s u g g e s t e d by t h e main o p i n i o n f r o m t h e n o t i o n t h a t C o n g r e s s was f o c u s e d o n t h e e c o n o m i c r e g u l a t i o n of motor c a r r i e r s of p r o p e r t y i n t h e enactment o f § 14501(c) -- a p r o p o s i t i o n that the Court c l e a r l y had e m b r a c e d j u s t f o u r y e a r s e a r l i e r i n C i t y o f C o l u m b u s -- a n d certainly not to the extent o f " r e j e c t [ i n g ] an a r g u m e n t s i m i l a r t o t h a t made b y t h [ i s ] d i s s e n t . " See So. 3d a t n.2. What t h e Rowe C o u r t d i d was s i m p l y t o r e j e c t t h e S t a t e o f M a i n e ' s " a r g u m e n t f o r an i m p l i e d ' p u b l i c h e a l t h ' o r ' t o b a c c o ' e x c e p t i o n t o f e d e r a l p r e - e m p t i o n , " 552 U.S. a t , 128 S . C t . a t 997, s t a t i n g i n t h e p r o c e s s that " i t i s frequently difficult to distinguish between a State's ' e c o n o m i c ' - r e l a t e d and ' h e a l t h ' - r e l a t e d m o t i v a t i o n s . " Id. The Rowe C o u r t w e n t o n t o r e a f f i r m , h o w e v e r , t h a t " C o n g r e s s ' overarching goal [was] h e l p i n g a s s u r e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n r a t e s , routes, and s e r v i c e s that reflect 'maximum r e l i a n c e on competitive market f o r c e s , ' thereby s t i m u l a t i n g ' e f f i c i e n c y , innovation, and low p r i c e s , ' as w e l l as ' v a r i e t y ' and 'quality.'" Rowe, 552 U.S. a t , 128 S . C t . 2 d a t 995 ( q u o t i n g M o r a l e s v . T r a n s W o r l d A i r l i n e s , I n c . , 504 U.S. 3 7 4 , 378 (1992)). The l a t t e r s t a t e m e n t d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o b e a repudiation of the notion that, i n enacting § 14501, C o n g r e s s ' s f o c u s was t h e e c o n o m i c r e g u l a t i o n o f c a r r i e r s . 7 33 1081131 does n o t c o n t a i n any p r o v i s i o n t h a t even b e g i n s t o address t h e t y p e o f t o r t i o u s c o n d u c t b y t h e t o w i n g company a l l e g e d case. 8 The the i n this main United Kelley v. Kelley, opinion States Court United States, however, constitutionality general, only primarily of Appeals 69 rejects the decision f o r the Tenth F.3d a upon 1503 general of the A c t brought of Circuit i n (10th C i r . 1995). challenge to the b y two s t a t e attorneys t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e c o m m i s s i o n s o f two s t a t e s , a n d two other e n t i t i e s industry. relies with no a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the tow-truck K e l l e y m a k e s no m e n t i o n o f t h e t o w - t r u c k industry. 9 T o b e c l e a r , I do n o t r e a c h t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r t h e A c t i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , i . e . , that i t i s " i r r a t i o n a l for purposes of Commerce C l a u s e a n a l y s i s . " See d i s c u s s i o n i n n o t e 4 o f t h e main o p i n i o n , So. 3d a t . My p o i n t i s m e r e l y that C o n g r e s s ' s o m i s s i o n f r o m t h e f e d e r a l s t a t u t o r y scheme o f a n y f e d e r a l l y c r e a t e d remedy f o r t o r t i o u s c o n d u c t o f a t y p e t h a t c l e a r l y i s i n need o f a remedy and t h a t , t r a d i t i o n a l l y , has been v i e w e d as f a l l i n g w i t h i n s t a t e " p o l i c e power" as t o matters a f f e c t i n g the safety, health, and w e l f a r e of the c i t i z e n s o f a s t a t e -- a n d a s s u c h h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y b e e n g o v e r n e d b y s t a t e common l a w -- i s a s t r o n g i n d i c a t o r t h a t Congress simply d i d not i n t e n d f o r f e d e r a l law t o preempt state law i n t h i s s p e c i f i c regard. 8 T h i s i s t r u e as w e l l o f t h e n e x t two c a s e s c i t e d i n t h e main o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g p r e e m p t i o n , Data M a n u f a c t u r i n g , Inc. v. U n i t e d P a r c e l S e r v i c e , I n c . , 557 F . 3 d 849 ( 8 t h C i r . 2 0 0 9 ) , a n d Deerskin Trading Post, I n c . v. U n i t e d Parcel Service of A m e r i c a , I n c . , 972 F. S u p p . 665 (N.D. G a . 1 9 9 7 ) . In A.J.'s Wrecker Service o f D a l l a s , I n c . v. S a l a z a r , 165 S.W.3d 444 9 34 1081131 Concomitantly, proposition nature of wrongful lest Kelley that state statutory conversion, sale of On have other considered preservation have h e l d or that disposition of towed e.g., (No. C V - 9 6 - 4 5 4 ML, not Supp.) and Rhode some for the in the alleging considered of federal and the preempted of state industry, and in a vehicle causes of tow-truck Feb. (concluding are Public 28, related not been to preempted by ( D . R . I . 1997) (not the v. route, or towed, and Act. State, published r e g u l a t i o n of s t o r a g e a price, the storage Inc. the to relating that particular Towing Ass'n, 1997) "that courts a f t e r i t has action vehicles Island sufficiently fraud "economic r e g u l a t i o n " towing storage state stand Congress. hand, the See, i n F. by not common-law c l a i m s a t o w e d v e h i c l e m u s t be intended the does and negligence, t h e y i m p i n g e upon the operators is unquestionably rates service of (Tex. App. 2 0 0 5 ) , a l s o c i t e d by t h e m a i n o p i n i o n , t h e claims o f " t r e s p a s s " a n d " c o n v e r s i o n " h e l d t o be p r e e m p t e d w e r e b a s e d on t h e a c t u a l " s e r v i c e " o f t o w i n g t h e v e h i c l e -allegedly w i t h o u t " p r o b a b l e c a u s e " t o c o n s i d e r i t u n l a w f u l l y p a r k e d -¬ as w e l l as t h e t o w i n g c o m p a n y ' s e n s u i n g r e f u s a l t o r e t u r n t h e v e h i c l e u n t i l f o r c e d t o do so b y a c o u r t o r d e r . 165 S.W.3d a t 447. The c a s e d i d n o t i n v o l v e t h e w r o n g f u l d i s p o s i t i o n o f a v e h i c l e t o a t h i r d p a r t y by a t o w i n g company w i t h o u t e v e r u n d e r t a k i n g a p p r o p r i a t e e f f o r t s to d e t e r m i n e or to l o c a t e the o w n e r o f t h e v e h i c l e o r t o n o t i f y t h e o w n e r o f t h e v e h i c l e as t o i t s w h e r e a b o u t s b e f o r e d i s p o s i n g o f i t , as d o e s t h e p r e s e n t case. 35 1081131 a tow was truck" not and therefore p r e e m p t e d by the s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n of those § 14501(c) (emphasis added)); C o r p . v. S e v e l ' s 24-Hour Towing S e r v ., 34 Rptr. Cal. 3d 120 (2005) i m p o s i n g l i m i t a t i o n s on remote relationship service" and thus 2008) Towing (not (Griffin, J., Congress to towing not & Hauling, company's come within Inc., 289 See Fed. for publication concurring did not in part and undertake the wrongful federal owner for 49 statutory of such purpose" the scheme a wrongfully 14501 Congress in this area, nature relating to of to of no wrongful fees Pro Appx. 852 to Cir. Reporter) in part). "regulate" any respect the granting the remedy cannot at a l l conclude towed that and manifest state tort-law common-law c l a i m s fraud, the Again, provision traditional 36 (6th Federal preempt a or Tow requisite "clear of route, a a l s o Ware v . vehicles. and only the the sale had of vehicle conversion, statute at l e a s t w i t h I therefore 1034, purview Act towed i.e., statutory negligence, the of disposed reflects by state dissenting i n the contains t o r t i o u s conduct. U.S.C. § claims disposition the Agency 4th "price, i n the t o r t i o u s conduct of t o w - t r u c k o p e r a t o r s , to that lien-sale-preparation did selected C a l . App. (holding p r e e m p t i o n p r o v i s i o n of § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) ) . Custom 132 CPF rates and vehicle in suppression by a tow- 1081131 truck to operator who a l l e g e d l y h a s n o t made r e a s o n a b l e determine the r i g h t f u l owner o f t h e v e h i c l e , owner o f t h e w h e r e a b o u t s o f h i s o r h e r v e h i c l e , that owner vehicle a reasonable before selling opportunity to notify that and t o p r o v i d e to retrieve i t to a third efforts h i s or her party. Jurisdiction The case trial court on t h e g r o u n d state claims, beginning review that the purported i t s analysis a ruling subject-matter on court's by a 2005) opinion a subject-matter appears t o base i t s judgment on t h e same motion (emphasis added)). to dismiss So. 3d Debra for lack at concerning this issue. the issue but only b r i e f l y , of (quoting I n s . C o . , 915 S o . 2 d 5 5 7 , 563 asserting makes Because of subject-matter of A t i t s end, however, t h e main footnote Weatherspoon ground, the standard that i t does undertake to address the issue of subject-matter because of initially jurisdiction.'" includes i t of " ' s e t [ t i n g ] out P o n t i u s v. S t a t e Farm Mut. A u t o . (Ala. of d i s m i s s a l i n this f e d e r a l preemption deprived The m a i n o p i n i o n of the t r i a l of i t s judgment i n i t s view, jurisdiction. affirmance based no jurisdiction argument on of the fundamental jurisdiction, I will not appeal nature of address i t , because t h e main o p i n i o n does appear i n t h e 37 1081131 final a n a l y s i s to disavow the jurisdiction court's as the basis from the t e x t of I simply claims result not would jurisdiction This to would form to to address complaint deprive state the the trial could glean simply been preemption defect of c o u r t , but the of those is by referred preemption. the of stands to R. Civ. forum for in contrast exist U.S. P., 380 to failure the to a Act. courts and of the (1986) preemption generally). See (noting does among not a l s o , e.g., other apply things to G o n z a l e s v. 38 cause 12(b)(6), claim. preemption i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l L o n g s h o r e m e n ' s A s s ' n v. that It found Davis, 476 choice-of- preemption Surgidev in state state-law viable "choice-of-forum" of federal I t r e s u l t s not plaintiff's state the state-law of a c t i o n t h a t would warrant a d i s m i s s a l under Rule Ala. as failure the by jurisdiction i n the the the to case, claims, because vitiated preempt courts state r e s u l t w o u l d be subject-matter rather a defect i n t e n t to Alabama a viable claim c o m m e n t a t o r s as " c h o i c e - o f - l a w " a of at i s s u e i n t h i s the v i a b i l i t y Instead, have of a congressional of the nature be court held. claims i t s affirmance n o t e t h a t , e v e n i f we § 14501(c) state-law tort the for subject-matter dismissal. Specifically, trial supposed l a c k of claims Corp., 120 1081131 N.M. 133, Davis 138-39, P.2d 57 6, explaining and 8 99 well the preemption and Davis how and the former failure to C o r p . v. O'Shea, [Ms. law between for in not the to 400 9-1597 , S e p t . 2009) 9, (applying Davis choice-of-forum (expositing "choice-of-law" as identified in deprivation a state s t a t e a v i a b l e cause D i s t . C t . App. (1 995) preemption leads jurisdiction waivable difference bases "choice-of-forum" subject-matter (Fla. 581-82 of court, of but to action); 200 9] and Cordis So. 3d recognizing preemption and a the choice-of- preemption). Conclusion I disagree with the conclusion i n the main § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) p r e e m p t s A l a b a m a ' s common-law and in the nature suppression operator making owner chance conversion, that would otherwise wrongfully disposes reasonable of of the to respectfully efforts towed to his or negligence, fraud, a v a i l a b l e when a d i s c e r n , l o c a t e , and give her dissent. 39 that owner vehicle. that statutory claims a and tow-truck of a towed v e h i c l e w i t h o u t v e h i c l e and retrieve be opinion first notify the reasonable Therefore, I

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