Sharon Melton v. Harbor Pointe, LLC

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REL: 02/26/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , Alabama A p p e l l a t e Courts, 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ((334) 2 2 9 - 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1081096 Sharon Melton v. H a r b o r P o i n t e , LLC Appeal from Lee C i r c u i t (CV-08-900126) Court LYONS, J u s t i c e . S h a r o n M e l t o n a p p e a l s f r o m a J a n u a r y 7, 2 0 0 9 , j u d g m e n t o f the Lee Circuit Court trespass and seeking easement over ("HP"). real denying Melton's a judgment declaring property owned claims that by Harbor alleging she h a d an Pointe, LLC 1 I n h e r b r i e f on a p p e a l , M e l t o n f r a m e d one o f t h e i s s u e s a s : "Whether [ H P ] f a i l e d t o p r o v e b y p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e evidence that i t had t i t l e t o t h e l a n d on w h i c h [ M e l t o n ] 1 1081096 Procedural On Court April 1 5 , 2008 , stating declaring History a that claim and F a c t u a l Melton sued of trespass she h a d an easement HP that she had used "openly and h o s t i l e l y period, Section i n t h e Lee and seeking judgment and by Specifically, Melton t h e easement t o access h e r p r o p e r t y f o r the s t a t u t o r i l y 18-3-1 a Circuit by p r e s c r i p t i o n i m p l i c a t i o n a c r o s s p r o p e r t y o w n e d b y HP. alleged Background o f t h e Code therefore ha[d] established required o f Alabama t h e easement t h r o u g h t e n year [1975], and prescriptive means." The trial trial held court i n July r e c e i v e d ore tenus 2008. Maxine purchased i t s p r o p e r t y a n d who contended Melton property, d i d not t e s t i f y . h a d an evidence Jackson, from a t a bench whom HP h a d owned p r o p e r t y o v e r alternate The means trial of access court which HP to her subsequently c l a i m e d h e r easement, once c h a l l e n g e d . " However, i n h e r b r i e f , M e l t o n d i d n o t argue, d i s c u s s , o r c i t e any e v i d e n c e o r a u t h o r i t y r e g a r d i n g t h i s i s s u e . HP r e s p o n d e d , w i t h o u t c i t a t i o n to a u t h o r i t y , a r g u i n g t h a t i t d i d n o t have t h e burden o f proving t i t l e . I n h e r r e p l y b r i e f , Melton argues the i s s u e . We w i l l not consider this issue because Melton d i d not a d e q u a t e l y r a i s e i t i n h e r p r i n c i p a l b r i e f on a p p e a l ; t h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t c o n s i d e r a r g u m e n t s made f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n a r e p l y b r i e f . S e e , e . g . , K y s e r v . H a r r i s o n , 908 S o . 2 d 9 1 4 , 917 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) ( f i n d i n g a r g u m e n t w a i v e d u n d e r R u l e 2 8 ( a ) ( 1 0 ) , A l a . R. A p p . P., w h e r e a r g u m e n t was made i n i n i t i a l b r i e f b u t was n o t s u p p o r t e d w i t h a u t h o r i t y u n t i l r e p l y b r i e f ) . 2 1081096 viewed the disputed entered an o r d e r property a n d , on September 3, 2008, i t stating: "When t h e c a s e b e g a n , t h e c o u r t a s k e d t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t Ms. M a x i n e J a c k s o n s h o u l d be j o i n e d as a necessary party. ... A f t e r reviewing the p r o p e r t y , t h e c o u r t i s now c o n v i n c e d t h a t pursuant t o R u l e 1 9 , [ A l a . R. C i v . P . , ] Ms. J a c k s o n s h o u l d b e j o i n e d as a p a r t y and a t t h e v e r y l e a s t testimony s h o u l d r e m a i n open u n t i l she t e s t i f i e s b e f o r e t h e court." On November 12, 2008, the evidence from Jackson. Melton's a t t o r n e y : "[H]ave you going just Judge." y'all ore tenus began, the c o u r t asked chosen received t o add h e r i n o r a r e h e r as a w i t n e s s ? " are just Jackson court As t h e h e a r i n g to c a l l r e s p o n d e d : "We trial calling testified, Melton's h e r as a w i t n e s s , but she was never i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y t o the a c t i o n under Rule attorney I added guess, as an 1 9 , A l a . R. C i v . P. The evidence November Melton's farmland 2008 presented shows the to the t r i a l following His land and c o n v e y e d t o f a m i l y members. all the various Mae Williams, conveyances, owned In the 1930s, Morgan, owned eventually subdivided The r e c o r d does n o t d i s c l o s e known 1990 M e l t o n ' s as l o t 9B and aunt, W i l b e r t T o l b e r t , o w n e d a p a r c e l known a s l o t 1 0 . record d o e s n o t show t h a t T o l b e r t ever Eva Melton's uncle, 3 and facts. was b u t by a parcel in July Lemmie great-great-grandfather, i n Lee County. court The owned a n y i n t e r e s t i n 1081096 lot 9B or that Lot 10 was W i l l i a m s ever situated landlocked. owned immediately Immediately east i n l o t 10. o f l o t 9B. was a L o t 9B road was running o v e r l o t 10 f o r m s t h e b a s i s o f litigation. In 1990, M e l t o n granted Melton benefit of purchased a 30-foot-wide l o t 9B. The s o u t h e r n p a r t o f l o t 10. a specific could location, access result, across was l o t 10 f o r t h e platted across the A l t h o u g h t h e e a s e m e n t was p l a t t e d i n l o t 9B t h r o u g h n o t on and T o l b e r t b e l i e v e d that Melton l o t 10 a n y w h e r e s h e w a n t e d . As a a h o u s e on l o t 9B i n 1 9 9 0 , s h e b u i l t the southern e a s e m e n t was s i t u a t e d o f l o t 10, where her Melton used the o f l o t 10 t o a c c e s s h e r house 2 i s some have g r a n t e d part according to the p l a t . on t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t 18 y e a r s . There easement Tolbert on t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t o f l o t 10 w i t h T o l b e r t ' s o r a l permission, driveway l o t 9B f r o m W i l l i a m s . easement Melton when M e l t o n b u i l t a driveway for east o f l o t 10 north to south, access to which this any i n t e r e s t indication another easement i n the record that T o l b e r t may i n f a v o r o f l o t 9B a c r o s s land Jackson t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l that before Melton b u i l t her h o u s e , c h i l d r e n i n t h e f a m i l y u s e d t o p l a y on l o t 10 a n d w o u l d , on o c c a s i o n , w a l k a c r o s s l o t 10 t o g e t t o l o t 9B. However, J a c k s o n d i d n o t s p e c i f y t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n was u s e d , a n d t h e a r e a i n t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t o f l o t 10 t h a t b e c a m e M e l t o n ' s d r i v e w a y was n o t u s e d a s a r o a d o r d r i v e w a y u n t i l Melton b u i l t her house. 2 4 1081096 he owned t o t h e s o u t h by a family the named B a s s . facts explained state on regarding the driveway 10 into Melton's platted l o t 10A driveway e a s e m e n t was h o u s e was b u i l t but a part a r e n o t c l e a r and explored or to never with o f l o t 10, and any c e r t a i n t y . Tolbert l o t 10B entirely located entirely on subdivided to the strip of on l o t 1 0 B . the south. l o t 10A. The I n 1994, a o f t h e e a s e m e n t on l o t 1 0 B , 10-foot-wide to h e r house and began u s i n g t h e located over part acquired i t i s impossible trial, to the north was were an e a s e m e n t a f t e r Melton b u i l t i n the northern eventually because the references issue during o f such was and a t t o r n e y s this record the existence Sometime all However, documents by t h e w i t n e s s e s because lot o f l o t 10 t h a t 30-foot-wide blocking platted easement. When Tolbert died, Jackson, h i s daughter. sell l o t 10A t o HP, James Starr, told HP lot 10A. showing that purchase devised Melton a company h a d no testified an e a s e m e n t on w h a t representation. l o t 10A free lots 10A and 10B to In 2007, J a c k s o n began n e g o t i a t i o n s t o t h a t owned a n e a r b y s u b d i v i s i o n . a representative Starr Jackson's he of o f HP, testified that r i g h t s to the driveway that he viewed Jackson located the recorded on plat h a d b e c o m e l o t 10B and confirmed HP that i t could then any 5 concluded encumbrances or easements. 1081096 Jackson across l o t 10A based sale testified on she belonged and M e l t o n of easement l o t 10A. l o t 10A. across 2008, HP Melton Starr requested destroying the driveway. ruled on M e l t o n ' s to t r i a l of the told both driveway l o t 10A from remained declaring that on M e l t o n ' s that on feet accessible she h a d an of the driveway. the t r i a l court On enjoin the action t r e s p a s s and d e c l a r a t o r y - j u d g m e n t f o r her t h e 10 Melton's a g a i n s t HP o n r e q u e s t , b u t by t h e time driveway along remove I t i s u n c l e a r how t h e t r i a l gravel situated to her action l o t 10A i n t h e l o c a t i o n HP h a d d e s t r o y e d M e l t o n ' s lot that began filed claims, that the course HP p u r c h a s e d s e e k i n g a judgment 16, 2008, M e l t o n court came spring from HP f r o m during driveway otherwise t h a t HP i n t e n d e d t o move M e l t o n ' s the 15, 2008, April the 2007. driveway April that but concluded I t i s undisputed i n December In assumed to Melton l o t 10B i f i t p u r c h a s e d Jackson had i n f o r m a t i o n she r e v i e w e d o f l o t 10A t o HP. Jackson to that driveway l o t 10B. That of the 30-foot after t h e house and had p u t i n a driveway platted was was easement c o n s t r u c t e d on 10B. At trial, Melton's necessary f o r h e r t o have driveway located on attorney access l o t 10A. 6 asked her t o h e r house Melton why i t was through the responded: " I t ' s 1081096 convenient f o r me t o g e t t o my home. I m e a n , i t ' s much m o r e c o n v e n i e n t " than the g r a v e l driveway across l o t 10B. described t h e v a r i o u s ways lot 10B was lot i n which n o t as c o n v e n i e n t She then the g r a v e l driveway over 10A. On J a n u a r y favor o f HP, f o r h e r as t h e d r i v e w a y 7, 2 0 0 9 , t h e t r i a l across c o u r t e n t e r e d a judgment i n stating: " A f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a l l e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by the p a r t i e s over the course of the t r i a l , including the undersigned's v i s i t to the p r o p e r t y at i s s u e i n t h i s case, i t i s the d e c i s i o n of t h i s Court that [ M e l t o n ' s ] r e q u e s t f o r r e l i e f i s due t o b e d e n i e d . [ M e l t o n ] has n o t h e l d t h e p r o p e r t y [ o n what became lot 10A] f o r the requisite twenty-year period necessary f o r an e a s e m e n t b y p r e s c r i p t i o n . See, e . g . , H a n k s v . S p a n n , 990 S o . 2 d 399 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 2008). [Melton] has also failed to show any necessity at law requiring an easement by i m p l i c a t i o n . S e e , e . g . , A r p v . E d m o n d s , 706 S o . 2 d 736 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) , a n d H e l m s v . T u l l i s , 398 S o . 2 d 253 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . Ms. M e l t o n h a s an e x i s t i n g recorded easement p r o v i d i n g access to the road [ a c r o s s what became l o t 1 0 B ] . I t i s n o t w i t h i n t h e Court's power to change an easement based on convenience, n o r b a s e d on t h e c o n d i t i o n of the e a s e m e n t s as l o n g as t h e e a s e m e n t s a r e u s e a b l e f o r a c c e s s t o t h e r o a d . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , Ms. Melton's c u r r e n t r e c o r d e d easement [ a c r o s s what became l o t 10B] i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r access t o the road from her property. Therefore, i t i s not w i t h i n the Court's p o w e r t o g r a n t h e r a n y p r o p e r t y r i g h t s on [ w h a t became l o t 1 0 A ] owned b y [ H P ] . Judgment f o r [ H P ] . " 3 In i t s w r i t t e n order, the t r i a l court d i d not address Melton's t r e s p a s s c l a i m , but i t d i d e n t e r a judgment i n the S t a t e J u d i c i a l I n f o r m a t i o n S y s t e m i n HP's f a v o r a s t o a l l Melton's claims. I n h e r b r i e f on a p p e a l , M e l t o n h a s n o t a s s e r t e d any arguments r e l a t e d t o h e r t r e s p a s s c l a i m . 3 7 1081096 On January "motion motion under Rule and Melton's 2009. this The motion Melton what but which trial court i t d i d , but the t r i a l postjudgment P., M e l t o n ' s filed she c a p t i o n e d a was i n substance 5 9 ( e ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., t o a l t e r , t h e judgment. respond, to Melton for reconsideration," vacate 29, 29, 2009, motion. gave court Under Rule HP amend, o r 21 to ruled never days on 5 9 . 1 , A l a . R. C i v . was d e n i e d b y o p e r a t i o n o f l a w o n thereafter filed a a timely notice April of appeal Court. Analysis Melton advances and a member o f t h e Bass necessary parties trial s i x a r g u m e n t s o n a p p e a l : 1) t h a t under family Rule s h o u l d have been Jackson joined as 1 9 , A l a . R. C i v . P . ; 2) t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d have r e f o r m e d t h e deed t h a t g r a n t e d h e r an e a s e m e n t a c r o s s l o t 1 0 ; 3) t h a t s h e h a d a n e a s e m e n t a c r o s s l o t 10A b a s e d o n a t h e o r y o f s t a t u t o r y a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n ; 4) t h a t she h a d an easement she h a d an easement b y n e c e s s i t y she h a d an easement b y i m p l i c a t i o n I. across l o t 1 0 A ; 5) that a c r o s s l o t 1 0 A ; a n d 6) that a c r o s s l o t 10A. Joinder of Parties In court the by p r e s c r i p t i o n her brief erred Bass on in failing family appeal, Melton to join as i n d i s p e n s a b l e 8 both argues Jackson parties that the trial a n d a member o f under Rule 19, Ala. 1081096 R. Civ. trial P. Melton court. This did not Court raise has these arguments before the explained: "The a b s e n c e o f an i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y c a n be r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l b y t h e p a r t i e s o r b y t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ex m e r o m o t u , e v e n i f t h e parties d i d not present the i s s u e to the trial c o u r t . C r u m v . S o u t h T r u s t B a n k o f A l a b a m a , N.A., 598 So. 2 d 867 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) ; J . C . J a c o b s B a n k i n g Co. v. C a m p b e l l , 406 So. 2 d 834 ( A l a . 1 9 8 1 ) . T h e r e f o r e , the [appellants'] delay i n arguing t h i s issue to the t r i a l c o u r t i s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e . The r u l e , h o w e v e r , g i v e s the t r i a l c o u r t the d i s c r e t i o n to permit or to d e n y t h e j o i n d e r o f an a d d i t i o n a l p a r t y . See Rule 1 9 ( b ) , A l a . R. C i v . P.; F e l d e r v . S t a t e , 515 So. 2d 17 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1987)." Gilbert v. Nicholson, 2002)(affirming join an alleged objected parties be the to the record i s not should owned c l e a r on simply 785, 790 denying because over her A l a . R. family, now a finding be road Melton property order party 19(b), that across support Bass 2d party by even at trial there an easement the the not enough that j o i n d e r of r e q u i r e d under Rule Bass family. existence information 19. 9 and the would not was to this in the the only a lot 9B Because of a member o f Melton, not P. have may to had property Civ. (Ala. a motion p r e v i o u s l y a g r e e d t h a t she also Rule mention is court's proposed t o the a c t i o n had Regarding there trial So. indispensable the j o i n e d ) ; see vague 845 the easement, record Bass to family t h e r e f o r e , has not 1081096 shown this that the t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment s h o u l d be reversed on the issue of basis. Regarding Jackson's court the Jackson, joinder stated very the t r i a l that Jackson " s h o u l d be j o i n e d testimony testifies before the November 12, 2008, merely to raised i n i t s S e p t e m b e r 3, 2 0 0 8 , o r d e r . least attempting court should court." the t r i a l join Jackson open at an s u b m i t t i n g her testimony. until the c o u r t gave M e l t o n as trial as a p a r t y and a t remain However, The hearing on the choice of indispensable party Melton's she or of a t t o r n e y chose the latter. On appeal, Melton argues that, i n d e c i d i n g whether easement existed was d e c i d i n g w e t h e r an a l t e r n a t e means o f a c c e s s also across i n h e r f a v o r a c r o s s l o t 10A, l o t 10B, affected and, Jackson's that, as a r e s u l t remove the house 10B. However, The to a 10-foot-wide 10B o r t h a t that interest that shows Melton i n l o t 10B. of the t r i a l argues, Melton court existed i t s decision also argues c o u r t ' s judgment, Jackson blocked part the t r i a l evidence indicating therefore, the t r i a l of the easement c o u r t h a s e n t e r e d no that Melton such must over l o t order. h a s an u n c h a l l e n g e d e a s e m e n t o v e r l o t 10B. an right T h e r e i s no evidence J a c k s o n ever c h a l l e n g e d the easement over l o t she o b j e c t e d t o M e l t o n ' s 10 use of the easement over 1081096 lot 10B to access q u e s t i o n whether inconsistent platted called Melton's o f an e a s e m e n t , the joinder assert the e a s e m e n t on l o t 10B i s under the 30-foot-wide The q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r narrower than s e r v e as a b a s i s the t h e easement on w h i c h t o deny o r b y n e c e s s i t y on l o t 10A d o e s n o t of Jackson, whose property i s presently her rights to a f u l l Whether 30-foot-wide easement a q u e s t i o n f o r a n o t h e r d a y i n an a c t i o n b e t w e e n M e l t o n Jackson. I t i s apparent discretion Gilbert, court supra, Reimer, Melton stated are persons controversy but cannot court exercised has Jackson not shown the C i v . P., 1 9 ( b ) , A l a . R. that and see was that not the an trial i t s discretion. Court leaving the t r i a l determined 435 S o . 2 d 5 0 , 52 parties" decree and party. exceeded This that provided i t i n Rule indispensable or arguments, b y a 1 0 - f o o t - w i d e g r a v e l d r i v e w a y t o l o t 9B. M e l t o n may is albeit may an e a s e m e n t b y i m p l i c a t i o n burdened Melton's rights i s not before us. f o r i n the p l a t , require Despite the use of a narrower with easement existence l o t 9B. an who in J.R. McClenney ( A l a . 1983), t h a t not interest only of have such b e made w i t h o u t e i t h e r a & Son, "'"[i]ndispensable an interest i n the nature that a affecting that interest the c o n t r o v e r s y i n such a c o n d i t i o n that d e t e r m i n a t i o n may be w h o l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e q u i t y 11 I n c . v. final i t s final and good 1081096 conscience.'" of in Civil ( Q u o t i n g 1 Champ L y o n s , Procedure, a t 389 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . ) Alabama P r a c t i c e , The C o u r t further Rules stated Reimer: "There i s no prescribed formula to be mechanically applied i n every case to determine w h e t h e r a p a r t y i s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y o r m e r e l y a p r o p e r o r n e c e s s a r y o n e . T h i s i s a q u e s t i o n t o be decided i n the context of the p a r t i c u l a r case. P r o v i d e n t T r a d e s m e n s Bank & T r u s t Co. v . P a t t e r s o n , 390 U.S. 1 0 2 , 88 S. C t . 7 3 3 , 19 L. E d . 2 d 936 ( 1 9 6 8 ) . The i s s u e i s o n e t o b e d e c i d e d b y a p p l y i n g e q u i t a b l e principles and, under the circumstances of t h i s case, i t would be inequitable to vacate this j u d g m e n t on m o t i o n o f t h e d e f e n d a n t , w h i c h h a s s o blatantly ignored the rules under which i t s m o r t g a g e e b a n k c o u l d h a v e s o e a s i l y b e e n made a party." 435 S o . 2 d a t 52 Reimer i s (emphasis particularly added). The c o n c l u s i o n r e a c h e d i n appropriate to the facts here presented. II. Reformation Melton failing o f Deed argues on a p p e a l that the t r i a l to reform t h e deed from Tolbert court erred i n granting her the p l a t t e d e a s e m e n t o v e r t h e s o u t h e r n p a r t o f l o t 1 0 , w h a t i s now lot 10B. her complaint She r a i s e d t h e argument f o r t h e f i r s t motion. Melton This d i d not argue or at t r i a l , Court has to the t r i a l that t h e deed held that court, either i n s h o u l d be reformed. time i n her postjudgment the trial d i s c r e t i o n whether t o c o n s i d e r arguments r a i s e d time i n a postjudgment motion. court has f o rthe f i r s t See, e.g., S p e c i a l A s s e t s , LLC 12 1081096 v. C h a s e Home F i n . , L L C , Green Tree A c c e p t a n c e , (Ala. 1988) ("[A] a legal argument new required to justification postjudgment trial court 59.1, A l a . R. the record Melton delay was to rule has by on but i s not not identified any this argument. Her o p e r a t i o n o f l a w when i t within Therefore, there the t r i a l 1369 to consider motion, in raising denied C i v . P. that ( A l a . 2007); 525 S o . 2 d 1 3 6 6 , i n a post-judgment f o r her failed 676-77 c o u r t has t h e d i s c r e t i o n so."). motion So. 2d 668, I n c . v. B l a l o c k , trial do 991 90 days. i s no See Rule indication court considered Melton's did. See S p e c i a l A s s e t s , s u p r a . discretion in failing that M e l t o n has n o t shown b a s i s u p o n w h i c h we c a n c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r i a l its in argument r e g a r d i n g r e f o r m a t i o n , a n d we a r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o p r e s u m e it the court any exceeded t o c o n s i d e r her argument r e g a r d i n g reformation. III. Statutory On Adverse appeal, Melton failing t o award adverse possession. for the responds, first her she alleged that for the s t a t u t o r i l y argues an HP time pointing Possession in that easement argues her "used over that Melton raised statutory this issue Melton 6 of her complaint i n which openly ten year p e r i o d , 13 by in motion. the easement required court erred l o t 10A postjudgment to paragraph she the t r i a l and hostilely Section 18-3-1 1081096 o f t h e Code o f A l a b a m a the easement [1975], and t h e r e f o r e ha[d] t h r o u g h p r e s c r i p t i v e means." established (Emphasis added.) H o w e v e r , § 1 8 - 3 - 1 , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ( w h i c h a l l o w s a for landlocked showing for 10 by years, property), and the prescription is pleadings, does 20 require required period not to years. Based Melton argues i n her Code 1975, taxation which f o r 10 Despite court a on use the this reply brief color of an in i t s shortcomings, the period was evidence § did state title or listing the complaint put This Court the i s s u e of adverse p o s s e s s i o n for t o be presented tried. to However, the as trial has on discussed court was possession explained: "An e a s e m e n t b y p r e s c r i p t i o n i s a c q u i r e d b y u s e of '"the p r e m i s e s over w h i c h the easement i s c l a i m e d for a p e r i o d of t w e n t y y e a r s or more, a d v e r s e l y t o the owner of the p r e m i s e s , under c l a i m of right, exclusive, continuous, and uninterrupted, with actual or p r e s u m p t i v e knowledge of the owner."' B l a l o c k v . C o n z e l m a n , 751 So. 2 d 2, 4 ( A l a . 1999) ( q u o t i n g B u l l v . S a l s m a n , 435 So. 2 d 2 7 , 29 ( A l a . 1983)). e a s e m e n t by ' a d v e r s e use f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y requires satisfaction of the nontemporal 14 trial based 6-5-200. "An period' her u n d e r § 6-5-200, A l a . i n s u f f i c i e n t to s a t i s f y the r e q u i r e m e n t s of adverse under use easement anomaly t h a t she of years. notice that 10-year below, requires acquire on a claim f o r s t a t u t o r y adverse possession a right-of-way 1081096 e l e m e n t s o f t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t , p l u s one of t h e t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f A l a . Code 1975, § 6-5-200: or "'(a) Adverse p o s s e s s i o n cannot defeat t i t l e to land unless: confer "'(1) The party setting i t up shall show t h a t a deed or o t h e r c o l o r of t i t l e purporting t o c o n v e y t i t l e t o him has been duly recorded i n the o f f i c e of the judge of probate of the county i n which the l a n d l i e s f o r 10 y e a r s b e f o r e t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t of the a c t i o n ; "'(2) He and those through whom he claims shall have annually listed the land for t a x a t i o n i n the proper county f o r 10 years prior to the commencement o f t h e a c t i o n i f t h e l a n d i s s u b j e c t to t a x a t i o n ; or "'(3) He derives title by descent cast or devise from a p r e d e c e s s o r i n t h e t i t l e who was i n p o s s e s s i o n of the l a n d . ' " ( E m p h a s i s added.) I f the r e q u i r e m e n t s of 'adverse u s e f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d ' a r e met, t h e n a use w i l l r i p e n i n t o an e a s e m e n t b y a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n i n 10 years, instead of the 20 years required to e s t a b l i s h a p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t . Downey v . N o r t h Alabama M i n e r a l Dev. Co., 420 So. 2d 68 (Ala. 19 8 2 ) . " J o n e s v. Johnson, Melton of the or Jackson, d i d not driveway the 827 So. present across 2d 768, any l o t 10A respective evidence was owners 15 771-72 (Ala. showing that adverse of 2002). lot to 10A. either her use Tolbert Instead, the 1081096 evidence r e p e a t e d l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y of the driveway on appeal satisfies However, satisfy was that permissive. the deed color of t i t l e described over in Jones Melton requirements v. for a finding t o an e a s e m e n t IV. Easement by has over across of § of t i t l e Neither Accordingly, as easement requirement for color l o t 10A. above an Melton a s t o an e a s e m e n t o v e r the requirement easement Additionally, creating the c o l o r - o f - t i t l e showed t h a t M e l t o n ' s not of the Johnson shown of adverse argues l o t 10B 6-5-200(a)(1). l o t 10B cannot w i t h r e s p e c t t o an other have that two been she methods satisfied. satisfied l o t 10A u n d e r § 6-5-200. Prescription she h a d an e a s e m e n t b y p r e s c r i p t i o n Although Melton's trial, based HP's on a attorney theory of court concluded i n the driveway that across l o t a t t o r n e y d i d n o t f o c u s on t h e i s s u e a t argued complaint put the t r i a l trial the possession i n her favor In h e r c o m p l a i n t , M e l t o n sought a judgment d e c l a r i n g 10A. use expressly against easement by prescription. c o u r t on n o t i c e o f t h i s that Melton any recovery Melton's issue, and t h e "has n o t h e l d t h e p r o p e r t y for t h e r e q u i s i t e t w e n t y - y e a r p e r i o d n e c e s s a r y f o r an e a s e m e n t by prescription." Upon a r e v i e w o f t h e e v i d e n c e , i t i s a p p a r e n t has not satisfied the requirements 16 for an that Melton easement by 1081096 prescription. See, above, Melton has not across l o t 10A was adverse property. driveway o v e r l o t 10A that requirement f o r an Easement by On location forms to 398 the supra. As her that to of driveway use respective f o r 18 y e a r s . The cannot easement by Implication Melton trial satisfy by and are these So. that Because she arguments 2d the substantially 253 and necessary Melton also of She argued d i d not motion assert f o r Melton unity of title. that the issue During in the the correctly 20-year an use easement elements similar, See, by i n the of these two i t i s expedient e.g., Helms v. that any she claim at t r i a l to have limited trial, case argued extensively at had an easement f o r an easement However, the p a r t i e s extensively presented that ( A l a . 1981). by n e c e s s i t y i n h e r c o m p l a i n t . was court the had together. i n her postjudgment implication. evidence owners Easement by N e c e s s i t y M e l t o n a l l e g e d i n h e r c o m p l a i n t and trial the noted prescription. and argues driveway. of easement Tullis, Johnson, a n d an e a s e m e n t b y n e c e s s i t y a c r o s s l o t 10A of her discuss v. i t i s undisputed that Melton used Melton appeal, implication Jones shown Additionally, determined V. e.g., was 17 presented r e g a r d i n g whether i t a driveway across evidence regarding the stated lot court whether the 10A. original i t s opinion access Melton 1081096 sought was necessary or merely therefore, that easement by under Rule The issue n e c e s s i t y was 15, trial necessity the at A l a . R. a convenience. whether t r i e d by Civ. Melton the consent requiring entitled of the an easement by "failed by necessity, an parties t o show implication." C o u r t has s t a t e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r easements by and to P. court concluded that Melton law was I t i s apparent, This implication explaining: "Creation by necessity is actually a form of c r e a t i o n by i m p l i c a t i o n , b u t i s t r e a t e d s e p a r a t e l y by some a u t h o r s . See R. P o w e l l , P o w e l l on Real P r o p e r t y 55 4 1 0 - 1 1 (abr. ed. 1968). See also II A m e r i c a n Law o f P r o p e r t y §§ 8 . 3 1 - . 4 3 (A. C a s n e r e d . 1 9 5 2 ) ; R e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e Law o f P r o p e r t y §§ 4 7 4 - 7 6 (1944). "The rationale for allowing an easement by n e c e s s i t y i s t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y demands t h a t land n o t be r e n d e r e d u n u s a b l e . R. P o w e l l , s u p r a , 5 4 1 0 . U n d e r A l a b a m a l a w , h o w e v e r , t h e r e m u s t be a g e n u i n e n e c e s s i t y ; mere c o n v e n i e n c e i s n o t enough. B e n e d i c t v. L i t t l e , 288 A l a . 638 , 2 64 So. 2 d 4 91 (1 9 7 2 ) ; R o b e r t s v . M o n r o e , 261 A l a . 5 6 9 , 75 So. 2d 492 ( 1 9 5 4 ) ; B i r m i n g h a m T r u s t & S a v i n g s Co. v . M a s o n , 222 A l a . 3 8 , 130 So. 559 (1930 ) . The b u r d e n i s on t h e one s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e a s e m e n t t o p r o v e t h e easement i s ' r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y f o r the enjoyment' o f t h e l a n d . R o b e r t s v . M o n r o e , 261 A l a . 5 6 9 , 75 So. 2 d 492 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . E a s e m e n t s b y n e c e s s i t y a l m o s t a l w a y s i n v o l v e access roads across the s e r v i e n t tenement c o n n e c t i n g the dominant tenement to a p u b l i c road or highway. ... O r i g i n a l u n i t y of ownership of the d o m i n a n t and s e r v i e n t t e n e m e n t s i s a l w a y s required f o r an e a s e m e n t b y n e c e s s i t y . C r a w f o r d v . Tucker, 258 A l a . 6 5 8 , 64 So. 2d 411 (1953). "Easements created by implication cover a variety of t y p e s o f e a s e m e n t s . C r e a t i o n by this 18 any 1081096 method requires not only original unity of o w n e r s h i p , B r e w e r v . A v i n g e r , 208 A l a . 4 1 1 , 94 So. 590 ( 1 9 2 2 ) , b u t a l s o t h a t t h e u s e be o p e n , v i s i b l e , c o n t i n u o u s , and r e a s o n a b l y n e c e s s a r y t o t h e e s t a t e g r a n t e d . B i r m i n g h a m T r u s t & S a v i n g s Co. v . M a s o n , 222 A l a . 3 8 , 130 So. 559 ( 1 9 3 0 ) ; W a l k e r v . C l i f f o r d , 128 A l a . 67, 29 So. 588 ( 1 9 0 1 ) . The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i m p l i e d s u c h an e a s e m e n t b e c a u s e t h e g r a n t e e , h a v i n g s e e n t h e u s e t h e g r a n t o r made o f the p r o p e r t y , can r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t a c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e f o r m e r m a n n e r o f u s e . R. P o w e l l , s u p r a , 5 4 1 1 . " Helms also v. Tullis, 398 So. 2d at 2 5 5-56(emphasis H e r e f o r d v. Gingo-Morgan P a r k , 551 So. 2d added); 918, 921 see (Ala. 1989). Melton driveway testified across across 398 l o t 10A l o t 10B. Helms, So. r e p e a t e d l y about as However, 2d at opposed In to of the the gravel driveway convenience "mere 255. the convenience i s not enough." light of the e x i s t e n c e of a d o c u m e n t e d e a s e m e n t p r o v i d i n g M e l t o n a c c e s s t o l o t 9B o v e r l o t 1 0 B - - a l b e i t as a c t u a l l y u s e d t o d a y a l e s s e r e a s e m e n t t h a n what was initially that Melton driveway on satisfied did not l o t 10A the Furthermore, not granted--the establish was show trial that court access necessary; requirements of an easement r e g a r d i n g an e a s e m e n t b y the land that w h a t b e c a m e l o t 10A was used as a d r i v e of t e r m i n a t i n g the conveyance 19 to therefore, that the correctly lot concluded 9B Melton by implication, became M e l t o n ' s via the has not necessity. Melton d i d driveway or roadway at the unity of ownership. on time As 1081096 explained i n Helms, the grant of the property. the differing required to supra, proof with to e s t a b l i s h an e a s e m e n t b y t h e use must e x i s t C o n s e q u e n t l y , we regard at the time need not to the degree of an e a s e m e n t b y implication, of address necessity as o p p o s e d necessity. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED. Cobb, C . J . , and S t u a r t , B o l i n , 20 and Murdock, J J . , c o n c u r .

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