Lisa Hill Sledge, as personal representative of the estate of Tanesha E. Hill, deceased v. IC Corporation and International Truck and Engine Corporation

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
REL:04/02/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1080087 Lisa Hill Sledge, of as p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e s t a t e T a n e s h a E. H i l l , d e c e a s e d v. IC Corporation Appeal PER and I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r u c k and E n g i n e Corporation from Madison C i r c u i t (CV-07-370) Court CURIAM. This appeal by Lisa Hill Sledge, as personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e s t a t e o f T a n e s h a E. H i l l , d e c e a s e d , one of of a the plaintiffs below, follows the entry partial 1080087 summary judgment International numerous in Truck defendants favor and of Engine below. We 1 IC Corporation Corporation dismiss ("IC") ("ITEC"), the appeal and two as of being from a n o n f i n a l judgment. Facts On November 20, Samantha Horton, and Procedural 2006, T a n e s h a E. James Moore, Hill, Morgan bus i n w h i c h t h e y were p a s s e n g e r s c r a s h e d . of On natural a l l minors, the injuries she February 23, 2007, mothers and next personal representative parties, i n c l u d i n g the caused the the crash, school construction IC and bus, of ITEC, manufacture, the the and were the of driver of a vehicle owner o f the Sledge, sued s c h o o l bus, which companies responsible of the that the connected r o a d w a y on distribution the school through estate, contractors the a accident. w e l l as Tanesha's Carter, Tanesha d i e d as i n j u r e d minors, as Mitchell, Lakera i n j u r e d when s u s t a i n e d i n the friends, various the Deanna Danton W i l l i e , and result Harkey, History crash for school their as the numerous allegedly driver with occurred, the bus. of the and design, The T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n IC a n d I T E C i s u n c l e a r f r o m t h e record. At times, they are r e f e r r e d to c o l l e c t i v e l y under a s i n g l e name. 1 2 1080087 complaint sought theories of and Manufacturer's specifically partial July of was seat b e l t s legislatively Ala. Code Eddins 17, 2008, the Alabama Extended ("AEMLD"). Sledge ITEC f i l e d to and/or a joint a l l counts preempted cause as the as a interpreted Sales, I n c . , 491 motion alleging for a that by of action this So. those Court 2 d 942 by counts § the lack were 16-27-6, i n Dentson ( A l a . 1986). v. The r e l i e d i n p a r t on t h e e x p a n d e d a n s w e r s explaining school death. dangerous because of the arguing that & Lee Bus in as various products f o r passengers, 1975, under warranty, Doctrine IC and defective interrogatories defects ITEC damages f o r T a n e s h a ' s w r o n g f u l summary-judgment m o t i o n to and of of Liability sought IC breach violation summary j u d g m e n t s c h o o l bus against negligence, liability, On damages bus that were the based counts on the asserting following allegations: " [ T ] h e IC s c h o o l bus h a d an i n a d e q u a t e seatbelt reminder. The I C s c h o o l b u s h a d i n a d e q u a t e o c c u p a n t r e s t r a i n t systems f o r a l l occupants of the bus. The I C s c h o o l b u s was n o t c r a s h w o r t h y . The I C s c h o o l bus f a i l e d t o warn t h a t t h e bus p r o v i d e s l i t t l e o r no p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e e v e n t o f a r o l l o v e r o r s i d e impact c o l l i s i o n . " 3 1080087 The p l a i n t i f f s r e s p o n d e d t o t h e m o t i o n , and, the t r i a l IC and court entered ITEC contract, "with respect alleging that b r e a c h o f w a r r a n t y due passengers," such a partial theory p a s s e n g e r s e a t b e l t s and that pending of certified P. Sledge [IC either was claims to The warn affect defect in arising final pursuant or or in court any out of lack the of expressly of the other by [the] trial court [asserted] ITEC]." tort of seatbelts for of trial and appeals. hearing, defective to provide " [ d i d ] not j u d g m e n t as Civ. like." product against R. bus failure the [p]laintiffs the claim, ancillary as i t s decision claims any to i t s f a i l u r e such a summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r school the i n c l u d i n g "any defect stated to after The to Rule 54(b), Ala. 2 Discussion As trial a threshold court's 54(b) Rule matter, 54(b) certification nonfinal judgment Clarke-Mobile It court's 2 we must certification is invalid, that will not Dist. v. Counties appears that judgment. determine Gas only then Sledge 4 was whether the If a Rule valid. the judgment is support an appeal. Prior appeals Energy from Corp., the a 83 4 trial 1080087 So. 2d 88, 9 6 ( A l a . 2002). t h a t an o r d e r a p p e a l e d F u r t h e r , "'[w]hen i t i s determined from i s not a f i n a l judgment, i t i s the d u t y o f t h e C o u r t t o d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l ex mero m o t u . ' " Alabama E l e c . 344 Co., ( A l a . 2008) 293 In Court C o o p . v . New ( q u o t i n g P o w e l l v. A l a . 101, Scrushy examined Hope T e l e p h o n e v. 102, 300 Tucker, whether a So. Republic Nat'l 2d 359, So. 955 2d partial C o o p . , 7 So. 360 as final "'[F]or a Rule under Rule 54(b) 3d Life 988 Ins. ( A l a . 2006), summary judgment this on an Tucker, was 54(b): certification of f i n a l i t y to be effective, i t must f u l l y a d j u d i c a t e a t l e a s t one c l a i m o r f u l l y d i s p o s e o f t h e c l a i m s as t h e y r e l a t e t o a t l e a s t one p a r t y . ' H a y n e s v . A l f a F i n . C o r p . , 730 So. 2 d 1 7 8 , 181 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . "We f i r s t a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r T u c k e r ' s u n j u s t - e n r i c h m e n t c l a i m was a s e p a r a t e a n d distinct c l a i m t h a t was fully a d j u d i c a t e d by t h e partial summary j u d g m e n t . I n P r e c i s i o n A m e r i c a n Corp. v. L e a s i n g S e r v i c e Corp., 505 So. 2d 380 , 381 ( A l a . 1987), t h i s Court r e c o g n i z e d the d i f f i c u l t y of the q u e s t i o n b e f o r e us. "'The question before t h i s Court i s whether the partial summary judgment [Leasing Service Corp.] received completely d i s p o s e d o f a c l a i m s o as t o make t h a t judgment final. Rule 54(b) does not a u t h o r i z e t h e e n t r y o f f i n a l j u d g m e n t on p a r t o f a s i n g l e c l a i m . T o l s o n v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 732 F . 2 d 9 9 8 , 999 (D.C. C i r . 1 9 8 4 ) . 5 342, (1974)). u n j u s t - e n r i c h m e n t c l a i m a s s e r t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f , certifiable North 1080087 N e i t h e r f e d e r a l nor s t a t e c o u r t s have been able to settle on a single test to determine when claims are separate or exactly what constitutes a claim. See, T o l s o n , 732 F.2d a t 1001; C a t e s v. B u s h , 293 A l a . 5 3 5 , 307 So. 2d 6 ( 1 9 7 5 ) . H o w e v e r , authorities have stated that "when p l a i n t i f f i s s u i n g t o v i n d i c a t e one legal right and alleges several elements of d a m a g e , o n l y one claim i s presented and subdivision (b) [of rule 54] does not a p p l y . " 10 C. W r i g h t , A. M i l l e r , and M. Kane, F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e : C i v i l 2d, § 2657, at 69-71 (1 9 8 3 ) ; Landry v. G.B.A., 7 62 F.2d 4 6 2 , 464 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 8 5 ) . ' " F e d e r a l a u t h o r i t i e s have a l s o r e c o g n i z e d that the 'separate claim' question i s not e a s i l y resolved. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t s t a t e d i n Samaad[ v. C i t y o f D a l l a s , 940 F.2d 9 2 5 , 930 (5th C i r . 1991)]: " ' E v e n i f we a r e a b l e t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e n i c e l y b e t w e e n t h e l e g a l and d i s c r e t i o n a r y a s p e c t s of r u l e 54(b) judgments, a great d e a l of u n c e r t a i n t y nonetheless remains, f o r we m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e u n s e t t l e d question of what e x a c t l y i s a " c l a i m f o r r e l i e f . " The m o s t t h a t c a n be s a i d c o n f i d e n t l y a b o u t t h i s question i s that various courts focus upon d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s but are r e l u c t a n t to a r t i c u l a t e hard-and-fast tests. "'Nonetheless, certain points of agreement emerge from the cases. For instance, " [ i ] t i s clear that a claimant who p r e s e n t s a n u m b e r o f a l t e r n a t i v e l e g a l t h e o r i e s , but whose r e c o v e r y i s l i m i t e d t o o n l y one o f t h e m , h a s o n l y a s i n g l e c l a i m of relief f o r p u r p o s e s of R u l e 54(b)." P a g e [ v . P r e i s s e r ] , 585 F . 2 d [336] at 339 6 1080087 [ ( 8 t h C i r . 1978)] ( c i t i n g Edney v. F i d e l i t y & G u a r . L i f e I n s . Co., 348 F . 2 d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1965)). Although courts g e n e r a l l y a g r e e on t h e s e p o i n t s , t h e y do not f u l l y r e v e a l the c o n t o u r s of the phrase "claim for r e l i e f . " A n d we a r e r e l u c t a n t , at l e a s t i n t h i s c a s e , to r u s h i n where other courts f e a r to t r e a d . L i k e them, rather than attempting to formulate a g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e d e f i n i t i o n , we take n o t e o f t h e f o r e g o i n g " r u l e s o f thumb" and d e c i d e the case at hand.' "940 F.2d at 930-32 (footnotes omitted). The Seventh Circuit employed similar reasoning in S t e a r n s [ v . C o n s o l i d a t e d M a n a g e m e n t , I n c . , 747 F.2d 1105 (7th C i r . 1984)]: " ' U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e r e i s no c l e a r t e s t t o determine when c l a i m s are separate for purposes of the rule. Local P-171 [ A m a l g a m a t e d Meat C u t t e r s v. Thompson Farms C o . ] , 642 F . 2 d [ 1 0 6 5 ] a t 1070 [(7th C i r . 1981)]. N o n e t h e l e s s , we h a v e r e c o g n i z e d c e r t a i n r u l e s o f thumb t o i d e n t i f y those types of claims that can never be c o n s i d e r e d s e p a r a t e , and have e x a m i n e d t h e remainder on a c a s e - b y - c a s e basis. The first rule i s that "claims cannot be separate unless separate recovery is possible on each Hence, mere variations of legal theory do not constitute separate claims." 642 F . 2 d at 1 0 7 1 . ... ' "747 F.2d at 1108-09. "The United States Court of Appeals Second C i r c u i t enunciated the following R i e s e r v . B a l t i m o r e & O h i o R.R., 224 F . 2 d (2d C i r . 1 9 5 5 ) , t h a t the commentators i n P r a c t i c e & Procedure f i n d workable: 'The 7 f o r the test in 198, 199 Federal ultimate 1080087 d e t e r m i n a t i o n of m u l t i p l i c i t y of c l a i m s must r e s t i n e v e r y c a s e on w h e t h e r t h e u n d e r l y i n g f a c t u a l b a s e s for recovery s t a t e a number of d i f f e r e n t claims w h i c h c o u l d have been s e p a r a t e l y e n f o r c e d . ' The commentators then s t a t e : "'A s i n g l e c l a i m a n t p r e s e n t s m u l t i p l e claims for relief under the Second Circuit's f o r m u l a t i o n when t h e possible r e c o v e r i e s a r e m o r e t h a n one i n n u m b e r a n d not m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e or, s t a t e d another way, when t h e f a c t s g i v e r i s e t o m o r e t h a n one l e g a l r i g h t or cause of a c t i o n . ... H o w e v e r , when a c l a i m a n t p r e s e n t s a n u m b e r o f l e g a l t h e o r i e s , b u t w i l l be p e r m i t t e d t o r e c o v e r o n l y on one o f t h e m , t h e b a s e s f o r r e c o v e r y are m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e , or s i m p l y p r e s e n t e d i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , and p l a i n t i f f has only a single claim for r e l i e f for purposes of Rule 54(b). S i m i l a r l y , when p l a i n t i f f i s s u i n g t o v i n d i c a t e one legal right and alleges several elements of d a m a g e , o n l y one claim i s presented and s u b d i v i s i o n (b) d o e s n o t a p p l y . ' "10 C h a r l e s A l a n W r i g h t P r o c e d u r e § 2 6 5 7 (3d e d . Scrushy, 955 So. 2d a t 9 9 6 - 9 8 et a l . , Federal P r a c t i c e & 1998) (footnotes omitted)." (footnote omitted). parte National Ins. Underwriters, 1978) rise So. 2d 687, also Ex 689-90 ( A l a . ( h o l d i n g t h a t a " ' c l a i m ' r e f e r s to a set of f a c t s g i v i n g to theories The ITEC 366 See and legal of rights recovery complaint IC, in the claimant, b a s e d upon t h o s e alleges including several products 8 and not mere legal facts"). different liability counts (count against VIII), 1080087 n e g l i g e n c e and/or wanton conduct AEMLD (count X ) , and breach those counts maintain 1975, § 6-5-410, alleged White, but So. i n count (count X I ) . claims. f o r wrongful However, Sledge can and IC o n l y under A l a . a g a i n s t ITEC Code death, Instead, ofthe which XV o f t h e c o m p l a i n t . she Alabama specifically Power Co. v . 377 S o . 2 d 9 3 0 , 9 3 3 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) ( " [ I ] n A l a b a m a t h e r e i s one cause 1975, of warranty are not separate an a c t i o n (count I X ) , v i o l a t i o n of action f o r wrongful death, i . e . , [ A l a . ] Code § 6 - 5 - 4 1 0 . " ) ; s e e a l s o C a r t e r v . C i t y o f B i r m i n g h a m , 444 2 d 3 7 3 , 375 only a ( A l a . 1983) ( n o t i n g wrongful death action may that be punitive damages a r e r e c o v e r a b l e " ) . in case this wrongful-death instead, those underlying supra cannot be action counts Sledge's 3 maintained under § "under Alabama law maintained, Counts V I I I by 6-5-410, a r e "'mere v a r i a t i o n s single (quoting Stearns wrongful-death Sledge and only through outside A l a . Code XI a 1975; of legal theory'" claim, Scrushy, v . C o n s o l i d a t e d Mgmt., I n c . , 747 F . 2 d Under § 6-5-410, "[a] personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e may commence a n a c t i o n . . . f o r t h e w r o n g f u l a c t , o m i s s i o n , o r n e g l i g e n c e " t h a t caused the decedent's death, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e d e c e d e n t " c o u l d h a v e commenced an a c t i o n f o r s u c h w r o n g f u l act, omission, or n e g l i g e n c e i f i t had not caused death." (Emphasis added.) 3 9 1080087 1105, 1109 (7th C i r . 1984)), s e t o f damages f o r a l l . 84 ( A l a . 2007) only recoverable The of (noting trial and Sledge T r o t t v. B r i n k s , that, seat certified belts on one I n c . , 972 S o . 2 d 8 1 , damages"). as f i n a l IC and ITEC as t o a l l a l l e g a t i o n s passenger only i n a wrongful-death action, "the damages a r e p u n i t i v e court can recover the school 4 i t s judgment i n f a v o r related bus. to the lack Count IX of of the c o m p l a i n t makes a l l e g a t i o n s o f n e g l i g e n c e a n d w a n t o n n e s s b a s e d on a failure measures. bus was court's that the to safety and protection the p l a i n t i f f s ' explanation Given provide that the defective partial count because adequate i t lacked seat summary j u d g m e n t a p p e a r s in full. Similarly, count belts, lack would suggest of passenger that that restraints. count Thus, trial t o have d i s p o s e d o f X seeks AEMLD b a s e d o n t h e l a c k o f a d e q u a t e s a f e t y again, the school relates those damages under features that, solely two c o u n t s to the appear We s e e n o t h i n g i n t h e a r g u m e n t s b e f o r e u s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t Sledge i s also seeking damages of the nature found i n B e n e f i e l d v . A q u a s l i d e 'N' D i v e C o r p . , 406 S o . 2 d 873 ( A l a . 1981) ( i n w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f s o u g h t c o m p e n s a t o r y damages f o r breach of warranty to recover f o r the pain and m e d i c a l expenses s u f f e r e d by t h e decedent between t h e date of h i s i n j u r y and h i s d e a t h ) . 4 10 1080087 to be w h o l l y a d j u d i c a t e d by the t r i a l court's p a r t i a l summary judgment. Two part. the other Specifically, school unrelated alleges bus. Of t o remain pending i n c o u n t V I I I a l l e g e s 11 s e p a r a t e defects i n however, those, to the lack a breach references of counts, the dangerous, b e l t s and s u r v i v e d portions against of unsafe, with seat unrelated the t r i a l Sledge's alleged belts. of s u i t a b i l i t y Those XI and condition counts for the t o the lack of passenger court's original summary i n the t r i a l the entry judgment. wrongful-death c o u n t s I X a n d X a p p e a r t o be w h o l l y 54(b) does n o t a u t h o r i z e defects Count 5 and/or d e f e c t i v e of the bus. ITEC and IC r e m a i n p e n d i n g Although Rule dealt of the implied warranty most p a r t - - a l l e g e d e f e c t s Thus, some of passenger t h e "component p a r t s " seat appear of f i n a l action court. adjudicated, judgment on That p a r t i c u l a r count i n c l u d e d a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t e d t o "inadequate or i n s u f f i c i e n t materials f o r i t s reasonable foreseeable use and wear"; failure to provide "adequate i n s t r u c t i o n s and w a r n i n g s f o r s a f e use and o f t h e h a z a r d s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the design under reasonably foreseeable uses, l o a d s , and s t r e s s e s " ; " f a i l i n g t o a d e q u a t e l y and p r o p e r l y u n d e r t a k e and c a r r y out t e s t s and r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n i n g t h e use of passive restraint systems"; and "[d]esigning, manufacturing, distributing, marketing and selling a c o m m e r c i a l s c h o o l b u s a n d p a r t s t h a t w e r e i n a d e q u a t e t o manage the energy f o r c e s present i n a h i g h impact c o l l i s i o n . " 5 11 1080087 p a r t s of a claim--here, Sledge's wrongful-death claim. v. Alfa Rule F i n . Corp., 54(b) fully as American (Ala. So. certification adjudicate at claims 730 they Corp. 1987) v. 178, 181 ( A l a . 1999) o f f i n a l i t y t o be least relate 2d one claim or at least one to Leasing Serv. Haynes ("for effective, i t must f u l l y dispose Corp., party"); 505 So. 2d of 380, does not a u t h o r i z e the e n t r y of j u d g m e n t on p a r t o f a s i n g l e c l a i m . " (citing trial 732 F.2d 998, court's partial 999 (D.C. summary e n t r y o f a f i n a l j u d g m e n t a s t o one of the claims or judgment not on Sledge's available nonfinal Cobb, Parker, under judgment APPEAL parties," i . e . , because and 54(b); this i s due t o be Lyons, Woodall, the "direct the fewer i t d i d not claim, final Because not o r more b u t wrongful-death Rule did 381 T o l s o n v. U n i t e d C i r . 1984)). judgment the Precision ("Rule 54(b) States, a than a l l enter certification appeal i s thus from a is a dismissed. DISMISSED. C.J., and Murdock, and Stuart, Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . 12 Smith, Bolin,

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.