Lisa Dixon, as administratrix of the estate of Maurine Humphreys, deceased v. Hot Shot Express, Inc., and John Jenkins

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REL: 03/05/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e R e p o r t e r o f D e c i s i o n s , A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1070960 Lisa Dixon, as a d m i n i s t r a t r i x Humphreys, o f the e s t a t e o f Maurine deceased v. Hot Shot E x p r e s s , I n c . , and J o h n J e n k i n s Appeal MURDOCK, Humphreys, favor Court Justice. Lisa in from W a l k e r C i r c u i t (CV-03-191) Dixon, appeals administratrix from o f Hot Shot of the estate a judgment e n t e r e d Express, of Maurine on a j u r y verdict I n c . ("Hot S h o t " ) , and i t s 1070960 employee, John J e n k i n s , i n Dixon's wrongful-death action. We affirm. I. Hot Shot Facts i s an i n t e r s t a t e Pennsylvania. Jenkins, operator of trailer, as w e l l and a Jenkins Humphreys, made a a resident of Georgia, i s an "leased" h i s truck who a s h i s own s e r v i c e s i n o p e r a t i n g to began History m o t o r - c a r r i e r company b a s e d i n tractor-trailer trailer, effectively and P r o c e d u r a l a Hot Shot Hot Shot under long-term h i s employer. cross-country woman a hauling i n h e r 7 0 s who Jenkins for several years, decided trip. The j o u r n e y states before took passing them through lease Georgia 2002 , f o r Hot had been Alabama that In October trip Shot. friends through on t h e i r and the truck t o accompany J e n k i n s from owner- with on t h e numerous way b a c k t o Georgia. On portion November of discovered Jenkins and his U.S. that decided to continue tractor 2, 2002, Highway two tires to leave exited 78 in on a his trailer the t r a i l e r the journey without Jenkins Winfield, 2 Alabama, access and had blown o u t . i n Winfield f o rservice back to Georgia the t r a i l e r . limited w i t h Humphreys i n Jenkins and Humphreys 1070960 continued County. as traveling Testimony Jenkins he curve the applied in the was tractor-trailer. U.S. trial on the highway. his to brakes When he on lane the estate, filed Jenkins i n the Walker C i r c u i t Dixon, Carrier so, the as statute, § killed Court. entered testified 1 975, an The oncoming collision. Humphreys's Hot Thereafter, Shot Dixon contending and filed that the specifically 49 Federal Motor C a r r i e r preempt Alabama's 2 a hydroplaned, by against Regulations, Code fell approached truck side summary j u d g m e n t , Ala. he i n the action U.S.C. § 1 3 9 0 2 e t s e q . , 32-1-2, as a d m i n i s t r a t r i x of Safety rain Jenkins Jenkins Walker of oncoming t r a f f i c . C.F.R. § 3 9 2 . 1 4 , e n a c t e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e S a f e t y A c t , 49 and down through a heavy As 1 passenger wrongful-death for a partial Motor did right March Federal slow into a lane In a motion 2003, 78 indicated that H u m p h r e y s was a Highway decreased, center struck on speed l i m i t road. c r o s s i n g the truck at proceeded Carbon H i l l , that east concerning the guest duty Two witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t the heavy r a i n had ended s h o r t l y b e f o r e the a c c i d e n t , although J e n k i n s t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was s t i l l r a i n i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . 1 2 Section the 32-1-2, A l a . Code 1975, provides: "The o w n e r , o p e r a t o r o r p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o p e r a t i o n o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t be l i a b l e 3 1070960 Jenkins filed owed t o H u m p h r e y s . their Alabama's own motion guest regulations judgment in their court Jenkins's the denied motion, Regulations also as The content and, favor motion that Federal not things, granted there was "no Motor that preempted negligence and concluding the was other to Dixon's Dixon's that Humphreys the a c t i o n was tried Dixon of and among as a result, evidence, Jenkins seeking claim. Hot 49 guest requested C.F.R. § was a of statute applied before that a jury. the 392.14, At j u r y be which for Safety Jenkins's close charged provides, in as It and action. of the to the pertinent part: "Extreme c a u t i o n i n the o p e r a t i o n of a commercial motor v e h i c l e s h a l l be e x e r c i s e d when hazardous conditions, s u c h as those caused by snow, i c e , s l e e t , f o g , m i s t , r a i n , d u s t , o r smoke, a d v e r s e l y f o r l o s s o r damage a r i s i n g f r o m i n j u r i e s t o o r d e a t h of a g u e s t w h i l e b e i n g t r a n s p o r t e d w i t h o u t payment t h e r e f o r i n or upon s a i d motor v e h i c l e , r e s u l t i n g from the o p e r a t i o n t h e r e o f , u n l e s s such i n j u r i e s or d e a t h are caused by the w i l l f u l or wanton m i s c o n d u c t o f such o p e r a t o r , owner or p e r s o n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the o p e r a t i o n of s a i d motor v e h i c l e . " 4 The support in this the a and Carrier guest by Shot preempt the Alabama Guest Passenger S t a t u t e . " determined that, applied that proposition S h o t and f o r a summary j u d g m e n t c o n t e n d i n g statute federal trial I n r e s p o n s e , Hot 1070960 affect visibility or traction. r e d u c e d when s u c h c o n d i t i o n s e x i s become s u f f i c i e n t l y d a n g e r o u s , t h e c o m m e r c i a l m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l be s h a l l n o t be resumed u n t i l the v e h i c l e can be s a f e l y o p e r a t e d . " Dixon also requested "Under Alabama vehicle Carrier in in this Safety Department pursuant law, of to § pertinent no t h a t t h e j u r y be person state Speed s h a l l be t. I f conditions operation of the discontinued and commercial motor in may operate violation Regulations as Transportation." 32-9A-2(a)(1), of c h a r g e d as a commercial motor the Motor prescribed Dixon Ala. Code follows: Federal by requested 1975, the this which U.S. charge provides, part: " [ N ] o p e r s o n may o p e r a t e a c o m m e r c i a l m o t o r v e h i c l e i n t h i s s t a t e , or f a i l to m a i n t a i n r e q u i r e d records or reports, in violation of the federal motor c a r r i e r s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s as p r e s c r i b e d b y t h e U.S. Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n , 49 C.F.R. P a r t 107, P a r t s 171-180, P a r t s 382-384, and P a r t s 390-399 and a s t h e y may be amended i n t h e f u t u r e . Except as o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d h e r e i n , t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l n o t be construed to r e p e a l or supersede other laws r e l a t i n g to the o p e r a t i o n of motor v e h i c l e s . " The the trial court denied following explanation both requested on the charges, providing record: "THE COURT: ... I d o n ' t see anywhere i n the P a t t e r n J u r y c h a r g e s , and I had j u s t worn out b o t h v o l u m e s o f t h e m l a s t n i g h t , t h a t m e n t i o n s t h e -- I don't f i n d anything t h a t m e n t i o n s t h e -Pattern Jury charges, a single thing that mentions the Federal Motor C a r r i e r V e h i c l e Safety Regulations, 5 1070960 period. There i s nothing there. Now, I w i l l s a y t h i s : I t ' s not l e f t out because of that because Alabama has chosen t o i g n o r e a n y t h i n g t h e f e d e r a l government does b e c a u s e there are instances i n our Pattern Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s where they talk e x t e n s i v e l y about standards t h a t a r e s e t by f e d e r a l acts. ... [ T h i s ] [ l ] e a d s me t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t d o e s n ' t w a n t me c h a r g i n g on those [federal regulations]. "MR. S H I G L E Y [ D i x o n ' s c o u n s e l ] : I w o u l d s u g g e s t t h a t i t ' s an o v e r s i g h t . Y o u do h a v e a c o d e s e c t i o n that i n Alabama says i t ' s u n l a w f u l f o r them t o operate on t h e r o a d i n v i o l a t i o n of the Federal Motor C a r r i e r Safety R e g u l a t i o n s . "THE COURT: I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t , a n d t o me t h a t ' s further proof that t h e Supreme Court, who h a s approved these P a t t e r n J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n s and g i v e n t h e m t o u s dumb o l d j u d g e s , t r i a l c o u r t j u d g e s , t o p r o p e r l y c h a r g e t h e j u r i e s w i t h , t h e y d o n ' t want us bothered with i t . "I t h i n k t h a t b r i n g s us b a c k t o t h e a r g u m e n t s t h a t [ H o t S h o t a n d J e n k i n s ] w e r e m a k i n g e a r l i e r on in the case, which i s simply the f a c t that a person does n o t comply w i t h the Federal Motor C a r r i e r Safety Standards Act, the f a c t that they f a i l e d t o c o m p l y w i t h i t , i s n o t a -- i s n o t n e g l i g e n c e o r i s not wantonness. But the conduct that the person d o e s t h a t may a l s o b e a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F e d e r a l Regs. c o u l d r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f b e i n g n e g l i g e n c e o r wantonness. "So, t a k e a l l o f t h a t , c o u p l e i t w i t h t h e f a c t that there i s no m e n t i o n of the Federal Motor C a r r i e r S a f e t y R e g u l a t i o n s l e a d s me t o b e l i e v e t h a t I'm s i m p l y s u p p o s e d t o c h a r g e i n t h i s c a s e a s I would i n any a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t , and t h a t ' s where I s e e i t , a n d s o t h a t t h e n p u t s me t o m a k i n g a 6 1070960 fairly standard charge on the Guest Statute, w i l l f u l n e s s and wantonness, l e a v e out a l l s o r t s o f contrib[utory negligence], just like we g o t t w o f o l k s r i d i n g down t h e r o a d i n a c a r . " The guest trial statute court as charged the jury a c c o r d i n g t o Alabama's follows: "Now, let's t a l k about t h e i s s u e s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h i s case. E a r l y o n i n t h i s c a s e i t was determined t h a t on t h e o c c a s i o n of this motor v e h i c l e c o l l i s i o n M a u r i n e H u m p h r e y s was a g u e s t i n the motor v e h i c l e d r i v e n by John J e n k i n s . That d e t e r m i n a t i o n b r i n g s up t h e f o l l o w i n g : The d r i v e r o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e u p o n a p u b l i c h i g h w a y owes t o a guest i n the driver's vehicle the duty not to w i l l f u l l y or wantonly injure the guest. Such a driver i s not l i a b l e for negligently inflicting i n j u r y upon t h e g u e s t . "Now, I'm now g o i n g t o r e a d y o u a C o d e S e c t i o n out o f t h e Alabama Code. T h i s i s Code o f A l a b a m a , 1975, S e c t i o n 32-5A-170. 'No p e r s o n s h a l l d r i v e a v e h i c l e a t a speed g r e a t e r than i s r e a s o n a b l e and prudent under t h e c o n d i t i o n s and having r e g a r d t o the actual and p o t e n t i a l hazards then existing. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when a p p r o a c h i n g a n d c r o s s i n g an i n t e r s e c t i o n o r r a i l r o a d g r a d e c r o s s i n g , when a p p r o a c h i n g o r g o i n g a r o u n d a c u r v e when a p p r o a c h i n g a h i l l c r e s t , when t r a v e l i n g u p o n a n y n a r r o w o r w i n d i n g r o a d w a y , a n d when s p e c i a l hazards e x i s t with respect t o pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.' "Negligence i s the failure to discharge or perform a legal duty owed t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y . N e g l i g e n c e means t h e f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e o r d i n a r y c a r e ; t h a t i s , such c a r e as a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n w o u l d h a v e e x e r c i s e d u n d e r t h e same 7 1070960 or s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Therefore, negligence i s t h e f a i l u r e t o do w h a t a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t person would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or t h e doing o f something which a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n w o u l d n o t have done under t h e same o r s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " W a n t o n n e s s i s t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f some d u t y u n d e r k n o w l e d g e o f e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s and conscious t h a t from t h e doing o f such a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f such d u t y an i n j u r y w i l l l i k e l y or p r o b a b l y r e s u l t . B e f o r e a p a r t y can be s a i d t o be g u i l t y o f w a n t o n c o n d u c t , i t must b e shown t h a t with reckless indifference t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s he either consciously and intentionally d i d some w r o n g f u l a c t o r c o n s c i o u s l y o m i t t e d some k n o w n d u t y which produced the i n j u r y . II " W i l l f u l n e s s means i n t e n t i o n a l l y , k n o w i n g l y , purposefully. Therefore, willfulness i s c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f some under knowledge o f e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s coupled a design or purpose t o i n f l i c t i n j u r y . and the duty with "The plaintiff claims the defendant, John Jenkins, w i l l f u l l y or wantonly operated a motor v e h i c l e he was d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c o l l i s i o n t h a t i s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s l a w s u i t , and t h a t h i s willfulness or wantonness p r o x i m a t e l y caused the d e a t h o f M a u r i n e Humphreys. The d e f e n d a n t i n answer to the p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint denies t h a t he was w i l l f u l o r w a n t o n a n d d e n i e s t h a t he b r o u g h t about the death o f M a u r i n e Humphreys. "This presents f o r your determination the f o l l o w i n g : Was t h e d e f e n d a n t , J o h n J e n k i n s , g u i l t y of willfulness or wantonness as c l a i m e d b y t h e plaintiff? I f s o , was such willfulness or wantonness o f John J e n k i n s the proximate cause o f t h e d e a t h o f M a u r i n e Humphreys as c l a i m e d ? " 8 1070960 Following court's failure Motor the Carrier charge, Dixon to instruct Safety the again o b j e c t e d to the jury r e g a r d i n g the Regulations. After d e l i b e r a t i o n s , the j u r y asked a q u e s t i o n about the between further willfulness instructed and wantonness, the j u r y and in pertinent the part as trial Federal initial distinction trial court follows: "Now, our Guest S t a t u t e we f o l l o w u n d e r t h e G u e s t S t a t u t e i n t h i s c a s e , a n d t h e -- h e r e i s t h e o b l i g a t i o n o f a d r i v e r o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e t o someone who i s a g u e s t i n t h e v e h i c l e w i t h h i m . Now, the g u e s t i s s o m e o n e who i s n o t p a y i n g t o r i d e , who i s s o m e o n e t h a t ' s j u s t b e e n i n v i t e d t o go a l o n g . The d r i v e r o f a m o t o r v e h i c l e u p o n a p u b l i c h i g h w a y owes a guest i n the d r i v e r ' s vehicle a duty not to w i l l f u l l y or wantonly i n j u r e the guest. That's two l e v e l s of c u l p a b i l i t y . I w i l l e x p l a i n them t o you in a minute. "The n e x t s e n t e n c e o f t h a t r u l e s a y s t h i s : Such a d r i v e r i s not l i a b l e f o r n e g l i g e n t l y inflicting i n j u r y u p o n a g u e s t . ... fi "Negligence i s the failure to d i s c h a r g e or p e r f o r m a l e g a l d u t y owed t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y . I ' l l go into a little b i t more detail on that. N e g l i g e n c e means t h e f a i l u r e t o e x e r c i s e r e a s o n a b l e o r d i n a r y c a r e ; t h a t i s , s u c h c a r e as a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n w o u l d h a v e e x e r c i s e d u n d e r t h e same or s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e r e f o r e , n e g l i g e n c e i s the f a i l u r e t o do w h a t a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n would have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the doing of something which a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n w o u l d n o t have done under the same o r s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ... 9 1070960 "... The n e x t Statute i f a person the p l a i n t i f f cannot a l lright. So u n d e r t h e G u e s t i s g u i l t y of negligence, then recover. "The n e x t l e v e l o f c u l p a b i l i t y i s w a n t o n n e s s . Now, again, l o o k i n g at the Guest Statute, the plaintiff can only recover i f the defendant i s g u i l t y o f wanton conduct or w i l l f u l conduct, doesn't have t o be b o t h . I n f a c t , t h e y ' r e n o t t h e same. A n d l e t me e x p l a i n t h a t t o y o u a g a i n . " I am g o i n g t o g i v e a c h a r g e t h a t I d i d n o t g i v e i n i t i a l l y . I t ' s [Alabama P a t t e r n J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n ] 29.01. W i l l f u l n e s s and wantonness distinguished. Now, w a n t o n n e s s i s t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t or t h e o m i s s i o n o f some d u t y u n d e r k n o w l e d g e o f existing c o n d i t i o n s and c o n s c i o u s that from the d o i n g o f s u c h a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f s u c h i n j u r y -- I'm s o r r y , or o m i s s i o n o f such duty, i n j u r y w i l l likely o r p r o b a b l y r e s u l t . L e t me r e a d t h a t t o y o u a g a i n . W a n t o n n e s s i s t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t o r t h e omission o f some duty under the knowledge of existing c o n d i t i o n s and c o n s c i o u s that from the d o i n g of such a c t or o m i s s i o n o f such duty injury w i l l l i k e l y or probably r e s u l t . " W i l l f u l n e s s i s t h e c o n s c i o u s d o i n g o f some a c t o r o m i s s i o n o f some d u t y u n d e r k n o w l e d g e o f e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s accompanied by a design or purpose of inflicting injury." Following verdict i n favor contending jury further that concerning deliberations, of Hot Shot the t r i a l the duty the jury and J e n k i n s . court Jenkins 10 erroneously returned Dixon appeals, instructed owed H u m p h r e y s . a the 1070960 II. Standard of Review " ' " ' [ A ] n i n c o r r e c t o r m i s l e a d i n g c h a r g e may b e the basis f o r the granting o f a new t r i a l . ' " ' G e o r g e H. L a n i e r M e m ' l H o s p . v . A n d r e w s , 8 0 9 S o . 2 d 8 0 2 , 8 0 6 ( A l a . 2 0 0 1 ) ( q u o t i n g K i n g v . W.A. B r o w n & S o n s , I n c . , 5 8 5 S o . 2 d 1 0 , 12 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) ( c i t a t i o n omitted)). 'When a n o b j e c t i o n t o a j u r y c h a r g e h a s b e e n p r o p e r l y p r e s e r v e d f o r r e v i e w o n a p p e a l , ... we " ' l o o k t o t h e e n t i r e t y of t h e [ j u r y ] charge t o see i f t h e r e was r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r , ' " a n d r e v e r s a l i s warranted only i f the error i s p r e j u d i c i a l . ' George H. L a n i e r M e m ' l H o s p . , 8 0 9 S o . 2 d a t 807 (quoting K i n g , 585 So. 2 d a t 1 2 ) . " B a l d w i n County E l e c . Membership Corp. v. C i t y o f Fairhope, So. 2 d 448, 459 (Ala. 2008). III. Dixon properly contends prescriptions further Alabama's standard argues the t r i a l jury that court by not § 392.14 the trial erred in failing guest statute, the state prejudicial Motor law concerning of care that Federal § 32-1-2, the i t scharges. She into court should not the types her errors case in because 11 of the under Regulations of breaches instructing have 1975, because, Safety f o r w h i c h a p a r t y may b e h e l d these to A l a . Code Carrier to incorporating t h e j u r y as t o wantonness and/or w i l l f u l n e s s argues, preempt the Analysis o f 49 C.F.R. contends instructed she that instruct 99 9 of the liable. the stark jury Dixon were difference 1070960 between and the "extreme caution" the wanton and/or willful s t a n d a r d i n 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 s t a n d a r d i n § 3 2 - 1 - 2 , A l a . Code 1975. We cannot instruct rather and agree the j u r y than on wantonness. correct there response that the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by r e f u s i n g on t h e p r e s c r i p t i o n s Alabama's common-law Hot and Shot against concepts Jenkins's to Dixon's p o s i t i o n . i s a presumption o f 49 C.F.R. § As of 392.14, willfulness brief they f i r s t makes the explain, preemption: "The a p p e l l a n t contends t h a t Alabama's Guest Passenger Statute i s preempted by 49 C.F.R. § 392.14. Any p r e e m p t i o n a n a l y s i s b e g i n s f i r s t w i t h the presumption against preemption. The United States Supreme Court has clearly mandated that 'preemption of s t a t e law by Federal statute or regulation i s not favored " i n the absence of pervasive reasons e i t h e r that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other c o n c l u s i o n , or that Congress has u n m i s t a k a b l y so o r d a i n e d . " ' C o m m o n w e a l t h E d i s o n Co. v . M o n t a n a , 453 U.S. 6 0 9 , 6 3 4 , 101 S . C t . 2 9 4 6 , 2 9 6 2 , 69 L . E d . 2 d 884 (1981) ( q u o t i n g C h i c a g o & N.W. T r a n s p . Co. v . K a l o B r i c k & T i l e Co., 450 U.S. 3 1 1 , 3 1 7 , 101 S . C t . 1124, 1130, 67 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1981)). There is a presumption 'that Congress did not intend to d i s p l a c e s t a t e l a w . ' M a r y l a n d v . L o u i s i a n a , 451 U.S. 7 2 5 , 7 4 6 , 101 S. C t . 2 1 1 4 , 2 1 2 9 , 68 L. E d . 2 d 576 (1981). Indeed, c o u r t s are i n s t r u c t e d to 'start w i t h the assumption t h a t the h i s t o r i c p o l i c e powers of t h e s t a t e s w e r e n o t t o be s u p e r s e d e d by the F e d e r a l A c t u n l e s s t h a t was t h e c l e a r a n d m a n i f e s t purpose of Congress.' C i t y o f B u r b a n k v. Lockheed Air T e r m i n a l , 411 U.S. 624 , 6 4 3 , 93 S . C t . 1854 12 to 1070960 (1973) ( q u o t i n g , R i c e v . S a n t a Fe E l e v a t o r Corp., 331 U.S. 218 , 230 , 67 S. C t . 1 1 4 6 , 91 L. E d 1 4 4 7 (1947))." Hot Shot As Circuit and J e n k i n s ' s the United has brief, States a t 11-12 Court (emphasis of Appeals added). f o r the Fourth explained: "The p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h p r e e m p t i o n may a r i s e ... may b e s u m m a r i z e d a s f o l l o w s : f i r s t , when a c t i n g w i t h i n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s , C o n g r e s s has e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d an i n t e n t i o n to preempt there i s preemption; second, though i t has not expressly preempted a field or an i d e n t i f i a b l e portion thereof, preemption e x i s t s i f C o n g r e s s h a s a d o p t e d a 'scheme o f f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n ... s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e t o make r e a s o n a b l e the i n f e r e n c e t h a t C o n g r e s s l e f t n o r o o m ... f o r s u p p l e m e n t a r y s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n ; ' a n d f i n a l l y , 'where t h e f i e l d i s one i n w h i c h " t h e f e d e r a l i n t e r e s t i s so dominant t h a t t h e f e d e r a l s y s t e m w i l l be assumed t o p r e c l u d e e n f o r c e m e n t o f s t a t e l a w s o n t h e same subject,"' o r 'when " c o m p l i a n c e w i t h b o t h f e d e r a l and s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n i s a p h y s i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y , " ' t h e r e w i l l be p r e e m p t i o n . [ H i l l s b o r o u g h C o u n t y v. Automated M e d i c a l L a b o r a t o r i e s , 4 7 1 U.S. 7 0 7 , 7 1 3 , 105 S. C t . 2 3 7 1 , 2 3 7 5 , 85 L . E d . 2 d 7 1 4 , 7 2 1 (1985)]. I n a p p l y i n g these p r i n c i p l e s , though, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o b e a r i n m i n d t h a t 'where t h e s t a t e ' s p o l i c e power i s i n v o l v e d , p r e e m p t i o n w i l l n o t be presumed.' C h r y s l e r C o r p . v . R h o d e s , 416 F . 2 d 3 1 9 , 324, n. 8 ( 1 s t C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) . " Specialized 1152, Carriers & Rigging Ass'n 1155 ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) ( e m p h a s i s Levine, [No. 0 6 - 1 2 4 9 , March added) . 4, 2 0 0 9 ] 13 v. V i r g i n i a , 795 F . 2 d See a l s o Wyeth v . U.S. , , 129 1070960 S.Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009) ("'[I]n a l l pre-emption cases, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those i n which Congress has " l e g i s l a t e d a field which t h e S t a t e s have t r a d i t i o n a l l y " s t a r t with the assumption the that o c c u p i e d , " ... we t h a t t h e h i s t o r i c p o l i c e powers o f S t a t e s were n o t t o be s u p e r s e d e d by t h e F e d e r a l A c t u n l e s s was t h e c l e a r Hot that ... i n Shot Dixon preempts correctly, occupy and m a n i f e s t purpose and J e n k i n s b e g i n t h e i r has not argued state law. that Hot why o n e c a n n o t of commercial analysis 49 C.F.R. Shot and by of safety explaining § 392.14 Jenkins then conclude that Congress completely the f i e l d operation of Congress."'"). expressly contend, intended "to regulations" f o rthe vehicles: " D i x o n h a s n o t a r g u e d t h a t 49 C.F.R. § 3 9 2 . 1 4 expressly preempts state law. Nor would this p o s i t i o n f i n d any s u p p o r t . W h i l e t h e r e g u l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n was a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e M o t o r C a r r i e r S a f e t y Act, 49 U.S.C. § 2 5 0 1 e t s e q . , C o n g r e s s made c l e a r t h a t t h e A c t d i d not i n t e n d t o c o m p l e t e l y preempt supplementary state r e g u l a t i o n . In Section 206(c)(2) of the A c t , which authorizes the promulgation of f e d e r a l s a f e t y r e g u l a t i o n s f o r motor v e h i c l e s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e S e c r e t a r y was d i r e c t e d , b e f o r e i s s u i n g a n y r e g u l a t i o n s , t o ' c o n s i d e r ... (B) S t a t e l a w s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s p e r t a i n i n g t o commercial motor v e h i c l e safety i n order to minimize unnecessary preemption of s u c h S t a t e laws and r e g u l a t i o n s under t h i s A c t . ' C o n g r e s s a l s o p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n s 2 5 0 6 a n d 2 5 0 7 , 49 U.S.C., a method under which State laws and r e g u l a t i o n s c o u l d be r e v i e w e d , u n d e r a r u l e - m a k i n g 14 1070960 procedure, f o r c o m p a t i b i l i t y with the federal A c t . I t f u r t h e r i n S e c t i o n 2 3 0 2 , 49 U.S.C., authorized f i n a n c i a l grants to the States f o r 'the development or i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f programs f o r t h e enforcement o f Federal rules, regulations, s t a n d a r d s and o r d e r s a p p l i c a b l e t o c o m m e r c i a l motor v e h i c l e s a f e t y and c o m p a t i b l e S t a t e r u l e s , r e g u l a t i o n s , s t a n d a r d s , and orders.' Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that '[u]nquestionably, these Sections demonstrate, not only that Congress d i d not intend to occupy completely the f i e l d of safety regulations f o rthe operation on interstate highways of commercial vehicles but also that i tcontemplated the continued application and enforcement of State rules or regulations which might n o t be i n c o n s i s t e n t or "incompatible" with federal regulations.' Specialized Carriers & Rigging [Ass'n] v. C o m m o n w e a l t h o f V i r g i n i a , 795 F . 2 d 1 1 5 2 , 1 1 5 6 ( 4 t h C i r . 1986)." Hot Shot and J e n k i n s ' s brief, As for preemption, implied acknowledge that and federal McGee correctly note Hot (emphasis Shot added). and Jenkins i m p l i e d p r e e m p t i o n can a r i s e where s t a t e l a w law a c t u a l l y Corp., a t 1 2 - 1 3 n.1 464 that U.S. conflict, 238 (1 984 ) . citing Hot Silkwood Shot and v. KerrJenkins such " ' a c t u a l c o n f l i c t ' ' a r i s e s e i t h e r where s i m u l t a n e o u s compliance with both state and f e d e r a l law i s i m p o s s i b l e , F l o r i d a Lime & Avocado Growers v. P a u l , 373 U.S. 1 3 2 , 1 4 2 - 4 3 , 83 S. C t . 1 2 1 0 , 1 2 1 7 - 1 8 , 10 L. E d . 2 d 248 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , o r w h e r e s t a t e l a w s t a n d s a s a n obstacle to accomplishment of the f e d e r a l purpose. S i l k w o o d , s u p r a , 464 U.S. a t 2 4 8 , 104 S. C t . a t 6 2 1 . Furthermore, i n order to j u s t i f y a f i n d i n g of 15 1070960 i m p l i e d p r e e m p t i o n , t h e a c t u a l c o n f l i c t m u s t be a 'sharp' c o n f l i c t . B o y l e v . U n i t e d T e c h . C o r p . , 487 U.S. 5 0 0 , 108 S. C t . 2 5 1 0 , 2 5 1 5 , 101 L. E d . 2 d 442 (1988)." Hot Shot and J e n k i n s ' s brief, a t 12-13. Hot then proceed to e x p l a i n that the Federal Act and 49 C.F.R. § 3 9 2 . 1 4 do Shot and Motor not c o n f l i c t Jenkins Carrier with Safety Alabama law: "While v i o l a t i o n s of the F e d e r a l Motor C a r r i e r S a f e t y R e g u l a t i o n s can l e a d t o the r e v o c a t i o n of a c a r r i e r ' s o p e r a t i n g a u t h o r i t y , can p l a c e a d r i v e r out of s e r v i c e , or can l e a d t o the s u s p e n s i o n of a driver's c o m m e r c i a l d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e (see, e.g., § 3 2 - 9 A - 4 , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 ) , t h e r e g u l a t i o n s g i v e no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d t o preempt any o f the t r a d i t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s of s t a t e law w i t h r e s p e c t to tort l i a b i l i t y . Nor i s any c o n f l i c t a p p a r e n t between Section 392.14 and the Alabama Guest Passenger Statute." Hot Shot and Hot Shot to fulfill to tort issue Jenkins's and liability speaks driving create Jenkins's a t 15-16 argument (emphasis i s well added). taken. Failing a f e d e r a l r e g u l a t o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y does not e q u a t e to commercial motor is brief, under the s t a t e law. The f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n at responsibility the operator v e h i c l e owes t o e v e r y o n e w h i l e i n "hazardous c o n d i t i o n s . " I t does a cause of a c t i o n f o r the f a i l u r e 16 the of operator not purport to exercise a to "extreme 1070960 caution" i n "hazardous c o n d i t i o n s , " and D i x o n has d i r e c t e d us t o no p r o v i s i o n o f t h e f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n s conduct t h a t mandates such a c o n c l u s i o n . regulation As noted, analysis, intent. the at issue does n o t c o n f l i c t the overarching as i n any s t a t u t o r y We note regulation Motor C a r r i e r Safety Jenkins's As s u c h , t h e f e d e r a l with concern Alabama in t o r t law. any p r e e m p t i o n interpretation, i s legislative the above-described i n question, governing field the fact that of operation neither the for Federal A c t n o r t h e f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n makes any mention of r e p l a c i n g state t o r t - l a w standards f o r l i a b i l i t y to third parties with federal standards, Motor C a r r i e r Safety Act, instead, regulations furtherance limited law in so as " t o m i n i m i z e pertaining conclude the adopted that the the Federal "clear of unnecessary Rice Motor Carrier and m a n i f e s t "historic establishing citizens. expressly standards police for tort v . S a n t a Fe E l e v a t o r (1947). 17 Act safety. Safety of of We Act be state cannot reflects of Congress" to the states" in liability Corp., the should preemption" purpose powers that p r o v i d e s t h a t any the to commercial-motor-vehicle requisite preempt and t h e f a c t among 331 U.S. their 2 1 8 , 230 1070960 In addition, application with or i n c o m p a t i b l e regulatory portion of Act with law § of Absent state trial charge definitions court's on a of i s nothing i n the for to truck that this Safety Congress limitations to to Carrier conclude drivers and relevance Motor tort-law that defenses various of the who persons on are vehicles. the t r i a l with There Federal Conclusion f e d e r a l p r e e m p t i o n , we court's the the cause suggests a preemption i n the commercial as t o w h e t h e r accordance 392.14. regulation eliminate in their how i s based limits Of more s p e c i f i c IV. the demonstrate s t a t u t e , which providing basis federal to liability guests i s no the intended to i n m o t o r v e h i c l e s , w o u l d be i n c o n s i s t e n t to l i a b i l i t y . there or guest scheme t h a t state exceptions case, failed s t a t e i n t e r e s t and w h i c h s i m p l y of passengers federal has of Alabama's legitimate action Dixon of court properly relating law. and We judgment. 18 question charged the j u r y . to Alabama's wantonness Alabama s e e no s i g n i f i c a n t guest willfulness therefore The statute were affirm the and a l l in trial 1070960 AFFIRMED. Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, concur. Lyons, J . , concurs specially. Cobb, C . J . , d i s s e n t s . 19 Parker, and Shaw, J J . , 1070960 LYONS, J u s t i c e (concurring I concur f u l l y note the specially). i n t h e main o p i n i o n . distinction between decision i n Weatherspoon 1081131, February v. this case Tillery 12, 2010] against a motor claims were Administration Termination preempted Authorization of § political subdivision of a State, a 14501(c)(1), law, r e g u l a t i o n , or other effect claims this judgment were The as Secretary Federal 1994 which claims because Aviation and provides: In the ICC B a s e d on t h e "a State, [or] ... may n o t e n a c t o r e n f o r c e p r o v i s i o n having route, the force or service and o f any Court i n Weatherspoon a f f i r m e d t h e t r i a l based on i t s h o l d i n g that the p l a i n t i f f ' s preempted. parties i n this regarding case, of of law r e l a t e d to a price, motor c a r r i e r , " court's of property, A c t o f 1 9 9 5 , 49 U.S.C. § 1 4 5 0 1 ( c ) . language I n c . , [Ms. (Ala. 2010). the Act Court's the p l a i n t i f f ' s carrier under this Shop, So. 3d court dismissed the and Body Weatherspoon, the t r i a l the defendant, I write specially to a c t i o n have n o t r a i s e d any argument preemption under § 14501(c). t h e main of opinion notes, Transportation, 20 in Additionally, i n this Congress directed prescribing 49 the C.F.R. 1070960 § 392.14--the jury r e g u l a t i o n upon w h i c h instruction--to consider Dixon based her "State laws and regulations commercial motor v e h i c l e s a f e t y , to minimize t h e i r preemption." 49 U.S.C. Congress included governed our presented Weatherspoon. in the main Based language in i n Weatherspoon, relate excluded 31136(c)(2)(B) such analysis there expressly no § by on to safety the the foregoing opinion. 21 (emphasis the nor on unnecessary added). statutes did that the issues a matter considerations, statutes requested under review distinctions, I in concur 1070960 COBB, C h i e f Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. court's Code charge based do of provided 49 C.F.R. hold the jury with § give that the 392.14, nor the appropriate of the guest do I case. contents of contend that that to be a Maurine standard proximate cause Humphrey's of death. of care regulation Jenkins that resulted i n opinion, citing f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n s a n d A l a . Code 1975, § 3 2 - 9 A - 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) , c l e a r t h a t our l e g i s l a t u r e s , both s t a t e and f e d e r a l , that the operation more dangerous case, i s the operation instrumentality than recognize the usual Not surprisingly, because vehicles much more complex and of care f o r operating automobiles, makes o f a much l a r g e r automobile. are the o f a c o m m e r c i a l motor v e h i c l e , such as t h e truck tractor i n this and are i n s u c h a manner as the accident The m a j o r i t y that Rather, n e c e s s a r y t o t h e j u r y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f whether John violated the appropriate I statute i n r i s e t o a new c a u s e o f a c t i o n . the trial statute, Ala. a just verdict i n this federal preemption regulation should would on A l a b a m a ' s g u e s t on w h i c h t o r e a c h not advocate favor I solely 1975, § 32-1-2, information I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t the standard 22 private commercial lethal than a motor personal commercial 1070960 motor vehicle is higher than the operating a personal automobile. following requirement of the standard of Thus, f e d e r a l care for l a w makes the operator: "Extreme c a u t i o n i n the o p e r a t i o n of a commercial m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l be e x e r c i s e d when hazardous conditions, such as those c a u s e d by snow, i c e , s l e e t , f o g , m i s t , r a i n , d u s t , o r smoke, a d v e r s e l y affect visibility or t r a c t i o n . Speed s h a l l be r e d u c e d when s u c h c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t . I f c o n d i t i o n s become s u f f i c i e n t l y d a n g e r o u s , t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e c o m m e r c i a l m o t o r v e h i c l e s h a l l be d i s c o n t i n u e d and s h a l l n o t be resumed u n t i l the commercial motor v e h i c l e can be s a f e l y o p e r a t e d . " Negligence standard of care circumstances as t h e always turns i s breached of prudent situation; any conduct that established to protect others harm Black's Law of case, context statute turns negligently, prescribed person this would have whether which can of the standard below the be i n which determined the i s defined legal (8th ed. operating tractor was risk the the i f one to similar 2004). of be of In guest tractor knows the operated. That i s , I b e l i e v e t h a t the j u r y s h o u l d have been p e r m i t t e d 23 a standard unreasonable only and of care t h a t a c h i e v i n g the purpose was facts exercised in a against Jenkins applicable Negligence D i c t i o n a r y 1061 on manner case. falls the context to e x e r c i s e the reasonably the whether i n the the p a r t i c u l a r "[t]he failure on to 1070960 assess of Jenkins's the standard tractor trial was r e q u i r e d by extreme court should imposed failure Jenkins verdict, be at the guest on Jenkins instructed l a w t o be the Thus, time of i n operating I would h o l d the jury operating the statute i n that accident. that therefore the jury had the judgment reversed. 24 no proper entered on light the that Jenkins the t r a c t o r The t o i n f o r m t h e j u r y as t o what t h e l a w meant and have federal caution court's should the law under at the time of the accident. the of negligence with trial required basis fori t s that verdict

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