1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, Alabama, a municipal corporation
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
REL:03/05/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1070531 1568 Montgomery Highway, I n c . v. City o f Hoover, a m u n i c i p a l Appeal corporation from J e f f e r s o n C i r c u i t (CV-05-223) Court On A p p l i c a t i o n f o r R e h e a r i n g BOLIN, Justice. The following opinion opinion o f September 11, 2009, i s withdrawn, and t h e i ssubstituted therefor. 1070531 The defendant, "Nancy's Nook," (hereinafter 1568 "Nancy's "Love challenge. Love January Stuff S t u f f was § 14, i n the an appeals We and Hoover m u n i c i p a l and/or "Love Stuff" from code. Code trial 1975, court's against a affirm. History Hoover Jefferson which the the 2005, "adult-only Act"), d/b/a Procedural C i t y of Circuit Court e n t e r p r i s e " and Obscenity Enforcement Act, ("the Inc., Stuff," 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) , A l a . Code 1975, 1975 Highway, 13A-12-200.2, A l a . Facts On Love Stuff") judgment u p h o l d i n g § constitutional Montgomery had § a part ("Hoover") sued a l l e g i n g that Love that Section been violated of the Alabama A n t i - 13A-12-200.1 et also i t had seq., incorporated 13A-12-200.5(4) Ala. into provides: "(4) I t s h a l l be u n l a w f u l f o r any p e r s o n to o p e r a t e an a d u l t b o o k s t o r e , a d u l t m o v i e h o u s e , a d u l t v i d e o s t o r e , or o t h e r form of a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e w i t h i n 1,000 f e e t of a church, p l a c e of w o r s h i p , church bookstore, public park, public housing p r o j e c t , daycare c e n t e r , p u b l i c or p r i v a t e s c h o o l , college, recreation center, skating rink, video a r c a d e , p u b l i c swimming p o o l , p r i v a t e r e s i d e n c e , or any o t h e r p l a c e f r e q u e n t e d by m i n o r s . Any p e r s o n who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a m i s d e m e a n o r a n d , u p o n c o n v i c t i o n , s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by a f i n e o f n o t more t h a n t e n t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ) a n d may a l s o be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e c o u n t y j a i l f o r n o t m o r e t h a n one year." 2 Code the 1070531 Hoover f u r t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t Love S t u f f i s l o c a t e d w i t h i n 1,000 feet play¬ of 2 grounds, Hoover 50 of private sought operating Act places a worship, a residences, judgment an " a d u l t - o n l y day-care and 3 declaring center, apartment that 2 complexes. Love Stuff e n t e r p r i s e " w i t h i n the meaning of the and t h a t Love S t u f f had v i o l a t e d § 13A-12-200.5(4) Hoover m u n i c i p a l code. of constitutes the business abatement On count of the March seeking violation request Stuff of 4, It further a and t h e alleged that the operation nuisance, and i t sought 2005, Hoover a judgment the law operating amended declaring i t s complaint that i f i t granted Love Hoover a l l e g e d in violation of § Hoover t o add would Stuff's that, a violation Love affirmative Stuff in defenses; i t also contended that enterprise," in pending Love 13A-12-200.5(4), "the business an a n s w e r a n d filed the term "other a t h e t e r m was 3 asserted counterclaim. form of a s s e t o u t i n § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) , was t h e A c t and t h a t a of the law." On M a r c h 9, 2 0 0 5 , L o v e S t u f f f i l e d certain be because i s s u a n c e o f a s i g n p e r m i t b y [ H o o v e r ] f o r an u n l a w f u l w o u l d be an nuisance. f o r a sign permit. was was adult-only not defined u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague and 1070531 overly broad under the Constitutions. Love Stuff customers" Alabama "on and behalf alleged i n i t scounterclaim United itself of States and i t s t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y ban on t h e s a l e o f s e x u a l a i d s a t § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) t h r o u g h was a violation Constitution 1901. of the Ninth Amendment and A r t . I , § 36, o f t h e Alabama Love S t u f f a d o p t e d by r e f e r e n c e 12-200.2(a)(1) federal Stuff court also The that had been i n Williams sought Alabama t o compel challenge filed "other vague C o n s t i t u t i o n of the challenge No. t o § 13A- General i n the 9 8-S-1938-NE. the issuance was of a sign notified Love 1 permit. of the to the A c t . On J u n e 3 0 , 2 0 0 5 , L o v e S t u f f f i l e d on States by t h e p l a i n t i f f s v. P r y o r , Attorney constitutional judgment to the United (3) i t s counterclaims, a m o t i o n f o r a summary asserting that the phrase f o r m o f a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e " was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a n d o v e r l y b r o a d ; t h a t t h e b a n on s e x u a l 12-200.2 was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; and compelled to issue the sign permit. general filed briefs in opposition that aids Hoover i n § 13Ashould be Hoover and t h e a t t o r n e y to the motion. On The i n i t i a l d e c i s i o n by t h e f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court i n t h i s e x t e n d e d l i t i g a t i o n i s p u b l i s h e d a t 41 F. S u p p . 2 d 1257 (N.D. A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . T h i s l i n e o f l i t i g a t i o n i s d i s c u s s e d i n f r a . 1 4 1070531 September 27, 2005, regard to Love 200.2, the t r i a l the t r i a l Stuff's court denied constitutional the motion. challenge to § With 13A-12- court s t a t e d : "This Court t h e r e f o r e regards the challenge to Ala. C o d e [ 1 9 7 5 , ] § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 a s t h e same a s t h a t presented i n the pending litigation before U.S. District J u d g e C. L y n w o o d Smith, Jr. Given the extensive h i s t o r y of that l i t i g a t i o n , this Court defers a decision regarding the contours o f any p r i v a c y / d u e p r o c e s s r i g h t s i m p l i c a t e d by a p p l i c a t i o n of A l a . Code § 13A-12-200.2. We w i l l w a i t t o s e e what Judge S m i t h , and t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t , decide on t h i s i s s u e . " Following following order a bench trial, the on N o v e m b e r 2, trial court entered 2007: "The t r i a l o f t h i s c a s e b e g a n on O c t o b e r 9, 2007, and c o n t i n u e d f o r s e v e r a l days thereafter. The trial was on a non-jury basis, with the undersigned s e r v i n g as t h e t r i e r - o f - f a c t . I n t h a t c a p a c i t y , the u n d e r s i g n e d had f u l l o p p o r t u n i t y t o observe and gauge the c r e d i b i l i t y of those who testified. Many exhibits were admitted into evidence, moreover. F i n a l l y , the undersigned toured the premises of the business in question, accompanied by t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r , a v i d e o g r a p h e r , and c o u n s e l f o r a l l p a r t i e s . T h i s o r d e r comes a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l lthe evidence i n t h i s matter. "Findings of Fact " S i n c e l a t e 2 0 0 4 , t h e d e f e n d a n t , 1568 M o n t g o m e r y Hwy., I n c . , has o p e r a t e d a s t o r e w i t h i n t h e c i t y l i m i t s o f H o o v e r . The d e f e n d a n t ' s s t o r e i s l i c e n s e d as N a n c y ' s Nook, b u t i s known more c o l l o q u i a l l y b y i t s p r o d u c t name o f ' L o v e S t u f f . ' The t a r g e t m a r k e t f o r Love S t u f f c o n s i s t s o f f e m a l e s , ages 32-52. 5 the 1070531 "Initially, Love Stuff admitted only those h a v i n g a v a l i d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n showing t h e y were a t l e a s t 18 y e a r s o f a g e i n t o t h e s t o r e . A t some p o i n t t h e r e a f t e r , Love S t u f f changed i t s p o l i c y and began admitting a l l customers i n t o the store premises, i n s t e a d r e s t r i c t i n g a c c e s s t o o n l y a p a r t i c u l a r room ( r e f e r r e d t o a s ' A r e a B' d u r i n g t h e t r i a l o f t h i s c a s e ) t o t h o s e a t l e a s t 18 y e a r s o l d . In Area B are i t e m s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s no t r o u b l e c h a r a c t e r i z i n g as h a r d - c o r e , a d u l t - o n l y m a t e r i a l t o w h i c h no c h i l d s h o u l d be e x p o s e d . Area B c o n s t i t u t e s from 26% t o 29% o f t h e s a l e s space i n Love S t u f f ' s p r e m i s e s . The i t e m s i n A r e a B c o n s t i t u t e a n y w h e r e f r o m 3 2 % t o 3 6 % o f L o v e S t u f f ' s i n v e n t o r y , d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r one u s e s an a v e r a g e c o s t o r a r e t a i l v a l u e b a s i s f o r this determination. " A c c e s s i b l e t o a l l c u s t o m e r s a r e t h e o t h e r rooms i n w h i c h f o o t w e a r and c l o t h i n g (such as c o s t u m e s , lingerie, and h o s i e r y ) and d r e s s a c c e s s o r i e s a r e sold, along w i t h magazines and books w i t h adult content, and v a r i o u s l u b r i c a n t s , massage o i l s , and l o t i o n s , among o t h e r i t e m s . T h e r e a r e some i t e m s o u t s i d e A r e a B t h a t t h i s C o u r t m i g h t c h a r a c t e r i z e as adult-only. Most, i f not a l l , of the books f o r s a l e are u n q u e s t i o n a b l y a d u l t - o n l y , f o rexample, a l t h o u g h the books (and magazines) a r e s h r i n k - w r a p p e d and therefore incapable of being reviewed prior to purchase. During i t s tour, the Court o c c a s i o n a l l y wondered whether other items i n Love Stuff's g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e d i s p l a y s weren't b e t t e r s u i t e d i n A r e a B. B e c a u s e t h e r e i s no c l a i m h e r e t h a t L o v e S t u f f i s v i o l a t i n g A l a . Code [ 1 9 7 5 , ] § 13A-12-200.2 or § 13A-12-200.5(2), however, t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n i s immaterial to the Court's adjudication of the merits, other t h a n f a c t o r i n g i n t o an a n a l y s i s o f what p o r t i o n o f t h e s t o r e ' s p r o d u c t s i s u n s u i t a b l e for minors. "It i s u n d i s p u t e d t h a t Love S t u f f i s w i t h i n 1,000 feet of churches, playgrounds, a daycare c e n t e r , and p r i v a t e r e s i d e n c e s . I t slocation raises 6 1070531 the i s s u e o f whether Love S t u f f stands i n v i o l a t i o n of A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) , d i s c u s s e d b e l o w . The Court does note, however, that Love Stuff o p e r a t e s o u t o f a s t a n d - a l o n e b u i l d i n g l o c a t e d on U.S. H i g h w a y 3 1 . I t i s not i n a m a l l or shopping center, and i t s l o c a t i o n i s not conducive to pedestrian t r a f f i c . According to t r i a l testimony, t h e o n l y c h i l d r e n who come i n a r e t y p i c a l l y i n f a n t s o r v e r y s m a l l t o d d l e r s b r o u g h t b y t h e i r p a r e n t s who want t o shop. Other than that, the Court can e n v i s i o n c u r i o u s t e e n a g e r s d r i v i n g t o Love S t u f f as a destination spot. "Love Stuff's Expert Evidence "During t r i a l , the Court r e c e i v e d , over the o b j e c t i o n s of t h e C i t y of Hoover and t h e S t a t e o f Alabama, the testimony o f two e x p e r t witnesses c a l l e d by Love S t u f f , Dr. R a c h e l Maines and Dr. Theodore Cole. Dr. Maines t e s t i f i e d concerning the history of various sexual devices, including the i n v e n t i o n o f c e r t a i n d e v i c e s by d o c t o r s i n t h e 1 9 t h and early 20th c e n t u r i e s f o r use i n t r e a t i n g d i a g n o s e d c a s e s o f h y s t e r i a i n women. D r . C o l e , who u n t i l r e c e n t l y was l i c e n s e d a s a m e d i c a l d o c t o r , was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y c o n c e r n i n g h i s w o r k o v e r many years with patients, both with and without d i s a b i l i t i e s , and t h e use o f v a r i o u s s e x u a l a i d s and devices i n conjunction with conditions affecting healthy sexual functioning. "At t h i s j u n c t u r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o a d d r e s s c e r t a i n m o t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e s e w i t n e s s e s . The C i t y of Hoover and t h e S t a t e f i r s t objected to the admission of their testimony on t h e g r o u n d s o f relevance. T h a t o b j e c t i o n was o v e r r u l e d a t t r i a l because of p o s s i b l e r e l e v a n c y t o the defendant's c o u n t e r c l a i m s , one o f w h i c h f o c u s e s on A l a . Code § 13A-12-200.2. The C i t y o f H o o v e r and t h e S t a t e subsequently objected to the admission of Dr. Cole's t e s t i m o n y b e c a u s e D r . C o l e was no l o n g e r a l i c e n s e d d o c t o r when he t e s t i f i e d , h a v i n g l e t h i s l i c e n s e 7 1070531 lapse. The C o u r t now o v e r r u l e s t h i s objection, finding nothing outside the confines of medical m a l p r a c t i c e l i t i g a t i o n t h a t would r e q u i r e a medical l i c e n s e i n order f o r a p h y s i c i a n t o t e s t i f y about h i s p a s t e x p e r i e n c e s , a n d r e s u l t i n g e x p e r t i s e , as an expert under Rule 702 o f t h e A l a b a m a R u l e s of Evidence. I n t h i s r e g a r d , the Court f i n d s that A l a . C o d e § 3 4 - 2 4 - 5 0 , on w h i c h t h e C i t y o f H o o v e r a n d t h e S t a t e r e l y , i s i n a p p o s i t e b e c a u s e D r . C o l e was n o t rendering any advice regarding the care and t r e a t m e n t o f any p a r t i c u l a r p a t i e n t . "In any e v e n t , a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c l a i m s and issues i n the case, the Court regards t h i s expert testimony as being of little consequence. U l t i m a t e l y , t h i s t e s t i m o n y goes t o s u p p o r t t h e view t h a t any s e x u a l d e v i c e o r t o y c a n , i n p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s , h a v e some m e d i c a l b e n e f i t . That j u s t goes t o say t h a t any s e x u a l d e v i c e can, i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , h a v e a m e d i c a l p u r p o s e i n a s s i s t i n g one who m i g h t o t h e r w i s e e n c o u n t e r d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h i s o r her p u r s u i t o f a happy sex l i f e . T h a t same d e v i c e , h o w e v e r , c a n a l s o be u s e d as a p u r e l y r e c r e a t i o n a l toy t o s p i c e up t h e s e x l i f e o f o n e who h a s no s i g n i f i c a n t p h y s i c a l or emotional d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the bedroom. I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o g e n e r a l l y p l a c e t h e s e d e v i c e s i n o n e c a t e g o r y o r t h e o t h e r -- i t a l l d e p e n d s on t h e i n d i v i d u a l u s i n g t h e d e v i c e . The Court need n o t worry about t h i s problem, f o r i t does not impact a d j u d i c a t i o n of the s p e c i f i c claims r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s i n t h i s a c t i o n . 1 "Legal Analysis "The C i t y o f Hoover r a i s e s c l a i m s s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t Love S t u f f i s v i o l a t i n g A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) a n d t h a t i t i s t h e r e f o r e a public nuisance. Love S t u f f ' s f i r s t c o u n t e r c l a i m seeks a declaration that this statute i s unconstitutionally vague. A l a . Code § 13A-12200.5(4) p r o v i d e s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 8 1070531 " ' I t s h a l l be u n l a w f u l f o r any p e r s o n t o o p e r a t e an a d u l t b o o k s t o r e , a d u l t m o v i e house, a d u l t video s t o r e , or other form of a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e w i t h i n 1,000 f e e t o f a church, place of worship, church bookstore, public park, public housing p r o j e c t , daycare center, p u b l i c or p r i v a t e school, college, recreation center, skating r i n k , v i d e o a r c a d e , p u b l i c swimming p o o l , private residence, or any other place frequented by m i n o r s . Any person who v i o l a t e s t h i s s u b s e c t i o n s h a l l be g u i l t y o f a misdemeanor and, upon c o n v i c t i o n , s h a l l be p u n i s h e d b y a f i n e o f n o t more t h a n t e n t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s ( $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 ) a n d may a l s o b e i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e c o u n t y j a i l f o r n o t more t h a n one y e a r . ' "Throughout t h i s case, counsel f o r the C i t y of Hoover and f o r t h e S t a t e r e p e a t e d l y characterized t h i s c a s e as a z o n i n g dispute. For purposes of statutory construction, however, the Court must recognize t h a t A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) is a c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e , w i t h anyone f o u n d i n v i o l a t i o n thereof subject to prosecution f o r committing a misdemeanor. W h i l e Hoover and t h e S t a t e further argue that the Court should i n t e r p r e t t h i s s t a t u t e as i t w o u l d a n y o t h e r s t a t u t e , g i v e n t h a t t h i s i s a c i v i l case r a t h e r than a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n , the Court disagrees. What m a t t e r s i s n o t t h e n a t u r e o f the p r o c e e d i n g but the nature of the s t a t u t e being s c r u t i n i z e d . Regardless of the claims at issue here, t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t c l o s e s c r u t i n y i s r e q u i r e d when interpreting a criminal statute. For this reason, t h i s Court f o l l o w s the r u l e of c o n s t r u c t i o n that ' c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e s a r e t o be s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r o f t h o s e p e r s o n s s o u g h t t o be s u b j e c t e d to their operation, i . e . , defendants.' Ex parte B e r t r a m , 884 S o . 2 d 8 8 9, 8 91 ( A l a . 2 0 0 3 ) , citing S c h e n h e r v . S t a t e , 38 A l a . A p p . 5 7 3 , 90 S o . 2 d 234 (1956). 9 1070531 " U l t i m a t e l y , of c o u r s e , the t a s k i s to f i g u r e out what t h e A l a b a m a L e g i s l a t u r e meant i n e n a c t i n g A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) . As t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t has put i t , '[t]he polestar of statutory c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e Legislature's intent in enacting a statute.' Ex parte B e r r y h i l l , 801 So. 2d 7, 10-11 (Ala. 2001), q u o t i n g N o r f o l k S. Ry. v . J o h n s o n , 740 So. 2 d 392, 396 (Ala. 1999). " W i t h no d i s p u t e t h a t L o v e S t u f f i s w i t h i n 1,000 feet of churches, playgrounds and other areas f r e q u e n t e d by m i n o r s , t h e c r u x h e r e i s w h e t h e r L o v e S t u f f i s an ' o t h e r f o r m o f a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e , ' as s e t o u t i n § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) . In analyzing this i s s u e , the Court f i r s t t u r n s to another well-known merchant of Hoover, the B o o k s - A - M i l l i o n bookstore. "Among t h e e x h i b i t s i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l a r e a number o f b o o k s and m a g a z i n e s t h a t were acquired from the Hoover B o o k s - A - M i l l i o n s t o r e . The books i n c l u d e those w i t h the f o l l o w i n g t i t l e s : "The "Em Little and Lo's B i t Naughty Book of Sex "K-I-S-S Guide "Great Sex to Sex Toys Toy Sex Tips "Sex Play "The Many J o y s "XXX Sex ... of Sex Toys Tonight "Many o f these books contain quite graphic discussion and accompanying photographs or i l l u s t r a t i o n s of s e x u a l conduct. Such p u b l i c a t i o n s should not be made a v a i l a b l e t o c h i l d r e n . The t e s t i m o n y was t h a t t h e s e b o o k s a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s i n 10 1070531 p l a i n s i g h t of a l l B o o k s - A - M i l l i o n customers, a d u l t a n d c h i l d r e n a l i k e , w i t h no e f f o r t made t o s h i e l d them or p r e v e n t anyone f r o m t h u m b i n g t h r o u g h them a t that store. " T h e r e i s no c o n t e n t i o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t B o o k s - A M i l l i o n i s an a d u l t b o o k s t o r e . Why? B e c a u s e a d u l t b o o k s s u c h as t h o s e l i s t e d a b o v e c o n s t i t u t e a v e r y small percentage of Books-A-Million's overall inventory. U n d e r A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 1 , an 'adult bookstore' is defined as a commercial establishment in which books or other medium d e p i c t i n g sexual conduct ' c o n s t i t u t e s u b s t a n t i a l l y all of i t s s t o c k or i n v e n t o r y . ' W h i l e no one contends t h a t a book s u p e r s t o r e l i k e B o o k s - A - M i l l i o n i s an 'adult bookstore,' the problem i s t h a t the word ' s u b s t a n t i a l l y ' i s not d e f i n e d . What i f s u c h books c o n s t i t u t e d 60% of a b o o k s t o r e ' s i n v e n t o r y -¬ i s t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l enough to throw the business into this category? What a b o u t 4 0 % o r 2 0 % ? No g u i d a n c e i s g i v e n as t o w h e r e t o d r a w t h e l i n e . "The p r o b l e m i s compounded h e r e b e c a u s e the p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t L o v e S t u f f i s t o be c a t e g o r i z e d as an ' o t h e r f o r m o f a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e , ' as t h a t term i s found in Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.5(4). Unlike 'adult bookstore,' the term 'other form of a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e ' i s not d e f i n e d at a l l . In a p r i o r order, t h i s Court concluded that given the c o m p l e t e a b s e n c e of a d e f i n i t i o n , the most l o g i c a l way to d e f i n e the term 'other form of a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e ' i s to a n a l o g i z e to a d u l t bookstores and video stores (which are d e f i n e d t e r m s ) , r e q u i r i n g the focus to be on the business'[s] inventory (keeping in mind the inherent difficulty in d e t e r m i n i n g what ' s u b s t a n t i a l l y ' means). " I f Love S t u f f d i d not have the items found i n ' A r e a B,' the Court s e r i o u s l y doubts that there w o u l d be a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s . The items i n o t h e r p a r t s of the s t o r e , w h i l e perhaps d e s c r i b e d b y a d j e c t i v e s s u c h as r a c y , s u g g e s t i v e o r r i s q u e , do 11 1070531 n o t r i s e t o t h e l e v e l o f ' o b s c e n e , ' as t h a t t e r m i s d e f i n e d i n A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 1 . F u r t h e r , most do n o t f a l l w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f i t e m s t h a t a r e ' h a r m f u l t o m i n o r s , ' as a l s o d e f i n e d i n t h a t s t a t u t e ( a l t h o u g h t h e r e may be a d e b a t e on t h a t p o i n t w i t h r e g a r d t o a few i t e m s ) . Both of these d e f i n e d terms a p p e a r t o be c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d i n o r d e r t o b r i n g t h e statute into compliance with constitutional requirements. A p r o v o c a t i v e F r e n c h Maid costume or some w a r m i n g p e r s o n a l l u b r i c a n t g e l ( a l s o a v a i l a b l e at Wal-Mart, a c c o r d i n g to t r i a l testimony) simply d o e s n o t meet t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s e v e n t h o u g h a p a r e n t might not d e s i r e such i t e m s d i s p l a y e d where h i s c h i l d r e n can see them. "As r e c o g n i z e d a b o v e , t h e h a r d - c o r e , a d u l t i t e m s i n Love S t u f f c o n s t i t u t e r o u g h l y 32% to 36% of i t s overall inventory. With that finding of fact, h o w e v e r , t h e C o u r t h a s no way o f k n o w i n g w h e t h e r t h e Legislature intended for this percentage to c o n s t i t u t e a s u b s t a n t i a l enough p o r t i o n of i n v e n t o r y t o p e r m i t d e f i n i n g L o v e S t u f f as an ' o t h e r f o r m o f adult-only enterprise.' "The C i t y o f H o o v e r a n d t h e S t a t e u r g e t h e C o u r t to look at other f a c t o r s , too. The C o u r t d o e s n o t know, h o w e v e r , i f t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d f o r s u c h other f a c t o r s to form p a r t of the c a l c u l a t i o n i n d e f i n i n g t h i s term. Should Love S t u f f ' s a d v e r t i s i n g be e x a m i n e d ? Even i f i t d i d so, the C o u r t cannot c o n c l u d e t h a t s u c h a d v e r t i s i n g e m p h a s i z e s an a d u l t o n l y b u s i n e s s . T h e r e i s no e x p l i c i t m e n t i o n o f t h e t e r m ' A d u l t O n l y ' o r o f any w e l l - k n o w n n o t a t i o n s u c h a s 'XXX.' " S h o u l d t h e C o u r t l o o k a t t h e d a t a on what percentage of floor space is devoted to unquestionably adult-only material? The a n s w e r -¬ f r o m 2 6 % t o 2 9 % -- o f f e r s no m o r e g u i d a n c e t h a n t h e d a t a on i n v e n t o r y . 12 1070531 "What a b o u t t h e f a c t t h a t L o v e S t u f f r e s t r i c t s a c c e s s t o A r e a B? That f a c t simply r e f l e c t s that Love S t u f f does o f f e r f o r s a l e some adult-only merchandise and that Love S t u f f takes steps to ensure t h a t c h i l d r e n are not exposed to the hard¬ c o r e i t e m s ( a l t h o u g h i t i s open t o d e b a t e w h e t h e r some o f t h e i t e m s i n g e n e r a l d i s p l a y a r e a s should a l s o f a l l under t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n ) . " H o o v e r and t h e S t a t e f u r t h e r a r g u e t h a t L o v e S t u f f i s an a d u l t - o n l y e n t e r p r i s e b e c a u s e a l l i t e m s are for adults only, with nothing i n the store i n t e n d e d t o be s o l d f o r m i n o r s . T h i s argument goes t o o f a r , h o w e v e r . The f a c t t h a t s h o e s , f o r e x a m p l e , a r e s o l d i n o n l y a d u l t s i z e s c a n n o t be u s e d t o b r i n g Love Stuff within the 'adult-only enterprise' definition any more than well-known and highly reputable c l o t h i n g s t o r e s t h a t c a t e r t o an adult c l i e n t e l e by o f f e r i n g o n l y a d u l t s i z e s . "The C o u r t now t u r n s t o S c o t t v . S t a t e , 917 So. 2d 159 ( A l a . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) , i n w h i c h t h e C o u r t o f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s e x a m i n e d a t some l e n g t h t h e v o i d for-vagueness doctrine involving claims against another s e c t i o n of the Alabama O b s c e n i t y Enforcement Act. The a p p e l l a n t t h e r e u n s u c c e s s f u l l y a r g u e d t h a t A l a . C o d e § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 1 1 was v o i d f o r vagueness because the terms 'business establishment,' 'for entertainment purposes,' and 'allow' are not specifically defined in that statute, and the s t a t u t e does not m e n t i o n o b s c e n i t y . 2 "In Scott, recognized the follows: the Court of Criminal Appeals void-for-vagueness doctrine as "'As g e n e r a l l y s t a t e d , the v o i d - f o r vagueness d o c t r i n e r e q u i r e s that a penal s t a t u t e d e f i n e the c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is p r o h i b i t e d and i n a manner t h a t does n o t 13 1070531 encourage arbitrary and discriminatory e n f o r c e m e n t . ... A s t a t u t e c h a l l e n g e d f o r v a g u e n e s s must t h e r e f o r e be s c r u t i n i z e d t o determine whether i t provides both fair n o t i c e to the p u b l i c that c e r t a i n conduct i s p r o s c r i b e d and m i n i m a l g u i d e l i n e s t o a i d officials i n the enforcement of that proscription ' " [ 9 1 7 ] So. 2d a t 170-71 (citations omitted). "After recognizing that not every r i s e s to the l e v e l of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l the Scott court then provided the guidance: ambiguity infirmity, following "'The judicial power to declare a statute void f o r vagueness "should be exercised only when a statute i s so i n c o m p l e t e , so i r r e c o n c i l a b l y c o n f l i c t i n g , or so vague o r i n d e f i n i t e , t h a t i t c a n n o t be e x e c u t e d , and t h e c o u r t i s u n a b l e , b y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f known a n d a c c e p t e d r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , to determine, with any r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e o f c e r t a i n t y , what t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended." J a n s e n v. S t a t e ex r e l . D o w n i n g , 273 A l a . 1 6 6 , 1 7 0 , 137 S o . 2 d 47, 50 ( 1 9 6 2 ) . ' "Id. a t 171-72 (citation omitted). " I f A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 1 1 were i m p l i c a t e d h e r e , a s i t was i n t h e S c o t t d e c i s i o n , t h e t a s k w o u l d b e an e a s y o n e . One may r e a d i l y c o n c l u d e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t a n a d u l t c l u b i n w h i c h n u d e women e n t e r t a i n p a t r o n s by p o l e - d a n c i n g f a l l s afoul of t h i s l a w . The m a t t e r h e r e i s m o r e c o m p l e x , h o w e v e r . W h i l e L o v e S t u f f c l e a r l y s e l l s a number o f i t e m s that are f o r adults only, this Court lacks any s t a n d a r d s t o d e c i d e w h e t h e r i t i s an ' o t h e r f o r m o f adult-only enterprise.' 14 1070531 "For t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e C o u r t must c o n c l u d e t h a t A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) i s t o o v a g u e t o p a s s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l muster. That being so, the C i t y of Hoover cannot r e l y upon i t t o have Love Stuff declared a public nuisance. "In i t s second c o u n t e r c l a i m , Love S t u f f asks t o h a v e A l a . Code § 13A-12-200.2 ( w h i c h g e n e r a l l y b a n s t h e s a l e o f s e x t o y s ) deemed u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . This provision of the Alabama Code was held to be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n W i l l i a m s v . M o r g a n , 478 F . 3 d 1 3 1 6 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) , w h i c h d e c i s i o n t h e U.S. Supreme C o u r t has r e c e n t l y d e c l i n e d t o r e v i e w . This Court f i n d s no b a s i s t o h o l d t o t h e c o n t r a r y , a n d f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e w i t h s t a n d s any argument o f u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y under the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n . " F i n a l l y , the p a r t i e s j o u s t over the issue of a sign permit. The C i t y o f H o o v e r ' s t h i r d c l a i m s e e k s a d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t i t h a s no o b l i g a t i o n t o i s s u e a p e r m i t g i v e n t h a t Love S t u f f s t a n d s i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e A l a b a m a Code and H o o v e r ' s l o c a l o r d i n a n c e . In r e s p o n s e , Love S t u f f ' s t h i r d c o u n t e r c l a i m s e e k s an order d i r e c t i n g the C i t y of Hoover to i s s u e such a permit. I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n t o deny Love S t u f f a s i g n p e r m i t i s i f i t were v i o l a t i n g t h e law, s i n c e i t has a l r e a d y o b t a i n e d , and c u r r e n t l y maintains, a b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e . B a s e d on t h e a b o v e r u l i n g s , however, t h i s Court cannot f i n d t h a t Love S t u f f i s i n v i o l a t i o n o f any e n f o r c e a b l e law. Love Stuff's counterclaim with respect to a sign permit i s t h e r e f o r e due t o b e g r a n t e d . "Conclusion "This C o u r t does not t a k e i s s u e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t z o n i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s may t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t f a c t o r s s u c h as p u b l i c s a f e t y , m o r a l s and g e n e r a l w e l f a r e . A l a . Code § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) i s n o t a zoning r e g u l a t i o n , however; i t i s a c r i m i n a l statute. Nor does t h i s C o u r t deny t h a t t h e S t a t e may g e n e r a l l y p r o s c r i b e a s i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s d e e m e d 15 1070531 obscene or harmful to the c h i l d r e n of t h i s State. E f f o r t s t o do s o , h o w e v e r , m u s t be w i t h p r e c i s i o n and c l a r i t y i n o r d e r t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e d e s i r e d g o a l s while recognizing every citizen's constitutional r i g h t t o know w h a t c o n d u c t i s d e e m e d c r i m i n a l . " T h i s C o u r t n e i t h e r condones nor condemns L o v e Stuff's business operations. Instead, this Court here emphasizes t h a t e v e r y c r i m i n a l s t a t u t e of t h i s State must be crafted with care to avoid the u n c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t can g i v e r i s e t o a r b i t r a r y and discriminatory enforcement. The following is t h e r e f o r e ORDERED: "1. The term 'other form of adult-only e n t e r p r i s e , ' as f o u n d i n A l a . C o d e § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) i s h e r e b y deemed u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a g u e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e d e f e n d a n t m u s t be entered on t h e C i t y o f H o o v e r ' s c l a i m s e e k i n g a declaration that the defendant is violating the statute (and H o o v e r ' s m u n i c i p a l o r d i n a n c e 11-31). Further, judgment is entered in favor of the defendant on the City of Hoover's second claim s e e k i n g t o e n j o i n t h e d e f e n d a n t f r o m o p e r a t i n g as a p u b l i c nuisance. The C i t y o f H o o v e r i s e n t i t l e d t o no r e l i e f u n d e r t h e s e c l a i m s . "2. Judgment i s h e r e b y e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f t h e C i t y o f H o o v e r and the S t a t e o f A l a b a m a on the d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m s e e k i n g t o h a v e A l a . Code § 13A-12-200.2 d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . " 3 . The defendant i s e n t i t l e d to the relief s o u g h t i n i t s t h i r d c o u n t e r c l a i m , and t h e C i t y o f Hoover is ordered to promptly undertake steps necessary for issuing a sign permit to the defendant. taxed "4. T h i s o r d e r c o n c l u d e s as p a i d . 16 this litigation. Costs 1070531 " The court has no problem recognizing that w h i l e sex t o y s are o f t e n used r e c r e a t i o n a l l y , t h e y can assist people suffering from physical disabilities or other conditions, emotional or p s y c h o l o g i c a l , t h a t can i m p a i r s e x u a l f u n c t i o n i n g . The C o u r t a l s o has no p r o b l e m c o n c l u d i n g that a healthy sex life can contribute to an adult's o v e r a l l h e a l t h and h a p p i n e s s . (In t h i s r e g a r d , the Court notes w i t h i n t e r e s t the v e r y recent d e c i s i o n o f J a n d a v . J a n d a , 984 So. 2d 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), i n which the Court of C i v i l A p p e a l s a f f i r m e d the t r i a l c o u r t ' s order a n n u l l i n g a marriage because of the complete absence of s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s between h u s b a n d and w i f e ; i n d o i n g s o , t h e C o u r t o f Civil A p p e a l s r e l i e d on C a l i f o r n i a p r e c e d e n t r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s i s an e s s e n t i a l a s p e c t o f t h e v e r y e x i s t e n c e of a m a r r i a g e . ) 1 " Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.11 provides the following: ' I t s h a l l be u n l a w f u l f o r a n y business establishment o r a n y p r i v a t e c l u b t o show o r a l l o w t o be shown f o r e n t e r t a i n m e n t p u r p o s e s t h e human male or female g e n i t a l s , p u b i c area, or buttocks with l e s s than a f u l l y opaque c o v e r i n g , or the showing of the female b r e a s t w i t h l e s s than a f u l l y opaque c o v e r i n g of any p o r t i o n t h e r e o f b e l o w the top of the n i p p l e , or the d e p i c t i o n of c o v e r e d male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. A violation o f t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be a C l a s s C Felony.'" 2 Love Stuff judgment 1975, new filed a insofar as was trial. not motion i t held to alter, that u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or, The trial court denied appealed. 17 § amend, or 13A-12-200.2, i n the the vacate Ala. the Code alternative, for motions. Love a Stuff 1070531 Issues Love issue Stuff argues whether § unconstitutional following Earle, 517 reasoning States the argues t h a t the Art. § (5th 1316 f o r the revisit Code States and Eleventh Inc. s t a t u t o r y ban on 1975, 1901, the A l a . Const. Standard the by t h e Love in Williams § 13A- Stuff also found i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under or, i n the alternative, that doctrine 1901. Review "'Our review of constitutional challenges to l e g i s l a t i v e e n a c t m e n t s i s de n o v o . ' Richards v. Izzi, 819 So. 2d 25, 29 n. 3 (Ala. 2001). A d d i t i o n a l l y , a c t s of the l e g i s l a t u r e are presumed constitutional. S t a t e v . A l a b a m a Mun. Ins. Corp., 730 So. 2 d 1 0 7 , 110 (Ala. 1998). See a l s o D o b b s v . S h e l b y C o u n t y E c o n . & I n d u s . Dev. A u t h . , 749 So. 2 d 425, 428 (Ala. 1999)('In reviewing the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a l e g i s l a t i v e a c t , t h i s Court will s u s t a i n the act "'unless i t i s c l e a r beyond 18 the United s a l e of s e x u a l a i d s separation-of-powers of v. rejecting Circuit challenge. is Constitution Consultants, 2008 ), the 1975, (11th C i r . 2007), which upheld A l a . Const. I I I , § 43, Reliable Cir. should Ala. United a constitutional 13A-12-200.2 v i o l a t e s Art. of 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 , A l a . Code I , § 36, Court the u l t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n reached F.3d 12-200.2 a g a i n s t § 738 of A p p e a l s v . M o r g a n , 478 at the reasoning o f and this 13A-12-200.2, under F.3d Court that in 1070531 reasonable doubt that i t is violative of the fundamental law.'" W h i t e v. R e y n o l d s M e t a l s Co., 558 So. 2 d 3 7 3 , 383 ( A l a . 1 98 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Alabama S t a t e F e d ' n o f L a b o r v . M c A d o r y , 246 A l a . 1, 9, 18 So. 2d 810, 815 (1944)).'). We approach the q u e s t i o n of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a l e g i s l a t i v e act '"'with every presumption and intendment in f a v o r o f i t s v a l i d i t y , and seek t o s u s t a i n rather than strike down t h e e n a c t m e n t of a c o o r d i n a t e branch of the government.'"' Monroe v. H a r c o , I n c . , 762 So. 2 d 8 2 8 , 831 ( A l a . 2000) ( q u o t i n g Moore v. M o b i l e I n f i r m a r y A s s ' n , 592 So. 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 ( A l a . 1 9 9 1 ) , q u o t i n g i n t u r n M c A d o r y , 246 A l a . a t 9, 18 So. 2 d a t 8 1 5 ) . "Moreover, i n o r d e r t o overcome the p r e s u m p t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , ... t h e p a r t y a s s e r t i n g t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e A c t ... b e a r s t h e b u r d e n ' t o show t h a t [the Act] i s not constitutional.' Board of T r u s t e e s of Employees' Retirement Sys. of M o n t g o m e r y v . T a l l e y , 291 A l a . 3 0 7 , 3 1 0 , 280 So. 2 d 553, 556 (1973) . See also Thorn v. Jefferson C o u n t y , 375 So. 2 d 7 8 0 , 787 ( A l a . 1 9 7 9 ) ( ' I t i s t h e l a w , o f c o u r s e , t h a t a p a r t y a t t a c k i n g a s t a t u t e has the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality ' ) . " State ex r e l . King v. Morton, 955 So. 2d 1012, 1017 (Ala. 2006). Discussion I. Does § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 , A l a . Code 1975, States Constitution? Love involved Stuff and fundamental argues that right, that the r i g h t a protected violate liberty c l a i m e d , a l t h o u g h not i s d e s e r v i n g of 19 greater the U n i t e d interest equal to protection is a than 1070531 w o u l d be argues a f f o r d e d under t r a d i t i o n a l r a t i o n a l - b a s i s review. that require its this a balancing citizens consensual, Stuff use and sexual interest United between Alabama's i n t e r e s t s i n p r o t e c t i n g the liberty interest of those engaging that devices the rights should of Alabamians prevail over to sell Alabama's States The Court Consultants, Alabama referred of to Appeals Inc. Attorney collectively in this Court. The a p p l y i n g the r e a s o n i n g Court of A p p e a l s that § v. and as create a new 13A-12-200.2 Ala. furthering v. the "the State") have asserts that Circuit The 1975, filed right to as i t s rational public welfare. 20 did U.S. sexual bases The 558 joint court, Circuit properly not (2003), public found violate privacy State a trial S t a t e argues t h a t the 539 in (hereinafter the Morgan, supra, Code Texas, fundamental has Hoover v. the supra. and State in Williams Lawrence Fifth General States C o n s t i t u t i o n . in Earle, the to purported of the d e c i s i o n of the E l e v e n t h 13A-12-200.2, Court for in Love i n p u b l i c m o r a l i t y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the o p i n i o n of Reliable United would p r i v a t e sexual conduct using sexual devices. contends brief protected-liberty-interest analysis It Supreme did and not that morality argues the that § and this 1070531 Court should f i n d Williams Fifth Circuit Court v. Morgan p e r s u a s i v e of Appeals' the parties and opinion reject in the Reliable Consultants. Because of constitutional the way issues, how States both of Supreme C o u r t ' s In obscenity designed of courts 1998, the appeals case Alabama of marketed as human g e n i t a l o r g a n s stated amended primarily for any thing adopting of the i t s purpose i n Section federal Williams a discussion the United the the state's "any device stimulation pecuniary value." amendments, 1 of Act No. No. 98-467, A l a . Acts 1998. 21 § the 98-467: "(1) That i n order to p r o t e c t children from exposure to obscenity, prevent assaults on the s e n s i b i l i t i e s of u n w i l l i n g a d u l t s by t h e p u r v e y o r [ s ] o f o b s c e n e m a t e r i a l , and s u p p r e s s t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 'adult-only video stores,' 'adult bookstores,' 'adult movie houses,' and 'adult-only entertainment,' the sale and dissemination of obscene material should be regulated without i m p i n g i n g on the F i r s t Amendment r i g h t s o f free s p e e c h by erecting b a r r i e r s to open d i s p l a y of e r o t i c and l a s c i v i o u s m a t e r i a l . " Act and Texas. d i s t r i b u t i o n of for the interpreted Legislature useful of includes L a w r e n c e v. In 13A-12-200.2(a)(1). legislature This have laws to c r i m i n a l i z e the or framed a detailed discussion Reliable Consultants i s necessary. of have 1070531 Vendors devices sexual challenged 200.2(a)(1) 2d of 1257 devices the i n federal and court. of operated a sexual According to facts sold stipulated of the such 13A-12- 41 F. S u p p . vendors/plaintiffs devices to at t r i a l , use § W i l l i a m s v. P r y o r , One that who constitutionality (N.D. A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . store persons and novelties. some c u s t o m e r s u s e the products t o a v o i d s e x u a l l y t r a n s m i t t e d d i s e a s e s ; some u s e the products t o enhance t h e i r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; some u s e the to achieve they are products unable to do so sexual satisfaction otherwise; some use because the products s a t i s f a c t i o n when t h e i r p a r t n e r i s n o t a v a i l a b l e ; referred The other through or marital "Tupperware-style" users/plaintiffs the sexual Id. devices dysfunction The p l a i n t i f f s their problems. vendor/plaintiff The sexual a n d some a r e t o t h e s t o r e b y a t h e r a p i s t as t r e a t m e n t dysfunction fundamental analysis. sold sexual parties. were were 41 F. S u p p . four claimed right 2d a t 1262-63. 41 F. S u p p . In the a l t e r n a t i v e , 2d a t 1260. that related to under a infringed upon strict-scrutiny they argued that § 22 women to sexual intercourse. t h a t § 13A-12-200.2 to privacy to asserted f o r t h e r a p e u t i c purposes o r an a l t e r n a t i v e f o r sexual devices women who e a c h for 13A-12-200.2 1070531 did not pass review. parties facts that crime to are or primarily for 1265. To will any have sexual devices use Supp. as general under at a rational-basis sell F. of state the that Act term prosecute sale of the marketed genital Supp. F. Alabama bring them and not Supp. 2d store, located in in 41 2d 1267. at F. 23 use Also, 1269. Supp. device, 2d of the or other a sexual and not 13A-12-200.2. the shopping malls Supp. Alabama. at define defined bookstores at law, masturbation § describing retail F. under 2d current does is sexual books 41 in 41 as Several aids. available human text is proscribed 1265. 41 of value." or g e n i t a l s , e v e n when p e r f o r m e d w i t h sexual vibrators. designed i n Alabama under the not certain 13A-12-200.2 makes i t a them i n a n o t h e r does to device pecuniary aids stipulated stimulation the The i t i s the public Pryor Section "obscene" law i t , that 2d of obtain of the Rather, of for lines. Alabama aid. here: sexual to state v. d i s t r i b u t e "any thing obtain stimulation Williams useful across Act. in relevant sell organs one muster Id. The as constitutional open the 41 to F. the vibrators or Spencer's Gifts in Huntsville, sells Virility at 1265. drugs Ribbed are or 1070531 tickler condoms throughout With in Alabama and sold Id. to their right-to-privacy claim, the i n W i l l i a m s v. P r y o r argued t h a t t h e enforcement o f 13A-12-200.2 'fundamental guaranteed Fourteenth manufactured the state. regard plaintiffs § are would "impose rights by the of an privacy First, and Fourth, Amendments o f t h e U n i t e d F. S u p p . 2 d a t 1274 plaintiffs argued undue burden personal Fifth, "their their autonomy Ninth[,] and S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . ' " 41 (quoting the p l a i n t i f f s ' that on right memorandum). of p r i v a c y and The personal a u t o n o m y c o n s t i t u t e s a ' l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t ' p r o t e c t e d b y t h e Due Process at Clause 1274. The involves of the Fourteenth court noted a fundamental to s t r i c t judicial that right Amendment." i f the challenged then the l e g i s l a t i o n s c r u t i n y and i f t h e c h a l l e n g e d does not burden a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t then only minimal Supp. 2d legislation i s subject legislation the l e g i s l a t i o n faces scrutiny. The p l a i n t i f f s privacy 41 F. f r a m e d t h e i s s u e as " w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t to ' i s b r o a d e n o u g h t o e n c o m p a s s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n to engage i n p r i v a t e s e x u a l activity not p r o s c r i b e d by law'"; t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l d e s c r i b e d t h e i s s u e as " ' w h e t h e r t h e r e i s 24 1070531 a constitutional right to obtain dildos, vibrators, marital the aids "designed and marketed s t i m u l a t i o n o f human g e n i t a l 1275. as u s e f u l p r i m a r i l y f o r organs."'" 41 F. S u p p . 2 d a t The c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e i s s u e was n o t a s b r o a d a s the p l a i n t i f f s defined issue i t . suggested Instead, as " w h e t h e r to privacy' devices 'designed stimulation private, The n o r as n a r r o w as t h e a t t o r n e y the federal d i s t r i c t the concept 'right protects sexual an or marketed o f human g e n i t a l activity." federal Constitution privacy fundamental. simply d i d not cover right 41 F. S u p p . has p l a c e d individual's primarily the individual's as useful organs' court The f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t liberty t o use f o r the v. Pryor Amendment t o t h e U n i t e d States Supreme Williams Court court focused 25 to extend recognized "The S u p r e m e as Court t o a l l o w r e c o g n i t i o n o f an 'designed interest." request has 2d a t 1281-83. the bar too high liberty protected 2d a t 1275. in f o r t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f human fundamental stated the primarily the p l a i n t i f f s ' use of devices general when e n g a g i n g i n l a w f u l , 41 F. S u p p . district court of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y determined that the Fourteenth the and o t h e r 41 F. or marketed genital Supp. as u s e f u l organs' 2d a t as a 1283-84. on t h e u s e , r a t h e r t h a n t h e 1070531 distribution, of such of the devices proscribed is a fundamental p l a i n t i f f s contend, then the compels The strict court says judicial looked to the "elucidate the between p r i v a t e use d e p e n d s on the target material 30. In (1973), Paris the scrutiny." holdings that Adult F. use as on distribution Supp. 2d at 1281. Supreme C o u r t c a s e s i t any of " i f the interest liberty 41 i n two prohibitions or because l e g i s l a t u r e ' s ban fact distinction devices, significance the use versus the p r o t e c t i o n the C o n s t i t u t i o n affords conduct." Theatre Supreme C o u r t I held 41 v. commercial of F. Supp. Slaton, 413 2d at 1281 n. U.S. 49, 66 that, "[i]f obscene m a t e r i a l u n p r o t e c t e d by the First Amendment i n i t s e l f c a r r i e d w i t h i t a 'penumbra' o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d p r i v a c y , t h i s Court would not have found i t n e c e s s a r y to d e c i d e S t a n l e y [v. G e o r g i a , 394 U.S. 557 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , ] on t h e n a r r o w b a s i s o f t h e ' p r i v a c y o f t h e home,' w h i c h was h a r d l y m o r e than a r e a f f i r m a t i o n that 'a man's home i s h i s castle.'" I n C a r e y v. 687-88 Population (1977), the Services, Supreme C o u r t I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 431 held U.S. that "[r]estrictions on the distribution contraceptives c l e a r l y burden the freedom to [protected childbearing] decisions of make "... [ T ] h e same t e s t m u s t be a p p l i e d t o s t a t e regulations t h a t b u r d e n an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t to decide to prevent conception or t e r m i n a t e pregnancy 26 678, 1070531 b y s u b s t a n t i a l l y l i m i t i n g a c c e s s t o t h e means o f e f f e c t u a t i n g t h a t d e c i s i o n as i s a p p l i e d t o state s t a t u t e s t h a t p r o h i b i t the d e c i s i o n e n t i r e l y . ... T h i s i s so ... b e c a u s e s u c h a c c e s s i s e s s e n t i a l t o e x e r c i s e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d r i g h t of d e c i s i o n s i n m a t t e r s of c h i l d b e a r i n g . " The most federal court noted argument persuasive district that use fundamental l i b e r t y medical sexual uses of the of that the such i n t e r e s t stemmed f r o m t h e devices dysfunction. The for court plaintiffs' devices is therapeutic individuals afflicted a and with stated: "The a p p e a l of t h i s argument notwithstanding, b a s e d on t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s f o c u s on h i s t o r y and t r a d i t i o n , t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s e x p r e s s r e l u c t a n c e t o e x t e n d t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e , i t s narrow readings of cases recognizing liberty i n t e r e s t s as f u n d a m e n t a l , a n d i t s s t a t e m e n t s t h a t i t h a s n o t y e t d e c i d e d a c a s e s q u a r e l y on p o i n t , this court refuses to e x t e n d the fundamental r i g h t of privacy to p r o t e c t plaintiffs' interest in using d e v i c e s ' d e s i g n e d o r m a r k e t e d as u s e f u l p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f human g e n i t a l o r g a n s ' when engaging i n l a w f u l , p r i v a t e , sexual a c t i v i t y , and t h e r e b y impose a s t r i c t s c r u t i n y frame of a n a l y s i s when r e v i e w i n g t h e A l a b a m a s t a t u t e a t i s s u e . " 41 F. Supp. The 2d at federal 1284. district 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) basis t e s t and rational-basis would court went survive on review to address under the whether rational- u l t i m a t e l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t § 13A-12-200.2 review. The court 27 noted that the § failed legislature 1070531 stated that children adults i t s purpose from exposure i n adopting to t h e A c t was obscenity, f r o m a s s a u l t s on t h e i r to to prevent sensibilities on the The f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t pleadings, independent enacting motions, judicial research, the Act could also court briefs, that unwilling by t h e s e l l e r s obscene m a t e r i a l , and t o s u p p r e s s t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n only businesses. protect of adult- concluded, oral arguments, the state's of based and interest in have been: "(1) the b e l i e f that '[t]he commerce of sexual s t i m u l a t i o n a n d a u t o - e r o t i c i s m , f o r i t s own s a k e , unrelated to marriage, procreation or familial relationships is an evil, an obscenity ... d e t r i m e n t a l t o t h e h e a l t h and m o r a l i t y o f t h e s t a t e ' ( B r i e f o f A l a b a m a A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a t 2 1 ) ; o r (2) the desire t o ban commerce i n a l l 'obscene' material." 41 F. Supp. district court 2d at 1286 (footnote found that although omitted). The federal t h e s t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t s were l e g i t i m a t e , t h e p r o h i b i t i o n on s e l l i n g o r d i s t r i b u t i n g designed f o r t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f human g e n i t a l o r g a n s rationally district r e l a t e d to those court o f an a b s o l u t e accomplish federal stated that legitimate state "[i]nnumerable b a n on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n the State's district court goals." noted 28 devices was n o t interests. measures f a r short of sexual devices 41 F. S u p p . 2 d a t 1 2 8 8 . that the The would The "Tupperware-style" 1070531 parties were n o t p u b l i c and t h a t could be m o d i f i e d . court c i t e d Romer v . E v a n s , an amendment review of to a under the the that City too 620 failed Clause v. the asserted relationship the d i s t r i c t that rational-basis because the breadth from the state's 482 U.S. 78, Safley, state displays (19 9 6 ) ( h o l d i n g f a r removed Turner reasonable constitute[d] 517 U.S. Protection was vendor's of i t sreasoning, constitution interests), (1987)(holding satisfy state the Equal amendment legitimate and In support the other interests "[did] standard, but 91 not rather an e x a g g e r a t e d r e s p o n s e t o [ i t s ] ... c o n c e r n s " ) , of Cleburne v. C l e b u r n e (1985)(holding a rational-basis federal to s t a t e that state's district court § 13A-12-200.2 for procreation or f a m i l i a l inevitably interferes eroticism which i t s own unconstitutional 432 i n Williams v. Pryor "sexual sake, i s related relationships." went on s t i m u l a t i o n and a u t o - unrelated to r e l a t i o n s h i p s , " because with under was n o t r a t i o n a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e interest i n discouraging eroticism, familial ordinance C t r . , 473 U.S. review). The zoning Living sexual to 29 "such a ban and auto- stimulation marriage, 41 F. S u p p . marriage, procreation, 2d a t 1289. The and court 1070531 n o t e d t h a t some c u s t o m e r s o f t h e v e n d o r s / p l a i n t i f f s the d e v i c e s upon t h e s u g g e s t i o n have used the relationship that two opined with that the married o f a t h e r a p i s t and t h a t achieve marital experts were couples' difficulties state Appeals appealed, court. 2001)("Williams reviewing that failed review and rational reasonably 13A-12-200.2 power, the United The was only vital, to t h e Food and States Eleventh of the Court of "A scrutiny state of 30 Circuit the d i s t r i c t panel court's u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l because i t The Eleventh standard the stating: conceivable sexuality reversed the d e c i s i o n of the scrutiny. basis i f not stated dysfunction. I I " ) . proscribes legislature's court the t h e r a p e u t i c value the h i g h l y d e f e r e n t i a l that others W i l l i a m s v . P r y o r , 240 F . 3 d 944 ( 1 1 t h rational-basis discussed § The and t h a t the d e c i s i o n f i r s t considered holding used satisfactory o f human effective, f o r the Eleventh C i r c u i t federal district Cir. sexual more i n the f i e l d devices for treating The a partners. Administration recognizes devices under to their undisputed treating Drug devices have very outer statute so long facts of is as that Circuit rational-basis limits of a constitutional 'there could is any provide a 1070531 rational basis f o r the' statute." FCC v . B e a c h Commc'ns, Eleventh in Circuit determining because the morality. I n c . , 508 U.S. concluded that state that the d i s t r i c t § 13A-12-200.2 has an 3 0 7 , 314 lacked interest on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 was a r a t i o n a l use of the devices not a defect of with court had by sexual The erred basis, public that the c r i m i n a l devices i n § 13A- the a c q u i s i t i o n "[I]ncremental under r a t i o n a l prohibiting their possession masturbation f o r making act irrationally distribution (1993)). a rational held of sexual more d i f f i c u l t . in legislation d i d not commercial means (quoting i n safeguarding The f e d e r a l a p p e l l a t e c o u r t proscription Alabama 240 F . 3 d a t 948 basis and steps are s c r u t i n y , so p r o h i b i t i n g only devices, rather the than or use o r by d i r e c t l y p r o s c r i b i n g or without a sexual device." 240 F . 3 d a t 950. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Romer v . E v a n s , supra, Cleburne, were d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e and t h u s d i d n o t the federal Eleventh that supra, district Circuit Turner T u r n e r v. S a f l e y , concluded court's stated concerned that decision. Turner inmates 31 and was supra, that and C i t y of support Specifically, the distinguishable i n d i d not "concern[] the 1070531 c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n a c c o r d e d by o r d i n a r y scrutiny to According Romer citizens i n free to the court, the state challenged had no society." rational 240 F.3d basis at 950. Romer was d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e b e c a u s e i n legitimate legislation. interest Last, City i n passing the Cleburne was of d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t h a t i t i n v o l v e d an E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e analysis and challenge r a i s e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f s The not Eleventh a fundamental-rights Circuit fundamental-rights district court Eleventh the "as-applied plaintiffs because ... analysis, concluding the f a c i a l that the challenge, but remanded t h e case f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f fundamental f o r due the record the i n Williams. correctly rejected Circuit like t h e n w e n t on t o a d d r e s s t h e d i s t r i c t court's the challenge rights challenges consideration by the d i s t r i c t and s t i p u l a t i o n s i n t h i s too narrow to permit the Alabama statute us t o d e c i d e whether i n this case right case." court simply o r t o what i n f r i n g e s a fundamental p r i v a c y of the s p e c i f i c p l a i n t i f f s r a i s e d by t h e to are extent sexual 240 F . 3 d a t 955. On r e m a n d , t h e f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t court struck down § 13A- 12-200.2, h o l d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y burdened 32 1070531 the right adult 2d t o use sexual 1257 devices relationships. within Williams (N.D. A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ( " W i l l i a m s concluded sexual on remand devices married that imposes sexual limits devices 2d Eleventh at persons their Circuit their The F.3d the "right privacy sexual district sexual devices. the of the r i g h t on sale of privacy, and i n that i t thus to relationships." court, based on what privacy i n t h i s case," the p l a i n t i f f s ' married court concluded The persons afforded privacy that court and F. the r e f e r r e d t o a s "a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t t o s e x u a l t h e h i s t o r y and l e g a l between use, 220 Williams I I , liberty interest t o s e x u a l p r i v a c y . " 220 F. S u p p . 2 d a t 1 2 7 7 . 13A-12-200.2 scrutiny court access, sexual district a t 955, d e f i n e d discussing Supp. burden to sexual p r i v a c y of the s p e c i f i c p l a i n t i f f s 240 F. The d i s t r i c t III"). to consensual 220 " p r o h i b i t i o n of ability within 1298. the private, v. P r y o r , a significant and u n m a r r i e d severely Supp. sexual to regarding and the h i s t o r i c a l unmarried adults, After sexual right the to federal t h a t t h e r e was a f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t t o encompasses applied found traditions as that a n a l y s i s because the right a strict-scrutiny the statute the s t a t u t e 33 to sexual analysis failed "imposes use the a to § strict- significant 1070531 b u r d e n on t h e r i g h t o f m a r r i e d privacy, and i n that thus to The States v. state Court appealed, 2004)("Williams f o r the Eleventh a 378 that right to access, their sexual of the United Circuit, F.3d there i n Williams 1232 was of consenting no (11th Cir. fundamental, adults t o engage conduct that would t r i g g e r a s t r i c t - s c r u t i n y of a l l infringements recognize within and a d i f f e r e n t p a n e l I V " ) ,held in private sexual ability 2d a t 1298. of Alabama, due-process their devices 220 F. S u p p . General substantive limits sexual of Appeals Attorney review i t severely use, relationships." and u n m a r r i e d p e r s o n s t o s e x u a l new of that fundamental right, right to and i t d e c l i n e d t o sexual privacy and remanded t h e case f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s opinion. I n so h o l d i n g , Lawrence v. Texas, district court not recognize Eleventh the Eleventh 539 U.S. had i s s u e d a Circuit 2 decided i t s decision fundamental Court 558, Circuit right of Appeals determined after the federal i n Williams to sexual advised that that III,did privacy. The on r e m a n d t h e L a w r e n c e v . T e x a s s t r u c k down a T e x a s s t a t u t e m a k i n g i t a c r i m e f o r t w o p e r s o n s o f t h e same s e x t o e n g a g e i n c e r t a i n i n t i m a t e s e x u a l c o n d u c t i n t h e p r i v a c y o f a home a s i m p i n g i n g on t h e i r e x e r c i s e o f l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t s p r o t e c t e d b y t h e Due Process Clause. 2 34 1070531 district that court "may Alabama's morality) examine law has remains good Bowers v. H a r d w i c k , whether a our h o l d i n g rational basis law" a f t e r Lawrence 478 U.S. 186 i n Williams (1986). (e.g., v. Texas 378 F.3d II public overruled a t 1238 n. 9. On court v. King, F. 420 second remand, t h e d i s t r i c t Supp. A l a . 2 006)("Williams V"), held that § 2d 1250 13A-12-200.2 grounds, under acknowledged Court 1224, (N.D. could be i n Williams upheld a rational-basis analysis. that i n Lawrence the language v. Texas, of the which on public-morality The district United States that indicated Supreme state's v i e w o f a " ' p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c e as i m m o r a l i s n o t a reason f o r upholding S u p p . 2 d a t 1247 (Stevens, F. Supp. continued rational stating Bowers v. H a r d w i c k , J., dissenting)). 2d a t 1248, to uphold basis that for 'massive sufficient concluded that the Eleventh the of viability legislation " [ t ] o hold that after disruption of public the 35 F. at 216 court, 420 had U.S. morality Lawrence public morality 420 Circuit 478 However, the d i s t r i c t as a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n a a a law p r o h i b i t i n g the p r a c t i c e . ' " (quoting court v. as a Texas, can never serve a f t e r Lawrence would cause current social order.'" 420 1070531 F.Supp. 2d a t 1249-50 591 it (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, (Scalia, J., dissenting)). was u n w i l l i n g current The d i s t r i c t to s e t i n motion s o c i a l order. Instead, 5 3 9 U.S. a t court stated such a disruption the d i s t r i c t court that of the considered whether Lawrence, as a p p l i e d t o § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 , was s u f f i c i e n t to The d i s t r i c t the s t r i k e down t h e s t a t u t e . criminalization reinforced a preserve[d] groups. of certain "vicious cycle the equilibrium 420 F. Supp. 2d court homosexual acts of distancing of at reasoned i n Lawrence and stigma oppression" among 1250. district The that that societal court determined that because Lawrence concerned t h e c r i m i n a l i z a t i o n of homosexual a c t s of distancing that were t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e " v i c i o u s and s t i g m a " reinforce, Lawrence The t h e Supreme d i d n o t want t o stated: court d i d not benefit Court the Williams plaintiffs. "If this i s a correct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the m a j o r i t y ' s d e c i s i o n i n Lawrence, i t does n o t b e n e f i t plaintiffs i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e . As t h e s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s show, A l a b a m a ' s b a n on t h e s a l e of sexual devices affects diffuse categories o f p e o p l e : men a n d women; m a r r i e d a s w e l l a s u n m a r r i e d . None h a v e been i d e n t i f i e d i n t h e s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s as 'gays,' 'lesbians,' o r any o t h e r 'discrete and i n s u l a r ' c l a s s o f i n d i v i d u a l s . M o r e o v e r , none o f t h e d e v i c e s have been characterized as i m p l e m e n t s that are common t o a h o m o s e x u a l l i f e s t y l e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t c a n n o t p l a u s i b l y be a r g u e d t h a t t h e l a w h a s t a r g e t e d 36 cycle 1070531 a s p e c i f i c c l a s s of i n d i v i d u a l s f o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n or harm out of s i m p l e h o s t i l i t y . Stated somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y , the Alabama s t a t u t e , u n l i k e the Texas anti-same-sex-sodomy s t a t u t e at i s s u e i n Lawrence, neither directly nor indirectly burdens an i d e n t i f i a b l e g r o u p i n s u c h a way t h a t a c l a s s o f s t i g m a t i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s emerges. "In a d d i t i o n , t h i s case simply i s d i f f e r e n t from Lawrence. The Lawrence majority was careful to d e f i n e the scope of i t s h o l d i n g , s t a t i n g : "'The p r e s e n t case does not involve m i n o r s . I t does not i n v o l v e p e r s o n s who m i g h t be i n j u r e d o r c o e r c e d o r who are situated in relationships where consent m i g h t n o t e a s i l y be r e f u s e d . I t does not i n v o l v e p u b l i c conduct or p r o s t i t u t i o n . I t does not i n v o l v e whether the government must give formal recognition to any r e l a t i o n s h i p that homosexual persons seek t o e n t e r . The c a s e d o e s i n v o l v e two a d u l t s who, w i t h f u l l a n d m u t u a l c o n s e n t f r o m e a c h o t h e r , e n g a g e d i n s e x u a l p r a c t i c e s common t o a h o m o s e x u a l l i f e s t y l e . The p e t i t i o n e r s are e n t i t l e d to r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r p r i v a t e lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a c r i m e . T h e i r r i g h t t o l i b e r t y u n d e r t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e g i v e s them t h e f u l l r i g h t t o engage in their conduct without i n t e r v e n t i o n of the government. 'It is a promise of the C o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t there i s a realm of p e r s o n a l liberty which the g o v e r n m e n t may not enter.' The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state i n t e r e s t which can j u s t i f y i t s i n t r u s i o n i n t o t h e p e r s o n a l and p r i v a t e l i f e o f t h e individual.' 37 1070531 " L a w r e n c e , 539 U.S. a t 5 7 8 , 123 S . C t . 2 4 7 2 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. [ 8 3 3 ] a t 8 4 7 , 112 S . C t . 2 7 9 1 [(1992)]). "In c o n t r a s t , t h e a c t i v i t i e s p r o h i b i t e d by t h e Alabama law a t i s s u e here a r e not l i m i t e d t o p r i v a t e s e x u a l conduct, o r t o any other a c t i v i t i e s o c c u r r i n g solely within the private lives of consenting adults. Instead, t h e a c t i v i t i e s p r o h i b i t e d by t h e law c o u l d v e r y w e l l be e x p o s e d t o t h e p u b l i c i n general, i n c l u d i n g t o m i n o r s . As t h e W i l l i a m s IV majority recognized, the d i f f e r e n c e s between this case and Lawrence a r e s i g n i f i c a n t . " 420 F. S u p p . In 2d a t 1253. Williams 2007)("Williams affirmed that criminalized distinguished The VI"), the decision observing forbade v. only court Morgan, the public 478 the Eleventh F.3d statute sexual Alabama commercial Court (11th struck After in Lawrence the Eleventh Circuit on activity. down Cir. of Appeals d i s t r i c t court. conduct, statute appealed. 1316 Circuit of the f e d e r a l t h e Texas private The p l a i n t i f f s a g a i n the ground that 478 F . 3 d a t 1 3 2 2 . stated: "The c h a l l e n g e d s t a t u t e d o e s n o t t a r g e t possession, use, o r even t h e g r a t u i t o u s d i s t r i b u t i o n of s e x u a l devices. In fact, p l a i n t i f f s here continue to possess and use such devices. States have traditionally had the authority to regulate c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y t h e y deem h a r m f u l t o t h e p u b l i c . S e e , e . g . , O h r a l i k v . O h i o S t a t e B a r A s s ' n , 436 U.S. 4 4 7 , 4 5 6 , 98 S . C t . 1 9 1 2 , 1 9 1 9 , 56 L . E d . 2 d 444 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ('[T]he S t a t e does n o t l o s e i t s power t o r e g u l a t e 38 i t 1070531 c o m m e r c i a l a c t i v i t y deemed h a r m f u l t o t h e public whenever speech i s a component of t h a t a c t i v i t y . ' ) . Thus, w h i l e public morality was an insufficient government i n t e r e s t to sustain the Texas sodomy s t a t u t e , because the c h a l l e n g e d s t a t u t e i n t h i s case does not target private activity, but public, commercial activity, the state's interest in p r o m o t i n g and p r e s e r v i n g p u b l i c m o r a l i t y r e m a i n s a sufficient rational basis." 478 F.3d at 1322-23. Determining regulate sufficient at activity Court "promoting F.3d post-Lawrence, commercial a c t i v i t y commercial Circuit that, of and is harmful Appeals held preserving rational basis 1322-23. The i f the to the public, may still the Eleventh interest in morality" remained a § 13A-12-200.2. stated: "[W]e do not read Lawrence, the overruling of B o w e r s , o r t h e L a w r e n c e c o u r t ' s r e l i a n c e on J u s t i c e S t e v e n s ' s d i s s e n t , to have r e n d e r e d p u b l i c m o r a l i t y altogether illegitimate as a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . The p r i n c i p l e t h a t ' [ t ] h e l a w ... i s c o n s t a n t l y b a s e d on n o t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y , ' B o w e r s , 478 U.S. a t 196, 106 S.Ct. a t 2 8 4 6 , was n o t a n n o u n c e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n B o w e r s and r e m a i n s i n f o r c e t o d a y . As we noted in Williams IV, t h e Supreme C o u r t has a f f i r m e d on repeated occasions t h a t l a w s c a n be b a s e d on m o r a l judgments. W i l l i a m s I V , 378 F . 3 d a t 1238 n. 8; see B a r n e s [ v . G l e n T h e a t r e , I n c . ] , 501 U.S. [560] at 569, 111 S . C t . [2456] a t 2462 [(19 9 1 ) ] ( u p h o l d i n g a p u b l i c i n d e c e n c y s t a t u t e , s t a t i n g , ' [ t ] h i s and other p u b l i c i n d e c e n c y s t a t u t e s were d e s i g n e d to p r o t e c t m o r a l s and p u b l i c order. The traditional police 39 the Alabama's for upholding court state state determines that that public a 478 1070531 p o w e r o f t h e S t a t e s i s d e f i n e d as t h e a u t h o r i t y t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e p u b l i c h e a l t h , s a f e t y , and morals, a n d we h a v e u p h e l d s u c h a b a s i s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n . ' ) ; id. ( n o t i n g t h a t 'a l e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y a c t ... t o p r o t e c t " t h e s o c i a l i n t e r e s t i n o r d e r and m o r a l i t y " ' ) ; G r e g g v . G e o r g i a , 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2 9 0 9 , 2 9 3 0 , 49 L . E d . 2 d 859 (1976) (upholding the death p e n a l t y , n o t i n g t h a t ' c a p i t a l punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct'); Paris Adult T h e a t r e I [ v . S l a t o n ] , 413 U.S. [49] a t 6 1 , 93 S.Ct. [2628] a t 2637 [ ( 1 9 7 3 ) ] ( h o l d i n g t h a t G e o r g i a had a l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t i n r e g u l a t i n g obscene m a t e r i a l because the l e g i s l a t u r e 'could l e g i t i m a t e l y act ... to protect "the social interest in order and morality"') ( q u o t i n g R o t h [v. U n i t e d States], 354 U.S. [476] at 485, 77 S.Ct. [1304] at 1309 [ ( 1 9 5 7 ) ] ) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . B a s s , 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S . C t . 515, 522, 30 L . E d . 2 d 488 (1971 ) (noting that ' c r i m i n a l punishment u s u a l l y represents the m o r a l condemnation of the community'). "Also, we have discussed the post-Lawrence v i a b i l i t y o f p u b l i c m o r a l i t y as a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n with approval. See L o f t o n v . S e c ' y o f t h e D e p t . o f C h i l d r e n and F a m i l y S e r v s . , 358 F.3d 8 04 , 81 9 n. 17 (2004 ) . I n L o f t o n , u p h o l d i n g a l a w p r o h i b i t i n g homosexual couples from adopting, we indicated that public morality likely remains a constitutionally rational basis for legislation: "'Florida also asserts that the statute is rationally related to its i n t e r e s t i n promoting p u b l i c morality both i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c h i l d r e a r i n g and i n t h e context of determining which types of households should be accorded legal r e c o g n i t i o n as f a m i l i e s . A p p e l l a n t s r e s p o n d that public morality c a n n o t s e r v e as a legitimate state interest [I]t is u n n e c e s s a r y f o r us t o r e s o l v e t h e q u e s t i o n . We do n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s 40 1070531 conclusion that there i s not only a legitimate i n t e r e s t , but a substantial government i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g o r d e r and m o r a l i t y , and i t s o b s e r v a t i o n that [ i ] n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are c o n s t i t u t e d to respond to the w i l l and c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e m o r a l v a l u e s o f the p e o p l e . ' "Id., 358 F . 3 d a t 819 n. 17 ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s and c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . We h a v e a l s o n o t e d : 'One w o u l d expect t h e Supreme C o u r t t o be m a n i f e s t l y more s p e c i f i c a n d a r t i c u l a t e t h a n i t was i n L a w r e n c e i f now such a traditional and significant jurisprudential principal has been jettisoned wholesale W i l l i a m s I V , 378 F . 3 d a t 1238 n. 8. "Accordingly, we find that public morality s u r v i v e s as a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r l e g i s l a t i o n e v e n a f t e r L a w r e n c e , a n d we f i n d t h a t i n t h i s c a s e t h e State's interest i n the p r e s e r v a t i o n of public m o r a l i t y remains a r a t i o n a l basis f o r the challenged statute. By u p h o l d i n g the s t a t u t e , we do not e n d o r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e A l a b a m a l e g i s l a t u r e . As we s t a t e d i n W i l l i a m s I I : "'However m i s g u i d e d t h e l e g i s l a t u r e o f Alabama may have been i n enacting the statute challenged in this case, the s t a t u t e i s not c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i r r a t i o n a l under r a t i o n a l b a s i s s c r u t i n y because i t i s rationally related to the State's l e g i t i m a t e power t o p r o t e c t i t s view of p u b l i c m o r a l i t y . "The C o n s t i t u t i o n p r e s u m e s that ... improvident decisions will e v e n t u a l l y be r e c t i f i e d by t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s and t h a t j u d i c i a l i n t e r v e n t i o n i s generally unwarranted no matter how u n w i s e l y we may t h i n k a p o l i t i c a l branch has a c t e d . " V a n c e v . B r a d l e y , 440 U.S. 9 3 , 97, 99 S . C t . 9 3 9 , 9 4 2 - 4 3 , 59 L . E d . 2 d 171 (1979). This C o u r t does not i n v a l i d a t e bad 41 1070531 or f o o l i s h p o l i c i e s , o n l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ones; we may not " s i t as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy d e t e r m i n a t i o n s made i n a r e a s t h a t n e i t h e r a f f e c t fundamental r i g h t s nor proceed along suspect l i n e s . " New O r l e a n s v . D u k e s , 427 U.S. 2 9 7 , 3 0 3 , 96 S . C t . 2 5 1 3 , 2 5 1 7 , 49 L.Ed.2d "Williams 511 (1976).' I I , 240 F . 3 d a t 9 5 2 . "CONCLUSION "For the foregoing reasons, we r e a f f i r m o u r holding i n Williams I I that the challenged statute i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d we a f f i r m t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e d i s t r i c t court." 478 F.3d a t 1323-24. In R e l i a b l e C o n s u l t a n t s , United a States Court of Appeals f o rthe F i f t h C i r c u i t constitutional illegal to s e l l , marketed challenge f o r sexual statutorily psychiatric, t o a Texas statute that advertise, give, or lend a device prove that the device a I n c . v . E a r l e , 517 F . 3 d 7 3 8 , t h e stimulation unless purpose, judicial, i . e . , a bona legislative, purpose. The Texas statute possession of sexual does devices. 42 made i t designed the defendant was s o l d , a d v e r t i s e d , g i v e n , defined addressed or or could or lent f o r fide medical, law-enforcement not p r o h i b i t the use or 1070531 The p l a i n t i f f s operators argued who sold that the because, they to engage in Reliable sexual devices statute governmental violated intimate intrusion. who The State rights of t h e i r of Appeals because of previous Connecticut, Court 479 people an that whom t h e y that the could for profit, not customers. which The Fifth served. citing failed Griswold I n G r i s w o l d , t h e Supreme Court who the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s tantamount without a ban plaintiffs, and t h a t home right invalidated The Fifth have h e l d t h a t b u s i n e s s e s customers item the to raise other cases Amendment argued precedent, (1965), on t h e u s e o f c o n t r a c e p t i v e s . standing They h e l d t h a t the s t a t e ' s argument Supreme 381 U.S. i n the of Texas devices recognized use. Fourteenth conduct sexual Court their the sold Circuit v. retail-store f o r off-premises the i n d i v i d u a l assert were a r g u e d , i t i n f r i n g e d upon an i n d i v i d u a l ' s in private plaintiffs, Consultants restricting to r e s t r i c t i n g were pharmacists, rights Circuit of the also had married noted that can a s s e r t the r i g h t s of the a b i l i t y to purchase the use of the item. In a d d r e s s i n g which c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a n d a r d t o a p p l y , the Fifth The Circuit plaintiffs first looked argued to the r i g h t that the 43 right that at was stake at stake. was an 1070531 individual's engage in p r i v a t e i n t i m a t e conduct f r e e from governmental i n t r u s i o n ; the state substantive defined one's the right genitals due-process narrowly for as right the non-medical to "'right purposes to stimulate unrelated to p r o c r e a t i o n o r o u t s i d e o f an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . ' " F.3d at 743. The Fifth the right as defined The Fifth Court's the Circuit Circuit narrowly stated decision that right sexual Lawrence, Lawrence 539 as at the sexual intimacy." recognized contours that sexual privacy to so do here." the 517 "Lawrence as stake F.3d at not at the and "to IV. Supreme construed be free 744 (quoting construed properly due 744. process The categorize n.32. and understood we The Fifth the do right to to Circuit right to not purport Fifth Circuit held: " B e c a u s e o f L a w r e n c e , t h e i s s u e b e f o r e us i s whether the Texas s t a t u t e i m p e r m i s s i b l y burdens the 44 Texas Circuit Fifth right, 745 by right F.3d is at did of ' t h e m o s t p r i v a t e human substantive F.3d State supra, the 517 The a fundamental 517 as regarding "Lawrence of guided Texas, 567). follows: explain i t was behavior.'" U.S. the d i d Alabama i n W i l l i a m s v. at from governmental i n t r u s i o n [conduct], as i n Lawrence constitutional noted that 517 1070531 i n d i v i d u a l ' s s u b s t a n t i v e due p r o c e s s r i g h t t o e n g a g e i n p r i v a t e i n t i m a t e conduct of h i s or her choosing. C o n t r a r y t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n , we h o l d that the Texas law burdens this constitutional right. An i n d i v i d u a l who wants t o l e g a l l y use a s a f e s e x u a l d e v i c e d u r i n g p r i v a t e i n t i m a t e moments alone or w i t h another i s unable to l e g a l l y purchase a device in Texas, which heavily burdens a constitutional right. This conclusion i s consistent w i t h the d e c i s i o n s i n C a r e y [v. P o p u l a t i o n S e r v i c e s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 431 U.S. 678 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , ] and Griswold, where the C o u r t h e l d t h a t r e s t r i c t i n g commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the e x e r c i s e of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Indeed, under t h i s s t a t u t e i t i s even i l l e g a l to ' l e n d ' or ' g i v e ' a sexual device to another person. This further r e s t r i c t s the e x e r c i s e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o e n g a g e i n p r i v a t e i n t i m a t e c o n d u c t i n t h e home f r e e from government i n t r u s i o n . It also undercuts any a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o n l y a f f e c t s p u b l i c conduct." 517 F.3d In Fifth at 744 reaching Circuit (footnote its Court governmental statute. The Fifth holding of asserted omitted). in Appeals Reliable examined interests Circuit in Consultants, a l l connection of Texas's with stated: "The State's primary justifications for the statute are 'morality based.' The asserted interests include 'discouraging prurient i n t e r e s t s in autonomous sex and the pursuit of sexual gratification unrelated to procreation and p r o h i b i t i n g the commercial s a l e of sex.' "These i n t e r e s t s i n ' p u b l i c m o r a l i t y ' cannot c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s u s t a i n the s t a t u t e a f t e r Lawrence. To u p h o l d t h e s t a t u t e w o u l d be t o i g n o r e t h e h o l d i n g 45 the the 1070531 in L a w r e n c e and allow the government to burden consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming i t m o r a l l y o f f e n s i v e . In Lawrence, Texas's o n l y a r g u m e n t was t h a t t h e a n t i - s o d o m y l a w r e f l e c t e d the moral judgment of the l e g i s l a t u r e . The Court e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d t h e S t a t e ' s r a t i o n a l e by a d o p t i n g J u s t i c e S t e v e n s ' v i e w i n B o w e r s as ' c o n t r o l l i n g ' a n d q u o t i n g J u s t i c e S t e v e n s ' s t a t e m e n t t h a t '"the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral i s not a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r u p h o l d i n g a law prohibiting the practice."' Thus, i f in Lawrence public morality was an insufficient justification for a law that restricted 'adult consensual intimacy in the home,' then public m o r a l i t y a l s o c a n n o t s e r v e as a r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r Texas's s t a t u t e , which a l s o r e g u l a t e s p r i v a t e sexual intimacy. " P e r h a p s r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t p u b l i c m o r a l i t y i s an insufficient justification f o r the statute after Lawrence, the State a s s e r t s t h a t an i n t e r e s t the statute s e r v e s i s the 'protection of minors and u n w i l l i n g a d u l t s f r o m e x p o s u r e t o s e x u a l d e v i c e s and their advertisement.' It i s undeniable that the g o v e r n m e n t has a c o m p e l l i n g interest in protecting c h i l d r e n from improper sexual e x p r e s s i o n . However, the S t a t e ' s generalized c o n c e r n f o r c h i l d r e n does n o t j u s t i f y s u c h a h e a v y - h a n d e d r e s t r i c t i o n on the e x e r c i s e of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o t e c t e d i n d i v i d u a l right. Ultimately, because we can divine no rational c o n n e c t i o n between the statute and the p r o t e c t i o n o f c h i l d r e n , and b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e o f f e r s none, we cannot sustain the law under this justification. "The a l l e g e d g o v e r n m e n t a l i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g ' u n w i l l i n g a d u l t s ' from exposure to sexual devices i s even l e s s c o n v i n c i n g . The C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e f u s e d to burden i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s out of c o n c e r n for the protection of 'unwilling recipients.' Furthermore, this asserted interest bears no 46 1070531 rational relation to sexual devices because device w i t h o u t making v i s i t a s t o r e a n d make t h e r e s t r i c t i o n on s a l e s o f an a d u l t c a n n o t b u y a s e x u a l the affirmative decision to the purchase. "The State argues that i f t h i s s t a t u t e , which proscribes the d i s t r i b u t i o n of sexual devices, i s struck down, i t i s equivalent to extending substantive due process protection to the 'commercial s a l e o f s e x . ' Not so. The s a l e o f a d e v i c e t h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l may c h o o s e t o u s e d u r i n g i n t i m a t e c o n d u c t w i t h a p a r t n e r i n t h e home i s n o t the 'sale of sex' ( p r o s t i t u t i o n ) . Following the S t a t e ' s l o g i c , t h e s a l e o f c o n t r a c e p t i v e s w o u l d be equivalent to the sale of sex because c o n t r a c e p t i v e s are intended t o be u s e d f o r t h e p u r s u i t o f s e x u a l gratification unrelated to procreation. This a r g u m e n t c a n n o t be a c c e p t e d as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o l i m i t the sale of contraceptives. The c o m p a r i s o n h i g h l i g h t s why t h e f o c u s o f o u r a n a l y s i s i s o n t h e b u r d e n t h e s t a t u t e p u t s on t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o make p r i v a t e d e c i s i o n s about consensual intimate conduct. Furthermore, there are j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r criminalizing prostitution other than public morality, including promoting public s a f e t y and p r e v e n t i n g i n j u r y and c o e r c i o n . " J u s t as i n L a w r e n c e , t h e S t a t e h e r e wants t o use i t s laws t o enforce a p u b l i c m o r a l code by r e s t r i c t i n g p r i v a t e intimate conduct. The c a s e i s not about p u b l i c s e x . I t i s n o t about c o n t r o l l i n g commerce i n s e x . I t i s a b o u t c o n t r o l l i n g what p e o p l e do i n t h e p r i v a c y o f t h e i r own homes b e c a u s e the State i s m o r a l l y opposed t o a c e r t a i n type of consensual p r i v a t e intimate conduct. T h i s i s an insufficient justification f o r the statute after Lawrence. " I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e Texas sexual devices t h e m s e l v e s as their sale. Nothing here s a i d public display of material 47 s t a t u t e cannot define obscene and p r o h i b i t or held protects the that i s obscene as 1070531 d e f i n e d b y t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t -- i . e . , t h e language in Section 4 3 . 2 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) of t h i s s t a t u t e , excluding t h e w o r d s i n t h e p r o v i s i o n d e f i n i n g as o b s c e n e any d e v i c e d e s i g n e d or marketed f o r s e x u a l stimulation. W h a t e v e r one m i g h t t h i n k o r b e l i e v e a b o u t t h e u s e o f these devices, government i n t e r f e r e n c e with their p e r s o n a l and p r i v a t e use v i o l a t e s t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . " 517 F.3d at 745-47 concluded that and the upholding constitutional It is (footnotes the law standard clear from Reliable Consultants Lawrence v. Texas Extreme Assocs., a federal obscenity). holding Due and did fundamental 521 U.S. is 702 in debate about See F.3d 150 regulated because the VI and the scope of United States v. Cir. the 2005)(upholding distribution Supreme based its liberty under the U.S. at applicable to F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t , " 539 the two-step articulated in In sum, the ... analysis Washington Fifth of Court the apply of Texas. Williams also (3d v. "exercise not 3 Lawrence applicable the of (1997). in the open. 431 so meet the that Clause rights not The discussions that i n L a w r e n c e on Process 564, This enacting announced remains statute Circuit do the Inc., Fifth governmental i n t e r e s t s i n asserted omitted). v. Circuit Glucksberg, interpreted I n G l u c k s b e r g , the p e t i t i o n e r s c h a l l e n g e d the State of Washington's ban on assisted suicide as patently unconstitutional because, they argued, i t violated the " ' l i b e r t y t o c h o o s e how to d i e . ' " 521 U.S. a t 722 (quoting 3 48 1070531 Lawrence broadly, narrowly. we and I t i s the the Eleventh Eleventh Circuit Circuit's interpreted i t view of Lawrence that embrace. In adopting the Eleventh i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f L a w r e n c e and Circuit Court of Appeals' that court's subsequent holding that public morality supplies a legitimate rational basis for the s t a t u t e , we for the Eleventh note Circuit the f o l l o w i n g : The recognized that Court the of A p p e a l s statute in Lawrence c r i m i n a l i z e d p r i v a t e s e x u a l a c t i v i t y w h i l e the Alabama s t a t u t e prohibits p u b l i c , commercial does prohibit not distribution" 1322. The of the sexual Eleventh activity. personal devices. Circuit did use Section of or Williams not "the VI, 13A-12-200.2 gratuitous 478 F.3d at i n t e r p r e t Lawrence as b r i e f of r e s p o n d e n t s ) . The S u p r e m e C o u r t d e f i n e d t h e i s s u e as " w h e t h e r t h e ' l i b e r t y ' s p e c i a l l y p r o t e c t e d b y t h e Due Process Clause includes a right to commit s u i c i d e which itself i n c l u d e s a r i g h t t o a s s i s t a n c e i n d o i n g s o " and c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r i g h t t o a s s i s t e d s u i c i d e was n o t a f u n d a m e n t a l l i b e r t y interest. 521 U.S. at 723. In i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the Supreme C o u r t drew f r o m i t s e s t a b l i s h e d method o f s u b s t a n t i v e d u e - p r o c e s s a n a l y s i s and a r t i c u l a t e d a two-step a n a l y s i s : F i r s t , i n a n a l y z i n g a r e q u e s t f o r a new f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t , t h e C o u r t must l o o k a t a " c a r e f u l d e s c r i p t i o n " of the asserted r i g h t and, s e c o n d , t h e C o u r t must examine w h e t h e r t h e a s s e r t e d r i g h t i s one o f " t h o s e f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s w h i c h a r e , o b j e c t i v e l y , ' d e e p l y r o o t e d i n t h i s N a t i o n ' s h i s t o r y and tradition,' ... and 'implicit i n the concept of ordered l i b e r t y , ' such t h a t ' n e i t h e r l i b e r t y nor j u s t i c e would e x i s t i f t h e y w e r e s a c r i f i c e d . ' " 521 U.S. at 720-21. 49 1070531 eliminating public determining the court public as a constitutionality the morality of recognized that morality invalidated as only a to the laws noncommercial a c t i v i t y . commercial activity, conduct. Also, discrete of class simple Alabama banning 1975, United II. the does States Does § 1901? Love statute no state through violate private and both in but the hold the of private sexual involved that the the left in its a statute i t to the view, any process. § 13A-12-200.2, Process out in enacting i t a "endorse not democratic Due public i s targeted did rectify, we i t for discrimination Circuit to interest, Lawrence class devices, foregoing, not such Clause Ala. of the Constitution. 13A-12-200.2 v i o l a t e Stuff in Legislature sexual legislation B a s e d on Code of this improvident regulation Eleventh Alabama sale of where The the the citizens Texas hostility, of the rejected 13A-12-200.2 i n v o l v e s individuals targeted statute. judgment" not the of Section involved for Although Lawrence governmental that basis legislation. extent that legitimate those rational argues that § the Alabama 13A-12-200.2, Constitution Ala. v i o l a t e s the Alabama C o n s t i t u t i o n under t h i s C o u r t ' s 50 Code of 1975, reasoning 1070531 in State Love v. Lupo, Stuff under argues the rights explored persons 2 d 395 ( A l a . 2007). in addition under the the rights choice Alabamians Alabama of Alabamians "where to Love that c e r t a i n terms used i n t h e g e n e r a l ban toys in § are Alabama Constitution. statute violates Alabama In Interior Lupo, supra, Design ("the Love as certain and contract void argues is argues of the s a l e Stuff with activity Stuff also t o be that of sex under the that the Constitution. the Last, have expressive so v a g u e enumerated Constitution L o v e S t u f f ' s b r i e f , p. 22. 13A-12-200.2 Specifically, to the r i g h t s Constitution, their of involved." So. that, Federal additional Lupo 984 separation-of-powers the State Board") decorator, a l l e g i n g that Board sued provisions of of Registration Diane Lupo, an registering allegations because, she and she had v i o l a t e d t h e A l a b a m a I n t e r i o r with asserted argued, interest for interior D e s i g n Consumer P r o t e c t i o n A c t by p r a c t i c i n g " i n t e r i o r without the the that i t was Board. the overly act Lupo was broad i n v i o l a t i o n o f due and her liberty the l e g i s l a t u r e h a d p a s s e d an a c t t o r e g u l a t e 51 design" denied the unconstitutional deprived process. In her of 1982, the p r a c t i c e of 1070531 interior design, complied with hold not prohibit 1982 of individuals interior held sued that design only those engaging 2001, the restricting the in the 1982 practice use intertwined 984 So. we held 2d t h e a c t was with a t 407, that unnecessary and of regulated trial, The Board act the practice to only those In 2002, trial n o t be imposed unreasonable upon i t was "overly this and of t h e a c t were of the severed. [a]ct," Specifically, restrictions the the court a p p e a l e d , and the remaining p o r t i o n s ' of title u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y overbroad they could the act d i d the the the unconstitutional i n that and v a g u e . " could The the p r a c t i c e a bench who l e g i s l a t u r e repealed a c t , which Following t h e a c t was that designers." t h a t , because the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s "'so persons had been c e r t i f i e d by t h e B o a r d . Lupo. held that restricted a new by broad, unreasonable Court In adopted i n d i v i d u a l s who from i t merely designer." a c t and Board o u t as " i n t e r i o r design; "interior provided the r e g i s t r a t i o n procedures under the act themselves interior which that pursuit of were useful activities; t h a t those r e s t r i c t i o n s d i d not bear a s u b s t a n t i a l relation the general to welfare, public the health, public safety, or m o r a l s , convenience, 52 or to or the to the general 1070531 prosperity; and that, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y overbroad Alabama therefore, the act was u n d e r A r t . I , §§ 6 a n d 1 3 , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1901. Love Stuff concurrence relies i n Lupo, primarily supra, on J u s t i c e i n w h i c h he Parker's special wrote: "The framers o f t h e A l a b a m a C o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1901 p r o t e c t e d economic l i b e r t i e s and o t h e r l i b e r t i e s i n t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e o f A r t . I , § 6 ('[He] s h a l l n o t ... b e d e p r i v e d o f l i f e , l i b e r t y , o r p r o p e r t y , except b y due p r o c e s s of law'), using language s i m i l a r t o t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e s o f t h e F i f t h a n d Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But they also protected economic l i b e r t i e s b y a d o p t i n g A r t . I , § 1 ( ' T h a t a l l men a r e e q u a l l y f r e e and independent; t h a t t h e y a r e endowed by t h e i r C r e a t o r w i t h c e r t a i n i n a l i e n a b l e rights; t h a t among t h e s e a r e l i f e , l i b e r t y a n d t h e p u r s u i t o f h a p p i n e s s . ' ) , § 13 ( ' T h a t a l l c o u r t s s h a l l b e open; and t h a t e v e r y p e r s o n , f o r any i n j u r y done t o him, i n h i s l a n d s , goods, p e r s o n , and r e p u t a t i o n , s h a l l h a v e a remedy b y due p r o c e s s o f l a w ; a n d r i g h t and justice shall be a d m i n i s t e r e d w i t h o u t sale, denial, o r d e l a y . ' ) , § 22 ('That no ... l a w , i m p a i r i n g t h e o b l i g a t i o n s o f c o n t r a c t s ... s h a l l b e passed by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' ) , § 23 ( ' p r i v a t e property shall n o t be t a k e n f o r , or applied to p u b l i c u s e , u n l e s s j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n b e f i r s t made t h e r e f o r ; n o r s h a l l p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y be t a k e n f o r p r i v a t e use, or f o r the use of c o r p o r a t i o n s , other than m u n i c i p a l , w i t h o u t t h e consent o f t h e owner,' t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g p r o t e c t i o n t h a t goes beyond those f o u n d i n t h e ' t a k i n g s ' c l a u s e o f t h e F i f t h Amendment to the United States Constitution), § 35 ('That [the] sole object and o n l y l e g i t i m a t e end o f government i s to protect the c i t i z e n i n the e n j o y m e n t o f l i f e , l i b e r t y , a n d p r o p e r t y , a n d when the government assumes other functions i t is 53 1070531 u s u r p a t i o n a n d o p p r e s s i o n . ' ) , a n d § 36 ('That t h i s enumeration of c e r t a i n r i g h t s s h a l l not impair or deny o t h e r s r e t a i n e d by t h e p e o p l e ; and, t o g u a r d against any e n c r o a c h m e n t s on the r i g h t s herein retained, we declare that everything in this D e c l a r a t i o n of Rights i s excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate.')." 984 So. 2d a t 4 0 8 - 0 9 . special concurrence provisions that Love We includes note that and 2000). that precedes Sections impair that or Alabamian without In violates deny will and, specifically, Ex p a r t e i t and t h e g e n e r a l to exercise be on of government rights. deprived of powers judicial C r a n m a n , 792 S o . 2 d 3 9 2 , 1 t h r o u g h 35 o f A r t i c l e branch those 36, a f i r e w a l l between the Section life, has 6 401 I s e t out b a s i c r i g h t s guaranteed to a l l Alabamians, no Parker's of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l of A r t . I , § i n c l u d i n g the a u t h o r i t y fundamental provides summation Justice i n i t s counterclaim. power, t h a t f o l l o w i t . " (Ala. a " [ s ] e c t i o n 36 e r e c t s of Rights government, a summation r i g h t s to Alabamians Stuff relied Declaration of includes granting his writing which Love S t u f f notes t h a t a n d § 36 the a u t h o r i t y to ensures no liberty, or that property due p r o c e s s o f l a w . i t s brief, § 35 Love Stuff ("that the s o l e argues object 54 that and o n l y § 13A-12-200.2 l e g i t i m a t e end 1070531 of government life, i s to liberty, and the general ban on its r i g h t to s e l l protect the property the ...."). Court the d e v i c e s , but Lupo, supra, could requirement for S t u f f argues a l s o the clarified create interior an rights Alabama's i n Lupo then i t should for "medical, or law at 1268 use. n. of to exception designers to for but that sexual nonregistered p e r m i s s i b l e to s e l l scientific, 47, note the the to f o r any Williams s t a t u t e does or sexual this in incidental sale, I I I , 220 offer 55 or design which this designers, not only judicial, F. Supp. 2d reasons. not regardless person to knowingly distribute, citizens registration sexual devices for personal devices, only interest educational, legislative, purposes," also of interior forbid of the A l s o , § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) provides unlawful intent be enforcement We or use extended not Love S t u f f argues t h a t i f the a s s i s t a n c e made i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a r e t a i l Court limits of that Love S t u f f contends t h a t p r o t e c t i n g commercial a c t i v i t y . legislature Love enjoyment Love S t u f f i n p u r c h a s i n g f o r t h e i r p r i v a t e use. in i n the s a l e of s e x u a l d e v i c e s to c o n t r a c t with vendors l i k e devices citizen the reason that "[i]t distribute, agree to possession for their shall be possess with distribute any 1070531 o b s c e n e m a t e r i a l o r any primarily thing value"; thus, an for a sexual Alabama violates a even i f consumers use purpose. on Lupo, to devices pursue i n which Stuff Love devices argues the for to purchase personal happiness. restriction Love on use Stuff interior an u n n e c e s s a r y a n d u n r e a s o n a b l e l i m i t a t i o n a substantial relation or to the general so, the o f an A l a b a m a c i t i z e n sexual right supra, Even p u r s u i t of u s e f u l a c t i v i t i e s morals, the vendor citizen's d e c o r a t o r s was bear any designed t h a t p r o h i b i t i n g the a b i l i t y the organs f o r massagers t h a t are not p r i m a r i l y marketed or i s allowed, the useful devices, primarily relies o r m a r k e t e d as s a l e of c e r t a i n s e x u a l use, from designed s t i m u l a t i o n o f human g e n i t a l of p e c u n i a r y s u c h as for f o r the device general be u p h e l d i f the r e s t r i c t i o n personal use justify the further argues without limits a restriction that and a the the restriction did public health, safety, w e l f a r e , the p u b l i c convenience, p r o s p e r i t y . The serves to and upon State argues t h a t the on t h e s a l e of s e x u a l d e v i c e s for on right t h a t the important to happiness. right restriction 56 or can interest citizen's or statute public the not to on enough The happiness the s a l e of to State is not sexual 1070531 devices set i s grounded i n the shared out i n t h e laws enacted by t h e i r The r i g h t a d d r e s s e d opportunity determined t o work that Lupo b r o a d l y and t o make in interior upon turn, case, devices restriction i n the statute The p o l i c e power. reasonable health, State this Court on t h a t right to include the s e l e c t i o n c o l o r s , and i t r e g u l a t e d without a to provide valid sale, reason, services. on an In the the sale of does n o t c o n s t i t u t e an u n r e a s o n a b l e r e s t r a i n t in a field safety, and The a c t a t i s s u e i n legislature's restraint to c o n t r a c t enact living, design and p a i n t right the i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t State's a interest. restricted, the as representatives. when t h e y w e r e n o t r e l a t e d t o a r e t a i l decorator's present sexual interior accessories those a c t i v i t i e s which, elected the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s r e s t r i c t i o n defined decorative of the people i n L u p o was t h e r i g h t t o p u r s u e t h e was n o t r e l a t e d t o a n y p u b l i c of morality that involves expressive or the r i g h t a c t i v i t y ; the as an e x e r c i s e of the s e t t l e d that the State f o r the promotion regulations that happiness is justified I t i s well and morals contends to pursue of and g e n e r a l l y i t has a g e n e r a l forpublic welfare may public welfare. interest in p r o t e c t i n g minors and u n w i l l i n g a d u l t s from exposure t o s e x u a l 57 1070531 devices. Love R e s t r i c t i n g the Stuff argues, commercial people of and place collaterally in addition adult-only 1975, i s so also contends sale of sex to vague as that toys) to § regard We the that this does not, burdens personal on choices the that § are phrase as the of the trial "other form Ala. Code 13A-12-200.5(4), the s u c h as the statute (which void, Love generally because certain Stuff bans properly "stimulation," vague. too The 4 raise a State court's order the undefined "device," and contends "void-for-vagueness" to § 13A-12-200.2 b e f o r e the did not trial court. specifically argument. In response to the raise in render statute argument w i t h not affected i s rendered void Love S t u f f d i d not address devices "unreasonable 13A-12-200.2 "human g e n i t a l o r g a n s , " note sexual arguing enterprise" terms used i n the that of Alabama." Next, of sale State's argument below, contention Love Stuff that Love S t u f f states did in i t s reply S e c t i o n 13A-12-200.5(4) p r o v i d e s t h a t i t i s u n l a w f u l f o r any p e r s o n t o o p e r a t e a d u l t b o o k s t o r e s , a d u l t m o v i e h o u s e s , a d u l t v i d e o s t o r e s , "or o t h e r form of a d u l t - o n l y enterprise" w i t h i n 1,000 f e e t of c e r t a i n e s t a b l i s h m e n t s l i k e s c h o o l s and churches. The t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p h r a s e " o t h e r form of adult-only enterprise" was so vague as to be unconstitutional. 4 58 1070531 brief that the State was placed on void-for-vagueness challenge following § of Love 13A-12-200.2 Stuff's i n i t s pleading: statement to notice by the "Wherefore, to the extent that Hoover's complaint implicates § 13A-12A-200.2, Code of Alabama 1975, with respect to [Love Stuff's] b u s i n e s s a n d p u r c h a s e s made b y i t s c u s t o m e r s , e i t h e r alone or in conjunction with the attempted a p p l i c a t i o n o f § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 5 ( 4 ) , Code o f A l a b a m a , 1975, [Love S t u f f ] seeks a d e c l a r a t i o n by t h i s C o u r t pursuant to § 6-6-223, Code o f A l a b a m a , 1975, b o t h f a c i a l l y and as a p p l i e d by H o o v e r i n t h i s cause, b o t h s t a n d i n g a l o n e and by r e f e r e n c e i n S e c t i o n 11¬ 31 o f t h e M u n i c i p a l Code o f t h e C i t y o f H o o v e r , Alabama, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under both the Alabama and U n i t e d S t a t e s Constitutions." Love S t u f f motion that We was also states challenged with the does in p . 7.) undefined Love motion. the that same Nothing terms Stuff contention § 13A-12-200.2 manner as § vague and o v e r b r o a d . " make Love S t u f f ' s challenged Love S t u f f ' s on n o t i c e unconstitutionally brief, i t argued i n i t s summary-judgment § 13A-12-200.2 v i o l a t e d t h e Alabama disagree placed that i n Love S t u f f ' s used that in § bare h i n t as u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 59 that that "could the State likewise be 13A-12-200.5(4) as (Love Stuff's reply complaint alleges 13A-12-200.2 argument Constitution. were that vague, nor i n i t s summary-judgment § 13A-12-200.2 could be v a g u e i n t h e same m a n n e r as 1070531 it was put challenging the State It first § 13A-12-200.5(4) on n o t i c e of Love i s well s e t t l e d that time on was insufficient Stuff's an i s s u e to the challenge. c a n n o t be r a i s e d f o r t h e appeal. "The r u l e i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e m u s t be r a i s e d a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l a n d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t m u s t b e g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r u l e on t h e i s s u e , o r some o b j e c t i o n m u s t b e made t o t h e f a i l u r e of the court to issue a r u l i n g , i n order to properly preserve that issue f o r appellate review. T h i s C o u r t s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d t h i s r u l e as f o l l o w s : " ' I n o r d e r f o r an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o r e v i e w a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l issue, that issue must have been r a i s e d by the appellant and p r e s e n t e d t o and r e v i e w e d by t h e trial court. A d d i t i o n a l l y , i n order to challenge the constitutionality of a s t a t u t e , an a p p e l l a n t m u s t i d e n t i f y a n d make s p e c i f i c a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g what s p e c i f i c r i g h t s i t c l a i m s have been v i o l a t e d . ' " A l a b a m a P o w e r Co. v . T u r n e r , 1991)(citations omitted.)" C o o l e y v. Knapp, Last, Love 607 Stuff separation-of-powers of So. 2d 146, argues 575 148 that provisions statute the Alabama 1901 s e t o u t i n A r t . I I I , §§ 42 a n d 4 3 . that i t should bench t r i a l laws have been showing that regarding the sale allowed t h e 1998 of sexual 60 2d 551 ( A l a . ( A l a . 1992). the of So. violates Constitution Love S t u f f to present evidence amendments t o t h e devices were the asserts at the obscenity suggested to 1070531 the sponsor by a district attorney, should of the b i l l attorney. Love Stuff argues that a s a member o f t h e e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h n o t engage We p r o p o s i n g t h e amendments a n d note that in legislative sources drafted the d i s t r i c t of government, activities. of ideas for legislation can vary greatly: "A l e g i s l a t o r may r e a d a n e w s p a p e r a c c o u n t o f a problem. A c o n s t i t u e n t may b r i n g a p r o b l e m t o t h e legislator's attention. A state employee may suggest a change i n t h e law t h a t would a l l o w t h e a g e n c y t o manage t h e p e o p l e ' s b u s i n e s s b e t t e r . A public official may have a p o l i t i c a l agenda t o implement through l e g i s l a t i o n . An organization, s u c h a s t h e N a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e o f C o m m i s s i o n e r s on U n i f o r m S t a t e L a w s , may o f f e r i d e a s . I n some c a s e s , ... t h e l e g i s l a t u r e h a s c r e a t e d a g r o u p s p e c i f i c a l l y to develop ideas f o r l e g i s l a t i o n . In every case, h o w e v e r , an i d e a c a n b e c o m e a l a w o n l y t h r o u g h t h e efforts of a person o r an e n t i t y who has t h e authority to convert the idea into a b i l l f o r the legislature to consider. That stage of t h e p r o c e s s involves sponsorship." Gregory Chainov, L. How a n I d e a R e a l l y B e c o m e s Law, 36 W i l l a m e t t e R e v . 1 8 5 , 187 The source (2000)(footnotes omitted). of the idea legislation does provisions. As t h e S t a t e n o t e d a proposed suggested bill by not that may i s the impetus implicate suggest the L e g i s l a t i v e the the sponsor i n addition Reference 61 separation-of-powers in i t s brief, changes f o r proposed Service to of changes o r by legal 1070531 counsel. Also, houses the of g o v e r n o r may with full v e t o the legislator Res., Inc., Todd, 267 to their legislature well in trial court, settled rule 809 (Ala. So. 2d the this that of and 19 in legislature 103 2d 522, So. 525, the at 192 28 motives of 274, 276 A c c o r d i n g l y , Love S t u f f 200.2 v i o l a t e s the Alabama of the 1 982). or the Terra James trial to court stated: "'It is the validity into the of affirming the the course members t h e r e o f . of ... Ala. a an motives or "The legislative discretion, l e g i s l a t o r s . " ' " 267 the judgment of inquire v. testify intent not or v. In the ( q u o t i n g M o r g a n C o u n t y v. So. intent In j u d i c i a l department cannot c o n t r o l into an Eagerton determining will of legislature purpose act. reasons the (1958), the Court reasons inquire to 8 07 , judiciary the relevant or bill." enactment, the of motives the passing The legislature not motive both the "The members in held. 103 allow bill are 2d 495, a hearings passing So. Ala. amend send i t back to and are in 426 concerning the bill may Public changes. legislature refused legislators legislature. suggested individual of other nor at 506, E d m o n s o n , 238 Ala. (1939)). has failed to Constitution. 62 show t h a t § 13A-12- 1070531 Conclusion To summarize, in constitutional challenge interpretation given Court of Appeals rejecting Lawrence can s t i l l for commercial As "There nothing is advertising is just by t h e U n i t e d Circuit. s e r v e as a l e g i t i m a t e activity, the Eleventh Circuit 'private' or which likely to adults.'" be rational i s not a i n Williams 378 to F . 3 d a t 1237 n. failed t o show that stated: about violated OPINION as to In r e j e c t i n g we h o l d the statute the and s a l e children 8. basis private IV 'consensual' exhibited States Post-Lawrence, Love S t u f f ' s s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e , Stuff federal and s a l e o f a d i l d o . And such a d v e r t i s i n g as 'consenting v. Texas f o r the Eleventh activity. Stuff's t o § 1 3 A - 1 2 - 2 0 0 . 2 , we a g r e e w i t h t h e public morality regulating Love SEPTEMBER that Love the Alabama Constitution. APPLICATION GRANTED; WITHDRAWN; O P I N I O N Lyons, Stuart, SUBSTITUTED; Smith, OF Murdock, concur. J . , dissent. 63 2009, AFFIRMED. Parker, Cobb, C . J . , and W o o d a l l , 11, and Shaw, J J . , 1070531 WOODALL, J u s t i c e I agree authority Court's (dissenting). with the majority regarding holding t h e scope i n Lawrence that there i s a of the United v. Texas, split States 5 3 9 U.S. Supreme 558 (2003). However, u n l i k e t h e m a j o r i t y , I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e U n i t e d Court of Appeals f o r the F i f t h Circuit Lawrence i n R e l i a b l e C o n s u l t a n t s , (5th C i r . 2008). As as a recognized [conduct], 744 right intrusion sexual (quoting Circuit, sexual privacy Fourteenth In opinion, banning be recognized free private Reliable Consultants, 5 3 9 U.S. at 567). from human 517 F . 3 d This right of i n t i m a c y i n t h e home," L a w r e n c e , 5 3 9 by Amendment." my generally protected to ' t h e most U.S. a t 5 6 4 , was g r o u n d e d u p o n t h e " v i t a l and dissent. Lawrence "right regarding Lawrence, "adult consensual I n c . v . E a r l e , 517 F . 3 d 738 the behavior.'" States correctly interpreted I respectfully by t h e F i f t h constitutional governmental at Therefore, of the Due interests Process in liberty Clause of the Id. § 13A-12-200.2, the sale of sexual burdens the individual's engage i n private intimate devices, substantive conduct 64 A l a . Code due 1975, by "impermissibly process of h i s or her right to choosing." 1070531 Reliable Consultants, " [ a ] n i n d i v i d u a l who during private unable to heavily burdens legally v. Morgan, to the "the activity the F.3d More specifically, a safe sexual alone or device with in device another [Alabama], right." reasoning and f o r the 1316 (11th Lawrence the is the holding Eleventh not of the Circuit C i r . 2007). Alabama activity." majority, is which Id. in Thus, controlling is statute So. important 3d at Williams according because, prohibits . because This, "to the United s t a t u t e i n Lawrence c r i m i n a l i z e d p r i v a t e while commercial 744. the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of § 13A-12-200.2, majority, reasons, a a constitutional of Appeals 478 at moments purchase m a j o r i t y embraces the Court F.3d wants t o l e g a l l y use intimate In u p h o l d i n g States 517 i t sexual public, according the extent to that L a w r e n c e r e j e c t e d p u b l i c m o r a l i t y as a l e g i t i m a t e g o v e r n m e n t a l interest, private i t i n v a l i d a t e d only and those laws noncommercial a c t i v i t y . " o p i n i o n , the m a j o r i t y ' s focus that So. statute places on p r i v a t e s e x u a l clear United "Supreme Court to purchase an restricting the States ability at i s u n d u l y n a r r o w and burden the that 3d involved 65 In ignores activity. cases item . both hold my the It is that i s tantamount ... to 1070531 restricting at that item's use." Lawrence hostility, Court where equal no So. without of Appeals holding a targeted statute." distinction finds i t significant involved [homosexuals] its Consultants, 517 F.3d 743. The m a j o r i t y in Reliable 3d class protection." Cobb, C . J . , class . In my As on substantive Consultants, concurs. 66 statute individuals out of simple i n the Alabama opinion, t h e Supreme C o u r t Reliable of i s targeted significance. [ i n Lawrence] "the Texas discrimination at any noted, discrete for such that this the F i f t h "explicitly due 517 is Circuit rested process, F.3d at a not 744.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
