Wachovia Bank, N.A., and American Casualty Company v. Jones, Morrison & Womack, P.C., et al.

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

REL: 09/25/2009 REL: 01/22/2010 as m o d i f i e d on o v e r r u l i n g o f r e h e a r i n g Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o f o r m a l r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter of Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA SPECIAL TERM, 2009 1061289 Wachovia Bank, N.A., and A m e r i c a n C a s u a l t y Company v. Jones, M o r r i s o n & Womack, P.C., e t a l . Appeal from Mobile C i r c u i t (CV-01-2163) SMITH, Justice. Wachovia SouthTrust Bank Bank, N.A., ("the B a n k " ) , the Morrison Morrison" successor by merger and American C a s u a l t y a p p e a l f r o m a judgment as a m a t t e r Jones, Court o flaw entered & Womack, P.C., a G e o r g i a o r "the Jones Morrison firm"), to Company 1 i nfavor o f lawfirm ("Jones and J . P a u l Clinton A m e r i c a n C a s u a l t y Company, t h e i n s u r a n c e company f o r S o u t h T r u s t Bank, i s a c o - a p p e l l a n t w i t h W a c h o v i a ; Wachovia a n d American Casualty f i l e d j o i n t b r i e f s i n t h i s appeal. 1 1061289 and Stokes P.C., & Clinton, Clinton sometimes affirm firm") referred and Stokes (hereinafter to c o l l e c t i v e l y i n part, reverse Facts This appeal SouthTrust as & Clinton, Clinton" or "the a l l the appellees as "the lawyers"). are We i n p a r t , and remand. and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y i s t h e second the u n d e r l y i n g case. background, 2d (Clinton 2 a r e r e f e r r e d t o c o l l e c t i v e l y as "Stokes Stokes in P.C. stated Bank v. J o n e s , round of appellate The f o l l o w i n g by the Court factual of proceedings and p r o c e d u r a l Civil Appeals M o r r i s o n , Womack & D e a r i n g , 885 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) , i s relevant in 939 S o . here: "In 1993, [ S o u t h T r u s t ] Bank i s s u e d a b u s i n e s s c r e d i t c a r d t o L a C o s t e C o n s t r u c t i o n Company, I n c . ('LCCI'), l o c a t e d i n M o b i l e , Alabama. LCCI a u t h o r i z e d nine o f i t s employees, i n c l u d i n g Brewton Neal Greene, t o use the credit card. None o f t h e n i n e employees, i n c l u d i n g G r e e n e , was a g u a r a n t o r o f t h e c r e d i t - c a r d i n d e b t e d n e s s , a n d n o n e was p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e f o r a n y o f t h e c h a r g e s made o n t h e c r e d i t c a r d . When L C C I f a i l e d t o make p a y m e n t s o n i t s c r e d i t - c a r d a c c o u n t , the Bank employed t h e A t l a n t a , G e o r g i a , l a w f i r m o f J o n e s , M o r r i s o n , Womack & D e a r i n g , P.C. ( ' t h e J o n e s , Morrison f i r m ' ) , t o c o l l e c t the debt. The B a n k s e n t the Jones, Morrison firm i t s file on t h e LCCI account. The f i l e included a guaranty agreement t h a t named L C C I a n d N e a l G r e e n e a s ' b o r r o w e r s ' a n d that was signed by Vincent D. LaCoste as 'guarantor.' Stokes & Clinton, P.C., C l i n t o n , Fleming & Sherling. 2 2 i s the successor to Stokes, 1061289 "Upon r e c e i v i n g t h e L C C I c o l l e c t i o n f i l e from the Bank, Saundra M o r r i s o n , the o f f i c e manager a t t h e J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m , w r o t e a l e t t e r on A u g u s t 9, 1 9 9 9 , t o S a n d r a N a s h , an e m p l o y e e i n t h e B a n k ' s r e c o v e r y d e p a r t m e n t , i n q u i r i n g as f o l l o w s : " ' P u r s u a n t t o y o u r n o t e , t h e a b o v e Company has a p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t e e . Do we h a v e a guarantee f o r a l l nine i n d i v i d u a l [ s ] that a r e s i g n e d on t h e i n d i v i d u a l a c c o u n t s o r do we just have a personal guarantee on V i n c e n t D. L a C o s t e ? Please a d v i s e . ' "On August 23, 1999, Sezette Spivey, a l e g a l - a c c o u n t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r the Bank, w r o t e t o B i l l M o r r i s o n , an a t t o r n e y i n t h e J o n e s , Morrison f i r m , as f o l l o w s : "'In response to the letter from your o f f i c e d a t e d A u g u s t 9, 1 9 9 9 : Attached you will find a copy of the Guaranty of Payment. I f you have any q u e s t i o n s , p l e a s e f e e l free to c a l l . ' "A d o c u m e n t e n t i t l e d with Spivey's l e t t e r following: ' G u a r a n t y of Payment' e n c l o s e d s t a t e s , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , the "'To i n d u c e B a n k t o make a l o a n o r extend credit or make other financial products or s e r v i c e s a v a i l a b l e to LaCoste Construction Co., Inc.--Neal Greene (as hereinafter further defined, called the "Borrower"), Guarantor hereby agrees with B a n k as f o l l o w s : " ' 1 . T h i s G u a r a n t y i s made f o r t h e purpose of securing to Borrower, at Guarantor's r e q u e s t , one o r m o r e l o a n s o r e x t e n s i o n s o f c r e d i t w i t h ... B a n k A l l such l o a n s or o t h e r f i n a n c i a l p r o d u c t s or s e r v i c e s now o r h e r e a f t e r p r o v i d e d b y B a n k 3 1061289 to Borrower, and a l l e x t e n s i o n s or renewals o f d e b t s o r o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s now o r a t a n y t i m e h e r e a f t e r owing by B o r r o w e r t o Bank, are made b y B a n k i n reliance on this Guaranty "'2. G u a r a n t o r j o i n t l y and s e v e r a l l y i f more t h a n o n e , h e r e b y unconditionally guarantees to Bank the payment and performance by Borrower of a l l the Guaranteed Obligations (as hereinafter defined) ' " L a C o s t e ' s s i g n a t u r e on t h e g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t i s not accompanied by a t y p e w r i t t e n v e r s i o n of h i s name. S p i v e y knew t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e was t h a t o f L a C o s t e , b u t she d i d n o t i n f o r m t h e Jones, M o r r i s o n firm of that fact. She a l s o d i d n o t s e n d t h e J o n e s , Morrison firm a copy of the other guaranty agreements, e a c h b e a r i n g t h e name o f a d i f f e r e n t LCCI employee as a ' b o r r o w e r ' b u t c o n t a i n i n g t h e s i g n a t u r e o f t h e s o l e g u a r a n t o r , V i n c e n t D. L a C o s t e . "The J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m a s s o c i a t e d t h e M o b i l e f i r m o f S t o k e s , C l i n t o n , F l e m i n g & S h e r l i n g ('the S t o k e s , C l i n t o n f i r m ' ) t o f i l e s u i t on t h e d e b t , a n d i t p r o v i d e d t h a t f i r m w i t h a copy o f t h e Bank's file, i n c l u d i n g t h e g u a r a n t y agreement s i g n e d by V i n c e n t L a C o s t e a n d b e a r i n g N e a l G r e e n e ' s name a s a 'borrower.' The S t o k e s , C l i n t o n f i r m p r e p a r e d a document entitled 'Statement of Account/Sworn Statement of C l a i m ' that identified t h e Bank as 'creditor' and LCCI and Greene as 'debtor' (singular). The S t o k e s , C l i n t o n firm sent the s t a t e m e n t t o t h e J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m on J a n u a r y 19, 2000; the Jones, Morrison firm forwarded the statement t o Nancy Tray, a s u p e r v i s o r i n t h e Bank's recovery department, w i t h the f o l l o w i n g cover l e t t e r f r o m L i n d a S e y m o u r , who i d e n t i f i e d h e r s e l f as a ' l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' of the Jones, Morrison f i r m : "'Enclosed please 4 find documents 1061289 needed t o proceed w i t h l e g a l a c t i o n s . At your earliest convenience please sign, n o t a r i z e and send back t o our o f f i c e . I f there a r e any q u e s t i o n s regarding this matter, please direct a l l phone calls, f a x e s , l e t t e r s , e t c . t o my a t t e n t i o n . ' "Tray s i g n e d t h e document and gave i t t o S p i v e y t o return to the Jones, Morrison firm. Spivey testified that s h e saw Greene's name on t h e s t a t e m e n t b u t t h a t she d i d n o t t h i n k i t meant t h a t G r e e n e w o u l d be a d e f e n d a n t i n a n y l a w s u i t f i l e d on b e h a l f o f t h e bank t o c o l l e c t t h e debt. "On M a r c h 3, 2 0 0 0 , t h e S t o k e s , C l i n t o n firm f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n t h e M o b i l e C i r c u i t C o u r t on b e h a l f o f t h e Bank a g a i n s t L C C I and N e a l Greene, j o i n t l y a n d i n d i v i d u a l l y , b u t n o t a g a i n s t V i n c e n t D. LaCoste, s e e k i n g a t o t a l indebtedness of $50,432.55, plus costs. The c o m p l a i n t c o n t a i n e d instructions requesting service on b o t h defendants at 3463 LaCoste Road i n M o b i l e . On M a r c h 1 6 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e s e r v i c e o f G r e e n e was r e t u r n e d ' n o t f o u n d , ' w i t h a sheriff's notation that Greene was ' n o longer employed' by LCCI. Neither t h e summons and c o m p l a i n t n o r any o t h e r m o t i o n s and p l e a d i n g s were s e n t t o t h e Bank. "On May 1 0 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e B a n k l e a r n e d t h a t V i n c e n t D. LaCoste had filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy p r o c e e d i n g s , and i t i n s t r u c t e d t h e Jones, M o r r i s o n f i r m t o ' c l o s e t h e f i l e ' on t h e L C C I collection matter because of LaCoste's personal bankruptcy. On May 10 a n d 1 1 , 2 0 0 0 , B i l l J o n e s , a n e m p l o y e e o f t h e J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m , n o t e d on t h e f i r m ' s c o l l e c t i o n h i s t o r y t h a t t h e f i l e s h o u l d be c l o s e d . On May 1 8 , S p i v e y made a s i m i l a r n o t a t i o n o n t h e B a n k ' s L C C I collection file. On May 3 1 , 2 0 0 0 , J a c k F o g e l m a n , the c o l l e c t i o n manager a t t h e Jones, M o r r i s o n f i r m , entered a ' c l o s e - f i l e ' memorandum on t h e f i r m ' s accounts. The c l o s e - f i l e i n s t r u c t i o n , h o w e v e r , was not communicated t o t h e Stokes, C l i n t o n f i r m . 5 1061289 "On August 14, 2000, Saundra M o r r i s o n , the o f f i c e manager at the J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m , w r o t e t h e f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r t o Drew D o r r a n c e i n t h e B a n k ' s legal-recovery department: "'Our c o - c o u n s e l h a s b e e n u n a b l e t o l o c a t e N e a l G r e e n e f o r s e r v i c e . Do y o u w i s h t o serve by publication? The cost is a p p r o x i m a t e l y $120.00. P l e a s e a d v i s e . ' " S p i v e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e l e t t e r was r o u t e d t o h e r ; s h e s a i d t h a t on A u g u s t 2 3 , 2 0 0 0 , s h e telephoned Jack Fogelman at the Jones, Morrison firm and i n q u i r e d why a n y a c t i v i t y was o c c u r r i n g on a f i l e that should have been closed. She did not s p e c i f i c a l l y q u e s t i o n why c o - c o u n s e l was attempting to serve Greene. " M e a n w h i l e , on A u g u s t 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 , P a u l C l i n t o n o f the S t o k e s , C l i n t o n f i r m had filed a motion for s e r v i c e b y p u b l i c a t i o n on G r e e n e , w i t h a s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t a v e r r i n g t h a t he h a d p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e o f the f a c t t h a t Greene had been a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e , t h a t G r e e n e had b e e n a b s e n t f r o m h i s r e s i d e n c e f o r more t h a n 30 d a y s s i n c e t h e f i l i n g o f t h e c o m p l a i n t , t h a t G r e e n e c o u l d n o t be l o c a t e d , a n d t h a t s e r v i c e c o u l d n o t be p e r f e c t e d on G r e e n e b y a n y m e t h o d o t h e r t h a n by p u b l i c a t i o n . The M o b i l e C i r c u i t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e m o t i o n on A u g u s t 18, 2 0 0 0 . [ 3 ] "On October 18, 2000, Saundra M o r r i s o n , the o f f i c e manager at the J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m , w r o t e the f o l l o w i n g l e t t e r , marked ' A t t ' n : Meg' to the Stokes, Clinton firm, referencing the '[LCCI] account balance w i t h SouthTrust Bank': "'Please requested be advised our client has t h a t we c l o s e t h e a b o v e d e b t o r ' s Two p r e v i o u s m o t i o n s f o r s e r v i c e b y p u b l i c a t i o n h a d b e e n denied because they e a c h were a c c o m p a n i e d by an unsworn affidavit. 3 6 1061289 file. They do not have adequate d o c u m e n t a t i o n t o p r o c e e d on t h i s c a s e . I f you have any q u e s t i o n s , p l e a s e a d v i s e . ' "The r e c o r d s o f t h e S t o k e s , C l i n t o n f i r m indicate that i t r e c e i v e d the l e t t e r from the Jones, Morrison f i r m on N o v e m b e r 2 2 , 2 0 0 0 . On O c t o b e r 2 4 , 2 0 0 0 , when G r e e n e h a d n o t a n s w e r e d o r o t h e r w i s e a p p e a r e d in the Bank's a c t i o n , C l i n t o n r e q u e s t e d the e n t r y of d e f a u l t against Greene. On O c t o b e r 3 0 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e Mobile C i r c u i t Court entered a d e f a u l t judgment f o r t h e Bank a g a i n s t G r e e n e i n t h e amount o f $ 5 0 , 7 0 2 . 9 7 . The Stokes, Clinton firm recorded the judgment a g a i n s t G r e e n on N o v e m b e r 2 9 , 2 0 0 0 . "At a l l t i m e s m a t e r i a l t o t h e Bank's l a w s u i t a g a i n s t G r e e n e , G r e e n e was listed i n the Mobile t e l e p h o n e d i r e c t o r y as 'B. N e a l G r e e n e ' r e s i d i n g a t 6602 C h e r r y P o i n t e C o u r t i n M o b i l e . On F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 2 0 0 1 , G r e e n e was a t t e m p t i n g t o c l o s e a s a l e o f r e a l p r o p e r t y when he l e a r n e d t h a t t h e r e was a j u d g m e n t r e c o r d e d a g a i n s t him i n f a v o r of the Bank. Greene contacted a Bank official who i n v e s t i g a t e d the matter, learned that there was no b a s i s for a judgment a g a i n s t G r e e n e , and i n s t r u c t e d t h e S t o k e s , C l i n t o n f i r m to c a n c e l the judgment immediately. The j u d g m e n t was subsequently s e t a s i d e , and a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r o f G r e e n e on May 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 . "On J u n e 2 6 , 2 0 0 1 , G r e e n e s u e d t h e B a n k , b u t n o t the lawyers, alleging claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligence, wantonness, and outrage. On August 28, 2001, c o u n s e l f o r t h e Bank w r o t e a l e t t e r t o Ben S t o k e s o f the Stokes, Clinton firm, stating, in pertinent part: " ' A f t e r r e v i e w i n g a Bank f i l e and t h e c o u r t file i n the u n d e r l y i n g case [SouthTrust Bank v. LCCI and N e a l G r e e n e ] , i t seems a p p a r e n t t o us t h a t , i f t h e r e i s l i a b i l i t y 7 1061289 on t h e p a r t o f S o u t h T r u s t ( w h i c h we h a v e denied), then the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h a t o b l i g a t i o n s h o u l d f a l l upon t h e a t t o r n e y s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e Bank i n s u i n g Mr. G r e e n e a n d t a k i n g a j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t him [ I ] t seems that we have no alternative b u t t o name y o u r f i r m , and p o s s i b l y one o r more a t t o r n e y s i n t h e f i r m , as third-party defendants f o r indemnity purposes.' "In A p r i l 2002, t h e Bank f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r a mediation, allowing the lawyers to participate w i t h o u t b e i n g named a s t h i r d - p a r t y d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e a c t i o n . T h a t m o t i o n was g r a n t e d On May 3 1 , 2002, t h e Bank f i l e d a t h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t the lawyers, a l l e g i n g c l a i m s under t h e Alabama L e g a l S e r v i c e s L i a b i l i t y A c t ( ' A L S L A ' ) , § 6-5-570 e t s e q . , Ala. Code 1975, and s e e k i n g indemnity f o r any l i a b i l i t y t h a t t h e Bank m i g h t have t o Greene. [ 4 ] " S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e Bank a l l e g e d ( 1 ) t h a t t h e Jones, Morrison f i r m had n e g l i g e n t l y or r e c k l e s s l y b r e a c h e d i t s duty t o examine t h e documents p r o v i d e d to i t by t h e Bank i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e the proper party t o s u e on t h e c r e d i t - c a r d debt, thereby w r o n g l y c a u s i n g G r e e n e t o b e made a d e f e n d a n t when t h e r e was no b a s i s f o r p u r s u i n g c l a i m s a g a i n s t h i m i n d i v i d u a l l y f o r the corporate debt of h i s employer, ( 2 ) t h a t the Stokes, C l i n t o n f i r m had n e g l i g e n t l y or r e c k l e s s l y c a u s e d Greene t o be s e r v e d b y p u b l i c a t i o n when, t h e Bank c l a i m e d , a reasonable effort to d e t e r m i n e G r e e n e ' s home a d d r e s s w o u l d h a v e r e s u l t e d in personal s e r v i c e on G r e e n e , t h e r e b y enabling Greene t o appear, t o argue f o r , and t o o b t a i n a d i s m i s s a l o f t h e Bank's l a w s u i t a g a i n s t him, and ( 3 ) t h a t a f t e r May 1 0 , 2 0 0 0 , when t h e B a n k i n s t r u c t e d t h e J o n e s , M o r r i s o n f i r m t o ' c l o s e t h e f i l e ' on t h e The lawyers d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e m e d i a t i o n , which was unsuccessful. S e e E x p a r t e J o n e s , M o r r i s o n , Womack & D e a r i n g , P.C., 939 S o . 2 d 9 1 2 , 913 ( A l a . 2 0 0 6 ) . 4 8 1061289 LCCI c o l l e c t i o n m a t t e r , t h e l a w y e r s d u t y t o t h e Bank by n o t i m m e d i a t e l y l a w s u i t a g a i n s t LCCI and Greene. breached their d i s m i s s i n g the "The l a w y e r s f i l e d m o t i o n s t o d i s m i s s t h e B a n k ' s t h i r d - p a r t y complaint The t r i a l c o u r t denied the motions to d i s m i s s . " I n May 2 0 0 3 , t h e t r i a l court again ordered mediation, and the parties agreed to hold a mediation on S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 . The d a t e o f t h e m e d i a t i o n was p o s t p o n e d t o O c t o b e r 1, 2 0 0 3 . On J u l y 25, 2003, the c i r c u i t court entered a summary j u d g m e n t f o r t h e B a n k on a l l c o u n t s o f G r e e n e ' s complaint except f o r the malicious prosecution claim. The l a w y e r s m o v e d f o r a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t on the Bank's third-party claims and attached s u p p o r t i n g b r i e f s , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e B a n k was n o t , a s a matter of law, e n t i t l e d to indemnity f r o m them. The l a w y e r s a s s e r t e d t h a t , e v e n a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e y were n e g l i g e n t i n s u i n g , s e r v i n g , and r e c o r d i n g a j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t G r e e n e , t h e B a n k was a l s o n e g l i g e n t in commencing the s u i t without t e l l i n g them that Greene was not a guarantor of LCCI's debt. A c c o r d i n g l y , the lawyers asserted that the p a r t i e s w e r e j o i n t t o r t f e a s o r s b e t w e e n whom t h e r e c o u l d be no r i g h t o f i n d e m n i t y . The B a n k m o v e d f o r a s u m m a r y judgment on i t s t h i r d - p a r t y claims against the l a w y e r s , a n d G r e e n e m o v e d f o r a s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t on h i s m a l i c i o u s - p r o s e c u t i o n c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e Bank. "Following a hearing at which the t r i a l court h e a r d a r g u m e n t s o f t h e p a r t i e s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t , on S e p t e m b e r 24, 2 0 0 3 , e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t f o r t h e l a w y e r s on t h e B a n k ' s t h i r d - p a r t y c o m p l a i n t , a n d denied t h e m o t i o n s by t h e Bank and Greene f o r a summary j u d g m e n t . The c o u r t d i d n o t s t a t e t h e b a s i s for i t s rulings. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , the lawyers informed the mediator that they would not attend the mediation. One m o n t h l a t e r , on t h e e v e o f t h e t r i a l scheduled f o r Greene's m a l i c i o u s - p r o s e c u t i o n a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Bank, t h e Bank s e t t l e d w i t h Greene f o r 9 1061289 $325,000. The c i r c u i t c o u r t s u b s e q u e n t l y dismissed Greene's complaint. The B a n k s o u g h t r e i m b u r s e m e n t f r o m t h e l a w y e r s f o r t w o - t h i r d s o f t h e amount i t had paid to settle Greene's c l a i m , and the lawyers r e f u s e d t o r e i m b u r s e t h e Bank f o r any p o r t i o n o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t w i t h Greene. "The B a n k a p p e a l e d t o t h e A l a b a m a S u p r e m e C o u r t f r o m t h e s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e l a w y e r s on the third-party claims. The supreme court transferred the appeal to [the Court of Civil A p p e a l s ] , p u r s u a n t t o § 1 2 - 2 - 7 ( 6 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 . " 939 So. 2d The at 889-93 Court of C i v i l entered against lawyers and 939 So. 2d for a writ On the a at 910. of remand, the of law a separate the t r i a l trial court Bank the the cause to This Court initially So. but Ex 2d the ("JML"). parte 912, failed to granted petition Womack & close of moved f o r a j u d g m e n t as the the Court. as Morrison, 2006). to t r i a l . Although a trial At the court did explaining i t s basis for granted t h e m o t i o n s f o r a JML. to i t s claims prove 10 by the writ (Ala. lawyers Circuit quashed Jones, 918 w r i t t e n order court o r a l l y summary j u d g m e n t Mobile later case proceeded s t a t e d t h a t as had reversed i t s third-party claim against Bank's c a s e - i n - c h i e f , the enter the B a n k on certiorari 939 omitted). Appeals granted. P.C., matter so, the remanded improvidently Dearing, (footnote against expert the not doing The lawyers, testimony the 1061289 applicable standards a l l e g e d l y breached of care and that those standards of care. Standard of the The lawyers had Bank a p p e a l s . Review "When r e v i e w i n g a r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r a JML, t h i s C o u r t u s e s t h e same s t a n d a r d t h e t r i a l c o u r t used i n i t i a l l y i n d e c i d i n g whether t o g r a n t or deny t h e m o t i o n f o r a JML. P a l m H a r b o r Homes, I n c . v . Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 ( A l a . 1997). Regarding q u e s t i o n s of f a c t , the u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e nonmovant has p r e s e n t e d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o a l l o w t h e c a s e t o be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y f o r a factual resolution. C a r t e r v . H e n d e r s o n , 598 So. 2 d 1350 ( A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . The n o n m o v a n t m u s t h a v e p r e s e n t e d s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n order to w i t h s t a n d a motion f o r a JML. See § 1 2 - 2 1 - 1 2 , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 ; W e s t v . F o u n d e r s L i f e A s s u r a n c e Co. o f F l o r i d a , 547 So. 2 d 87 0 , 87 1 ( A l a . 1 98 9 ) . A r e v i e w i n g c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e p a r t y who b e a r s t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f has p r o d u c e d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e c r e a t i n g a f a c t u a l d i s p u t e r e q u i r i n g r e s o l u t i o n by t h e j u r y . C a r t e r , 598 So. 2d a t 1 3 5 3 . In r e v i e w i n g a r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r a JML, t h i s C o u r t v i e w s t h e e v i d e n c e in t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e nonmovant and e n t e r t a i n s s u c h r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s as t h e j u r y would have been f r e e t o draw. Id. Regarding a q u e s t i o n o f l a w , h o w e v e r , t h i s C o u r t i n d u l g e s no p r e s u m p t i o n o f c o r r e c t n e s s as t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling. R i c w i l , I n c . v . S.L. P a p p a s & C o . , 599 So. 2 d 1126 ( A l a . 1992)." Waddell So. 2d & Reed, 1143, 1152 I n c . v. United Investors Life I n s . Co., 87 5 ( A l a . 2003). Discussion I. As noted i n the Court of Civil 11 Appeals' o p i n i o n and as 1061289 argued by the following lawyers three the this appeal, against identified the Greene the Bank lawyers: as action; Bank i n s t r u c t e d the file" on the their duty LCCI LCCI to the debt; negligently or publication and (2) that of stopping (3) the that the caused collection Greene LCCI defendant 10, 2000, "close lawyers action Stokes the the made a the the that a f t e r May matter, not recklessly i n the (1) Jones M o r r i s o n f i r m to collection Bank by alleges a guarantor t h e r e b y w r o n g l y c a u s e d G r e e n e t o be Bank's c o l l e c t i o n when t h e the in claims wrongly d e b t and in parties breached to collect Clinton to be the firm served by action. A. The complaint the against Bank's t h i r d - p a r t y firm Stokes Legal Service ("the the L i a b i l i t y Act, ALSLA"); ALSLA the applies addition to Morrison firm, Jones Clinton Stokes to asserting Morrison the had under G e o r g i a law. Clinton Bank's claims under firm the its duty complaint also 12 its the claims Alabama seq., A l a . Code 1975 does not dispute that claims third-party breached The by § 6-5-570 e t the Bank's that governed are alleged against A L S L A as to complaint of i t . the In Jones alleged that professional care asserted that " i f Jones 1061289 M o r r i s o n i s not d e e m e d t o be the meaning the for any may be of under liable firm the one then and/or that i t is liable to [the Bank] [the Bank] the Jones Among o t h e r i t is not within for which omissions to Greene." contends 6-5-573 form providers known as 'legal service provider' things, subject to liability ALSLA. Section only [ALSLA], i t s actions held Morrison of a in the and courts of the cause in as defined defines "legal service of the legal service meaning ALSLA provides: action State of liability herein." Section provider" "There against Alabama shall legal and a c t i o n and be service i t shall be s h a l l have the 6-5-572(2) of the ALSLA as: "Anyone l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law by t h e S t a t e of Alabama or engaged i n the p r a c t i c e of law i n the S t a t e of Alabama. The t e r m l e g a l s e r v i c e provider includes professional corporations, associations, and partnerships and the members of such professional corporations, associations, and p a r t n e r s h i p s and t h e p e r s o n s , f i r m s , o r corporations e i t h e r e m p l o y e d by o r p e r f o r m i n g w o r k o r services for the b e n e f i t of such p r o f e s s i o n a l corporations, associations, and partnerships including, without limitation, law clerks, legal assistants, legal secretaries, investigators, paralegals, and couriers." Citing 961 Fogarty So. 784 2d v. (Ala. Parker, 2006), Poe, and 13 Adams Alabama & Bernstein, Education Ass'n LLP, v. 1061289 Nelson, that 770 So. 2d "Alabama's l a w y e r s who brief, are p. legal 43.) acting a this Morrison statute applies Morrison (Jones contends only to Morrison's because its not service provider" former schoolteacher that argues l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e i n A l a b a m a , i t was "legal Nelson, Alabama a Education e m p l o y e d by the legal dispute Board of Long's This provider" Association AEA (Long). with her Education, and alleged and liable Jones under the circumstances case. In Long 2000), malpractice Jones were not of (Ala. l i c e n s e d to p r a c t i c e here." attorneys as 1057 the legal AEA. Court and under that the Long had former Nelson So. 2d that ALSLA. AEA at sued and a to under the Etowah recover the in County damages ALSLA a from for both 1057-58. AEA could was not, Specifically, not a "legal therefore, this Court service be held stated: "Under § 6-5-572(2), a ' l e g a l s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' c a n be e i t h e r : (1) a p e r s o n l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w i n t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a , o r (2) a p e r s o n e n g a g e d i n the p r a c t i c e of law i n the State of Alabama. O b v i o u s l y , t h e AEA i s not l i c e n s e d to p r a c t i c e law i n A l a b a m a , so we m u s t c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e AEA is 'engaged i n the p r a c t i c e of law,' w i t h i n the meaning of § 6-5-572(2). 14 the lawyer represented Nelson sought the the AEA") employer, malpractice 770 held ("the (Nelson) 1061289 "In order t o a s c e r t a i n the meaning of a s t a t u t e , we l o o k first t o t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e words w r i t t e n by t h e L e g i s l a t u r e . J o h n s o n v . P r i c e , 743 So. 2 d 4 3 6 , 438 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) . The p l a i n m e a n i n g o f the words used i n § 6-5-572(2) i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e Legislature contemplated that the term 'legal service provider' would include a professional corporation, association, or partnership i t s e l f ; the members o f a p r o f e s s i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n , association, or p a r t n e r s h i p who a r e l i c e n s e d to p r a c t i c e law w i t h i n t h e S t a t e o f Alabama; and o t h e r s n o t l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w b u t who w o r k i n f u r t h e r a n c e o f t h e practice of law by a p r o f e s s i o n a l corporation, a s s o c i a t i o n , o r p a r t n e r s h i p - - s u c h as 'law c l e r k s , legal assistants, legal secretaries, investigators, p a r a l e g a l s , and c o u r i e r s . ' The members o f t h e A E A are t e a c h e r s , n o t l a w y e r s ; a n d t h e l a w y e r s t h e AEA h i r e s a r e n o t members o f t h e AEA, b u t , i n s t e a d , a r e e m p l o y e e s o f t h e AEA. The m e m b e r s h i p o f t h e A E A does n o t c o n s i s t o f p e r s o n s l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law in the State of Alabama. "We n o t e t h a t t h r o u g h o u t t h e A L S L A , t h e l a n g u a g e u s e d b y t h e L e g i s l a t u r e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e A c t was i n t e n d e d t o a p p l y t o l a w y e r s and law f i r m s . F o r example, § 6-5-572(3)(a) sets out the 'standard of care' a ' l e g a l service provider' i s to observe: "'The standard of care applicable to a l e g a l service provider i s that l e v e l of such r e a s o n a b l e c a r e , s k i l l , and d i l i g e n c e as o t h e r s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d l e g a l s e r v i c e providers i n t h e same g e n e r a l line of practice i n t h e same general locality ordinarily have and e x e r c i s e in a like case.' "What s t a n d a r d o f c a r e w o u l d be a p p l i e d t o t h e A E A under t h i s s t a t u t e ? We know o f no o t h e r 'legal s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' t h a t , i n r e g a r d t o t h e AEA, m i g h t be c o n s i d e r e d t o be ' s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d . ' Clearly 15 1061289 t h i s section contemplates t h a t t h e A L S L A i s t o be a p p l i e d o n l y t o l a w y e r s and t o law f i r m s - - i n c l u d i n g professional corporations, associations, and p a r t n e r s h i p s - - w h o s e membership i s composed s o l e l y of lawyers a c t i n g f o r the purpose of p r o v i d i n g l e g a l services. "The p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f § 6 - 5 - 5 7 2 ( 2 ) , a s w e l l a s t h a t of the o t h e r p o r t i o n s of the ALSLA, clearly indicates t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e intended for the ALSLA t o a p p l y o n l y t o l a w y e r s and t o e n t i t i e s t h a t a r e c o m p o s e d o f m e m b e r s who a r e l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law w i t h i n the S t a t e of Alabama. B e c a u s e t h e AEA i s not a lawyer or an entity whose membership is c o m p o s e d o f l a w y e r s , i t c a n n o t be h e l d l i a b l e u n d e r the ALSLA." 770 So. In and held 2d at Fogarty, Jane C. majority one Parker A involved in Poe, alleging practice misrepresentations them from venture. joint law ("Parker venture, Parker Poe"), Poe law i n Alabama, of law, and trial 16 court three closely in Gulf Parker, Poe, Group, the Inc., Fogartys sued engaged in the that Parker Poe had that to Fogarty represented The had M. venture MacPherson o b t a i n i n g access The in firm, Gary Southworth. that of a Carolina i n the of i t s p r i n c i p a l s , joint m i n o r i t y members North shareholder prevented the were B e r n s t e i n , L.L.P. unauthorized made Carolina residents Charles companies Alabama. Adams, and and South Fogarty Alabama Shores, 1058-59. Parker business granted Poe had records of Parker Poe's 1061289 motion t o d i s m i s s , and t h e F o g a r t y s Among o t h e r "exclusive So. things, Parker r e m e d y " was 2d a t 788. appealed. Poe a r g u e d t h a t t h e t o a l l e g e c l a i m s under t h e ALSLA. Because the Fogartys properly dismissed the Fogartys' that arose Poe" law ALSLA Parker remedy, the Poe argued provided " s o l e l y out of the r e n d i t i o n and (2) t h a t Parker the Poe was 788-89. Fogartys' of l e g a l As to Parker services" had services Court s e r v i c e s by claims Parker "engaged i n the p r a c t i c e the of definition 961 S o . 2 d a t disagreed. Poe's argument t h a t to the Fogartys, expressly of i t s exclusive a l l the Fogartys' s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r " under t h e ALSLA. This c o u r t had In support i n t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a " a n d t h e r e f o r e met of a " l e g a l Poe complaint. (1) t h a t 961 had not a l l e g e d a c l a i m u n d e r t h e A L S L A , P a r k e r Poe c o n t e n d e d t h a t t h e t r i a l argument Fogartys' stated to the Fogartys. this that This Court i t had p r o v i d e d "legal p o i n t e d out that Parker i t had Court not provided noted: " I n Cunningham v. L a n g s t o n , F r a z e r , Sweet & F r e e s e , P.A., 727 S o . 2 d 800 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) , t h i s C o u r t thoroughly discussed the issue of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the ALSLA to claims against legal-service p r o v i d e r s t h a t do n o t a r i s e f r o m t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f l e g a l s e r v i c e s . In Cunningham, a lawyer sued a law f i r m , a l l e g i n g b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t and n e g l i g e n c e o r wantonness arising out of a fee-splitting 17 legal 1061289 a r r a n g e m e n t i n an u n d e r l y i n g c a s e . C u n n i n g h a m , 727 So. 2 d a t 8 0 1 - 0 2 . A f t e r a thorough examination of the language of the e n t i r e a c t , t h i s Court h e l d t h a t ' t h e A L S L A d o e s n o t a p p l y t o an a c t i o n f i l e d against a " l e g a l s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r " b y someone whose c l a i m does not arise out of the receipt of legal services.' C u n n i n g h a m , 727 S o . 2 d a t 804 ( e m p h a s i s added). " C o u n t s 7, 8, 1 0 , 1 1 , a n d 14 o f t h e c o m p l a i n t do n o t a l l e g e t o r t i o u s c o n d u c t r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e receipt of l e g a l services by t h e F o g a r t y s from P a r k e r Poe. A l s o , P a r k e r P o e , i n a r g u i n g t h a t no ' p r i v i t y ' e x i s t e d between i t s e l f and t h e F o g a r t y s , expressly states that i t never provided legal services to the Fogartys. Therefore, i t appears that t h e ALSLA does not a p p l y to the Fogartys' c l a i m s ; t h u s , i t c a n n o t b e , a s P a r k e r Poe a s s e r t s , t h e i r e x c l u s i v e remedy." [ 5 ] 961 S o . 2 d a t 789 In in (second r e j e c t i n g Parker the p r a c t i c e emphasis added). Poe's argument t h a t of law i n the State i t was "engaged of Alabama," t h i s Court stated: " F u r t h e r m o r e , i t appears t h a t t h e ALSLA a p p l i e s o n l y t o a t t o r n e y s who a r e l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w i n Alabama. P a r k e r Poe a r g u e s t h a t i t was ' e n g a g e d i n the p r a c t i c e of law i n the S t a t e of Alabama' and, thus, f a l l s under the second prong of the ALSLA's d e f i n i t i o n of a l e g a l - s e r v i c e provider. However, t h i s C o u r t has e x p r e s s l y s t a t e d t h a t ' [ t ] h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f § 6 - 5 - 5 7 2 ( 2 ) , as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e o t h e r p o r t i o n s o f t h e ALSLA, c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t the L e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d f o r t h e ALSLA t o a p p l y o n l y C o u n t s 7, 8, 1 0 , 1 1 , a n d 14 o f t h e c o m p l a i n t w e r e a l l t h e c o u n t s a p p l i c a b l e t o P a r k e r Poe a n d t h e o n l y c o u n t s t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d on a p p e a l . Fogarty, 961 S o . 2 d a t 788 & n . 1 . 5 18 1061289 t o l a w y e r s and t o e n t i t i e s t h a t a r e composed of m e m b e r s who a r e l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w w i t h i n t h e S t a t e of Alabama.' Alabama Educ. A s s ' n v. N e l s o n , 770 So. 2 d 1 0 5 7 , 1059 ( A l a . 2 0 0 0 ) ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . " A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o m p l a i n t , Jones and B a r o n [ , two a t t o r n e y s employed by P a r k e r P o e , ] were not licensed to practice law within the State of Alabama, and Parker Poe does not dispute this allegation. Thus, t h e ALSLA w o u l d not a p p l y t o t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t P a r k e r Poe, and t h e ALSLA c o u l d n o t be t h e F o g a r t y s ' e x c l u s i v e r e m e d y . The t r i a l c o u r t erred, therefore, i n granting Parker Poe's Rule 12(b)(6) motion on Parker Poe's first stated ground." 961 So. 2d We disagree Nelson and because within and at none of Jones Morrison's i t cannot be i t s attorneys Poe present licensed First, i n Fogarty, unlike Jones Morrison legal services Indeed, Jones Morrison's i s t h a t because i t provided legal the B a n k was the applicable standard required to o f f e r breached Second, liable providing case. Morrison held contention that were the S t a t e of Alabama. i t was appeal with Fogarty Parker that 789. to of expert care and that those the ALSLA to p r a c t i c e t h e AEA in does not the Nelson Bank central law dispute in argument the on s e r v i c e s t o t h e Bank, testimony establishing establishing that Jones the Bank, standard. provide to under under 19 legal services to 1061289 Jones Morrison i n the present and to perform work o r i n f o r m a t i o n between Stokes s e r v i c e s - - s u c h as r e l a y i n g case Clinton t h e Bank r e g a r d i n g t h e l e g a l agreed action to c o l l e c t the debt-¬ for the b e n e f i t of the Stokes C l i n t o n f i r m i n i t s rendering of legal t o t h e Bank. Clinton, services Stokes as n o t e d , l e g a l - s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r under t h e ALSLA. Thus, u n l i k e in relationship the present between Jones services case an Morrison Clinton Stokes Clinton, and a g r e e d itself ALSLA. Consequently, whether t h e ALSLA i n Alabama licensed to p r a c t i c e suggests the that language Nelson to perform a and "legal-service extent that the ALSLA was of of provider" conjunction i n Alabama, performs language and i s n o t c o n t r o l l i n g under the i n this case-¬ a t t o r n e y not with legal an attorney services i n i n Fogarty or Nelson. in c o u l d not apply unnecessary legal the assistance t o c l a i m s a g a i n s t an in existed in offering the question presented who, Fogarty, f o r the b e n e f i t work f o r a c l i e n t - - w a s not at issue to that t h e Bank, M o r r i s o n sought applies licensed Thus, and t o t h e Bank, Jones Stokes Alabama attorney-client is a Fogarty i n such or a Nelson scenario, to the holdings i n Fogarty here. and 6 We h a v e n o t b e e n a s k e d t o o v e r r u l e F o g a r t y o r N e l s o n ; h o w e v e r , o v e r r u l i n g t h o s e d e c i s i o n s i n t h i s a p p e a l w o u l d be 6 20 1061289 As a the Bank p o i n t s o u t , contingency-fee the credit-card Inc. i t employed Jones M o r r i s o n arrangement debt ("LCCI"). owed Jones f o r the LaCoste by purpose Construction Morrison C l i n t o n under a c o n t i n g e n c y - f e e Stokes Clinton Morrison fee was was to in collecting Company, associated arrangement pursuant r e c e i v e 25% t o r e c e i v e 8.33%. turn of of any under recovery Moreover, Stokes to which and Jones in addition to the arrangement between the law f i r m s , Jones M o r r i s o n r e t a i n e d t h e r i g h t t o c o n t r o l c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and litigation, such and Clinton. Stokes Morrison and as relaying Thus, Stokes communications between the arrangement Clinton--i.e., a between aspects prosecute Joint the Ventures of the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n - - w a s Bank's § 50 collection (2006), which action. Bank Jones contingency-fee arrangement w i t h Jones M o r r i s o n r e t a i n i n g the r i g h t to certain the control a j o i n t venture See 46 Am. Jur. to 2d states: " [ W ] h e r e an a t t o r n e y r e t a i n e d on a c o n t i n g e n t - f e e b a s i s to p r o s e c u t e a c l a i m engages another lawyer to a s s i s t i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n , u p o n an a g r e e m e n t t o s h a r e the fee i n case of success, o t h e r w i s e to r e c e i v e n o t h i n g , t h e y become j o i n t v e n t u r e r s . However, a l o c a l c o u n s e l h i r e d b y an o u t - o f - s t a t e c o u n s e l t o perform c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s i s not a j o i n t venturer unnecessary because the q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d not p r e s e n t e d i n F o g a r t y or N e l s o n . 21 in this case was 1061289 where the local counsel's compensation is not contingent upon the successful outcome of the l i t i g a t i o n a n d t h e r e i s no a g r e e m e n t t o s h a r e i n t h e p r o f i t s o r l o s s e s and t h e c o n t r o l and management o f the litigation being vested in the out-of-town c o u n s e l who employed a l o c a l c o u n s e l to perform l i m i t e d s e r v i c e s f o r a f i x e d fee r e g a r d l e s s of the results." (Footnotes omitted.) As service provider" is "professional a partnership[]" of Alabama or Alabama." firm, under that i n the for the associations, law and clerks, meets The arise out between that that Jones the a association[], of law law of "the assistants, claims and the d e f i n i t i o n of 22 a or services corporations, limitation, secretaries, (emphasis Jones relationship and of Clinton persons, firms, against Bank State State Stokes legal couriers" [or] the i n the the the by including, without and "legal ALSLA because i t professional attorney-client Morrison is or p e r f o r m i n g work or partnerships above-stated the part includes such paralegals, Bank's of of legal investigators, of to p r a c t i c e practice e i t h e r e m p l o y e d by benefit Clinton i t s arrangement with "legal service provider" corporations 6-5-572(2) is "licensed engaged Morrison § Stokes corporation[], In view of Jones noted, added). Morrison that out existed of Jones 1061289 Morrison's the ALSLA p r o v i s i o n of l e g a l governs the Bank's See § 6 - 5 - 5 7 3 , A l a . C o d e and in of Alabama claims 1975: cause of a c t i o n a g a i n s t the State services against "There s h a l l legal and t o the Bank. Jones be o n l y service providers i t shall be known as 7 Thus, Morrison. one form i n courts the legal C f . V a l e n t i n e v . W a t t e r s , 896 S o . 2 d 385 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , i n w h i c h t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e ALSLA a p p l i e d t o a p l a i n t i f f ' s claim that an attorney, at the plaintiff's initial c o n s u l t a t i o n , had m i s r e p r e s e n t e d h i s l e v e l of e x p e r t i s e . In support o f h e r c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e ALSLA d i d not a p p l y t o t h a t claim, the p l a i n t i f f i n Valentine argued that when t h e a t t o r n e y a l l e g e d l y made t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , s h e h a d n o t y e t h i r e d t h e a t t o r n e y a n d t h e y h a d n o t y e t e n t e r e d i n t o an attorney-client relationship. This Court rejected that argument and s t a t e d : 7 "The A L S L A a p p l i e s t o a n y c l a i m o r i g i n a t i n g a s t h e r e s u l t of the p l a i n t i f f ' s r e c e i p t of l e g a l s e r v i c e s . Moreover, t h e ALSLA e x p r e s s l y c o n t e m p l a t e s t h a t t h e standard of care a p p l i c a b l e to a p a r t i c u l a r attorney is, i n part, based on whether the attorney r e p r e s e n t s t o t h e c o m m u n i t y , o r ' p u b l i s h e s , ' t h a t he or she i s s p e c i a l i z e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r area o f t h e law. See § 6 - 5 - 5 7 2 ( 3 ) b . , A l a . C o d e 1975. An attorney's representations to a p o t e n t i a l c l i e n t are governed by t h e ALSLA. The m e r e existence or n o n e x i s t e n c e o f an e x p r e s s c o n t r a c t , e m p l o y m e n t , t h e payment of legal fees, or the length of the consultation i s not determinative of whether a preliminary consultation has matured into an attorney-client relationship. Green v. Montgomery C o u n t y , 784 F. S u p p . 8 4 1 , 846 (M.D. A l a . 1 9 9 2 ) . Thus, Valentine's misrepresentation claim is g o v e r n e d by t h e ALSLA." 896 So. 2d a t 3 9 1 . 23 1061289 service herein." liability a c t i o n and s h a l l have t h e m e a n i n g as Moreover, for t h e Bank's See 6-5-572(1), t h e ALSLA above-stated which provides claims defines a defined the exclusive against "legal remedy Jones Morrison. service liability action" as: "Any action against a legal service provider i n w h i c h i t i s a l l e g e d t h a t some i n j u r y o r damage was caused i n whole o r i n p a r t by t h e l e g a l service provider's violation of the standard of care applicable to a legal service provider. A legal service l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n embraces a l lc l a i m s f o r i n j u r i e s o r damage[] o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h w h e t h e r i n contract or i n tort and whether based on an intentional or unintentional a c t or omission. A l e g a l s e r v i c e s l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n embraces any form o f a c t i o n i n w h i c h a l i t i g a n t may s e e k l e g a l redress for a w r o n g o r an i n j u r y a n d e v e r y l e g a l t h e o r y o f r e c o v e r y , w h e t h e r common l a w o r s t a t u t o r y , a v a i l a b l e t o a l i t i g a n t i n a c o u r t i n t h e S t a t e o f A l a b a m a now or i n t h e f u t u r e . " See also Sessions ("From t h e s e v. Espy, Code s e c t i o n s 854 S o . 2 d 5 1 5 , 522 [§§ 6 - 5 - 5 7 3 , 5 7 2 ( 1 ) , A l a . Code 1 9 7 5 ] , i t i s c l e a r t h a t all actions against breach of t h e i r duties required 'legal service i n providing (Ala. 6-5-572(2), 2002 ) a n d 6-5- t h e ALSLA a p p l i e s t o providers' alleging legal services. The d u t y u n d e r t h e A L S L A may b e o n e u n d e r t a k e n b y c o n t r a c t gratuitously."). 24 a or 1061289 B. Having concluded that against erred i n entering claims. As n o t e d , the was Bank alleging through Bank, JML of those as t o e a c h claim a against the t r i a l to prove of care Bank standard trial of c a r e ] . court's expert See, The not from 1975, exception against that Court held 25 AmSouth testimony i s a standard of 6-5-580.'" (quashing however, the that present case lawyers Court meet the recognized in ( A l a . 2004). that legal-malpractice v. claim attorney's the this 896 S o . 2 d 385 this § that [ o f an in knowledge" Valentine's ("'Expert the plaintiff that Tonsmeire necessary "common Linnie e.g., deviation i t s claims In V a l e n t i n e , both a prove contends, i t says, v. W a t t e r s , must Bank because, Valentine generally ( A l a . 1995) A l a . Code was each testimony [an] a l l e g e d b r e a c h order)). testimony that claim to e s t a b l i s h with that by e x p e r t recognizes 659 S o . 2 d 6 0 1 , 605 i n connection held on and t h a t t h e l a w y e r s b r e a c h e d testimony. i n order t h e Bank court legal-malpractice expert required care The a court required applicable standard standard. claims we now d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l the lawyers, t h e ALSLA governs t h e Bank's t h e ALSLA claims applied against to Richard 1061289 Watters. 8 96 So. 2d at Valentine had litigation regarding claims t h a t W a t t e r s had was very familiar that he had offer with 8 896 response expert Watters So. 2d the testimony also about supra implants, regarding several at breast clients 7. her in of her "he was implants and and in one that breast-implant 386. contention in note representing m i s r e p r e s e n t e d to her litigation to See defective breast represented litigation." In consulted 390-91. support that of her she had claim, failed to Valentine argued " t h a t her case i s analogous to medical-malpractice s u i t s and t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n a p p l i e d i n t h o s e c a s e s to the r e q u i r e m e n t of e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d also apply to l e g a l - m a l p r a c t i c e cases. See Ex parte H e a l t h S o u t h C o r p . , 851 So. 2d 3 3 , 38 ( A l a . 2002 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y i s not r e q u i r e d i n a c a s e ' " ' w h e r e w a n t o f s k i l l o r l a c k o f c a r e i s so a p p a r e n t ... as t o be u n d e r s t o o d b y a l a y m a n , and requires only common k n o w l e d g e a n d expertise to understand it.'"' (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v . W y a t t , 4 60 So. 2d 156, 161 (Ala. 19 8 4 ) ) ) . " 896 So. 2d at 391. This Court agreed with Valentine. Valentine also claimed that Watters had missed the deadline to f i l e paperwork to i n c l u d e V a l e n t i n e i n a c l a s s a c t i o n and t h a t the f a i l u r e to t i m e l y f i l e the paperwork negatively affected Valentine's status in that class action. This Court held that expert t e s t i m o n y was not r e q u i r e d to prove t h a t i n f a i l i n g to t i m e l y f i l e the paperwork Watters breached the standard of care. 896 So. 2d a t 394. 8 26 1061289 This Court establishing a requirements 1987, noted that the statutory legal-malpractice claim scheme i s similar imposed by t h e Alabama M e d i c a l Liability for to the Act of §§ 6-5-540 t o 6 - 5 - 5 5 2 , A l a . C o d e 1 9 7 5 ( " t h e A M L A " ) , f o r medical-malpractice claims ALSLA includes n o r t h e AMLA plaintiff claim, offer expert and t h a t an e x p r e s s testimony generally expert even testimony though requirement i n support a This Court thoroughly examined requirement i n m e d i c a l - m a l p r a c t i c e a c t i o n s "'where t h e want o f skill or lack comprehension of care i s so a p p a r e n t of the average layman common k n o w l e d g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e at 392 1129-30 ( q u o t i n g Rosemont, (Ala. 1985)). to the that of h i s or her i s required. the exception neither the expert-testimony as t o be and thus to understand within the requires only i t . ' " 896 S o . 2 d I n c . v . M a r s h a l l , 481 So. 2 d 1 1 2 6 , This Court stated: "Many o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s r e c o g n i z e a 'common knowledge' exception to the requirement that a p l a i n t i f f i n a l e g a l - m a l p r a c t i c e case must p r e s e n t expert testimony. M c l n t y r e v . R u m s e y , 80 P . 3 d 1 2 0 1 (Kan. C t . App. 2003) ( u n p u b l i s h e d o p i n i o n ) (stating that expert testimony i s n o t n e c e s s a r y where t h e a t t o r n e y ' s b r e a c h o f d u t y i s so c l e a r and o b v i o u s that the determination that the attorney deviated from the standard of care i s w i t h i n t h e common knowledge o f t h e t r i e r of f a c t ) ; D u b r e u i l v. W i t t , 80 C o n n . A p p . 410 , 4 1 8 , 835 A . 2 d 4 7 7 , 4 8 3 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n t o t h e need f o r e x p e r t 27 1061289 t e s t i m o n y a p p l i e s when ' t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t was s u c h an o b v i o u s a n d g r o s s want o f c a r e a n d s k i l l that the n e g l e c t would be c l e a r t o the average l a y p e r s o n ' ) ; R o b e r t s v . H u t t o n , 152 O h i o A p p . 3 d 4 1 2 , 4 2 3 , 787 N . E . 2 d 1 2 6 7 , 1 2 7 6 ( 2 0 0 3 ) ('The o n l y exception to this [expert-testimony] requirement i s when t h e a l l e g e d b r e a c h o f c a r e i s so o b v i o u s t h a t i t c a n be d e t e r m i n e d f r o m t h e o r d i n a r y k n o w l e d g e a n d experience of laymen.'); Mazuca & Assocs. v. S c h u m a n n , 82 S.W.3d 9 0 , 97 ( T e x . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) ('Expert t e s t i m o n y i s n o t r e q u i r e d i f t h e a t t o r n e y ' s l a c k o f c a r e and s k i l l i s so o b v i o u s t h a t t h e t r i e r of f a c t c a n f i n d n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r o f common knowledge.'); Hall v. Fedor, 34 9 S.C. 1 69, 5 6 1 S . E . 2 d 654 ( S . C . C t . A p p . 2 0 0 2 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t e x p e r t testimony i s normally required to establish the a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e e x c e p t when t h e m a t t e r i s w i t h i n t h e common k n o w l e d g e o f l a y p e r s o n s ) . "Watters argues, a n d we a g r e e , that expert testimony i s generally required in a legal-malpractice case because a jury that i s u n f a m i l i a r with the p r i n c i p l e s of law governing the u n d e r l y i n g c a s e m i g h t be i n c a p a b l e o f d i s c e r n i n g whether a lawyer's professional conduct falls o u t s i d e an a c c e p t a b l e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e . Generally, an e x p e r t may t e s t i f y when ' s c i e n t i f i c , technical, or o t h e r s p e c i a l i z e d k n o w l e d g e w i l l a s s i s t t h e t r i e r of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact i n issue.' A l a . R. E v i d . 7 0 2 . However, 'Alabama h i s t o r i c a l l y and g e n e r a l l y has r e f u s e d e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y o r o p i n i o n on a s u b j e c t t h a t i s w i t h i n the understanding of the average l a y p e r s o n . ' Ala. R. E v i d . 7 0 2 , A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e ' s N o t e s . "We a r e p e r s u a d e d b y o u r e a r l i e r a n a l y s e s u n d e r the m e d i c a l - s e r v i c e s - l i a b i l i t y cases and by o t h e r c o u r t s ' a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t same k i n d o f a n a l y s i s t o l e g a l - s e r v i c e s - l i a b i l i t y c a s e s t h a t an e x c e p t i o n t o the general requirement that a p l a i n t i f f present 28 1061289 expert testimony i n support of a legal-malpractice c l a i m o c c u r s where a l e g a l - s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' s want o f s k i l l o r l a c k o f c a r e i s so a p p a r e n t as t o be u n d e r s t o o d b y a l a y p e r s o n a n d r e q u i r e s o n l y common k n o w l e d g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e t o u n d e r s t a n d i t . ... "... Accepting Valentine's claim that Watters t o l d h e r t h a t he h a d r e p r e s e n t e d prior clients i n litigation involving breast implants a n d t h a t he later admitted he h a d n o t , we conclude that Valentine i s not required to present expert testimony to support her claim that Watters breached the a p p l i c a b l e standard of care i n misrepresenting h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o h e r i n t h i s manner. We h o l d that a trier of fact with common k n o w l e d g e a n d experience could determine that an attorney's r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t he o r s h e h a s h a d e x p e r i e n c e i n a certain type of litigation, when that representation i s not true, v i o l a t e s the standard of care." 896 So. 2d a t 393-95. With examining the foregoing t h e Bank's legal three principles claims against i n mind, the we t u r n t o lawyers. 1. The Bank's lawyers wrongly debt and against in first claim, identified thereby "In Bank stated Greene wrongly claim, above, as a g u a r a n t o r commenced him. Regarding t h i s SouthTrust as i s that o f t h e LCCI the c o l l e c t i o n action the Court of C i v i l Appeals stated: support of their 29 the motions for a summary 1061289 judgment, the lawyers submitted a l l of their correspondence with t h e Bank leading up t o t h e commencement of the debt-collection proceeding a g a i n s t Greene. They a r g u e d t h a t , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e commencement o f t h e l a w s u i t a g a i n s t G r e e n e , t h e B a n k was n e g l i g e n t i n l e a d i n g t h e m t o b e l i e v e t h a t G r e e n e was a p r o p e r p a r t y t o b e s u e d . Specifically, t h e l a w y e r s a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e B a n k was n e g l i g e n t b y f a i l i n g t o t e l l t h e m t h a t G r e e n e was n o t a g u a r a n t o r of LCCI's c r e d i t - c a r d indebtedness and t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e on t h e g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t was n o t t h a t o f Neal Greene, but that of V i n c e n t LaCoste. They p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e Bank h a d , b u t d i d n o t s e n d t h e m , e i g h t o t h e r g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t s on t h e L C C I a c c o u n t , e a c h b e a r i n g t h e same s i g n a t u r e - - t h a t of a s o l e g u a r a n t o r - - a s i g n a t u r e t h a t , t h e lawyers say, i s ' s q u i g g l y ' and d i f f i c u l t t o d e c i p h e r , i f n o t illegible. The l a w y e r s c o n t e n d e d t h a t , i f t h e y h a d r e c e i v e d m u l t i p l e guaranty agreements, each b e a r i n g t h e name o f a d i f f e r e n t L C C I e m p l o y e e b u t t h e same signature of a sole guarantor, they would have u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e s i g n a t u r e on t h e o n e g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t t h e y h a d was n o t G r e e n e ' s a n d t h a t G r e e n e was n o t , t h e r e f o r e , a g u a r a n t o r . "The Bank p r e s e n t e d evidence i n d i c a t i n g the f o l l o w i n g i n o p p o s i t i o n : (1) t h a t t h e B a n k e m p l o y e e s n e v e r t o l d t h e l a w y e r s t h a t G r e e n e was a g u a r a n t o r ; (2) t h a t t h e Bank e m p l o y e e s s e n t t h e l a w y e r s a guaranty agreement that designated Greene as a 'borrower,' not a 'guarantor'; (3) t h a t t h e B a n k e m p l o y e e s knew t h a t L a C o s t e was a g u a r a n t o r ; (4) t h a t t h e B a n k e m p l o y e e s knew t h e s i g n a t u r e o f t h e g u a r a n t o r was L a C o s t e ' s a n d n o t G r e e n e ' s ; (5) t h a t t h e l a w y e r s d i d n o t i n q u i r e a b o u t t h e s i g n a t u r e on t h e g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t ; a n d (6) t h a t i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t s i n (1) t h r o u g h (5) a b o v e , t h e B a n k e m p l o y e e s h a d no r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y n e e d e d t o t e l l t h e l a w y e r s t h a t G r e e n e was n o t a g u a r a n t o r o r t h a t the s i g n a t u r e on t h e g u a r a n t y a g r e e m e n t was n o t Greene's. 5 30 1061289 "The l a w y e r s c o n t e n d t h a t t h e B a n k was a l s o negligent by s i g n i n g and r e t u r n i n g t o them f o r commencement o f s u i t a document e n t i t l e d 'Statement of Account/Sworn Statement o f C l a i m ' - - a document that identified t h e Bank as ' c r e d i t o r , ' LCCI as ' d e b t o r , ' a n d t h a t h a d G r e e n e ' s name t y p e d o n t h e line below 'LCCI.' In opposition, t h e Bank presented evidence i n d i c a t i n g that the lawyers d i d not tell t h e Bank's employees who r e v i e w e d a n d s i g n e d t h e 'Statement o f Account/Sworn Statement o f Claim' (and t h e employees were o t h e r w i s e unaware) t h a t t h e i m p o r t o f t h e document l i s t i n g LCCI as t h e ' d e b t o r ' ( s i n g u l a r ) , w i t h G r e e n e ' s name t y p e d b e l o w L C C I , w o u l d b e t o make G r e e n e a d e f e n d a n t i n t h e collection suit. "We h o l d t h a t , i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e m o t i o n s f o r summary j u d g m e n t , t h e Bank p r e s e n t e d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t h a t i t was n o t n e g l i g e n t i n i t s i n i t i a l dealings with the lawyers leading up to the commencement of the lawsuit against Greene. Lawyers, by v i r t u e o f t h e i r l e g a l t r a i n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e , p o s s e s s a g r e a t e r a b i l i t y than laymen t o d i s c e r n t h e l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f documents such as the ones a t i s s u e h e r e : a g u a r a n t y agreement and a 'Statement of Account/Sworn Statement of Claim.' See T u r n e r v . K e n t u c k y B a r A s s ' n , 980 S.W.2d 5 6 0 , 563 ( K y . 1 9 9 8 ) ( s t a t i n g t h a t ' i n t e r p r e t [ i n g ] l e g a l documents' i s one o f s e v e r a l d u t i e s p e r f o r m e d b y paralegal assistants that must be a c c o m p l i s h e d 'under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n and d i r e c t i o n o f a l i c e n s e d lawyer'); Sisler v. Courier-News C o . , 199 N . J . S u p e r . 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 , 4 8 9 A . 2 d 7 0 4 , 710 ( A p p . D i v . 1 9 8 5 ) , r e v ' d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s s u b nom. S i s l e r v . G a n n e t t C o . , 104 N . J . 2 5 6 , 516 A . 2 d 1 0 8 3 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ( i n d i c a t i n g that no reliance could be p l a c e d , as t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a m o r t g a g e , on t h e o p i n i o n o f a c o u n t y c l e r k , 'who [ w a s ] n o t a l a w y e r a n d w h o s e duties [did] not include explaining the l e g a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of documents'). "'Perhaps t h e most fundamental 31 legal skill [a 1061289 lawyer brings to h i s representation of a c l i e n t ] c o n s i s t s o f d e t e r m i n i n g what k i n d o f l e g a l p r o b l e m s a s i t u a t i o n may i n v o l v e . ' R u l e 1.1, A l a . R. P r o f . C o n d . , Comment. ' C o m p e t e n t h a n d l i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r m a t t e r i n c l u d e s i n q u i r y i n t o and f a c t u a l a n a l y s i s o f the f a c t u a l and l e g a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e p r o b l e m . ' I d . " ' " I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h e c l i e n t must r e l y upon h i s lawyer t o make a reasonable i n v e s t i g a t i o n of h i s case. Likewise, the attorney must accept the o b l i g a t i o n to conduct a reasonable investigation i n an a t t e m p t t o f i n d what t h e t r u e f a c t s a r e b e f o r e f i l i n g a c i v i l a c t i o n on b e h a l f o f his c l i e n t . " ' " H u n t v . D r e s i e , 241 K a n . 6 4 7 , 6 5 6 , 740 P . 2 d 1 0 4 6 , 1 0 5 3 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ( q u o t i n g N e l s o n v . M i l l e r , 227 K a n . 2 7 1 , 2 8 4 , 607 P . 2 d 4 3 8 , 448 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ) . ... "... [W]e do n o t d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e l a w y e r s o r t h e Bank were n e g l i g e n t i n commencing t h e s u i t a g a i n s t Greene. We h o l d o n l y t h a t t h e B a n k , i n o p p o s i t i o n to the lawyers' m o t i o n s f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , presented substantial evidence that i t was not n e g l i g e n t i n commencing t h e s u i t . fl " T h e B a n k p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a n A u g u s t 9, 1 9 9 9 , letter from the office manager at the Jones, M o r r i s o n f i r m t o Sandra Nash of t h e Bank's r e c o v e r y d e p a r t m e n t , i n q u i r i n g w h e t h e r t h e r e was 'a g u a r a n t e e f o r a l l n i n e i n d i v i d u a l [ s ] t h a t a r e s i g n e d on t h e i n d i v i d u a l a c c o u n t s o r j u s t ... a p e r s o n a l g u a r a n t e e on V i n c e n t D. L a C o s t e ? ' d e m o n s t r a t e s c l e a r l y t h a t the Jones, Morrison firm knew that Vincent D. L a C o s t e was a guarantor." 5 939 So. 2d a t 900-02. 32 1061289 As Civil the above d i s c u s s i o n Appeals regarding Greene that Greene collection was events a should action. be At t r i a l , guaranty and Morrison, guaranty, Morrison Jones he on mailed January Morrison, Bank, and Clinton Greene. sworn 19, to mailed the Bank had once in authorized the debt- a lawyer at Bank be the of Stokes Bank and had sworn on provided appeared account forwarded s i g n e d and the therefore determined, based signature a bank r e p r e s e n t a t i v e that defendant decision and the of lawyers disagree debt statement 2000, i n turn, testified believed he h a d Greene's a a LCCI of the Court lawyers' Paul Clinton, documents that the to the the as after other up to named t e s t i f i e d that the leading guarantor Clinton, Jones the o p i n i o n i l l u s t r a t e s , t h e Bank and several that from on to the to Jones the to Bank. statement to r e t u r n e d the r e t u r n e d the instructed the form. form, him the to he sue 9 C l i n t o n also o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g testimony at t r i a l r e g a r d i n g the r e c e i p t of the s i g n e d statement of account from the Bank: 9 " T h e r e i s no m o r e i m p o r t a n t d o c u m e n t b e c a u s e we do n o t know N e a l G r e e n e . We do n o t know a n y d e b t o r s when t h e y come t o o u r o f f i c e . T y p i c a l l y we don't know who they are. So, we send a s u i t request a s k i n g the c r e d i t o r t o swear under o a t h t h a t this p e r s o n owes t h i s a m o u n t o f m o n e y . We a r e g o i n g t o 33 1061289 Ultimately, in t h e B a n k ' s c l a i m t u r n s on w h e t h e r t h e l a w y e r s g e n e r a l , and C l i n t o n i n p a r t i c u l a r , b r e a c h e d t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d o f care i n p r e p a r i n g and r e l y i n g Account/Sworn CONSTRUCTION Statement COMPANY, of Claim," signed that i t was n o t r e q u i r e d t o o f f e r particular and r e t u r n e d aspect Although Clinton's that statement The lawyers' reliance testimony signature of the lawyers' of account contends as t o t h i s appeared on t h e s w o r n s t a t e m e n t of on questions preparation of and t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of account of the after the and r e t u r n e d i t . p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e sworn statement reliance professional rely The B a n k that determination i s intertwined with the Bank s i g n e d and which t h e disagree. Greene's the reasonableness lawyers' "LACOSTE t h e Bank s t r o n g l y d i s p u t e s t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s regarding sworn expert We listed GREENE" to the lawyers. of i t s claim. determination the guaranty, which I N C . " a n d "NEAL Bank on t h e " S t a t e m e n t o f upon judgment. on w h a t t h e y i t involved of account the Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s tell us. and t h e exercise of this That's the s i g n i f i c a n c e . " I f we d o n ' t g e t t h e s u i t r e q u e s t , we d o n ' t f i l e s u i t . I f we d o n ' t g e t a s w o r n a f f i d a v i t , we d o n ' t f i l e s u i t b e c a u s e we a r e n o t g o i n g t o [ s u e ] s o m e b o d y t h a t we d o n ' t b e l i e v e owes t h e money. ... " 34 of case, 1061289 a determination prepared part and of of whether whether the the was to a p p l i c a b l e to the lawyers the statement the had signed Bank supra. the As sworn statement properly process are establish and and i t . was relied matters average layperson. required preparing sworn lawyers suit-initiation common k n o w l e d g e o f t h e testimony the of upon Therefore, the i t as beyond standard the expert of care whether they d e v i a t e d from i t i n subsequently See relying Tonsmeire, on supra; to the Bank's c l a i m a g a i n s t the lawyers statement correctly account, the JML i t after Valentine, relating to i s affirmed. 2. The the Bank's Bank instructed file" on their duty debt. 1 0 second c l a i m i s that a f t e r the by This LCCI not the Jones collection stopping c l a i m has two Morrison matter, the action components: May 10, 2000, firm to "close when the the lawyers breached to collect the (a) the Bank LCCI alleges In seeking to prove t h a t the lawyers breached the s t a n d a r d o f c a r e by n o t s t o p p i n g t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t G r e e n e , the Bank i s a t t e m p t i n g to p r o v e t h a t "the l a w y e r s ' a c t i o n s amounted to a m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n " of Greene. SouthTrust Bank, 939 So. 2d at 907. The Court of Civil Appeals explained: 1 0 "The Bank had the burden of p r o d u c t i o n with r e s p e c t to whether the l a w y e r s ' a c t i o n s amounted to m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n . See E x p a r t e G e n e r a l M o t o r s , 35 1061289 [769 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1 999)]. The elements m a l i c i o u s - p r o s e c u t i o n cause of a c t i o n are: of a "'(1) t h a t the [Bank] i n s t i t u t e d a p r i o r j u d i c i a l proceeding against [Greene]; (2) t h a t i n i n s t i t u t i n g the p r i o r proceeding t h e [Bank] a c t e d w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e and w i t h m a l i c e ; (3) t h a t t h e p r i o r proceeding ended i n f a v o r of [Greene]; and (4) t h a t [ G r e e n e ] was d a m a g e d as a r e s u l t o f the prior proceeding.' "Wal-Mart S t o r e s , 174 (Ala. 2000). Inc. v. Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, "The e x i s t e n c e o f t h e f i r s t , t h i r d , a n d f o u r t h elements i s undisputed. The e x i s t e n c e o f t h e first part of the second element--that the Bank sued Greene individually for LCCI's credit-card indebtedness without probable c a u s e t o b e l i e v e he was personally liable for the debt--is also undisputed. 'Where e v i d e n c e o f a l a c k o f probable c a u s e i s p r e s e n t e d and t h e f a c t s a r e n o t i n d i s p u t e , a q u e s t i o n o f l a w i s p r e s e n t e d , t o be d e c i d e d b y t h e Court.' D e l c h a m p s , I n c . v . L a r r y , 613 So. 2 d 1235, 1238 ( A l a . 1992). "The d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e Bank and t h e lawyers c e n t e r s on t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e s e c o n d e l e m e n t o f a malicious-prosecution claim: namely, m a l i c e . For t h a t e l e m e n t , the Bank had the b u r d e n of s u b m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t w o u l d h a v e e n t i t l e d G r e e n e t o a JML i f the p r o o f had not been c o n t r o v e r t e d a t t r i a l , i . e . , that the B a n k , o r a g e n t s a c t i n g on i t s behalf, commenced o r c o n t i n u e d a d e b t - c o l l e c t i o n p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t Greene w i t h m a l i c e . " ' M a l i c e i s an i n f e r e n c e o f f a c t a n d may be i n f e r r e d from the l a c k of probable cause or from mere wantonness or carelessness. P e r s o n a l i l l w i l l or a d e s i r e f o r revenge 36 1061289 that Jones Morrison Stokes debt Clinton a f t e r May Morrison matter; its duty finally firm breached firm to stop when to the f i l e " "close t h e Bank a n d (b) t h e B a n k a l l e g e s to stop relayed the c o l l e c t i o n t h e Bank's Jones is not malice.' that on to collect essential to does the t h e LCCI i n s t r u c t e d the Jones t h e LCCI once collection Jones instructions to close firm i n s t r u c t the Stokes C l i n t o n action Jones Morrison Morrison to timely the action 10, 2000, The The i t s duty the breached Morrison file. Firm not dispute existence that of "Delchamps, I n c . v. L a r r y , 613 S o . 2 d a t 1 2 3 9 (citation omitted). We h a v e a l r e a d y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e r e was no p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r t h e B a n k ' s l a w s u i t a g a i n s t Greene. We h a v e a l s o d e c i d e d t h a t t h e r e i s a d i s p u t e d q u e s t i o n o f m a t e r i a l f a c t as t o w h e t h e r t h e B a n k - - b a s e d on i t s own c o n d u c t o r t h e c o n d u c t o f its lawyers--was negligent i n commencing that lawsuit. Even i f that question of fact were r e s o l v e d by f i n d i n g t h e Bank n e g l i g e n t , an i n f e r e n c e o f m a l i c e c o u l d n o t be drawn f r o m t h a t f i n d i n g o f negligence a l o n e b e c a u s e t h e good f a i t h o f t h e Bank o r t h e l a w y e r s m i g h t be a d e f e n s e . See D e l c h a m p s , I n c . v . B r y a n t , 738 S o . 2 d 824 ( A l a . 1 9 9 9 ) ; W a l - M a r t Stores, I n c . v . Goodman, supra. Nevertheless, 'going forward carelessly or recklessly with previously commenced p r o c e e d i n g s after receiving n o t i c e o f a p r o b l e m may be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h g o o d faith.' D e l c h a m p s , I n c . v . B r y a n t , 738 S o . 2 d a t 834 (emphasis added)." 939 So. 2d a t 907-08. 37 i t 1061289 understood the Bank's to the debt collect contends that establish that i n s t r u c t i o n s to should expert stop. testimony Jones Morrison Jones was until October 2000, to Clinton of Bank's i n s t r u c t i o n s . a l l attempts Morrison, required committed waiting the 18, mean t h a t Bank to legal malpractice by attempt for however, to the notify Jones Morrison Stokes contends: "This i s not a case i n w h i c h a l a w y e r t o t a l l y f a i l e d to f o l l o w the c l i e n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s ; r a t h e r , the i s s u e i s whether Jones M o r r i s o n followed those i n s t r u c t i o n s i n a t i m e l y manner, g i v e n that [the B a n k ] t o l d J o n e s M o r r i s o n t o c l o s e i t s f i l e on May 10 a n d t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e n o t r e l a y e d t o the Stokes C l i n t o n f i r m u n t i l Jones M o r r i s o n ' s October 18 letter. The precise question, therefore, is whether the passage of t i m e b e t w e e n May 10 and O c t o b e r 18 a m o u n t e d t o a b r e a c h o f t h e s t a n d a r d of care. For purposes of t h i s appeal, the i s s u e i s e v e n more s p e c i f i c : w h e t h e r t h i s p a s s a g e o f time constituted such an obvious, or 'clear and p a l p a b l e , ' d e v i a t i o n from the p r o f e s s i o n a l standard of c a r e - - a k i n to m i s s i n g the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s - - t h a t no e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y was r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h it. When t h i s t i m e l i n e s s i s s u e i s e x a m i n e d i n l i g h t of the f a c t s of t h i s case, i t i s apparent t h a t t h i s case i s nothing l i k e V a l e n t i n e v. W a t t e r s o r any other case i n which a lawyer i r r e t r i e v a b l y f o r f e i t e d his client's rights by missing an established deadline." (Jones M o r r i s o n ' s At trial, testified obligation that to brief, Lewis he, "as pp. 30-31.) Jones, an communicate" a partner attorney to 38 We for Stokes disagree. at Jones [the] Clinton Morrison, Bank, the had an Bank's 1061289 i n s t r u c t i o n s to close the f i l e . the Jones file and functions three Morrison firm notifying of people Further, considered Stokes i t s support the acts Clinton staff. at the firm--none Jones t e s t i f i e d to do Jones of c l o s i n g the the same down." a at the Jones Morrison firm, Moreover, Jones t e s t i f i e d clue" a s t o why Stokes Clinton waited until instruction no t e l e p h o n e of t h e Bank's October to 18, 2000, Stokes "and t e l l that call be named lawyers--who had a u t h o r i t y to telephone Stokes C l i n t o n , without f i r s t attorney to specifically o f whom w e r e that asking them t o an stand t h e f i r m " d i d n o t have was e v e r made t o n o t i f y i n s t r u c t i o n o r why the to mail Clinton a letter ("the firm r e l a y i n g the October 18, 2000, letter"). In contrast to the evidence professional judgment statement account of document, t h e o n l y involved and the regarding in lawyers' the exercise preparing reliance the upon of sworn that reason o f f e r e d by Jones f o r t h e more-than- five-month delay i n r e l a y i n g t h e Bank's i n s t r u c t i o n t o Stokes Clinton i t was was t h a t "an o v e r s i g h t . " He testified: "Q. Do y o u h a v e a n y r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h e f a c t t h a t n o t i c e t o S t o k e s C l i n t o n t o c l o s e t h e f i l e was n o t g i v e n u n t i l O c t o b e r was d u e t o a n y t h i n g other t h a n an o v e r s i g h t ? 39 1061289 "A. T h a t ' s a l l i t i s i s an o v e r s i g h t . I have p i c k e d through the f i l e , p i c k e d through the h i s t o r y . I cannot see any reason that i t t o o k us until October to send the letter. I t j u s t had to be oversight." The evidence conclusion in that instruction to this case Jones therefore Morrison's Stokes Clinton does delay conclusion support staff Clinton as that judgment. relaying be not the Bank's testimony. the Bank's for attorney the the the trier of its delay of the supports act of i t s to Stokes professional delay Stokes firm i s something care that analogous So. in Clinton the assistance the Bank's c l a i m 896 of of fact without is in Valentine, exercise Morrison's the In t h a t r e g a r d , the instruction Jones standard the testimony exercise whether lead the considered i n s t r u c t i o n to a b r e a c h of Morrison against the involving d e t e r m i n e d by of expert Jones relaying Consequently, amounts t o may Jones Morrison to relaying in involved p r o f e s s i o n a l j u d g m e n t ; i n d e e d , J o n e s ' s own the not 2d to against the a t 392, claims i n which t h i s C o u r t , i n examining the s i m i l a r i t i e s between e s t a b l i s h i n g a standard breach for of the applicable legal-malpractice malpractice actions, actions and stated: 40 of care under the under AMLA f o r the ALSLA medical- 1061289 " R e c e n t l y , t h i s C o u r t i n Ex p a r t e HealthSouth C o r p . , [851 So. 2d 33 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) ] , s t a t e d t h a t i t was o b v i o u s t h a t e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y was n o t n e e d e d t o support a claim that nurses had breached the standard of care in failing to respond to the p l a i n t i f f patient's repeated c a l l s for assistance. 851 So. 2 d a t 3 9 . We s t a t e d t h a t ' [ a ] j u r y c o u l d u s e "common k n o w l e d g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e " t o determine w h e t h e r t h e s t a n d a r d o f c a r e was b r e a c h e d in this c a s e , where c u s t o d i a l c a r e , not m e d i c a l c a r e , i s at issue.'" Thus, the t r i a l Bank on its notifying the file. claim Stokes 1 c o u r t e r r e d i n e n t e r i n g a JML relating Clinton of against to Jones Morrison's delay the Bank's instruction to the in close 1 J o n e s M o r r i s o n a l s o a r g u e s t h a t , b a s e d on an a v e r a g e m a i l time of f i v e days from Jones M o r r i s o n to Stokes C l i n t o n , J o n e s M o r r i s o n ' s O c t o b e r 18, 2 0 0 0 , l e t t e r "was sent i n time for Stokes C l i n t o n to d i s m i s s the l a w s u i t before f i l i n g i t s d e f a u l t a p p l i c a t i o n or, at the v e r y l e a s t , to withdraw the d e f a u l t a p p l i c a t i o n a n d d i s m i s s t h e s u i t b e f o r e j u d g m e n t was entered a g a i n s t Greene." ( J o n e s M o r r i s o n ' s b r i e f , p. 34.) That p a r t i c u l a r argument, however, depends upon the d r a w i n g of i n f e r e n c e s i n Jones M o r r i s o n ' s f a v o r from the e v i d e n c e , which i s n o t a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h i s C o u r t t o do i n t h i s a p p e a l u n d e r the s t a n d a r d g o v e r n i n g r e v i e w of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s e n t r y of a JML f o r J o n e s M o r r i s o n . W a d d e l l & R e e d , I n c . , 875 So. 2d a t 1152 ("In r e v i e w i n g a r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r a JML, t h i s C o u r t views the evidence i n the light most f a v o r a b l e to the n o n m o v a n t and e n t e r t a i n s s u c h r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s as t h e j u r y would have been f r e e t o draw."). 1 1 A d d i t i o n a l l y , Jones M o r r i s o n ' s argument about the t i m i n g of the October 18, 2 0 0 0 , l e t t e r d o e s n o t f u l l y t a k e into a c c o u n t e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t b y O c t o b e r 18, 2 0 0 0 , G r e e n e had a l r e a d y begun to suffer damage as a result of the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the l e g a l a c t i o n a g a i n s t him. Specifically, 41 1061289 The As Stokes to the Stokes Stokes Clinton Clinton Clinton breached the firm, standard Firm the of s t o p the c o l l e c t i o n a c t i o n once i t f i n a l l y instructions claim focuses October 18 to close on letter, the the file. Stokes which Bank care claims in Clinton failing r e c e i v e d the Specifically, firm's that the receipt to Bank's Bank's of the stated: " P l e a s e be a d v i s e d o u r c l i e n t h a s r e q u e s t e d t h a t we c l o s e the above d e b t o r ' s f i l e . T h e y do n o t h a v e adequate documentation t o p r o c e e d on t h i s c a s e . If you have any q u e s t i o n s , p l e a s e a d v i s e . " At trial, Clinton testified that the October 18 letter t h e r e was e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g t h a t b y O c t o b e r 2 0 0 0 t h e a t t e m p t t o s e r v e G r e e n e b y p u b l i c a t i o n was c a u s i n g a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e number o f c a l l s t o G r e e n e ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n b u s i n e s s , w h i c h he a s s e r t e d c a u s e d h i s g r o s s income and n e t p r o f i t s t o drop. G r e e n e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s " b u s i n e s s j u s t f l a t s t o p p e d due t o t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f a l a w s u i t b y [ t h e B a n k ] a g a i n s t me." He testified further: " I n my i n d u s t r y , i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n d u s t r y , when i t s h o w s up i n t h e p a p e r a n d i n t h e p i n k s l i p s t h a t a c o n t r a c t o r i s b e i n g sued by h i s bank o r a bank i t i s l i k e l e p r o s y t h e y w i l l - - a l l hands are o f f . No one will fool with you because as a whole c o n s t r u c t i o n i s a r i s k y b u s i n e s s anyway. I f you a r e e v e n ... s h a k y t h e y a r e n o t g o i n g t o do b u s i n e s s a n d t r u s t y o u w i t h $50 o r $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n p r o j e c t s a n d you have f i n a n c i a l problems w i t h a bank. T h e r e f o r e , you w i l l j u s t d r y up u n l e s s y o u f i n d a s o u r c e . That i s b a s i c a l l y t h e w o r d - o f - m o u t h t y p e b u s i n e s s t h a t I am, l o n g - t i m e c o n n e c t i o n s i n the town. T h e y know t h e f a m i l y ' s name as a c o n t r a c t o r - - w a s h u r t i n s t a n t l y . " 42 1061289 "makes i t clear that the S t o k e s C l i n t o n does not client wants argue that the i t could proceed against Greene a f t e r r e c e i v i n g the That C l i n t o n does not in i s , Stokes the the exercise not 18 that action letter. receive the "[b]y the Rather, time 2000 judgment against that [the Clinton's by from seven Morrison the to standard construed the letter If as the of Clinton early that days as to Bank] wanted had already Clinton's in brief, that suggesting for mail to applicable firm October actually 20, on in closed, the by the however, from the the Jones the with evidence, Bank, s u g g e s t s received is i t took In a c c o r d a n c e that October 18 2000. Stokes C l i n t o n f i r m indeed received 43 and average, here, to the i t did 14.) travel Stokes C l i n t o n f i r m . review p. the 2000, entered regard, that, pursue notice file been have, receiving received the to letter. i t could after Clinton i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e Stokes O c t o b e r 18 Stokes C l i n t o n argues that claim evidence f i r m to the Greene [Stokes] (Stokes controverted two have c o n t i n u e d l e t t e r u n t i l November 22, Greene court." Stokes against O c t o b e r 18 November circuit closed." of p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment, c o n t i n u e d collection October contend file the October 18 1061289 letter the before October Stokes C l i n t o n from t h e Bank apply f o r and to firm, close obtain a p p l y f o r and o b t a i n record The that Stokes evidence. argument scenario, Clinton Notably, to counter failing stated despite receiving file, default against firm judgment the Stokes C l i n t o n October 18 proceeded against this to court. version that under to offer expert which such an a testimony of care i n were Accordingly, 1 2 of the f i r m does not o f f e r instructions, 1 3 Greene, to ("COJ"), and t o breached the standard letter. that instructions i n the probate contention not r e q u i r e d the Bank's clear of judgment Greene the Bank's to indicate nevertheless does not a d d r e s s Stokes C l i n t o n t o obey i s evidence a certificate t h e B a n k was i n the there the a judgment to prove that 24, no clearly expert Stokes Clinton applied f o r the default judgment on O c t o b e r 2 4 , 2 0 0 0 ; t h e j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d on O c t o b e r 2 6 , 2000. S t o k e s C l i n t o n f i l e d f o r a COJ on N o v e m b e r 7, 2 0 0 0 . The c i r c u i t c l e r k p r e p a r e d a C O J on N o v e m b e r 1 4 , 2 0 0 0 , a n d t h e C O J was a l l e g e d l y r e c e i v e d by t h e S t o k e s C l i n t o n f i r m on November 21, 2000. On N o v e m b e r 2 9 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e j u d g m e n t was recorded i n the probate o f f i c e . 1 2 C l i n t o n d i d t e s t i f y t h a t i f he h a d r e c e i v e d t h e O c t o b e r 18 l e t t e r b e f o r e O c t o b e r 2 4 , he w o u l d n o t h a v e f i l e d t h e application for a default judgment. C l i n t o n t e s t i f i e d as follows: 1 3 "Q. Now, a t t h a t t i m e on O c t o b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 0 , y o u had yet to f i l e an application for a default judgment; i s that r i g h t ? 44 1061289 testimony was required conduct after received the letter "A. No. of receiving to the establish October before October that 18 Stokes Clinton's letter--if indeed i t 24--breached the standard care. I believe that i s correct. "Q. I f you had had t h a t l e t t e r f i l i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e f a u l t , f i l e d the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r d e f a u l t ? "A. i n hand b e f o r e w o u l d you have No. "Q. And t h a t ' s b e c a u s e t h a t l e t t e r makes i t c l e a r y o u a r e t o s t o p y o u r c o l l e c t i o n a c t i v i t i e s on that f i l e ; i s that correct? "A. the "Q. file "A. No. No. I t m a k e s i t c l e a r t h a t closed, doesn't i t ? Right, wants i t does. "Q. Now, a r e you t e l l i n g operate i n opposition to your instruction? "A. No, I w o u l d n o t . B u t them about t h e l e t t e r . asked the c l i e n t me t h a t y o u would client on s u c h an and ask "Q. And you n e v e r c a l l e d S o u t h T r u s t Bank them what t h e y meant by t h a t , d i d you? and "A. I d i d not." 45 I would call 1061289 Thus, t h e t r i a l B a n k on i t s c l a i m stopping had court that the action instructed erred i n entering a JML a g a i n s t t h e Stokes C l i n t o n breached i t s duty by not to collect i tto "close t h e LCCI the f i l e " debt after t h e Bank on t h e LCCI c o l l e c t i o n matter. 3. The Bank's negligently or final claim recklessly i s that caused the Stokes Greene to Clinton be served publication i n the c o l l e c t i o n action. The B a n k c o n t e n d s this e s s e n t i a l l y turns Clinton's claim file, with the publication, knowledge" In an that motion on P a u l seeking affidavit asserting G r e e n e was a v o i d i n g addressing this claim, service that that to Greene by had "personal service. the Court of C i v i l Appeals stated: "The Bank a r g u e s that the Stokes, Clinton firm n e g l i g e n t l y o r r e c k l e s s l y c a u s e d G r e e n e t o be s e r v e d b y p u b l i c a t i o n when a r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t t o d e t e r m i n e Greene's home address would have resulted in p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e on G r e e n e , t h e r e b y e n a b l i n g G r e e n e to appear, t o argue f o r , and t o o b t a i n a d i s m i s s a l of t h e Bank's l a w s u i t a g a i n s t him. In support of this allegation, t h e Bank submitted evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e l a w y e r s made o n l y o n e a t t e m p t a t p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e on G r e e n e , a t 3 4 6 3 L a C o s t e R o a d i n Mobile; t h a t t h e s h e r i f f ' s r e t u r n o n s e r v i c e was marked 'not found--no longer employed by LCCI'; t h a t 46 by decision of he firm 1061289 a simple 'skip-trace' search of the Mobile telephone d i r e c t o r y w o u l d h a v e r e v e a l e d a 'B. N e a l G r e e n e ' r e s i d i n g a t 6602 C h e r r y P o i n t C o u r t i n M o b i l e ; a n d that Paul Clinton's affidavit i n support of the m o t i o n f o r s e r v i c e b y p u b l i c a t i o n was n o t b a s e d o n p e r s o n a l knowledge or f a c t s t h a t would establish avoidance of service. [ 1 4 ] "The l a w y e r s s u b m i t t e d no e v i d e n c e indicating t h a t t h e y h a d made a n e f f o r t t o f i n d G r e e n e o r t h a t t h e y h a d p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t G r e e n e was a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e . ... S e e g e n e r a l l y R u l e 4 . 3 ( c ) , A l a . R. C i v . P., C o m m i t t e e Comments on 1 9 7 7 C o m p l e t e R e v i s i o n ( s t a t i n g t h a t 'more t h a n m e r e i n a b i l i t y t o f i n d t h e defendant i s r e q u i r e d ' f o r s e r v i c e by p u b l i c a t i o n b e c a u s e ' a v o i d a n c e o f s e r v i c e ' i m p l i e s an ' e l e m e n t o f c u l p a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' ) ; a n d V a u g h a n v . O ' N e a l , 736 S o . 2 d 635 ( A l a . C i v . A p p . 1999) ( h o l d i n g t h a t a c o n c l u s o r y s t a t e m e n t i n an a f f i d a v i t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was ' a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e , ' without r e c i t i n g facts to support the conclusion, was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f R u l e 4 . 3 ( d ) ( 1 ) , A l a . R. C i v . P . ) . " SouthTrust The service Bank, 939 S o . 2 d a t 9 0 6 - 0 7 . affidavit Clinton by p u b l i c a t i o n submitted with the motion for stated: "1. My name i s J . P a u l C l i n t o n , a n d I am t h e attorney of record f o r the p l a i n t i f f . I give this a f f i d a v i t based upon p e r s o n a l knowledge o f t h e f a c t s herein. The for "2. The d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e . defendant has been absent from t h e i r r e s i d e n c e more t h a n t h i r t y (30) d a y s s i n c e t h e f i l i n g o f On t h e g u a r a n t y t h a t t h e Bank m a i l e d t o J o n e s on A u g u s t 2 3 , 1 9 9 9 , t h e " B o r r o w e r " was l i s t e d a s C o n s t r u c t i o n C o . , I n c . -- N e a l G r e e n e . " 14 47 Morrison "LaCoste 1061289 this complaint a n d c a n n o t be l o c a t e d . Service c a n n o t be p e r f e c t e d upon t h e d e f e n d a n t b y a n y m e t h o d other than p u b l i c a t i o n . " Rule 4.3(d) states: " B e f o r e s e r v i c e b y p u b l i c a t i o n c a n b e made i n a n action where the identity or residence of a d e f e n d a n t i s u n k n o w n , o r when a d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n a b s e n t f r o m t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e f o r more t h a n t h i r t y (30) d a y s s i n c e t h e f i l i n g o f t h e c o m p l a i n t o r where t h e d e f e n d a n t a v o i d s s e r v i c e , an a f f i d a v i t o f a p a r t y o r t h e p a r t y ' s c o u n s e l must be f i l e d w i t h t h e c o u r t a v e r r i n g t h a t s e r v i c e o f summons o r o t h e r p r o c e s s c a n n o t b e made b e c a u s e e i t h e r t h e r e s i d e n c e i s unknown t o t h e a f f i a n t and c a n n o t w i t h r e a s o n a b l e d i l i g e n c e be a s c e r t a i n e d , o r , t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i s unknown, o r , t h e r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t has b e e n a b s e n t f o r more t h a n t h i r t y (30) d a y s s i n c e t h e f i l i n g of the complaint, o r , the defendant avoids s e r v i c e , a v e r r i n g f a c t s showing such avoidance." (Emphasis The added.) Bank a s s e r t s that Clinton t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l that the s o l e r e a s o n f o r h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t G r e e n e was a v o i d i n g was Clinton's i n a b i l i t y to find authority cited out that Greene. the person that Clinton's t h a t no e x p e r t comply w i t h with the by t h e C o u r t o f C i v i l A p p e a l s , t h e Bank t h e mere i n a b i l i t y t o l o c a t e that Consistent service i s avoiding affidavit service. a person i s needed t o t e s t i f y t h a t Rule 4.3(d). 48 d o e s n o t mean Thus, t h e Bank d i d not comply w i t h points Rule contends 4.3(d) and the a f f i d a v i t d i d not 1061289 At trial, several Clinton testified unsuccessful Specifically, that Stokes attempts Clinton to locate C l i n t o n h a d made and serve Greene. testified: "We attempted [ t o s e r v e Greene] by t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e and had been u n s u c c e s s f u l and t h e c e r t i f i e d m a i l had been u n s u c c e s s f u l . There are o n l y three ways t o s e r v e somebody, c e r t i f i e d mail, process server or the s h e r i f f , a n d t h e o n l y t h i r d way left i s s e r v i c e b y p u b l i c a t i o n . S o , we d e c i d e d that's w h a t we n e e d e d t o t r y t o g e t a u t h o r i t y t o d o , a n d t h a t ' s what t h e y wanted t o do." Regarding Clinton the attempt testified to serve Greene by certified mail, that " [ i ] t was r e t u r n e d u n c l a i m e d . I t was n o t r e t u r n e d wrong a d d r e s s . I t was n o t r e t u r n e d ' t h e y m o v e d . ' It was unclaimed, as i f he was there, but he w o u l d n ' t c l a i m i t . T h a t ' s what o u r b e l i e f was." (Emphasis added.) time he was Additionally, attempting certified mail, dwelling" was attempting t o have that, based have Greene t o have h i s research located at Greene he Greene served indicated that the served. on h i s r e s e a r c h served, Clinton testified address i n person which Clinton and h i s u n s u c c e s s f u l believed that or by a "multi-family at Thus, that at the Greene he testified attempts was was to avoiding service. However, regardless of the 49 reasons given at trial by 1061289 Clinton for his assertion in avoiding service, the reasons; instead, the i t included was avoiding service avoidance." by the but of Civil affidavit determining that that Bank's claim making that allows "a affidavit that he party inability to locate in was deviated the of assertion that and facts the to those Greene show authority SouthTrust avoiding testimony or Clinton 4.3(d) state was Bank, such cited supra, e x e r c i s e d p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment i n determination. i n support Moreover, service." Greene expert "aver[] not Greene deficient. C l i n t o n a r g u e s t h a t he contends not did that did bare Appeals was itself the Thus, under R u l e Court Clinton's affidavit affidavit was from a motion acknowledged a person he required the However, party's service; to standard Rule therefore prove of 4.3(d) counsel" to the care in expressly submit an f o r s e r v i c e by p u b l i c a t i o n . at doesn't trial mean that they "the are mere avoiding 1 5 The Bank c i t e s s e v e r a l i t e m s of e v i d e n c e t o d i s p u t e the reasonableness of C l i n t o n ' s b e l i e f , s u c h as (1) evidence i n d i c a t i n g that Stokes C l i n t o n attempted to l o c a t e a d i f f e r e n t address other than the address at which i t attempted to serve G r e e n e b y c e r t i f i e d m a i l ; a n d (2) t e s t i m o n y f r o m E d w i n D a v i s , a " s k i p t r a c e r , " who t e s t i f i e d t h a t S t o k e s C l i n t o n c o u l d h a v e u n d e r t a k e n more d i l i g e n t e f f o r t s t o l o c a t e G r e e n e s u c h as a s k i n g t h e Bank t o p r o v i d e a S o c i a l S e c u r i t y number o r d a t e o f 1 5 50 1061289 Under the that expert Clinton's and particular testimony was determination not that of required G r e e n e was this to c a s e , we establish "avoiding hold whether service"-¬ u l t i m a t e l y C l i n t o n ' s d e c i s i o n to seek s e r v i c e of Greene publication--breached Because of circumstances Rule of Clinton's 4.3(d), w i t h o u t the the failure Ala. assistance Civ. applicable to comply w i t h P., of expert standard the jury the could of by care. requirements determine, testimony, that Clinton acted b i r t h f o r Greene. The B a n k a l s o a r g u e s , as t o Clinton's assertion that his research indicated that a multi-family d w e l l i n g was a t t h e a d d r e s s a t w h i c h he t r i e d t o h a v e G r e e n e served, (1) that i t was not until June 20 , 2 0 0 0 , that C l i n t o n ' s r e s e a r c h i n d i c a t e d the e x i s t e n c e of a m u l t i - f a m i l y d w e l l i n g a t t h a t a d d r e s s , w h i c h was a f t e r S t o k e s C l i n t o n h a d m a i l e d the s t a t e m e n t of account to Jones M o r r i s o n to send to t h e Bank; and (2) t h a t i f C l i n t o n b e l i e v e d t h e r e t o be m o r e t h a n one d w e l l i n g a t t h e a d d r e s s , he s h o u l d h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o have Greene s e r v e d at the other d w e l l i n g at t h a t address r a t h e r than o n l y "at the main house." ( B a n k ' s r e p l y b r i e f , p. 18.) The Bank also points out that Clinton filed two unsuccessful m o t i o n s t o h a v e G r e e n e s e r v e d by p u b l i c a t i o n ; a l t h o u g h e a c h o f t h e m o t i o n s was a c c o m p a n i e d b y an a f f i d a v i t f r o m C l i n t o n a s s e r t i n g t h a t he b e l i e v e d G r e e n e was avoiding s e r v i c e , t h e a f f i d a v i t s were u n s w o r n , and the t r i a l court d e n i e d the motions. A f t e r t h o s e m o t i o n s were d e n i e d , C l i n t o n filed a third motion accompanied by a sworn affidavit a s s e r t i n g t h a t G r e e n e was a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e . The B a n k a s s e r t s t h a t t h e two e a r l i e r m o t i o n s u n a c c o m p a n i e d b y s w o r n a f f i d a v i t s i n d i c a t e an u n w i l l i n g n e s s on C l i n t o n ' s p a r t t o a s s e r t t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t G r e e n e was a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e . [substituted p. 51] 1061289 negligently or publication. JML against based on recklessly Therefore, the Bank Clinton's in the as to seeking trial court i t s claim decision to to serve erred against seek Greene by in entering Stokes service of a Clinton Greene by publication. II. On on remand a f t e r the October 10, 2006, first seeking Specifically, the that B a n k was "(1) the [that] the Bank], subject motion lawyers' to 41.) May On stating, 4, at and 2007 , in relevant the a motion summary judgment. a summary j u d g m e n t declaring partial potentially liable proof reasonable Bank f i l e d a sought conduct G r e e n e was appeal, obligated trial i n good the Greene them to that the faith." trial to court and (2) indemnify [the settlement with (Bank's b r i e f , entered an p. order part: " [ T ] h e c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e B a n k ' s m o t i o n i s due to be granted, in part. In p r o v i n g i t s claim for indemnity against the lawyers, the Bank w i l l not h a v e t o p r o v e t h a t i t was a c t u a l l y l i a b l e to Neal G r e e n e , b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t was p o t e n t i a l l y l i a b l e t o Greene f o r m a l i c i o u s p r o s e c u t i o n . The r e m a i n d e r o f the Bank's motion i s d e n i e d . " In addition lawyers, the to seeking reversal B a n k a s k s us of the JML to reverse the trial 52 in favor court's of the denial 1061289 in part of the above-described motion for a partial summary judgment. In 2d B e i e r s d o e r f e r v. H i l b , 1196 (Ala. 2006), this Rogal Court & Hamilton stated: court's denial a trial on t h e m e r i t s . ' " 953 S o . 2 d a t 1205 Folmar and & Assocs., citing Grayson Superskate, and of a summary-judgment motion L L P , 854 v. I n c . v. Nolen, C i r . 2001)). Mitchell ( A l a . 2003), So. 146 ( A l a . 2002); So. 2 d 2 3 1 , 233 ( A l a . 1994); L i n d v. U n i t e d P a r c e l S e r v . , (11th I n c . , 254 F . 3 d 1 2 8 1 , The B a n k c o n t e n d s , however, t h a t 1283-84 the rule s t a t e d i n B e i e r s d o e r f e r does n o t a p p l y b e c a u s e , t h e Bank it was present "deprived case. The presented to JML of a 'full (Bank's b r i e f , i n this at a t r i a l i t . Therefore, case Bank's reviewable. App. motion p. t h e B a n k was for a on 44.) entered a jury on t h e m e r i t s , a n d t h e t r i a l the trial was before the m e r i t s ' " We after the a l l the evidence not deprived partial B e i e r s d o e r f e r , supra. summary i n the Bank had available of a f u l l trial d e n i a l of judgment i s not See S k a c h v . G e e , 137 I l l . 441, 444, 53 says, disagree. court's earlier p a r t i a l 3d 2 1 6 , 2 2 1 , 484 N . E . 2 d review 843 641 2d So. following (quoting S o . 2 d 1 1 1 5 , 1116 Hanson, 953 " ' [ W ] e do n o t a trial v. Co., 91 I l l . D e c . 882, 885 1061289 (1985), i n which the A p p e l l a t e Court of Illinois stated: " P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e t h a t i t was e r r o r f o r t h e trial court to deny their motion for summary judgment. However, p l a i n t i f f s r e c o g n i z e t h a t the denial of a motion f o r summary j u d g m e n t i s n o t r e v i e w a b l e on a p p e a l a f t e r a t r i a l h a s b e e n h e l d because any error in denial merges into the subsequent appeal. (Banwart v. Okesson (2d D i s t . 1 9 8 0 ) , 83 I l l . A p p . 3 d 2 2 2 , 2 2 5 , 38 I l l . D e c . 630, 403 N . E . 2 d 1 2 3 4 . ) P l a i n t i f f s argue t h a t the p r e s e n t t r i a l was n e v e r c o m p l e t e d b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l court granted Orland's motion f o r a d i r e c t e d f i n d i n g . We disagree. P l a i n t i f f s p r e s e n t e d a l l the evidence a v a i l a b l e t o t h e m . T h u s , an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g was held, and the t r i a l court found their evidence insufficient. T h e r e f o r e , t h e summary j u d g m e n t o f the t r i a l c o u r t i s n o t r e v i e w a b l e . C l a r k v. Maddux (2d D i s t . 1 9 8 3 ) , 118 I l l . A p p . 3d 5 4 6 , 5 4 9 - 5 0 , 73 Ill. Dec. 930, 454 N.E.2d 1179, appeal denied ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 96 I l l . 2 d 5 6 7 . " 1 6 See also 1285-86 Lind v. United Parcel Serv., I n c . , 254 F.3d 1281, (11th C i r . 2001): " ' I f we w e r e r o u t i n e l y t o h e a r p o s t - t r i a l a p p e a l s o f s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t m o t i o n d e n i a l s , we w o u l d p r o v i d e an unwarranted i n c e n t i v e f o r t r i a l judges to grant such m o t i o n s i n c l o s e c a s e s . The o n l y way f o r a d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o d e f u s e t h e 'bomb' o f a d e n i a l ' s reversal The Bank a r g u e s t h a t Skach i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e because the " d i r e c t e d f i n d i n g " was e n t e r e d i n S k a c h a f t e r b o t h s i d e s had p r e s e n t e d t h e i r e v i d e n c e at t r i a l . Although i t i s true t h a t t h e JML was e n t e r e d i n the present case b e f o r e the l a w y e r s had p r e s e n t e d t h e i r e v i d e n c e i n r e b u t t a l t o the Bank's e v i d e n c e , t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n from Skach i s i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l . In r e a c h i n g i t s c o n c l u s i o n t h e S k a c h c o u r t r e l i e d p r i m a r i l y on the f a c t that the " [ p ] l a i n t i f f s p r e s e n t e d a l l the evidence a v a i l a b l e t o them." 137 I l l . A p p . 3 d a t 2 2 1 , 484 N . E . 2 d a t 4 4 4 , 91 I l l . D e c . a t 8 8 5 . 1 6 54 1061289 f o l l o w i n g w h a t w o u l d be a therefore superfluous trial would be to grant the motion, enter an a p p e a l a b l e judgment d i s m i s s i n g the c o m p l a i n t , and a w a i t the outcome of the a p p e a l . Then, o n l y i n the event of reversal, would the court and parties p r o c e e d t o t r i a l s e c u r e i n t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t one i s necessary.'" (Quoting Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 131 (2d C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) . ) III. During sought discovery testimony internal and analysis in the underlying documents of from i t s actual or case, the Bank amount o f any such settle with Greene. lawyers sought former in-house John Buchanan, identified the as decision sought to counsel, the evaluation The of the settle production his of Bank's request to take Company objected Bank Buchanan's to and the The Casualty request for Casualty 55 the the the Bank's Bank Greene and the American production of its lawyers Company's Company had knowledge Bank o b j e c t e d t o the d e p o s i t i o n , and American any Additionally, American to i t s d e c i s i o n to whom to its liability to depose liability claim. Greene's c l a i m . The and o n l y bank employee h a v i n g concerning file. liability, lawyers regarding potential Greene, the the file lawyers' Casualty of asserted its that 1061289 the requested client the and and Casualty's to American assert 512A(a), sought assert to bank's own company an "adverse A l a . R. the inference settled with "that Neal trial granted the t o two of t h i s the trial Because the t r i a l as upheld privilege. reversal of the that JML are On the Bank its of the separate lawyers." appeal, the motion. at the c l o s e of entered were lawyers and of the motion. a JML the because g r a n t i n g of court entered the bank Greene omissions lawyers' court's against the liabilities The our of attorney- court Specifically, a p a r t f r o m t h e a l l e g e d a c t s and Bank's case, the trial inference" and Bank c h a l l e n g e s The claims Evid. a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l court under t h e n moved f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e y under Rule insurance privileged privileges. lawyers entitled was work-product Bank's The discovery a g a i n s t the the Bank of the Bank's t h r e e c l a i m s p r e t e r m i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n issue. 1 7 See g e n e r a l l y A t k i n s v. Lee, 603 So. 2d 937, A s n o t e d , t h e JML i s a f f i r m e d as t o t h e B a n k ' s c l a i m t h a t the lawyers breached the s t a n d a r d of care i n p r e p a r i n g t h e s w o r n s t a t e m e n t o f a c c o u n t a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y r e l y i n g on i t a f t e r t h e B a n k h a d s i g n e d i t . The b a s i s f o r t h a t a f f i r m a n c e is that the Bank failed to prove the c l a i m by expert testimony. The B a n k d o e s n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g on t h e l a w y e r s ' m o t i o n s e e k i n g t o a s s e r t an adverse inference prevented or l i m i t e d the Bank i n i t s e f f o r t s to prove i t s c l a i m r e l a t i n g to the sworn statement of account. R a t h e r , as t o t h e a d v e r s e - i n f e r e n c e r u l i n g , t h e B a n k c o n t e n d s : 17 56 1061289 941 (Ala. for an 1 9 9 2 ) ("[A] j u d g m e n t error complained rights and 'unless of the p a r t i e s . ' " citing Civ. Snow v . B o y k i n , (Ala. 1985); App. i t should of has p r o b a b l y American Furniture 369 ... cannot be r e v e r s e d appear injuriously (quoting Rule on the that appeal error affected substantial 45, A l a . R. A p p . P., 432 S o . 2 d 1 2 1 0 , 1 2 1 4 ( A l a . Galleries, I n c . v . McWane, I n c . , 1983); 477 S o . 2 d a n d M u n c h e r v . M u n c h e r , 5 0 9 S o . 2 d 250 (Ala. 1987))). Conclusion The lawyers JML i s affirmed wrongly as t o t h e Bank's i d e n t i f i e d Greene claim as a g u a r a n t o r that the o f t h e LCCI d e b t a n d t h e r e b y w r o n g l y c a u s e d G r e e n e t o b e made a d e f e n d a n t " P e r m i t t i n g the adverse i n f e r e n c e i n t h i s case i s especially inappropriate because the t r i a l court also ordered that [ t h e Bank] could not offer testimony relating to their analysis, e t c . ,of settlement i n s u p p o r t o f t h e i r c l a i m t h a t i t was reasonable. [The Bank] c o m p l i e d w i t h t h a t , a n d t h e i r e f f o r t t o prove r e a s o n a b l e n e s s has been and w i l l h e r e a f t e r be s o l e l y b y s h o w i n g t h e j u r y what t h e l a w y e r s d i d , and l e t t i n g t h e j u r y see t h a t $325,000 was reasonable. I f t h e y h a d t r i e d t o show t h e i r internal a n a l y s i s f o r a r r i v i n g a t $325,000, then perhaps t h e r e would have been a w a i v e r i s s u e . " (Bank's r e p l y b r i e f , pp. 34-35.) Thus, t h e Bank has n o t argued o r d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t any e r r o r i n t h e t r i a l court's r u l i n g on t h e a d v e r s e - i n f e r e n c e m o t i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e us t o r e v e r s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s JML a s t o t h e B a n k ' s c l a i m r e g a r d i n g the sworn s t a t e m e n t o f a c c o u n t . 57 1061289 i n t h e Bank's c o l l e c t i o n a c t i o n ; Bank's claims (1) t h a t the lawyers breached t h e i r duty to the Bank by n o t s t o p p i n g the action (2) Clinton that caused action; the Stokes Greene t o be served and t h e cause AFFIRMED Cobb, t o c o l l e c t t h e LCCI debt, and firm negligently by p u b l i c a t i o n or recklessly i n the c o l l e c t i o n i s remanded. I N PART; R E V E R S E D C . J . , and t h e JML i s r e v e r s e d a s t o t h e Lyons, I N PART; AND Woodall, REMANDED. Parker, Murdock, and Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . Stuart and B o l i n , J J . ,concur part. 58 i n part and dissent in 1061289 BOLIN, Justice I concur exception Part "that (concurring i n part i n a l l aspects of Part and d i s s e n t i n g o f t h e main I.B.3., as t o w h i c h I.B.1. o f t h e main o p i n i o n i n part). opinion I respectfully with dissent. concerns t h e Bank's the lawyers wrongly i d e n t i f i e d [Brewton Neal] the claim Greene as a g u a r a n t o r o f t h e LCCI debt and t h e r e b y w r o n g l y c a u s e d Greene t o b e made a d e f e n d a n t i n t h e Bank's c o l l e c t i o n So. I.B., t h e Court quotes from and r e l i e s 3d a t . upon V a l e n t i n e settled In Part v. Walters, proposition action." 896 S o . 2 d 385 ( A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) , f o r t h e that, although expert testimony i s generally required i n a l e g a l - m a l p r a c t i c e a c t i o n brought under the Services Ala. Alabama Legal C o d e 1 9 7 5 ("the when t h e a l l e g e d the comprehension Liability ALSLA"), expert breach Act, testimony i snot required of the standard of the average § 6-5-570 e t s e q . , of care layman. comes within In Valentine, stated: "We a r e p e r s u a d e d b y o u r e a r l i e r a n a l y s e s u n d e r the m e d i c a l - s e r v i c e s - l i a b i l i t y cases and by other c o u r t s ' a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t same k i n d o f a n a l y s i s t o l e g a l - s e r v i c e s - l i a b i l i t y c a s e s t h a t an e x c e p t i o n t o the general requirement that a p l a i n t i f f present expert testimony i n support of a legal-malpractice c l a i m o c c u r s where a l e g a l - s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' s want o f s k i l l o r l a c k o f c a r e i s so a p p a r e n t as t o be u n d e r s t o o d b y a l a y p e r s o n a n d r e q u i r e s o n l y common k n o w l e d g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e t o u n d e r s t a n d i t . ... " 59 we 1061289 896 So. 2d The at 394. lawyers Account/Sworn submitted that they of Claim" Statement to Construction main argued the Bank Company, and Inc." opinion correctly relied that that and on a they listed "Neal "Statement of prepared and both Greene" "Lacoste therein. The holds: "The p r e p a r a t i o n of the sworn statement of a c c o u n t and t h e l a w y e r s ' r e l i a n c e upon i t i n v o l v e d the e x e r c i s e of p r o f e s s i o n a l judgment. Under the circumstances of this case, a determination of w h e t h e r t h e s w o r n s t a t e m e n t was c o r r e c t l y p r e p a r e d and w h e t h e r t h e l a w y e r s p r o p e r l y r e l i e d upon i t as part of the suit-initiation process are matters beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson. T h e r e f o r e , e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y was r e q u i r e d to e s t a b l i s h the standard of care a p p l i c a b l e to the lawyers and whether they deviated from i t in p r e p a r i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y r e l y i n g on i t a f t e r the Bank had s i g n e d i t . See T o n s m e i r e [ v . AmSouth Bank, 659 So. 2d 601 (Ala. 1995)]; Valentine, supra." So. I 3d am at not conclusion able of the addresses legal necessary to to c o n t r a s t the main opinion m a l p r a c t i c e and show an Part I.B.3. of the the Stokes Clinton alleged main above in Part whether breach conclusion with of I.B.3., expert the opinion addresses firm committed 60 legal which the also testimony standard issue of the was care. whether malpractice by 1061289 improperly c a u s i n g Greene t o be collection action. noted i n the main o p i n i o n , for Stokes obtaining Clinton a The order trial i t showing that sheriff and prepared court publication. before A s was that was an found a lawyer of service of process by - no the returns service on service on G r e e n e b y l o n g e r e m p l o y e d by c e r t i f i e d m a i l was the LCCI" returned "unclaimed." In support of s u b s t i t u t e d s e r v i c e of p r o c e s s publication), the a f f i d a v i t of simply the motion the support had s e r v i c e by in in allowing court publication affidavit the attempted r e t u r n e d "not the attempted s e r v e d by (by s u b m i t t e d by t h e l a w y e r i n s u p p o r t stated: "1. My name i s J . P a u l C l i n t o n , a n d I am t h e a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d f o r the p l a i n t i f f . I give this a f f i d a v i t based upon p e r s o n a l knowledge of the f a c t s herein. "2. The d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n a v o i d i n g s e r v i c e . The d e f e n d a n t h a s b e e n a b s e n t f r o m t h e i r r e s i d e n c e f o r m o r e t h a n t h i r t y (30) d a y s s i n c e t h e f i l i n g o f this c o m p l a i n t and cannot be located. Service c a n n o t be p e r f e c t e d u p o n t h e d e f e n d a n t b y a n y m e t h o d other than p u b l i c a t i o n . " Rule of and 4 . 3 ( c ) , A l a . R. failure provides that of s e r v i c e i s not s u f f i c i e n t the a f f i d a v i t specific C i v . P., facts in subdivision of avoidance." evidence of (d)(1) of t h i s The 61 "[t]he trial court, mere fact avoidance, r u l e must aver in i t s file, 1061289 had the with "mere f a c t the of f a i l u r e of s e r v i c e " conclusory affidavit before i t , together submitted by the lawyer (see Rule 4.(d), r e g a r d i n g " f a c t s showing such a v o i d a n c e " ) , yet the trial with c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r a l l o w i n g t h e p l a i n t i f f service by Although understand lawsuit believe Ala. i t may R. that easy or of the types 4, A l a . R. concepts is "so only apparent common thereby In notice, I to understand avoidance of s e r v i c e of however, in the and that t h e most I believe that by of expert expert 62 to in the this main lawyer's of p r o c e s s a l a y p e r s o n and experience judge difficult the avoiding service necessity concur n o t be holding understood the 4, master; knowledge I a under Rule may to t o be obviating short, of o f p r o c e s s by p u b l i c a t i o n t h a t G r e e n e was as notice of process C i v . P., incorrect determination to i t appears t h a t even the l e a r n e d t r i a l case. opinion layperson receive needed service a apply to such and what c o n s t i t u t e s allowed service legal for must that is of incorrectly of entity testimony Indeed, Rule enough there are r u l e s C i v . P., process. be a person expert intricacies proceed publication. that and to was requires understand i t , " testimony. testimony was necessary 1061289 for the jury statement of to determine account lawyer's standard, For reasons the there was an concerning publication, law main granted as main greater requirements and by the regard previously even the with the I would trial the J., to an opinion stated, in affirm Rule the concurs. 63 holds the sworn breach i n Part my of a I.B.1. judgment that for expert 4.3 for service by as a matter of judgment court discussed of alleged i t is necessity opinion. Stuart, sufficiency in Part testimony I.B.3. of the

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.