Daniel G. Hamm and Leo Paul Brooks v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company

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REL: 06/30/2010 Notice: T h i s o p i n i o n i s s u b j e c t t o formal r e v i s i o n b e f o r e p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e advance s h e e t s o f Southern R e p o r t e r . R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e Reporter o f Decisions, A l a b a m a A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s , 300 D e x t e r A v e n u e , M o n t g o m e r y , A l a b a m a 3 6 1 0 4 - 3 7 4 1 ( ( 3 3 4 ) 2 2 9 ¬ 0 6 4 9 ) , o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r e r r o r s , i n o r d e r t h a t c o r r e c t i o n s may b e made b e f o r e t h e o p i n i o n i s p r i n t e d i n Southern R e p o r t e r . SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010 1060935 D a n i e l G. Hamm and Leo P a u l Brooks v. Norfolk Appeal MURDOCK, Leo from T a l l a d e g a C i r c u i t (CV-05-22) favor Court Justice. Paul Brooks bankruptcy f o r Brooks, in S o u t h e r n R a i l w a y Company of Norfolk and appeal Daniel G. Hamm, a trustee f r o m a summary j u d g m e n t Southern Southern") i n a personal-injury Railway action Company Brooks filed i n entered ("Norfolk i n the 1060935 Talladega Circuit Liability part, Court A c t , 45 U.S.C. reverse i n part, I. Brooks Southern of to the Federal § 51 e t s e q . ( " F E L A " ) . Employers We a f f i r m i n and remand. F a c t s and P r o c e d u r a l H i s t o r y worked as a conductor f r o m 1971 t o 2004. a petition in pursuant f o r Chapter and brakeman On O c t o b e r 7 bankruptcy f o r Norfolk 21, 2004, B r o o k s (11 U.S.C. § 701 e t s e q . ) the United States Bankruptcy Court f o r the Middle Alabama. proceedings petition, as w e l l Brooks by was attorney Brooks filed represented Mark of f i n a n c i a l among h i s a s s e t s a c a u s e of action On J a n u a r y 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 , B r o o k s in the Talladega C i r c u i t he allegedly whole" as exposed to cervical Norfolk action a Court had s u s t a i n e d result of numerous and lumbar Southern. Brooks by a t t o r n e y J o e l bankruptcy with his h i s d e b t s and a s s e t s He d i d n o t l i s t against Norfolk filed District Southern. t h e p r e s e n t FELA s e e k i n g $750,000 hips, action for injuries and body as a " c o n t i n u o u s l y and r e p e a t e d l y vibrations spine" the Along affairs. t o h i s "back, being in Cavanaugh. schedules l i s t i n g as a s t a t e m e n t filed and other i n the course stresses to h i s of h i s career with was a n d i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e F E L A Alexander. 2 Brooks d i d n o t amend h i s 1060935 b a n k r u p t c y s c h e d u l e s or o t h e r w i s e i n f o r m the b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t of the FELA c l a i m he had filed against Norfolk Southern. On M a r c h 2, 2 0 0 5 , B r o o k s r e c e i v e d a c o m p l e t e his debts According i n t h e b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g as a " n o - a s s e t s " c a s e . to the b r i e f s Alexander learned deposition i n the 6, 2006, N o r f o l k appeal, both Norfolk Brooks's FELA a c t i o n Southern asserting estoppel. On May a judgment summary on of complaint was bankruptcy on filed the January to d i s c l o s e affirmative the ground at any time 31, he filed March Brooks's judicial a motion f o r Brooks's FELA action e s t o p p e l b e c a u s e he t h e FELA c a u s e o f a c t i o n after On of filed and Brooks's 2006. defense that p r o c e e d i n g e i t h e r a t t h e t i m e he f i l e d or during 1, 2 0 0 6 , N o r f o l k S o u t h e r n on Southern an a m e n d e d a n s w e r t o b a r r e d by t h e d o c t r i n e o f j u d i c i a l failed d i s c h a r g e of had i n his bankruptcy the bankruptcy his complaint petition against Norfolk response to Southern. On motion September for Southern Brooks were a had 28, summary failed knew b e f o r e he related 2006, Brooks judgment, to cite filed to h i s job with filed arguing any a first evidence his complaint Norfolk 3 that Norfolk indicating that Southern his and the that injuries therefore 1060935 would p r o v i d e the b a s i s Brooks also contended for a claim against Norfolk that "a amend h i s s c h e d u l e s t o n o t i f y debtor no the bankruptcy that are not p a r t that a t t h e t i m e t h e a r g u m e n t was Southern's has of the b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e . " summary-judgment obligation he to c o u r t of c l a i m s Alexander made i n r e s p o n s e motion Southern. believed avers to Norfolk i t to be a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t o f l a w , b u t he u n e q u i v o c a l l y a c k n o w l e d g e s i n Brooks's brief to t h i s The Bankruptcy the bankruptcy that Court that the C o d e p r o v i d e s , i n 11 the e s t a t e estate includes acquires after a r g u m e n t was mistaken. U.S.C. § 5 4 1 ( a ) ( 7 ) , t h a t "[a]ny interest in property t h e commencement o f t h e Alexander explains t h a t he b e l i e v e d when he made t h e that was § 541(a)(7) B a n k r u p t c y Code and proceeding. § 541(a)(7) in i t s motion Southern B u r n e s v. (11th C i r . 2002), of the thus d i d not Norfolk and part 2005 points out that f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , so B r o o k s and time. 4 the bankruptcy both F.3d 1282 § 541(a)(7) f o r authority, s h o u l d have been aware o f t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y that to i t cited Pemco A e r o p l e x , I n c . , 291 a case that c i t e s argument amendments apply to Brooks's case." Alexander of § 541(a)(7) at 1060935 A hearing September 29, additional copies § summary-judgment 2006. The 2006, court the their including Alexander motion letter as well as that, Norfolk Southern schedules as an asset to of upon parties legal On brief the with text reviewing of those a responsibility reflect the on positions. a Burnes, held submit filed m a t e r i a l s , he r e a l i z e d t h a t B r o o k s h a d h a d amend h i s b a n k r u p t c y to respective avers was p e r m i t t e d the hearing N o r f o l k Southern cases, 541(a)(7). trial following supporting 3, of the time authorities October on the claim bankruptcy to against estate. To t h a t end, A l e x a n d e r c o n t a c t e d Cavanaugh t o have him reopen the bankruptcy to the that he proceeding, trial court "felt he he that had he time r e p o r t e d back court had verbally supplemental motion." received requiring 1 trial The two him but had to get to done so. trial stated before court to f i l e November relate filing 10, states reopened because permit that for case ... ruling extensions not Alexander i t would record indicates by did the bankruptcy the materials Alexander on the trial [Brooks] to summary judgment Alexander asked supplemental 2006. before for file and materials, 1 Alexander s t a t e s that i n a telephone conference w i t h the c o u r t a n d N o r f o l k S o u t h e r n he a s k e d f o r a n d r e c e i v e d a 5 1060935 On October 11, of Brooks seeking 2006, failed date." the of then FELA c l a i m the motion On reopen a Chapter 7 P e t i t i o n Norfolk estate. the November supplemental a motion action that amended h i s b a n k r u p t c y against bankruptcy to "filed to d i s c l o s e a cause of Brooks 2 filed on behalf to reopen Brooks's bankruptcy e s t a t e g r o u n d t h a t B r o o k s had and Cavanaugh Southern The proceeding 16, material 2006, from as not Brooks, e x i s t e d on court 7, having the trial that to a potential November the 11/15/04 schedules bankruptcy on on on list asset granted the 2006. received court any granted Norfolk S o u t h e r n ' s m o t i o n f o r a summary j u d g m e n t , f i n d i n g t h a t Brooks was pursuant 1236 "barred to the holding (Ala. 2003)." separate, Brooks but filed by On the doctrine i n Ex parte December 11, r e l a t e d , motions with a motion third extension. record; Norfolk extension. to of First Alabama, 2006, B r o o k s the s u b s t i t u t e the No r e c o r d Southern judicial trial estoppel 883 filed court. bankruptcy So. 2d three First, trustee, of s a i d e x t e n s i o n i s noted makes no mention of a i n the third A l e x a n d e r s t a t e s t h a t t h i s was "a p o o r c h o i c e o f w o r d s " b y C a v a n a u g h a n d t h a t w h a t C a v a n a u g h "meant t o w r i t e i s t h a t [Brooks] mistakenly failed to amend h i s schedules after r e c e i v i n g knowledge t h a t a FELA c l a i m had a r i s e n a f t e r he f i l e d his bankruptcy p e t i t i o n . " 2 6 1060935 Daniel G. Hamm, a s t h e r e a l Second, Brooks filed party a motion i n interest t o vacate t h e summary on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g and Brooks's claim the schedules as a p o t e n t i a l trial court bankruptcy h a d been asset. to consider court amended the pleadings judgment had been to reflect Third, Brooks i n reconsidering t o t h e case. filed t h e FELA a motion f o r and orders the motion reopened from t h e f o r a summary judgment. On December bankruptcy court Alexander action. Norfolk the filed a motion trustee's attorney employment trial from court that alternative, a s Hamm's a t t o r n e y issued motions Southern i nthe f o r t h e FELA On J a n u a r y 2 4 , 2 0 0 7 , t h e b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t postjudgment appealed Hamm a s k i n g t h e c o u r t t o approve t h e employment o f as t h e b a n k r u p t c y Alexander's The 13, 2006, on F e b r u a r y order filed a blanket f o r t h e FELA order 6, 2 0 0 7 . on M a r c h 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 . a motion to strike to dismiss Hamm authorized claim. denying Brooks's Brooks a n d Hamm On May 2, 2 0 0 7 , t h e appeal a s an a p p e l l a n t . or,i n Norfolk S o u t h e r n c o n t e n d e d t h a t Hamm was n e v e r a p a r t y t o t h e j u d g m e n t b e l o w a n d t h u s c o u l d n o t be a p a r t y t o t h e a p p e a l . Hamm f i l e d a response asking this 7 Court Brooks and t o deny t h e m o t i o n o r 1060935 to consider later i t with informed the merits the p a r t i e s w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d with II. This Court postjudgment exceeded Foster, that Standard to a So. 2d See (11th v . Wendy's Cir. motion appeal. court's whether Flagstar rulings the t r i a l Enters., ( A l a . 2000 ). h e l p f u l the f o l l o w i n g explanation Parker Court Southern's of the trial 1220, 1221 This of Review determine i t s discretion. 77 9 Norfolk the merits reviews motions of the appeal. We of the standard I n t e r n a t i o n a l , I n c . , 365 F.3d on court I n c . v. also find of review i n 1268, 1271 2004): "'[W]e r e v i e w the d i s t r i c t court's a p p l i c a t i o n of j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l f o r abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n . ' Burnes [v. Pemco A e r o p l e x , I n c . ] , 2 9 1 F . 3 d [ 1 2 8 2 , ] 1284 [(11th C i r . 2002)]. 'The a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.' T a l a v e r a v. S c h o o l Bd. o f Palm Beach C o u n t y , 129 F . 3 d 1 2 1 4 , 1 2 1 6 ( 1 1 t h C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) . " III. A. N o r f o l k Norfolk this Motion Southern contends that appeal or at l e a s t s t r i k e was n o t a p a r t y that Southern's Analysis this Court to Dismiss this stated should dismiss Hamm a s an a p p e l l a n t b e c a u s e he t o t h e judgment below. has Court the Appeal that, 8 Norfolk Southern notes "'[u]nless a person is a 1060935 party t o a judgment, Boschert So. Merrifield 2d 1048, County In this that motion from that judgment.'" Consultants, Inc. v. Masonite 1051 ( A l a . 2004) Sheriff's substitute he c a n n o t a p p e a l Dep't, case, (quoting 536 S o . 2 d 953, however, Hamm a s t h e r e a l i sthefollowing Brooks party Corp., Daughtry 8 97 v. Mobile 954 ( A l a . 1 9 8 8 ) ) . and Hamm i n interest. moved to Included i n statement: "The undersigned [Alexander] i s authorized to r e p r e s e n t t o t h i s C o u r t t h a t T r u s t e e Hamm j o i n s i n t h i s motion, t h a t T r u s t e e Hamm h a s no i n t e n t o f abandoning the claim, a n d t h a t T r u s t e e Hamm h a s a s s e r t e d and w i l l continue t o a s s e r t t o r e s o l u t i o n an interest i n the proceeds. The u n d e r s i g n e d f u r t h e r r e p r e s e n t s t h a t T r u s t e e Hamm h a s a g r e e d t o engage t h e u n d e r s i g n e d as c o u n s e l , and t h a t t h e undersigned's petition to approve said r e p r e s e n t a t i o n h a s been, o r soon w i l l be, p r e s e n t e d to t h e B a n k r u p t c y C o u r t f o r a p p r o v a l . " Hamm court did, i n fact, and o b t a i n from t o employ permission request Alexander as p r o s e c u t i n g the FELA a c t i o n b e f o r e the t r i a l the motion to substitute Hamm joined then i n the notice a p p e a l i n g the t r i a l Hamm a s t h e r e a l Hamm a s t h e r e a l the bankruptcy h i s counsel i n court's denial of party i n interest. of appeal, which c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f the motion party i n interest. 9 included to substitute 1060935 Under dismiss is these Norfolk t h eappeal o r t o s t r i k e due t o be B. circumstances, Brooks's Southern's Hamm a s a p a r t y motion t o t o the appeal denied. Motion to Substitute Hamm a s t h e R e a l Party i n Interest A decision party t o s u b s t i t u t e Hamm a s t h e r e a l i n interest affects thed i s p o s i t i o n of therest issues on a p p e a l ; Rule action "shall have we a d d r e s s A l a . R. be p r o s e c u t e d and t h a t commenced Court thus, 17(a), shall interest" is on t h e m o t i o n C i v . P., that "[e]very i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l party i n effect as i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l has s t a t e d a means i t next. that "'ther e a l to identify party the person t o be e n f o r c e d . ' " Drive, 740 S o . 2 d 1 0 2 5 , 1 0 2 7 ( A l a . City Dodge, State party i n interest i f the action party sought Magic requires s u b s t i t u t i o n of the real t h e same of the had been i n interest." i ninterest who p o s s e s s e s v. Property This principle the right a t 2018 Rainbow 1999) ( q u o t i n g Dennis v. I n c . , 524 S o . 2 d 6 1 6 , 618 ( A l a . 1 988 ) ) . Therefore, we m u s t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r Hamm p o s s e s s e s t h e r i g h t to t h e FELA enforce trial claim at issue, and, i f so, whether t h e court exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n d e c l i n i n g t o s u b s t i t u t e Hamm a s t h e p r o p e r party. 10 1060935 All claim the such properly the as belongs listed Lopez), to schedules e.g., B.R. 22, that claim when the L o p e z v. 28 estate even at under against bankruptcy i s true See, 283 conceded FELA the This i n the closed. have Brooks's creditors. been is parties f o r the the 9th benefit Corp. of the b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e Petition the Action that is schedules, and administered case § property remains of is debtor not Pace closed)."). pursuant the v. or aff'd, property "Once an asset to § 554 the of asset the 11 even is in the the nor the of e s t a t e ) and Pace), 395 in debtor abandoned Bankruptcy re after becomes the (In listed F.3d remains a l l r i g h t s h e l d by unless 17 re case as o f administered (In not abandoned estate Battley 1992), not (property abandoned (unscheduled extinguished of was neither U.S.C. § 541 ( 9 t h C i r . BAP bankruptcy estate, are 11 estate); (table) case See property (property 564-66 1994) though property i s closed. 554(d) 562, even of (finding that " t h e A c t i o n became p r o p e r t y Date, has bankruptcy C i r . 2002) a Southern property Specialty Rests. (B.A.P. 541(a)(7) Norfolk the time § remains 146 B.R. (9th C i r . estate part after of i n the back Code. the asset to the See 11 1060935 U.S.C. § 5 5 4 ( a ) - ( c ) . " P a r k e r v . Wendy's I n t ' l , I n c . , 3 65 F . 3 d at 1272. Under duty 11 U.S.C. on b e h a l f "collect which t o money t h e p r o p e r t y trustee expeditiously parties as serves, legal responsibility and i s compatible i n interest." including the bankruptcy trustee of the c r e d i t o r s of the bankruptcy and reduce such § 704(1), held to such estate as by the best i n t e r e s t s of of the bankruptcy The a s s e t s claims estate of the estate f o r close with has a estate the debtor of the bankruptcy trustee. -- -¬ become t h e See, e.g., Looney v . H y u n d a i M o t o r M f g . A l a b a m a , L L C , 330 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 2 8 9 , 1 2 9 2 (M.D. to A l a . 2004) 11 U.S.C. (explaining that § 704(1) 'compels "the duty a chapter imposed pursuant 7 trustee to take over a l l nonexempt l a w s u i t s o f t h e d e b t o r ' " (quoting G r i n e r v. Griner (Bankr. S.D. A l a . petition has been (In re Griner), 1999))). filed, all Consequently, the bankruptcy nonexempt bankruptcy Our on 240 B.R. a bankruptcy trustee i s the real party lawsuits that are have r e c o g n i z e d this part of i n interest to the debtor's estate. courts several once 4 3 2 , 436 occasions. "'"'It aspect i s well 12 of bankruptcy law settled that the right 1060935 to pursue causes of a c t i o n f o r m e r l y b e l o n g i n g a form of p r o p e r t y to the debtor -¬ " u n d e r t h e B a n k r u p t c y C o d e " -- v e s t s i n the trustee f o r the benefit 793 2d 764 So. 762, Homes, I n c . , other 695 So. of the estate.'"'" ( A l a . 2000) 2d 19, 21 (quoting Ex parte Cooks v. ( A l a . C i v . App. Jim 1996), Moore, Walter quoting cases). " U n d e r 11 U.S.C. § 5 4 1 ( a ) ( 1 ) , commencement o f a bankruptcy a c t i o n c r e a t e s an e s t a t e c o n s i s t i n g o f ' a l l l e g a l or e q u i t a b l e i n t e r e s t s of the debtor i n p r o p e r t y as o f t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e c a s e . ' This includes causes of a c t i o n owned by the debtor. I n r e L o u d e n , 106 B.R. 109 (E.D. K y . 1 9 8 9 ) . Until t h e p r o p e r t y i s l i s t e d as e x e m p t , i t h a s no e x e m p t status and the bankruptcy t r u s t e e has exclusive a u t h o r i t y t o a s s e r t any c a u s e o f a c t i o n t h a t i s t h e p r o p e r t y of the e s t a t e . B a l l v. N a t i o n s c r e d i t F i n . S e r v . C o r p . , 207 B.R. 869 (N.D. Ill. 1997)." C r i d e r v. App. Misty Acres, Inc., 893 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (Ala. Civ. 2004). "A number of cases have held that once a p r o c e e d i n g has been i n i t i a t e d u n d e r C h a p t e r 7 o f t h e B a n k r u p t c y Code i n v o l v i n g a d e b t o r , t h e t r u s t e e i n b a n k r u p t c y becomes the r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t w i t h r e s p e c t t o l a w s u i t s upon c a u s e s of a c t i o n h e l d by the debtor. See, e.g., B i c k f o r d v . P o n c e de Leon C a r e C t r . , 918 F. S u p p . 377 (M.D. F l a . 1996); Ex parte Moore, 793 So. 2d 762 (Ala. 2000) ( d i s t i n g u i s h i n g C h a p t e r 13 cases, although using 'standing' terminology). However, t h e r e are two s i g n i f i c a n t exceptions recognized to that p r i n c i p l e of law: i f the t r u s t e e abandons a cause of a c t i o n , or i f the bankruptcy c o u r t a u t h o r i z e s the debtor to 13 1060935 maintain i t i n lieu of thetrustee, the real party i n i n t e r e s t i s t h e debtor and n o t t h e t r u s t e e . " Battle Civ. v. Alpha Chem. & P a p e r A p p . 2000) Sterilite (quoting Corp. Battle C o . , 770 S o . 2 d 6 2 6 , 634 (emphasis omitted); o f Alabama, see also (Ala. Ex parte 837 S o . 2 d 8 1 5 , 8 1 9 ( A l a . 2 0 0 2 ) with approval). It i s undisputed that Brooks's FELA c l a i m a g a i n s t N o r f o l k Southern has n o t been exempted from h i s b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e , and Hamm, t h e t r u s t e e motion of the estate, h a s made i t c l e a r b o t h i n t h e to substitute before the t r i a l he h a s no i n t e n t i o n o f a b a n d o n i n g is thereal Norfolk Lumber trial motion are Southern of Mobile, demonstrates the party i ninterest contends that, the t r i a l of judicial failed t o amend claim. Verneuille v. Buchanan (Ala. 2005), e v e n i f Hamm i s t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t , t o those basis that that T h e r e f o r e , Hamm I n c . , 914 S o . 2 d 8 2 2 , 8 2 4 - 2 5 f o rs u b s t i t u t i o n Verneuille, the action. t o Brooks's court d i d not exceed similar c o u r t a n d on a p p e a l i n this i t s discretion case. The f a c t s i n the instant i ndenying the i n Verneuille appeal i n that, i n c o u r t e n t e r e d a summary j u d g m e n t on t h e e s t o p p e l because Charles Byrd had i n i t i a l l y h i s bankruptcy personal-injury complaint. schedules The t r i a l 14 after he f i l e d court then denied a Byrd's 1060935 motion to Byrd's bankruptcy trial alter, amend, trustee, court's decision. ruling, finding or that vacate Joseph t h e summary Verneuille, "the t r i a l court court's d i d not exceed i t s motion." 914 S o . 2 d 825. Though instant motion Verneuille shares appeal, i td i f f e r s bankruptcy in appealed the This Court affirmed the t r i a l d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Byrd's postjudgment at judgment. trustee as a m o t i o n interest, some similarities i n at least i n Verneuille with the one k e y r e s p e c t . The couched Byrd's to substitute Verneuille but this Court explicitly postjudgment as t h e r e a l disagreed with characterization. " T h a t a r g u m e n t ... o v e r s t a t e s t h e s u b s t a n c e o f Byrd's motion. The m o t i o n requested only that V e r n e u i l l e be a l l o w e d a ' s u f f i c i e n t o p p o r t u n i t y ' t o 'determine whether t o p r o s e c u t e ' t h e c l a i m i n t h e e v e n t h e s h o u l d ' e l e c t t o do s o . ' ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . ) V e r n e u i l l e h a d f i l e d n o t h i n g i n t h e c a s e when t h e t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e d B y r d ' s m o t i o n on O c t o b e r 7, 2 0 0 4 . T h u s , b o t h when t h e p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n was f i l e d a n d when i t was d e n i e d , t h e r e c o r d was b y no means c l e a r a s t o when -- i f e v e r -- V e r n e u i l l e would a p p e a r i n t h e c a s e . We w i l l n o t p l a c e a t r i a l c o u r t ' " i n e r r o r on m a t t e r s w h i c h t h e r e c o r d r e v e a l s i t n e i t h e r r u l e d u p o n n o r was p r e s e n t e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to r u l e upon."' J . K . v . L e e C o u n t y D e p ' t o f Human Res., 668 So. 2d 8 1 3 , 817 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1 9 9 5 ) ( q u o t i n g W i l s o n v . S t a t e D e p ' t o f Human R e s . , 527 S o . 2 d 1 3 2 2 , 1324 ( A l a . C i v . App. 1988)) (emphasis added). 15 party that 1060935 " I m p l i c i t i n V e r n e u i l l e ' s argument i s t h a t t h e trial court was r e q u i r e d to hold t h e case i n abeyance indefinitely, without a motion by Verneuille. He c i t e s no a u t h o r i t y f o r s u c h a proposition. I ti s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t the t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t r u l e on B y r d ' s p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n u n t i l 5 7 d a y s a f t e r V e r n e u i l l e was a p p o i n t e d as t r u s t e e . U n d e r t h e s e f a c t s , we c a n n o t h o l d t h a t t h e t r i a l court exceeded i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Byrd's postjudgment motion." 914 So. 2d a t 824-25. Thus, the trustee's issue failure postjudgment i n Verneuille to motion appear failing i n was the to give the case bankruptcy and the t r i a l court i n d i c a t i o n t h a t a n a p p e a r a n c e w o u l d e v e r b e made. in the instant requested the that case, Brooks's real party hiring counsel Brooks's prosecution t h e case; action estate, was as t h e r e a l could Given he at that asking asking intended FELA a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g f o r the case. f o r an i n d e f i n i t e f o r Hamm party time as t o be Unlike suspension immediately i n i n t e r e s t so t h a t t h e FELA proceed. that that o f the as t h e a t t o r n e y V e r n e u i l l e , B r o o k s was n o t substituted expressly i n i n t e r e s t a n d i t i n d i c a t e d t h a t Hamm the any Conversely, motion Hamm b e s u b s t i t u t e d f o r B r o o k s to proceed with of postjudgment Byrd's Brooks's FELA c l a i m the Bankruptcy Code 16 i s part clearly o f the provides bankruptcy that the 1060935 bankruptcy in trustee assumes e x c l u s i v e the bankruptcy petition, and substitute Hamm estate that upon a u t h o r i t y over the f i l i n g Brooks and as t h e r e a l Hamm party property of the bankruptcy properly i n interest moved to t o t h e FELA a c t i o n o n c e B r o o k s ' s b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e was r e o p e n e d , t h e t r i a l court as exceeded thereal i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n r e f u s i n g t o s u b s t i t u t e Hamm party In r e a c h i n g whether there the trial ground trial judgment 2003), judgment I n c . v. Stokes subject, Liberty Nat'l Life Found., As noted, "[e]very action should Chevrolet, legal other Court oflaw, than t h e may a f f i r m a ground,'" General 8 8 5 S o . 2 d 1 1 9 , 124 t o due-process Rule shall 17(a), A l a . R. be p r o s e c u t e d I tfurther (Ala. c o n s t r a i n t s , see I n s . Co. v . U n i v e r s i t y o f Alabama 881 So. 2 d 1 0 1 3 , 1020 ( A l a . i ninterest." considered as a m a t t e r "This on 'any v a l i d action. we h a v e be a f f i r m e d Southern. of course, FELA conclusion, was some g r o u n d u p o n w h i c h , argued by N o r f o l k Motors, party the foregoing court's court's Servs. i n i n t e r e s t t o Brooks's Health 2003). C i v . P., r e q u i r e s i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l provides: "No a c t i o n s h a l l b e d i s m i s s e d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t is not prosecuted i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t u n t i l a reasonable time has been allowed a f t e r o b j e c t i o n f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n o f commencement o f 17 that 1060935 the a c t i o n by, or j o i n d e r real party i n interest Taken together, these trial court to decline time" has "reasonable being See prosecuted 6A C h a r l e s Federal real party a manner t h a t judgment turn postjudgment upheld & Procedure the court be an more trustee, on should brought the seeking as t h e r e a l alternative was n o t f i l e d party-in-interest objection Procedure 1554 § within the s u i t , " court's We summary denial of the Hamm, as i n i n t e r e s t should be that of a that party."). the a "reasonable motion that Federal a for time." be o b s e r v e d t h a t i s waivable. (explaining the albeit i n " b a r any a c t i o n i t s party i t should i s not in interest. substitution ground that & Mary Kay Kane, the proper the aforesaid or s u b s t i t u t e d w i t h i n dismiss by for a (2d e d . 1 9 9 0 ) ( " [ I ] f specifically, a threshold matter, at party R. M i l l e r , § 1555 the action to the issue whether the t r i a l motion substitution As and gone, the basis after does n o t , i n and o f i t s e l f , and, bankruptcy come form consider, Wright, Arthur subsequently therefore to i n i n t e r e s t i s not j o i n e d reasonable time, might provisions i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l Alan Practice two or s u b s t i t u t i o n of, the " a real- Practice defendant & "may v o l u n t a r i l y o r i n v o l u n t a r i l y w a i v e a n y o b j e c t i o n t h a t he m i g h t 18 1060935 have had to interest"). plaintiff's As status noted, Rule 17(a) s h a l l n o t be d i s m i s s e d based an opposing " o b j e c t i o n " by the as the real contemplates on t h a t r u l e u n t i l party and party that an there in action has been a "reasonable time" has p a s s e d f o l l o w i n g t h a t o b j e c t i o n t o a l l o w f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n . We have c a r e f u l l y we see to Brooks's no reviewed the f i l i n g s objection of the nature prosecution t h a t he was of not the r e a l p a r t y summary-judgment motion argument or real party that in interest. court to apply There i s no on interest; allowed estopped to Brooks to ground doing the so. an that Brooks is limited and argument action the not of the that because was ground the not t o an asks and 17(a) contains estoppel prosecution is Rule Southern of j u d i c i a l he by Specifically, the p l a i n t i f f the that i s only prosecute from as court, i . e . , on in interest. That motion objection there action, the b a s i s the p r i n c i p l e the contemplated f i l e d by N o r f o l k " o b j e c t i o n " on contemplates Brooks the i n the t r i a l no the argument the to trial Brooks. the action by real party in he should he is not be judicially 3 E v e n i f an i s s u e as t o B r o o k s ' s s t a t u s as a r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t h a d b e e n r a i s e d b y N o r f o l k S o u t h e r n a t some p o i n t during the proceedings i n the t r i a l court, the question w h e t h e r a " r e a s o n a b l e t i m e " w o u l d have p a s s e d and w h e t h e r t h e 3 19 1060935 Nor was t h e r e whether Brooks supplemental before the judgment. itself, any m e n t i o n was letter trial In for party in interest i n the brief filed by N o r f o l k Southern shortly court ruled argument from p r o s e c u t i n g in-interest issue proceedings. I t therefore ground i t s motion have upheld, the denial that was brief estoppel t h e FELA the motion into motion i s one t o t h e should apply to action. t o s u b s t i t u t e Hamm i n interest that injected f o r summary summary-judgment letter of j u d i c i a l sum, i t was n o t u n t i l uphold, on i n that B r o o k s as t h e r e a l p a r t y could as t o real effect that the p r i n c i p l e Brooks 17 o r c o n c e r n s the A s was t r u e o f t h e o r i g i n a l the only prevent of Rule the real-party- the trial c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t t h e t r i a l or that we, as an a p p e l l a t e of the motion i t was n o t made w i t h i n court, court court may f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n on t h e a "reasonable time" after action should have been d i s m i s s e d at that juncture for a f a i l u r e of s u b s t i t u t i o n are questions as t o w h i c h a t r i a l c o u r t i s t o e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n b a s e d on i t s a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e type o f case and i t s f a c t s and t h e p r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y o f t h e case. Federal Practice & Procedure a t § 1555 ("What constitutes a reasonable time i s a matter of judicial d i s c r e t i o n and w i l l depend upon t h e f a c t s o f each c a s e . " ) . We t h e r e f o r e do n o t i n t e n d t o s u g g e s t t h a t , e v e n i f an o b j e c t i o n t o B r o o k s ' s n o t b e i n g t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t h a d b e e n made i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t , we, a s an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , c o u l d a d d r e s s t h e s e q u e s t i o n s i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e as a m a t t e r o f l a w . 20 1060935 the opposing Rule 17(a). party had party a n d Hamm Judicial contend i n t e r e s t and because of t h e FELA a c t i o n u n t i l following cannot the reopening be b a r r e d theclaim. requires that under Hamm i s the real t h e b a n k r u p t c y s c h e d u l e s were amended of Brooks's the doctrine h i s claim because h e was n o t a w a r e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e Norfolk because of Brooks's delay include "objection" Estoppel that by t h e d o c t r i n e pursuing to an 4 C. Brooks raised bankruptcy of judicial Southern responds of j u d i c i a l estate, Hamm estoppel from that estoppel be i n amending h i s b a n k r u p t c y against Norfolk fairness applied schedules Southern. I t m i g h t a l s o be q u e s t i o n e d whether t h e f a c t that t h e a t t e m p t t o s u b s t i t u t e Hamm a s t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t comes t o o l a t e f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t i t comes a f t e r t h e t r i a l court's e n t r y o f s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . F o r t h e same r e a s o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t the d o c t r i n e o f j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e debtor does n o t p r e v e n t t h eb a n k r u p t c y t r u s t e e from p r o s e c u t i n g t h e underlying claim f o r the benefit of the bankruptcy c r e d i t o r s , see discussion i n Part C, i n f r a , there i s no r e a s o n t o f o r e c l o s e t h e b a n k r u p t c y t r u s t e e from s e e k i n g t o i n t e r v e n e as t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t a f t e r a summary j u d g m e n t h a s b e e n e n t e r e d , a t l e a s t w h e r e t h e t r u s t e e was n o t a w a r e o f t h e c l a i m b e f o r e t h e e n t r y o f t h e summary j u d g m e n t . As noted i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t f o l l o w s , t h i s has been t h e approach o f c o u r t s confronted with a request f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n of a bankruptcy trustee a f t e r a court has entered a summary j u d g m e n t o r j u d g m e n t on t h e p l e a d i n g s a g a i n s t t h e d e b t o r on t h e g r o u n d o f j u d i c i a l estoppel. S e e P a r t C, i n f r a . 4 21 1060935 "In Ex 2003),] parte this Court H a m p s h i r e v. 2d in 968 dealing 2007) For position be (2) Bank, 742, the 121 S.Ct. of "so 979 apply that have been judicial and (3) t h a t e i t h e r the f i r s t "the party seeking So. (1) 149 U.S. at the opposing a t 750-51 6 0 - 6 1 ; Ex '"to 2d 53, 883 First see (Ala. So. "a party's with its 2d at later earlier successful in the of an would create 'the misled'"; inconsistent position estopped." omitted); 60 New Hampshire, Middleton, 2d estoppel parties from of the 2d So. s t a t e d t h a t " [ t ] h e purpose of j u d i c i a l integrity So. 979 532 1244-45. the A l a b a m a B a n k , 883 detriment at protect "prohibiting i f not (citations parte T h i s C o u r t has is party L.Ed. estoppel.'" w o u l d d e r i v e an u n f a i r a d v a n t a g e o r i m p o s e an u n f a i r on New jurisprudence o r s e c o n d c o u r t was t o a s s e r t an in acceptance inconsistent p o s i t i o n i n a l a t e r proceeding perception of (Ala. forth 1808, Bank, inconsistent' must 1236 judicial Alabama to 2d set mainstream First estoppel So. factors Inc., party proceeding [883 Indus., 'clearly the the doctrine parte judicial position"; prior the Ex must U.S. join[ed] Caterpillar (quoting 1246). 532 and with v. Alabama 'embrace[d] Maine[, (2001),] Middleton First judicial process" d e l i b e r a t e l y changing 22 by positions 1060935 according to the exigencies S o . 2 d a t 59 citation It (quoting New H a m p s h i r e , 532 U.S. a t 7 4 9 - 5 0 ; i s evident that of j u d i c i a l the t r i a l estoppel summary j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t Brooks f a i l e d FELA c l a i m outcome, him. other $750,000 applied the i t entered t h e FELA the action, Brooks continued received "windfall" a n d t h e r e a f t e r he r e c e i v e d i n the bankruptcy proceeding. i n h i s bankruptcy have properly A f t e r he f i l e d to prosecute Thus, B r o o k s had t a k e n c l e a r l y Norfolk 979 t o amend h i s b a n k r u p t c y s c h e d u l e s t o r e f l e c t h i s discharge successful court t o B r o o k s when as a p o t e n t i a l a s s e t , "no-assets" could Middleton, omitted). doctrine this o f t h e moment."'" the Despite action. i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n s ; he was proceeding; unfair i f he t h e FELA a a n d he advantage succeeded potentially of a i n h i s claim possible against Southern. The doctrine mean t h a t fact that of j u d i c i a l that his capacity the summary the trial estoppel doctrine against properly to Brooks, necessarily as b a n k r u p t c y judgment court trustee. Brooks, applied however, i s applicable Following does the not t o Hamm i n the entry the bankruptcy case of was r e o p e n e d , t h e b a n k r u p t c y s c h e d u l e s were amended t o i n c l u d e t h e 23 1060935 FELA c l a i m , as a n d t h e b a n k r u p t c y t r u s t e e m o v e d t o be the r e a l party has i n i n t e r e s t i n the t r i a l court. never taken i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n s with claim because he d i d not know about b a n k r u p t c y s c h e d u l e s were amended t o r e f l e c t the claim as a p o t e n t i a l a s s e t c a n n o t be j u d i c i a l l y Norfolk Southern Cartersville, Ga., demonstrates that apply when even substituted employee as sued 348 the the r e a l an party employer During summary discharge, judgment, on t h e b a s i s (11th of j u d i c i a l trustee the seeking After filed dismissal of estoppel. 2003), eventually In Barger, court Barger a the Even of should an alleging of the a c t i o n , employer of j u d i c i a l City Cir. is federal the pendency v. estoppel in interest. in of the claim. Barger bankruptcy the T h e r e f o r e , Hamm 1289 F.3d until the existence that a p e t i t i o n i n bankruptcy. bankruptcy claim contends the doctrine discrimination. filed from p u r s u i n g trustee t o t h e FELA claim to the estate. estopped The regard the substituted Barger had obtained motion a for a discrimination though Barger t h e n r e o p e n e d t h e b a n k r u p t c y c a s e and amended h e r s c h e d u l e t o reflect a the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n summary judgment against claim, Barger. 24 the d i s t r i c t court entered 1060935 We first pause to note i n relation P a r t B, s u p r a , t h a t t h e U n i t e d Eleventh Circuit substituted on appeal allowed as t h e r e a l from States the party t h e summary to the discussion i n Court of Appeals bankruptcy trustee i n interest while judgment. Barger, f o rthe to be the case was 348 F.3d a t 1292-93. Insofar as the issue however, the E l e v e n t h the district Barger's court of Circuit judicial Court had p r o p e r l y Aeroplex, Court of Appeals discrimination bankruptcy I n c . , 291 concluded cause petition the bankruptcy of of Appeals to Relying heavily on B u r n e s v. that action 1282 Barger later her impress the Barger reopened ( 1 1 t h C i r . 2002 ), Barger's at demonstrated system the knowledge time she the of her filed her to d i s c l o s e the claim to that she had to her benefit. bankruptcy intentionally The f a c t proceeding that d i d not court. "Barger's attempt t o reopen the bankruptcy e s t a t e t o include her d i s c r i m i n a t i o n claim hardly casts her i n the good l i g h t she would l i k e . She o n l y s o u g h t t o reopen the bankruptcy e s t a t e a f t e r the defendants moved t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o e n t e r summary j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t h e r on j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l g r o u n d s . 'Allowing 25 that estoppel F.3d manipulated the j u d i c i a l concluded judicial and h e r f a i l u r e court itself, applied discrimination claim. Pemco estoppel 1060935 [a d e b t o r ] t o b a c k - u p , r e - o p e n t h e b a n k r u p t c y c a s e , and amend h i s b a n k r u p t c y f i l i n g s , only a f t e r h i s omission has been challenged by an adversary, suggests that a debtor should consider d i s c l o s i n g p o t e n t i a l a s s e t s o n l y i f he i s c a u g h t concealing them. T h i s s o - c a l l e d remedy w o u l d o n l y d i m i n i s h t h e necessary incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a t r u t h f u l d i s c l o s u r e of the debtor's assets.' Burnes a t 1288 (citation omitted). As such, B a r g e r ' s d i s c l o s u r e upon r e - o p e n i n g t h e b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e d e s e r v e s no f a v o r . " Barger, 348 F . 3 d a t 1 2 9 7 . The analysis Trustee i s the real standing F.3d to assert party fails should Indeed, held responsible a r e s u l t such debtor, why any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s , " d i d n o t know i t had any m o n e t a r y v a l u e be to explain f o r the actions innocent i f"the exclusive Barger, of the claim -- t h e b a n k r u p t c y as t h e one i n B a r g e r but the debtor's -- i n i n t e r e s t and i t has a t 1292, and t h e t r u s t e e know t h a t the i n Barger of the punishes or trustee debtor. not j u s t creditors. "Viewed as a t w o - p a r t y d i s p u t e , i m p o s i t i o n o f judicial estoppel may be u n r e m a r k a b l e , but the t y p i c a l b a n k r u p t c y - r e l a t e d flaw i n such a n a l y s i s i s t h e f a i l u r e t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h a t an u n s c h e d u l e d cause of a c t i o n i s not the debtor's p r o p e r t y and that the v i c t i m s are the debtor's creditors. The e q u i t a b l e balance compels c o n s i d e r a t i o n of whether the economic consequences of a j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l are borne by t h i r d p a r t i e s . " 26 348 1060935 An-Tze Cheng v. K&S Diversified Cheng), 308 B.R. 4 4 8 , 460 As i n Barger Invs., and t h e p r e s e n t Hearing Dist. Connection (B.A.P. o f Tampa C t . App. 2008), case, from i n Losacano v. Deaf & B a y , I n c . , 98 8 the t r i a l An-Tze 9th C i r . 2004). c o u r t was summary j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t a b a n k r u p t c y judicial Inc. (In re So. 2d asked 66 ( F l a . to enter d e b t o r on t h e g r o u n d a of e s t o p p e l because the debtor had o b t a i n e d a d i s c h a r g e bankruptcy listing the action i n q u e s t i o n as an of the bankruptcy asset without estate. The t r i a l court entered the summary judgment on t h e g r o u n d summary judgment was appeal, the bankruptcy as primary the substitution court The debtor trustee appellant. agreed. indeed asked In i n Part while relation B, estoppel. t h e case prevent judicial on supra, the issue we note that of the 988 S o . 2 d a t 6 9 . estoppel the bankruptcy action f o r the benefit was to Court of Appeal t o r e s o l v e was an a p p e a l o f t h e same i s s u e Should After t o be a l l o w e d t o p r o c e e d appeal that the F l o r i d a D i s t r i c t proceeded here: entered, discussed of appeal of j u d i c i a l that trustee to the prosecuting the of the bankruptcy c r e d i t o r s ? 27 presented i s applicable from then The c o u r t 1060935 answered i n the n e g a t i v e . the court Criticizing the decision i n Barger, noted: "[The] d i s c u s s i o n [ o f j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l i n B a r g e r ] seems o d d b e c a u s e ... t h e E l e v e n t h C i r c u i t had already concluded that the claims had been transferred to the Trustee. Ms. B a r g e r ' s actions c o u l d n o t and d i d n o t p r e v e n t the trustee from p u r s u i n g t h e c l a i m s p o s s e s s e d by t h e t r u s t e e " Losacano, action 988 S o . 2 d a t 6 9 - 7 0 . i n this bankruptcy judicial case was The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d owned b y ... that "the [the] trustee of the e s t a t e a n d c o u l d n o t b e d i s m i s s e d on a n y t h e o r y o f estoppel" applicable to the debtor. 988 S o . 2 d a t 70. The in a o v e r s i g h t s of the Barger case decided by that a f t e r B a r g e r was d e c i d e d . Inc., 365 Appeals F.3d at same analysis court were approximately I n P a r k e r v . Wendy's 1271-72, not repeated the Eleventh a International, Circuit Court explained: "Trustee Reynolds concedes that Parker [the debtor] took i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n s i n bankruptcy court and d i s t r i c t court. Reynolds argues that Parker's inconsistent statements should n o t be attributed t o h i m and t h a t , even i f judicial estoppel would bar Parker, i t should not bar Reynolds from pursuing this claim on b e h a l f o f Parker's creditors. Reynolds contends that j u d i c i a l e s t o p p e l s h o u l d n o t a p p l y t o h i m , as b a n k r u p t c y trustee, because he did not know of the discrimination claim during the bankruptcy 28 year of 1060935 proceedings and, therefore, did not take inconsistent p o s i t i o n s i n the courts. Moreover, Reynolds p o s i t s that applying j u d i c i a l estoppel to him w o u l d n o t s e r v e t h e p o l i c y o f e n c o u r a g i n g h o n e s t d i s c l o s u r e t o t h e c o u r t s b e c a u s e R e y n o l d s was n e v e r dishonest with the courts. "In t h i s case, Parker's discrimination claim b e c a m e an a s s e t o f t h e b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e when s h e filed her p e t i t i o n . R e y n o l d s , as t r u s t e e , then became the r e a l party in interest in Parker's discrimination suit. He has never abandoned P a r k e r ' s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m a n d he n e v e r t o o k an i n c o n s i s t e n t p o s i t i o n under oath w i t h regard t o t h i s claim. T h u s , R e y n o l d s c a n n o t now b e judicially estopped from pursuing i t . " 5 5 The Parker court further noted: "Although general bankruptcy law e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e t r u s t e e does n o t have any more r i g h t s t h a n t h e d e b t o r h a s , B a n k o f M a r i n v . E n g l a n d , 385 U.S. 99, 1 0 1 , 87 S . C t . 2 7 4 , 2 7 6 , 17 L . E d . 2 d 197 ( 1 9 6 6 ) ('The t r u s t e e s u c c e e d s o n l y t o s u c h r i g h t s a s t h e b a n k r u p t p o s s e s s e d ; and t h e t r u s t e e i s s u b j e c t t o all claims and d e f e n s e s which might have been asserted against the bankrupt but f o r the f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . ' ) ; I n r e H a l a b i , 184 F . 3 d 1 3 3 5 , 1337 (11th C i r . 1999), any p o s t - p e t i t i o n c o n d u c t by P a r k e r , i n c l u d i n g f a i l u r e t o d i s c l o s e an a s s e t , d o e s not r e l a t e to the merits of the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m . This i s because the i n s t a n t the bankruptcy p e t i t i o n was f i l e d , P a r k e r ' s claim against Wendy's b e c a m e p r o p e r t y o f t h e e s t a t e u n d e r s e c t i o n 541 a n d R e y n o l d s became t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . A t t h a t p o i n t , t h e d e b t o r c e a s e d t o h a v e an i n t e r e s t i n t h e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m , u n l e s s and u n t i l t h e t r u s t e e abandoned i t . B o t h Bank o f M a r i n and I n r e H a l a b i are r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e s i n c e those cases d e a l w i t h p r e - p e t i t i o n d e f e n s e s and c o u n t e r c l a i m s to a 29 1060935 The Florida District " B a r g e r was B.R. of 902 further 147 (M.D. F.Supp.2d]. See Cheng), 308 So. at See 70. "equity Ga. and Fla. also An-Tze ( B a n k r . N.D. Fed. opinion); Corrections, noted i n Losacano that i n In re Moore, 312 A l a . 2 0 0 4 ) ; B a x l e y v. P e d i a t r i c S e r v i c e s Inc., (unpublished of Appeals c r i t i c i z e d or l i m i t e d ( B a n k r . N.D. America, 2d Court Appx. Wheeler Aug. B.R. 2004) In 460 re the Florida 2006) [not ( 9 t h C i r . BAP on Parker trustee Cir. 2005) Department of reported in Invs., Inc. Rochester, (relying favors allowing (11th Diversified 448, also v. 9, Cheng v. 59 308 (In re 2004)." 596, 611 in concluding that to pursue B.R. 988 [the Debtor's] claim " ) . The implication mistakenly applied of the Parker doctrine is that of j u d i c i a l an i n n o c e n t b a n k r u p t c y trustee i n a case failure to bankruptcy to add claims the the Barger court estoppel against involving a debtor's schedules. As one b a n k r u p t c y c o u r t s u c c i n c t l y s u m m a r i z e d P a r k e r and i t s p r o g e n y : "The o n l y way t h e p r o p e r p a r t y c a n be b r o u g h t into t h e a c t i o n i s t o r e o p e n t h e b a n k r u p t c y case t o see i f the t r u s t e e wishes to i n t e r v e n e . I f the case i s cause of a c t i o n t h a t would have been a p p l i c a b l e t h e d e b t o r h a d no b a n k r u p t c y c a s e b e e n f i l e d . " Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 n.3. 30 to 1060935 reopened and t h e t r u s t e e i n t e r v e n e s , then under [Parker], judicial estoppel w i l l generally not apply. The e x c e p t i o n m i g h t be i f t h e t r u s t e e r e c o v e r e d more t h a n t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o s a t i s f y all creditors. In that event, the defendants could invoke judicial estoppel to t r y to l i m i t any m o n e t a r y r e c o v e r y t o t h e amount n e e d e d t o s a t i s f y c r e d i t o r s and t h e t r u s t e e ' s expenses." In re Upshur, Based a better 317 B.R. 4 4 6 , 453 on t h e f o r e g o i n g , we understanding bankruptcy schedules claims trustee. estoppel on an punishes innocent creditors further judicial 553, 560 Imposing innocent the purpose process. of innocent creditors judicial Parker embodies of j u d i c i a l estoppel that the bankruptcy are to disclose i n unknown doctrine trustee, to of p r o t e c t i n g the of judicial which, i n turn, f o r the mistakes of a debtor, the i n t e g r i t y (expressing concern estoppel in a of the debtor). court erred i n denying the postjudgment Hamm f r o m p u r s u i n g B r o o k s ' s the b e n e f i t that 2004). does of the S e e g e n e r a l l y J i n r i g h t v . P a u l k , 758 S o . 2 d ( A l a . 2000) doctrine Ga. to a debtor's f a i l u r e bankruptcy not conclude of the doctrine t h a n B a r g e r as i t r e l a t e s its ( B a n k r . N.D. about manner applying the that punishes Accordingly, the motion trial and p r e v e n t i n g claim against N o r f o l k Southern f o r of the bankruptcy estate. 31 1060935 A l t h o u g h we r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e t r i a l relates t o Hamm i n h i s c a p a c i t y concerns to expressed prevent assets a i n Barger debtor from i n a bankruptcy as b a n k r u p t c y trustee, as t o t h e n e c e s s a r y not making a proceeding persist full c o u r t as i t the disincentive disclosure of as t o B r o o k s : "'Allowing [a d e b t o r ] to back-up, re-open the b a n k r u p t c y c a s e , a n d amend h i s b a n k r u p t c y filings, o n l y a f t e r h i s o m i s s i o n h a s b e e n c h a l l e n g e d b y an adversary, suggests that a debtor should consider d i s c l o s i n g p o t e n t i a l a s s e t s o n l y i f he i s c a u g h t c o n c e a l i n g them. T h i s s o - c a l l e d remedy would o n l y diminish the necessary incentive to provide the bankruptcy court with a t r u t h f u l d i s c l o s u r e of the debtor's assets.' Burnes at 1288 (citation omitted)." Barger, 348 F . 3 d a t 1 2 9 7 . Brooks Norfolk Southern proceeding which as clearly knew during of h i s cause of action the pendency of his and t h e r e f o r e w e l l within the time against bankruptcy frame within t h e l a w o b l i g a t e d h i m t o amend h i s s c h e d u l e o f a s s e t s s o to include (noting claim. among that that the See J i n r i g h t , questions of 758 fact So. 2d a t 559 essential to a determination of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the doctrine of j u d i c i a l estoppel i s "whether proceedings of action a debtor knew o r s h o u l d h a v e that who known a b o u t s h o u l d be d i s c l o s e d 32 i s engaged i n bankruptcy claims or as a s s e t s " ) . causes Moreover, as 1060935 Ex parte First estoppel concerns the judicial the parties "'The to a proceeding So. 2d the at opposed from the a i n the to 1244 758 of U.L. Rev. concerns weigh 1244, more Middleton, which proceeding in 1249-50 Rand involved which the an in in a the G. 555). statement integrity relied on Chapter assets the 883 Precluding of J u d i c i a l E s t o p p e l , added). than of "public proceedings."'" case of process. damages (emphasis of 883 sanctity Boyers, to legal at judicial itself this schedule 2d some p a r t y ongoing 33 1245. "applies i n j u r e s the judicial (1986)) heavily and at inconsistent I n c o n s i s t e n t Statements: the D o c t r i n e Nw. 2d So. the any o a t h and (quoting So. preserve integrity of litigant position Jinright, ... judicial r e l a t i o n s h i p between 883 a inconsistency purity the [therefore] whether or not The of previously asserted."'" strives the process, at one f a c t o r because statement. 2d the assuming s a n c t i t y of the judicial confidence ... protect violates to estoppel (quoting i s not doctrine litigation." estoppel Reliance So. as judicial of 1241 and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between inconsistent with oath first explains, prior party "'Judicial the "the system, doctrine preclude the Alabama they 13 could 80 These did in bankruptcy still be 1060935 amended i n t h e third-party proceeding claim event of a successful action. had contrast, the without any amendment Norfolk Southern filed Norfolk exercise We Southern i t s discretion the to judicial estoppel recovery satisfy to reopen the schedule the the Norfolk t o be that claim might claims of bankruptcy of doctrine bankruptcy court's affirmed exceed to the the be unlikely scenario F.3d where the amount t h a t w o u l d s a t i s f y incurred, the an non-disclosing to limit debtor."); n.4 a l l c r e d i t o r s and any undeserved 1273 estoppel recovery windfall In re 34 to the could only from Upshur, expenses Parker ("Moreover, t r u s t e e would recover then, perhaps j u d i c i a l defendant prevent at v. in the more t h a n costs be that and amount B.R. on at an fees invoked devolving 317 that necessary See 365 subject extent amount to to determination r e l a t e d to r e o p e n i n g the b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g . Inc., and court proceeding. any Int'l, judicial bankruptcy pay Wendy's assets. of Southern should creditors Brooks's summary-judgment m o t i o n trial i s due on the f o r the that conclude the have asked the that Brooks's claim against to to asserting Brooks would not therefore debtor's adding i t i s c l e a r t h a t , but estoppel, the in Further, by to Here, ended against outcome by and the 453 1060935 (noting that, necessary invoke to " i f thetrustee to satisfy judicial t h e amount more than t h e amount a l l c r e d i t o r s ... , t h e d e f e n d a n t s estoppel needed recovered tot r ytolimit to satisfy anymonetary could recovery c r e d i t o r s and t h e t r u s t e e ' s expenses"). IV. Based on Southern's motion alternative, reverse pursuing as to strike i tbarred Brooks's Hamm judgment against Norfolk necessary court's or, of Norfolk Southern Norfolk an o r d e r i n interest Southern. i n the and t o pursue f o ra we Southern t o from The t r i a l a l l o w i n g Hamm t o i n t e r v e n e recovery Brooks's claim up t o t h e amount o f Brooks's c r e d i t o r s and expenses the r e l a t e d bankruptcy proceeding. i sjudicially Norfolk Norfolk t o the appeal, judgment i s a f f i r m e d t o the e x t e n t Brooks against i n favor deny appeal as a p a r t y against t opaythe claims associated with the we Hamm, a s t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t , claim party analysis, dismiss i s directed to enter the real that foregoing to t h e summary the e x t e n t court the Conclusion estopped Southern beyond 35 from that i t recognizes pursuing the foregoing. The t r i a l any c l a i m 1060935 AFFIRMED I N PART; REVERSED I N PART; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Cobb, and C . J . , and Woodall, Stuart, Shaw, J J . , c o n c u r . Lyons, J . , concurs specially. 36 Smith, Bolin, Parker, 1060935 LYONS, J u s t i c e (concurring I concur f u l l y address have to subject-matter address I conclude finding usage of the term Pate, 2018 Rainbow Imprecision lacking trustee the has Ex p a r t e able to concur I write 3d 8 3 5 , Drive, a 838 U.S.C. based § on abandons So. 2d i n the main 908, opinion be r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r specially t o condemn loose upon 541. jurisdiction. ( A l a . 2008); 740 debtor's estate 918 power "standing." in labeling of to the p a r t i e s the inherent V.S., that the issue should So. 2d a party's i n subject-matter bankruptcy action Court State 1025, Riley v. P r o p e r t y 1028 inability problem u n n e c e s s a r i l y expands Most 11 Although implicates subject-matter 3 So. standing am jurisdiction. Standing See I I write specially jurisdiction. i t ex mero motu. ( A l a . 2005). because v. i n the main o p i n i o n . not r a i s e d the i s s u e , t h i s 912 of specially). at ( A l a . 1 999). to proceed the universe of as a cases jurisdiction. possessions the f i l i n g The right a pre-bankruptcy the claims to bring claim a of the petition. post-discharge exists when the t o 11 U.S.C. § 5 5 4 . In o f t h e FELA 37 property of a bankruptcy pursuant a b s e n c e o f an a b a n d o n m e n t become cause only o f a c t i o n by 1060935 Daniel G. interest Norfolk Hamm, L e o P a u l Brooks was not the r e a l when he c o m m e n c e d t h e p o s t - d i s c h a r g e Southern Rule 17(a), Railway C i v . P., action in against Company. A l a . R. party requires that an a c t i o n b e b r o u g h t i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . I t further provides: "No a c t i o n s h a l l b e d i s m i s s e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t i s not prosecuted i n t h e name o f t h e r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t u n t i l a reasonable time has been allowed a f t e r o b j e c t i o n f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n o f commencement o f the a c t i o n by, or j o i n d e r or s u b s t i t u t i o n o f , the real party i n interest; and such ratification, j o i n d e r , o r s u b s t i t u t i o n s h a l l h a v e t h e same e f f e c t as i f t h e a c t i o n h a d b e e n c o m m e n c e d i n t h e name o f the r e a l p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t . " I n A n - T z e C h e n g v . K&S D i v e r s i f i e d re the An-Tze Cheng), court bankruptcy 308 B.R. stated: case "The i s filed, 4 4 8 , 461 (B.A.P. consequence the debtor t r u s t e e owns t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n . " the problem efforts Shabani, t o cure an issue the defect is lacks the i s truly Investments, of standing, (Ala. 9th C i r . that, 2004), once standing then If subsequent See C a d l e Co. v . 2008): "Perhaps t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h e p a r t i e s assumed t h a t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e c t c r e a t e d by C a d l e ' s l a c k o f s t a n d i n g t o commence t h i s e j e c t m e n t a c t i o n was c u r e d b y t h e p l e a d i n g p u r p o r t i n g t o amend t h e 38 the because (Emphasis added.) are f o r naught. 4 So. 3d 4 6 0 , 462-63 Inc.(In 1060935 complaint t o add a d d i t i o n a l p a r t i e s . I f so, they were m i s t a k e n . Standing i s '"'[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n . ' " ' Pharmacia Corp. v . S u g g s , 932 S o . 2 d 9 5 , 98 ( A l a . 2 0 0 5 ) ( q u o t i n g I n r e A l l i s o n G., 2 7 6 C o n n . 1 4 6 , 1 5 6 , 8 8 3 A . 2 d 1 2 2 6 , 1231 (2005), quoting in turn H. Monaghan, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l A d j u d i c a t i o n : The Who a n d When, 8 2 Y a l e L . J . 1 3 6 3 , 1384 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ) . " R u l e 17(a) is allows an a c t i o n t o p r o c e e d a f t e r made b a s e d o n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e r e a l curative party steps in are taken. interest Obviously, does not party an o b j e c t i o n i n interest i f an a b s e n c e implicate of a real subject-matter j u r i s d i c t i o n o r t h e s o l e remedy w o u l d be d i s m i s s a l , as o p p o s e d to countenancing the c u r a t i v e measures. want o f a r e a l party I f we a l l o w instances of i n interest t o b e s w a l l o w e d up b y a n erroneously expansive definition of standing, we effectively eliminate any of operation f o r the field a f o r e m e n t i o n e d f e a t u r e o f R u l e 17(a) will a l l o w i n g t h e d e f e c t t o be cured. Standing i s properly limited from l a c k of j u s t i c i a b i l i t y . that he o r s h e w i l l bring proceeding. A plaintiff outcome as so to to circumstances A plaintiff the requisite must be so s i t u a t e d adverseness must a l s o have a d i r e c t prevent litigation, 39 stemming stake initiated to the i n the by an 1060935 interested bystander on t h o s e w i t h an a g e n d a , h a v i n g whose r i g h t s a r e d i r e c t l y Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 Much o f t h e p r e c e d e n t federal do have a i n the area See D i a m o n d of standing of justiciability are not Pharmacia v. Suggs, Corp. Court, requirement after States Constitution. case-or-controversy Constitution impact v. (1986). I I I of the United not Alabama this implicated. courts subject to the case-or-controversy of A r t i c l e we an a d v e r s e 1901, comes requirement Of requirement but our from course, in concepts substantially ( A l a . 2005), of dissimilar. 932 So. 2d 95 n o t i n g the absence of a i n our C o n s t i t u t i o n , the See where case-or-controversy observed: "We h a v e c o n s t r u e d A r t . V I , § 1 3 9 , A l a . C o n s t . o f 1901 ( a s a m e n d e d b y amend. n o . 3 2 8 , § 6.01, v e s t i n g t h e j u d i c i a l power i n t h e U n i f i e d J u d i c i a l System), to vest t h i s Court 'with a l i m i t e d j u d i c i a l power t h a t e n t a i l s t h e s p e c i a l competence t o d e c i d e discrete cases and controversies involving p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i e s and s p e c i f i c f a c t s . ' Alabama P o w e r Co. v . C i t i z e n s o f A l a b a m a , 740 S o . 2 d 3 7 1 , 381 ( A l a . 1999). See a l s o C o p e l a n d v . J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , 284 A l a . 5 5 8 , 226 S o . 2 d 385 ( 1 9 6 9 ) ( c o u r t s decide o n l y c o n c r e t e c o n t r o v e r s i e s between adverse parties)." 932 So. If 2 d a t 97 we limit n.4. standing to issues of justiciability as d e f i n e d above, thereby s i g n i f i c a n t l y r e d u c i n g the o c c a s i o n f o r 40 1060935 concerns over s u b j e c t - m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n , case for i s p r o p e r l y viewed which this Rule 1 7 ( a ) , A l a . R. of r e a l C i v . P., party offers in the a c t i o n . absence b y s t a n d e r at the helm Viewed from this 41 n o r do In we as o f t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t perspective, of subject-matter j u r i s d i c t i o n interest a remedy. p r o c e e d i n g we h a v e no c o n c e r n s o v e r a d v e r s e n e s s have a meddlesome of a s an i s s u e the problem i n t h i s no p r o b l e m i s presented. of

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