Justia.com Opinion Summary: Flight Options, LLC challenged the constitutional and statutory authority of the Department of Revenue to assess apportioned property taxes against a fleet of airplanes it managed. Specifically, Flight Options argued that its airplanes did not have a tax situs in Washington state, and that the due process clause of the federal constitution prohibited assessment of taxes on them. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court rejected each of Flight Options’ contentions and affirmed the lower court decision dismissing Flight Options’ case.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FLIGHT OPTIONS, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent.
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No. 84207-8
En Banc
Filed August 25, 2011
OWENS, J. -- Flight Options LLC challenges the constitutional and statutory
authority of the Department of Revenue (Department) to assess apportioned property
taxes against the fleet of airplanes it manages. Specifically, Flight Options argues that
its airplanes do not have a tax situs in Washington and that the due process clause,
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, therefore prohibits assessment of taxes on them. Flight
Options further contends that chapter 84.12 RCW prohibits the tax assessment
because Flight Options is not an “airplane company” within the statutory definition,
because the property has not established a statutory tax situs in Washington, and
Flight Options, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue
No. 84207-8
because Flight Options does not own the fleet of airplanes. We reject each of Flight
Options’ contentions and affirm the Court of Appeals.
Facts
Flight Options is a limited liability company with its principal place of business
in Richmond Heights, Ohio. The company has purchased and manages a fleet of
approximately 200 private aircraft. These aircraft are used as part of two programs:
the JetPass program and a fractional ownership program. In 2004, the aircraft landed
at or took off from airports in Washington 1,397 times; in 2005, the aircraft landed in
Washington 700 times.1
The JetPass program is a straightforward charter program. JetPass members
deposit a predetermined amount of money with Flight Options. Members notify Flight
Options of their itinerary at least 24 hours in advance of their desired departure, and
Flight Options provides the airplane and pilot. Flight Options maintains operational
control of the airplane at all times. Flight Options thereafter deducts an hourly rate,
which varies depending on the airplane used and the current fuel surcharge. Once the
deposited funds have been used, the JetPass membership is terminated.
The fractional ownership program is more complicated. Participants are
required to sign four contracts: a purchase agreement, a management agreement, a
1
This was not a decrease in the number of visits. The Department simply changed the
metric it employed from both landings and takeoffs to just landings.
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master interchange agreement, and an owner’s agreement. Under these contracts,
participants purchase an undivided interest in a particular airplane in Flight Options’
fleet.
When participants in the fractional ownership program wish to use an airplane,
they notify Flight Options at least 10 hours in advance of the departure time. Flight
Options then provides an airplane of the same make or model as that in which the
participant owns an interest or, if none is available, an alternative airplane.
Participants have no right to use the plane in which they own an interest. Flight
Options maintains operational control, provides pilots, and arranges for takeoffs and
landings.
While participating in the fractional ownership program, participants receive 50
hours of flight time per one-sixteenth ownership interest that are billed at the
“Occupied Hourly Rate.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 171. Any hours beyond this assigned
number are billed at the “Supplemental Hourly Rate.” Id. at 176. In 2004 and 2005,
Flight Options charged participants a total of $413 million in hourly rates. In addition
to these usage charges, participants also pay a “Monthly Management Fee.” Id. at
171, 185.
Participants must agree to participate in an interchange program administered
by Flight Options. It is from this interchange program that airplanes are provided to
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participants, either of the same make and model or, if that is unavailable or if the
participant requests a different make and model, another type of airplane.
Flight Options retains possession of all the airplanes in which it sells ownership
interests and is responsible for their maintenance and insurance. At the end of 2004,
Flight Options owned around a 20-percent interest in the fleet of airplanes it operates.2
Flight Options also has the right to use the airplanes in which participants own
fractional interests and retain all compensation earned through such use, such as
through use of the airplanes in the JetPass program.
In June 2005, the Department notified Flight Options by e-mail that it had to
submit an annual return in order to avoid a default assessment and 25 percent penalty.
Flight Options complied. In December 2005, the Department issued a property tax
assessment against Flight Options. It calculated the amount by multiplying the total
value of the Flight Options fleet of planes by the percentage of the fleet’s takeoffs and
landings that took place in Washington. Flight Options subsequently filed a
declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that the Department lacked the
authority to impose a property tax against it. When the Department issued another
assessment the following year, Flight Options amended its complaint to include that
assessment as well. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the
2
This interest includes planes owned in whole by Flight Options as well as unsold
fractional interests.
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superior court, by letter opinion, granted the Department’s motion. Flight Options
sought review in this court, and we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s summary judgment order. Flight
Options, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 154 Wn. App. 176, 178, 225 P.3d 354 (2010).
Flight Options petitioned this court for review, which we granted. Flight Options, LLC
v. Dep’t of Revenue, 169 Wn.2d 1025, 238 P.3d 504 (2010).
IssueS
1. Does the due process clause require “fixed routes and regular schedules” in
order to establish a taxable situs?
2. Does chapter 84.12 RCW authorize the Department to collect apportioned
property taxes from Flight Options?
Analysis
A. Standard of Review
This case involves questions of constitutional interpretation and statutory
interpretation and involves review of a summary judgment order. Accordingly, our
review is de novo. Lamtec Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 Wn.2d 838, 842, 246 P.3d
788 (2011), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3629 (2011); Optimer Int’l, Inc. v. RP
Bellevue, LLC, 170 Wn.2d 768, 771, 246 P.3d 785 (2011).
B. The Flight Options Fleet of Airplanes Acquired a Tax Situs in Washington
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The due process clause prohibits a state from taxing property unless that
property has acquired a tax situs in that state. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473,
496, 45 S. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058 (1925). Instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
such as airplanes, trains, and inland water vessels, may acquire a tax situs in multiple
states. Cent. R.R. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 613-14, 82 S. Ct. 1297, 8
L. Ed. 2d 720 (1962); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization &
Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 600-01, 74 S. Ct. 757, 98 L. Ed. 967 (1954); Ott v. Miss.
Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 170, 174, 69 S. Ct. 432, 93 L. Ed. 585 (1949).
The same constitutional analysis applies to each of these instrumentalities, and we may
thus rely on case law addressing taxation of each type of instrumentality. Braniff
Airways, 347 U.S. at 599-600; Ott, 336 U.S. at 173-74. In determining whether
property has acquired a tax situs in a given state, it is appropriate to look at the fleet of
instrumentalities as a whole, even if “the specific and individual items of property”
entering the state are “not continuously the same, but [are] constantly changing,
according to the exigencies of the business.” Marye v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 127
U.S. 117, 123, 8 S. Ct. 1037, 32 L. Ed. 94 (1888); see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 307 Or. 406, 411, 769 P.2d 193 (1989) (“[T]he validity [of a tax assessment
against an airline] depends upon whether each airline’s aircraft property was part of a
unit with situs in this state.”).
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Flight Options contends that, in order to establish a tax situs in a state, its
airplanes must operate over fixed routes and regular schedules. This is incorrect;
Flight Options confuses a sufficient condition with a necessary one. In Central
Railroad, the United States Supreme Court explained that a state could impose an
apportioned property tax on railroad cars that traveled through it on “fixed and regular
routes.” 370 U.S. at 614. It also recognized that a tax situs could be created in a state
through “[h]abitual employment within the State of a substantial number of cars, albeit
on irregular routes.” Id. at 615. Thus, fixed and regular routes are sufficient to create
a tax situs for instrumentalities of interstate commerce within a state but are not
necessary. See Am. Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70, 71-72, 81-82, 19 S.
Ct. 599, 43 L. Ed. 899 (1899) (holding that Colorado possessed authority to tax
property of out-of-state business that furnished railroad cars to railroad companies
where the cars used in Colorado were not part of regularly run trains, were not run at
regular times, and were not constantly the same specific cars).
Flight Options contends that the language relating to “habitual employment” in
Central Railroad is refuted by the Court’s disposition of the case. 370 U.S. at 613.
This is not so, as a careful reading of the case demonstrates. The Central Railroad
Company was a Pennsylvania corporation that owned 3,074 freight cars, some of
which were operated in other states by other companies. Id. at 609. Pennsylvania
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imposed its property tax against the value of all the cars owned by the Central Railroad
Company. Id. at 608. The company argued that it was constitutionally entitled to
reduce the property tax it owed by a proportion corresponding to the amount of time
that its cars spent outside Pennsylvania. Id. at 610. The Court began from the premise
that “the State of domicile retains jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property which
has ‘not acquired an actual situs elsewhere.’” Id. at 611-12 (quoting Johnson Oil Ref.
Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 161, 54 S. Ct. 152, 78 L. Ed. 238
(1933)). If personal property acquires a tax situs in another state, the commerce
clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, precludes the state of domicile from taxing the
property to the extent it can be taxed in that other state. Cent. R.R., 370 U.S. at 612,
614. The question, therefore, became whether the Central Railroad Company’s cars
had acquired an actual situs in another state. The company had the burden to
demonstrate that its property had acquired such a situs. Id. at 613. The Central
Railroad Court held that the company had met its burden with respect to those cars
that were run on fixed routes and regular schedules within New Jersey; such use was
sufficient to create a tax situs and allow for imposition of an apportioned property tax
on the value of the Central Railroad Company’s fleet of cars. Id. at 613-14. However,
the Court held that the company had not met its burden with respect to the remainder
of its cars that were operated outside Pennsylvania. Id. at 614-15. The Central
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Railroad Company had shown that those cars were habitually employed outside
Pennsylvania but had failed to produce evidence of their “habitual presence . . . in
particular nondomiciliary States.” Id. at 615. The Court clearly indicated that the
latter showing would have been sufficient. Id. Flight Options’ argument to the
contrary is unpersuasive, particularly since it fails to account for the Court’s holding in
American Refrigerator Transit, which approved a property tax by a nondomiciliary
state on the basis of the habitual use of property in that state. 174 U.S. at 71-72, 8182.
Though Flight Options did not specifically raise the issue in the context of its
due process clause challenge, we nonetheless proceed to consider whether its use of its
fleet of airplanes in Washington was sufficiently habitual to create a tax situs in
Washington. Due process requires “‘some minimum connection’” between the taxing
state and the property to be taxed, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Tax Comm’r,
504 U.S. 298, 306, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 119 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1992) (quoting Miller Bros. Co.
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45, 74 S. Ct. 535, 98 L. Ed. 744 (1954)), and that
“‘the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection
conferred or afforded by the taxing State.’” Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 600 (quoting
Ott, 336 U.S. at 174). We address these requirements in turn.
The minimum contacts test applicable under the due process clause “centrally
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Flight Options, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue
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concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
Notice and fair warning are the touchstones of the due process analysis. Id. The
magnitude of the contacts necessary to meet the minimum contacts is quite low. In
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. District of Columbia, 84 U.S. App. D.C. 367, 174 F.2d
505, 505-06 (1949), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
district could assess an apportioned property tax against a fleet of water vessels that
entered the district an average of once per day. See Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. v. King
County, 90 Wash. 38, 44, 46, 155 P. 416 (1916) (approving assessment of property tax
where three railroad cars entered Washington each day, though the three were not
continuously the same). Flight Options’ average of two daily visits to the state of
Washington in each year was more than adequate to put it on notice that it would be
subject to taxation here.
Further support for the existence of minimum contacts can be found from the
large number of cases decided on dormant commerce clause grounds. While the due
process clause and the commerce clause are animated in part by differing concerns,
Quill, 504 U.S. at 312, the inquiries are not mutually exclusive. In Trinova Corp. v.
Michigan Department of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 111 S. Ct. 818, 112 L. Ed. 2d 884
(1991), the United States Supreme Court explained that the dormant commerce clause
analysis set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct.
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1076, 51 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1977), “encompasses as well the due process requirement” of
minimum contacts. Trinova, 498 U.S. at 373. In other words, a finding that the
imposition of a tax does not violate the dormant commerce clause is sufficient to
establish that the imposition also does not violate the due process clause, even though
the converse is not true. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.7. The minimum contacts
requirement of the due process clause is contained in the “substantial nexus”
requirement of the test articulated in Complete Auto Transit. 430 U.S. at 279. We
recently held that 50 to 70 visits by sales employees of a company over a seven-year
period was sufficient to establish a substantial nexus with the State. Lamtec, 170
Wn.2d at 841, 851. Other states have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Fall
Creek Constr. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 109 S.W.3d 165, 171 (Mo. 2003) (finding that
42 arrivals or departures of airplanes, together with 24 overnight stays, in one year
established a substantial nexus with the state). Flight Options’ average of 700 visits to
Washington far exceeds the number of visits held sufficient in Lamtec.
We turn next to whether “‘the tax in practical operation has relation to
opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State.’”
Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 600 (quoting Ott, 336 U.S. at 174). The fact that the tax
is apportioned so as to limit its assessment to a proportion of the value of the property
commensurate with the proportion of time the property spent in Washington goes a
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long way toward meeting this requirement. See Ott, 336 U.S. at 174. While in
Washington, Flight Options planes “enjoyed the benefits and protection of
[Washington] criminal laws, the provision of search and rescue services if needed and
opportunities for further commerce through contacts with [Washington].” Alaska
Airlines, 307 Or. at 412. We have little difficulty determining that the apportioned
property tax imposed on the Flight Options planes is reasonably related to the
opportunities, benefits, and protections afforded by the state.
In sum, we hold that a state may impose an apportioned property tax on
airplanes habitually entering the state, even where those airplanes do not operate over
fixed routes or on regular schedules. We further hold that an average of two visits to
the state each day is sufficiently habitual to establish a tax situs.
C. Chapter 84.12 RCW Authorizes Imposition of the Property Taxes at Issue
Flight Options contends that the Department lacks statutory authority to assess
the challenged property taxes. Specifically, Flight Options contends that (1) it is not
an “‘[a]irplane company,’” as defined by RCW 84.12.200(3); (2) the airplanes are not
“situate” in Washington, as required by RCW 84.12.200(12); and (3) it does not own
the airplanes as it argues is required by RCW 84.40.020 and RCW 84.12.210. Each of
these arguments requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. When interpreting
a statute, our fundamental objective is “to discern and implement the intent of the
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legislature.” State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). We do so by
giving effect to the plain meaning of a statute, which may be gleaned “from all that the
Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent
about the provision in question.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146
Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If, after this inquiry, the statute is “susceptible to two
or more reasonable interpretations,” the statute is ambiguous. Burton v. Lehman, 153
Wn.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005). However, a statute is not ambiguous merely
because two or more interpretations are conceivable. Id. We have long held that any
ambiguity in a tax statute is construed in favor of the taxpayer. Vita Food Prods., Inc.
v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978).
We begin our interpretation with the context in which the relevant statutes
appear. Chapter 84.12 RCW requires that the Department annually assess the
“operating property” of certain utilities and transportation companies. RCW
84.12.270. One type of “[o]perating property” subject to assessment by the
Department is aircraft owned, controlled, operated, or managed by an “‘[a]irplane
company.’” RCW 84.12.200(3), (12). Personal property must be “situate within the
state of Washington,” and, for personal property used in more than one state, the value
to be assessed must be in proportion to the property’s use in Washington. RCW
84.12.200(12), .300. Construing these statutes together, chapter 84.12 RCW requires,
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generally, that the Department assess taxes against an apportioned value of the aircraft
of airplane companies, so long as those aircraft are situate in Washington.
Flight Options is undoubtedly an “airplane company” within the plain meaning
of the definition of that term set forth in RCW 84.12.200(3). An airplane company is
any person or entity
owning, controlling, operating or managing . . . personal property, used
or to be used for or in connection with or to facilitate the conveyance and
transportation of persons and/or property by aircraft, and engaged in the
business of transporting persons and/or property for compensation, as
owner, lessee or otherwise.
RCW 84.12.200(3), (10). To satisfy the first requirement, the person or entity need
only do one of the four options listed: own, control, operate, or manage personal
property. The record leaves no doubt that Flight Options manages all the airplanes in
its fleet; it maintains the entire fleet at its headquarters and determines which specific
airplane will be dispatched to which customer. Though we do not find the
characterization binding on our inquiry, we find further support for our conclusion in
the fact that Flight Options refers to itself as the “Manager” and charges a “Monthly
Management Fee” in the “Management Agreement” it requires participants in the
fractional ownership program to sign. CP at 146, 171. Because Flight Options
manages the airplanes, we need not determine whether it also owns, controls, or
operates them.
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Flight Options does not dispute that its airplanes are used for the conveyance
and transportation of persons, nor could it. Instead, it argues that it is not “engaged in
the business of transporting persons . . . for compensation,” RCW 84.12.200(3),
because it is actually engaged in the business of selling fractional ownership interests.
This is not, however, an either-or distinction. While Flight Options may well be in the
business of selling fractional ownership interests in airplanes, it is also engaged in the
business of transporting persons for compensation. This is obvious in the context of
the JetPass program, in which customers pay Flight Options an hourly rate in exchange
for transportation. Precisely the same thing occurs in the context of the fractional
ownership program. Fractional owners pay Flight Options an hourly rate in exchange
for transportation on an airplane. From this it is apparent that Flight Options is
engaged in the business of transporting persons for compensation. Flight Options
therefore falls squarely within the definition of an “airplane company” subject to
assessment by the Department.
The next question is whether Flight Options’ airplanes were “situate within the
state of Washington.” RCW 84.12.200(12). “There is nearly universal agreement that
personal property is ‘situated’ for tax purposes at its tax situs.” Mesa Leasing Ltd. v.
City of Burlington, 169 Vt. 93, 96, 730 A.2d 1102 (1999). “Situate” and “situated” are
synonyms, Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 811 (2d ed. 1995),
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and we therefore construe “situate” to mean “having a tax situs.” We have never held
that the statutory requirement that property have a tax situs in Washington is more
extensive than the due process clause requirement. In Canadian Pacific, we relied
exclusively on United States Supreme Court cases to determine the situs of railroad
cars. 90 Wash. at 43-44. Similarly, in United States Whaling Co. v. King County, 96
Wash. 434, 436-37, 165 P. 70 (1917), we noted that Washington cases establishing tax
situs “are to the same effect” as United States Supreme Court cases. The last case
relied on by Flight Options, Guinness v. King County, 32 Wn.2d 503, 506, 202 P.2d
737 (1949), applied the since-abandoned “home port doctrine,” see Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 443, 99 S. Ct. 1813, 60 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1979),
under which moveable personal property could only be assessed at the home port of
the owner. The home port doctrine has given way to a scheme allowing for “fair
apportionment” of tax revenues among the states. Id. at 442; see Alaska Freight
Lines, Inc. v. King County, 66 Wn.2d 360, 363-64, 402 P.2d 670 (1965) (noting that
situs requirements for non-oceangoing vessels had “been relaxed to permit . . . tax
apportionment between states” and citing to federal cases). We conclude that the
requirement in RCW 84.12.200(12) that property be “situate within the state of
Washington” is coextensive with the due process clause requirement that property
have a tax situs in Washington before it can be taxed. As discussed above in the
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context of the due process clause, the Flight Options fleet of airplanes has established
a tax situs in Washington.
The final question in this case is whether the Department may assess property
taxes against a nonowner of the airplane. We assume, without deciding, that Flight
Options does not own the airplanes in its fleet.3 Nonetheless, neither of the statutes
cited by Flight Options, RCW 84.40.020 and RCW 84.12.210, precludes the
Department’s assessment of taxes at issue here.
RCW 84.40.020 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll personal property in this
state subject to taxation shall be listed and assessed every year, with reference to its
value and ownership on the first day of January of the year in which it is assessed.”
As Flight Options argues, that statute provides that all personal property is only
assessable to the owner of the property. RCW 84.12.270, however, when construed in
light of the definitions set forth in RCW 84.12.200, is a more specific statute that
plainly permits the Department to assess property tax against a nonowner that controls,
operates, or manages the property. It is well settled that a more specific statute
prevails over a general one should an apparent conflict exist. Residents Opposed to
Kittitas Turbines v. Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council, 165 Wn.2d 275, 309, 197
3
It is undisputed that Flight Options owns a 20-percent interest in its fleet of airplanes.
The Department further contends that the “common indicia of ownership” demonstrate
that Flight Options is properly regarded as the “‘owner’” of the entirety of the property
for purposes of taxation. Answer to Pet. for Review at 9.
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P.3d 1153 (2008). This interpretation gives effect to the plain language of a number of
statutes expressly permitting taxation of nonowners of property. See, e.g., RCW
84.12.270; RCW 84.40.065 (permitting assessment of nonowners who possess or
control ships or vessels); RCW 84.16.040 (permitting assessment of nonowners who
operate private railway cars). Because a more specific provision governs assessment
of the operating property of airplane companies, RCW 84.40.020 does not preclude
assessment of the property tax on the fractionally owned airplanes against Flight
Options.
RCW 84.12.210 is no more helpful to Flight Options. That statute provides that
[p]roperty used but not owned by an operating company shall, whether
such use be exclusive or jointly with others, be deemed the sole operating
property of the owning company.
RCW 84.12.210. By its terms, this provision only applies where there are two
companies (i.e., an “operating company” and an “owning company”). The term
“‘[c]ompany’” is defined to mean, as relevant here, “airplane company.” RCW
84.12.200(11). Fractional owners of the airplanes cannot be airplane companies,
however, because they are not “engaged in the business of transporting persons and/or
property for compensation.” RCW 84.12.200(3). The master interchange agreement
specifically prohibits this. CP at 192 (“Participant [(fractional owner)] . . . will not use
such Interchange Aircraft . . . to provide transportation of passengers or cargo in air
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commerce for compensation or hire except in accordance with the provisions of
Section 91.501 and 91.321 of the [federal aviation regulations].”).4 Because the
fractional owners cannot be airplane companies, Flight Options is the only “company,”
as that term is defined by RCW 84.12.200(11), and RCW 84.12.210 is inapplicable.
Conclusion
We conclude that the Department properly assessed Flight Options an
apportioned property tax based on the value of the fleet of airplanes it manages. That
fleet of airplanes acquired a tax situs in Washington through habitual use of the State’s
airspace, landing facilities, and other services and benefits. Further, chapter 84.12
RCW plainly authorized the imposition of the tax on Flight Options. We affirm the
Court of Appeals.
AUTHOR:
Justice Susan Owens
WE CONCUR:
4
The cited sections of the federal aviation regulations do not permit any action that
would amount to being “engaged in the business of transporting persons and/or property
for compensation.” RCW 84.12.200(3). 14 C.F.R. § 91.501(b) identifies nine operations
for which fractional owners may employ their airplane, most of which prohibit any
charge or fee. 14 C.F.R. § 91.321 merely authorizes receipt of payment for carrying a
candidate for election where federal, state, or local law require such payment.
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Chief Justice Barbara A. Madsen
Justice Mary E. Fairhurst
Justice Charles W. Johnson
Justice James M. Johnson
Justice Gerry L. Alexander
Justice Debra L. Stephens
Justice Tom Chambers, result only
Justice Charles K. Wiggins
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