LaPlume v. Lavallee

LaPlume v. Lavallee (2003-391); 177 Vt. 526; 858 A.2d 255

2004 VT 78

[Filed 18-Aug-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 78

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-391

                               JUNE TERM, 2004

  John LaPlume                         }        APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.                              }        Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }  
  Rachelle Lavallee                    }
                                       }        DOCKET NO. 1554-02 CnSc

                                                Trial Judge: Matthew I. Katz


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  Appellant John LaPlume appeals the superior court's dismissal
  of his small claims case, wherein he sought money damages for various
  personal belongings allegedly retained by appellee Rachelle Lavallee
  following the demise of their relationship.  The superior court determined
  that family court was the appropriate forum to address his claims and
  dismissed LaPlume's complaint.  We reverse and remand.

       ¶  2.  In July 2002, LaPlume stipulated to entry of a relief from
  abuse order against him in Chittenden County Family Court, following a
  hearing on Lavallee's complaint for relief.  The parties waived the
  requirement that the court find that abuse or danger of abuse existed.  The
  order required LaPlume to maintain a distance of 100 feet from Lavallee at
  all times, and that Lavallee "box [LaPlume's] belongings and cause them to
  be delivered by July 31." 

       ¶  3.  Three months later, LaPlume filed a motion in family court to
  enforce the relief from abuse order, contending that Lavallee had failed to
  return all of his property.  The court heard testimony, but dismissed the
  petition without prejudice, explaining to LaPlume that "[t]he purpose of an
  abuse procedure is to stop abuse.  If you have some property disputes I
  think you should resolve that in another forum." 
   
       ¶  4.  LaPlume next filed a complaint in small claims court, citing
  the property return provision of the relief from abuse order and seeking to
  recover "the approximate value of all unreturned property," which he
  estimated at $3500.  In February 2003, the small claims court issued an
  entry order granting LaPlume thirty days to show cause why the proper forum
  for resolution of a relief from abuse order was not the family court that
  had issued the order.  LaPlume argued in response that the family court had
  already declined jurisdiction, and that the matter fit best within the
  small claims court's statutory mandate to provide a "simple, informal and
  inexpensive procedure" for resolution of civil proceedings where claims do
  not exceed $3500.  See 12 V.S.A. _ 5531(a).

       ¶  5.  The small claims court rejected LaPlume's claims and
  dismissed the action.   The court noted that the relief from abuse form
  provides a mechanism for family courts to handle limited personal property
  claims where they are sufficiently linked to relief from abuse proceedings,
  and that small claims courts are ill-suited to resolve conflicts where the
  primary concern remains prevention of  abuse.  Acknowledging that the
  family court had already declined to exercise jurisdiction, the small
  claims court encouraged LaPlume to appeal to the Supreme Court sua sponte,
  waived the filing fee for the appeal and secured counsel for Lavallee, who
  had been unrepresented in the small claims action.  This appeal followed.

       ¶  6.  The issue before this Court is whether the small claims court
  erred in dismissing LaPlume's case on jurisdictional grounds.  We review
  this appeal de novo, Jordan v. State, 166 Vt. 509, 511, 702 A.2d 58, 60
  (1997), and we hold that it did.

       ¶  7.  We begin by observing that the family court is a court of
  limited jurisdiction.  See Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492, 494, 808 A.2d 648,
  650 (2002) (mem.); In re R.L., 163 Vt. 168, 171, 657 A.2d 180, 183 (1995). 
  It "has limited jurisdiction over particular matters" and does not have
  "overlapping jurisdiction" with the superior court.  Rogers, 174 Vt. at
  494, 808 A.2d  at 650.  Furthermore, the family court's "jurisdictional
  grant must be strictly construed."  R.L., 163 Vt. at 171, 657 A.2d  at 183.

       ¶  8.  Section 454 of Title 4 establishes the sixteen areas in which
  the family court has jurisdiction, one of which is "abuse prevention
  proceedings filed pursuant to chapter 21 of Title 15."  4 V.S.A. § 454(14). 
  In abuse prevention proceedings, the family court is authorized by statute
  to, among other things, "make such orders as it deems necessary to protect
  the plaintiff," including to order defendant to refrain from abusing
  plaintiff, to restrict defendant's ability to come near or contact
  plaintiff, or to order defendant to vacate the household, leaving plaintiff
  with sole possession.  15 V.S.A. § 1103(c)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 
  Although the family court is permitted to oversee division of property in
  the limited context of divorce proceedings, see id. at § 751, nowhere does
  the statute authorize the family court to resolve property disputes between
  the plaintiff and defendant as part of an abuse prevention proceeding. 
  Where there is no express grant of jurisdiction, we will not invent it. 
  See State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26, 29, 643 A.2d 226, 228 (1993) ("In the
  absence of a specific legislative sanction, it is improper to infer
  consequences not provided in the statute.").

       ¶  9.  Moreover, the relief from abuse proceeding had nothing to do
  with ownership of property.  The court order merely addressed Lavallee's
  temporary possession of LaPlume's belongings after he was barred from
  entering her home and specified a method for transferring that property
  back to him.  The family court plainly lacks the authority to hear
  LaPlume's complaint seeking money damages for Lavallee's alleged failure to
  return his belongings, and the small claims court erred when it found
  otherwise.
   
       ¶  10.  The small claims court also erred in characterizing this case
  as a request to enforce the family court's relief from abuse order.  It is
  clear from the small claims complaint filed by LaPlume that he sought
  monetary damages for the alleged conversion of his personal property by
  Lavallee, not  enforcement of the relief from abuse order.  Thus, the small
  claims court's concern that it lacked authority to enforce a relief from
  abuse order was of no moment, for it was not being asked to do so.

       ¶  11.  The superior court expressed concern that plaintiffs in abuse
  prevention proceedings might be reluctant to participate in the mandatory
  mediation that precedes small claims hearings.  This concern is
  insufficient to remove property disputes such as this one from the small
  claims court's jurisdiction, however, because the mediation requirement can
  be waived by the court in circumstances where the power balance is unequal,
  where there is a danger of abuse, or for any other valid reason pled by
  either litigant.

       ¶  12.  Finally, the court's concern that a plaintiff in an abuse
  prevention proceeding would have to appear in a small claims action to
  defend against claims made by her former abuser, can be remedied by
  providing for her testimony to be taken out of the presence of the abuser. 
  In a small claims hearing, the judge may allow witnesses to testify by
  telephone.  V.R.S.C.P. 6(a).  The plaintiff's right to question the
  defendant is also "subject to the judge's authority to protect witnesses
  against unfair imposition," id., authority which the judge could exercise
  to prevent undesirable contact between the litigants at trial.

       ¶  13.  We hold that appellant was entitled to bring an action for
  conversion of his personal property in small claims court.  Therefore, the
  decision of the small claims court is reversed, and the cause remanded for
  hearing.

       Reversed and remanded.


                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Associate Justice