Rogers v. Wells

Rogers v. Wells (2001-544); 174 Vt. 492; 808 A.2d 648

[Filed 14-Aug-2002]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-544

                               JUNE TERM, 2002


  Joan A. Rogers	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Chittenden Superior Court
                                       }	
  Donald E. Wells	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. S124-98 CnC

                                                Trial Judge: David A. Jenkins

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Father Donald Wells appeals from a decision by the Chittenden Superior
  Court enforcing the terms of a contract he entered with mother Joan Rogers
  Powell regarding parental rights and responsibilities for the parties'
  child.  Father argues that the superior court was without jurisdiction to
  enforce the contract as mother's complaint properly belonged in family
  court, and that the court's interpretation of the contract was erroneous. 
  Although we find that the superior court did have jurisdiction over
  mother's complaint, we agree that the court erred in its interpretation of
  the agreement.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a determination of
  any arrears owed by father.

       The parties had one child, Robert, who was born in 1993.  The parties
  did not marry.  When their relationship ended, the parties entered into an
  agreement regarding parental rights and responsibilities.  Both parties
  were represented by counsel, and signed the agreement in August 1995.  The
  agreement divided up the parties' property, including a farmhouse and
  adjacent property on Poor Farm Road in Colchester, Vermont, which had
  served as the parties' primary residence during their relationship.  That
  agreement stated in part:

         9.  Father will pay mother the sum of $1800.00 per month as
    child support for Robert and as father's contribution toward the
    expense of the Poor Farm Road residence for a period of five years
    from the date hereof.  Father's $1800.00 per month payment shall
    be reduced to $800.00 per month upon the happening of any of the
    following: (1) mother's cohabitation with another; (2) mother's
    relocation; or (3) at the end of five years from the date hereof.
           a. Commencing in year six following the date of this
    Agreement, father shall pay mother the sum of $800.00 per month as
    child support for Robert; said support to be paid monthly until
    Robert graduates from high school so long as the parties are
    exercising parent-child contact as set forth . . . above.

 

  This dispute centers on the amount of payments made in satisfaction of this
  clause.  Father began making payments of $1800 in August 1995 until
  November 1996, when he reduced payment to $900, which continued until
  November of 1998.  In response to this reduction, mother initiated an
  action in family court requesting that the court enforce the 1995
  agreement. The family court declined to enforce the agreement for lack of
  jurisdiction because the parties had not married, although it did hold
  hearings to establish child support according to the statutory guidelines. 
  Before hearings could be held, the court set $900 as the temporary child
  support amount.  In September 1998, mother triggered one of the conditions
  of paragraph nine by marrying another man.  In November 1998, after several
  days of hearings, the family court magistrate established a child support
  obligation for father of $154.76 per month.  That order was not appealed. 
  Father's payments from December 1998 until the present have been
  approximately $154 per month.

       Mother filed the present action in superior court in January 1998
  seeking, as she had in family court, enforcement of the terms of the
  agreement.  Mother claimed that father had violated paragraph nine of the
  agreement by not paying the full $1800 until her marriage in 1998.  She
  argued that the agreement provided that the $1800 and the reduced amount of
  $800 were undifferentiated between child support and a property settlement. 
  Because part of the money owed her was to support the Poor Farm Road
  residence, she was entitled to receive the full amount (by then only $800). 
  Father responded that he had complied with the agreement and that his
  reduction in payments were in response to a change in his financial
  circumstances, and mother's misrepresentations about her cohabitation.  He
  also asserted that he was obligated to pay only the amount of child support
  as determined by the family court.  The superior court agreed with mother,
  so far as it concluded that paragraph nine lumps together child support and
  property support without differentiating the amount for each.  The court
  concluded, however, that father was entitled to credit for the amount of
  child support as determined by the family court.  Father appealed.

       On appeal, father argues that the superior court was without
  jurisdiction to interpret the agreement, characterizing mother's superior
  court claims as an "anticipatory collateral attack" on a family court
  ruling.  Father claims that because this case relates to child support, the
  suit is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the family court.  Father
  further argues that even if the superior court has jurisdiction, its
  interpretation of the agreement was error.  He contends that the court was
  required to determine what amount described in paragraph nine was child
  support and what amount was for support of the Poor Farm Road property.  By
  concluding that the agreement lumped the two amounts together, the court
  did not fulfill its obligation to interpret the contract according to the
  plain language and the parties' intent.
   
       The superior court properly had jurisdiction over this case.  The
  superior court is the court of original jurisdiction over civil actions,
  while the family court has limited jurisdiction over particular matters
  including divorce and child support.  Compare 4 V.S.A. § 113 (superior
  court jurisdiction) with id. § 454 (family court jurisdiction).  We have
  acknowledged that the two courts do not have overlapping jurisdiction -
  matters that belong in family court may not be brought in superior court. 
  St. Hilaire v. DeBlois, 168 Vt. 445, 447, 721 A.2d 133, 135 (1998).  Apart
  and aside from the fact that mother brought a parentage action in family
  court seeking child support, the 1995 agreement is nothing more than a
  contract between two parties.  Although the family court has exclusive
  jurisdiction over divorce proceedings, 4 V.S.A. § 454(4), there is no
  provision in the family court's 

 

  jurisdiction for the separation of unmarried parties.  Thus, to the extent
  that the parties negotiated for themselves an agreement on support and
  property division, that agreement is enforceable through civil action in
  the superior court.  We find that the Chittenden Superior Court properly
  entertained mother's action for enforcement of the 1995 agreement.

       We hold, however, that the court erred in its interpretation of the
  agreement.  Absent ambiguity, contract interpretation is a matter of law. 
  Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 366, 670 A.2d 820, 826 (1995). Whether
  a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law.  Isbrandtsen v. North
  Branch Corp., 150 Vt. 575, 577, 556 A.2d 81, 83 (1988).  We therefore
  review the trial court's interpretation de novo.  In determining that the
  1995 agreement did not differentiate between child support and property
  settlement, the court focused on the language of paragraph nine.  The court
  found that the phrase "as child support for Robert and as father's
  contribution toward the expense of the Poor Farm Road residence"
  unambiguously indicates the parties intended not to differentiate between
  the two purposes of the payment.  In construing a specific provision of a
  contract, "we consider the whole instrument and construe it in harmony if
  possible" with the rest of the contract.  John A. Russell Corp. v. Bohlig,
  170 Vt. 12, 17, 739 A.2d 1212, 1216-17 (1999).  While the court's
  interpretation may be accurate if we considered only the first part of
  paragraph nine alone, when analyzed with the rest of the agreement, we
  conclude that the parties did separate the child support amount from the
  property support amount.

       Specifically, the court failed to consider paragraph 9a, which states
  that after five years, regardless of what conditions mother has triggered,
  father would pay mother $800 as child support until Robert graduates from
  high school.  Considering this provision in conjunction with the provision
  in main paragraph nine, it is apparent that the agreement allocated $1000
  to support the Poor Farm Road residence and $800 to child support.  There
  is nothing in the agreement that indicates that the amount of child support
  in paragraph 9a is any different from the amount of child support in
  paragraph nine.  Furthermore, this interpretation of the contract accounts
  for the agreement's provision that father's contribution would fall to $800
  should mother relocate or cohabitate with another within the first five
  years.  Presumably, after either of these events, she would no longer need
  father's support to maintain the Poor Farm Road residence.  Thus, father's
  contribution would be limited to child support.  The parties intent,
  therefore, as evident from the plain language of the whole contract, is
  that father would provide child support and a form of maintenance to
  support mother's residence for five years, and then only child support
  until the child reached the age of majority.

       Despite the parties agreeing to an amount of child support, $800, that
  would not change until Robert graduated from high school, the amount is
  modifiable.  A court may modify child support whether it is based on a
  stipulation or agreement.  See C.D. v. N.M., 160 Vt. 495, 498, 631 A.2d 848, 850 (1993).  Such authority comes from the policy expressed by the
  Legislature that children's needs should be met by having them share in
  family income.  Id. at 500, 631 A.2d  at 851 (citing 15 V.S.A. § 650).  "The
  fact that a parent may have agreed, based on inadequate information, to an
  inappropriate child support amount should not undercut this policy."  Id. 
  Thus, there is no conflict between the superior court's jurisdiction over
  the 1995 agreement and the proceedings in family court that set child
  support according to the guidelines.

 

       By the terms to the agreement, as a result of mother's marriage in
  September 1998, she was entitled to $800 of child support per month from
  that point forward.  The agreement was modified, however, by a family court
  order that set child support at $154.76.  Because father's property support
  obligation of $1000 ended with mother's marriage in 1998, no part of the
  remaining $800 to which mother is entitled under the agreement is
  attributable to property support.  The amount owed by father, therefore, is
  the amount of child support, which has been modified by the family court. 
  Nevertheless, it does appear from the record that father prematurely
  reduced his payment to $900 before mother married.  Thus, we remand to the
  superior court for a determination of arrears owed by father according to
  the terms of the agreement as set forth in this decision.

       Reversed and remanded.



                                       BY THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice