In re M.B.

In re M.B. (2003-305); 177 Vt. 481; 857 A.2d 772

2004 VT 58

[Filed 15-Jun-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 58

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-305

                              MARCH TERM, 2004

  In re M.B.	                       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
                                       }	Washington Superior Court
                                       }	
                               	       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 304-6-03 Wncv

                                                Trial Judge: Stephen B. Martin

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       ¶  1.  M.B. appeals a Washington Superior Court order denying his
  petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from Vermont State
  Hospital (VSH).  M.B. claims the court erred when it held that the State
  substantially complied with the emergency examination statutes even though
  M.B. was taken into police custody before the application authorizing his
  detention was completed.  We find that any defect in M.B.'s initial custody
  had no bearing on the legal basis for his restraint at the time he
  petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  On May 23, 2003, at the request of his mother, M.B. met with
  his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Donna Kiley, at her office at Northeast
  Kingdom Human Services (NKHS).  During the appointment, M.B. became
  increasingly angry and repeatedly stated his refusal to take the
  medications prescribed for his bipolar disorder.  Dr. Kiley then determined
  that M.B. needed to be hospitalized and recommended that he check himself
  into VSH.  When he vehemently refused, Dr. Kiley decided M.B. met the
  criteria for an emergency examination pursuant to 18 V.S.A. § 7504.  Dr.
  Kiley then called the state police to transport M.B. to the hospital, but
  as soon as M.B. heard mention of the police, he fled.  Less than a mile
  from Dr. Kiley's office, M.B. flagged down the police that were sent to
  apprehend him.  The officer took M.B. into temporary custody and
  transported him back to NKHS.
   
       ¶  3.  Once back at the office, M.B. saw Dr. Kiley briefly and then
  was interviewed at some length by Kimberly Roberge, a qualified mental
  health professional, who acted as the statutorily required "interested
  person" and completed the application for emergency examination.  See 18
  V.S.A. § 7504(a).  During the interview, M.B. was crying, screaming,
  spitting, and refusing any further treatment, all of which Roberge
  documented to support M.B.'s emergency examination application.  Once the
  application and physician's certificate were completed, M.B. was
  transported by police to Fletcher Allen Health Care Center.  He stayed
  there only a short time before being transferred to VSH for his emergency
  examination. 

       ¶  4.  At VSH, Dr. Richard Munson completed an emergency psychiatric
  examination of M.B. and determined that he was a "person in need of
  treatment" pursuant to 18 V.S.A. § 7508.  The State then filed an
  application for involuntary treatment in the Washington Family Court on May
  26, 2003.  

       ¶  5.  While the application for involuntary treatment was still
  pending in family court, M.B. filed this petition for a writ of habeas
  corpus in Washington Superior Court seeking release from VSH.  The superior
  court held a summary hearing on M.B.'s petition on June 9, 2003.  After
  hearing argument from the parties and testimony from M.B., the court denied
  the petition finding that Dr. Kiley had already made the decision to
  complete the application for emergency examination before M.B. was placed
  in police custody and therefore the State had substantially complied with
  the spirit and intent of the statutes governing the emergency examination
  process.  M.B. appealed.  In the meantime and just prior to the family
  court hearing on the involuntary treatment application, the parties agreed
  to a ninety-day conditional order of non-hospitalization.  M.B. was
  released from VSH on or about June 11, 2003. 

       ¶  6.  When reviewing the trial court's factual findings, we will
  view them in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below,
  disregarding the effect of modifying evidence, and we will not set them
  aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  Brown v. Whitcomb, 150 Vt. 106,
  109, 550 A.2d 1, 3 (1988).  The court's findings will stand if there is any
  reasonable and credible evidence to support them.  Harlow v. Miller, 147
  Vt. 480, 481-82, 520 A.2d 995, 997 (1986).  Our consideration of questions
  of law, however, is nondeferential and plenary.  State v. Pollander, 167
  Vt. 301, 304, 706 A.2d 1359, 1360 (1997).  

       ¶  7.  The issue presented is whether non-compliance with statutory
  emergency examination application procedures justifies granting a mental
  health patient's writ for habeas corpus when his then current confinement
  was based on a subsequent, independent, and uncontested certification for
  involuntary treatment.  The trial court denied the petition on grounds that
  there was no defect in the emergency examination procedures in the first
  instance and therefore never addressed the propriety of bringing a writ of
  habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of the petitioner's present
  restraint.  We agree that M.B.'s habeas corpus petition should be denied,
  but for different reasons than those cited by the trial court.  See Amy's
  Enters. v. Sorrell, 174 Vt. 623, 625, 817 A.2d 612, 618 (2002) (mem.)
  (court may affirm rulings on alternative grounds than that of trial court).
        
       ¶  8.  M.B. argues that the initiation of his custody on May 23 was
  unlawful because the application for emergency examination authorizing his
  detention had not yet been completed when he was detained.  This defect,
  M.B. asserts, tainted all subsequent legal proceedings and justifies his
  release from confinement on June 9.  The fundamental problem with M.B.'s
  argument is that habeas corpus is designed to challenge the legal basis for
  the petitioner's current detention.  "It is well settled that a [confined
  person] has no right to a writ of habeas corpus unless he is entitled to
  immediate release, and the writ will not issue unless he is presently
  restrained of his liberty without warrant of law."  In re Bryant, 129 Vt.
  302, 306, 276 A.2d 628, 631 (1971) (relying on holding in Stallings v.
  Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 343 (1920)) (emphasis added).  

       ¶  9.  When M.B. filed his habeas corpus petition and had the
  corresponding hearing in superior court, he was confined pursuant to the
  State's application for involuntary treatment pending before the family
  court.  See 18 V.S.A. § 7508(d)(2).  Section 7508(d)(2) provides that once
  a person is certified as being a "person in need of treatment" pursuant to
  § 7508(d), and an application for involuntary treatment has been filed,
  "the patient shall remain hospitalized pending the court's decision on the
  application."  Id.  M.B.'s current confinement was therefore authorized by
  statute and more importantly uncontested.  M.B. conceded before the trial
  court and again at oral argument that, when he filed his habeas petition,
  he was lawfully in custody at VSH based on the State's application for
  involuntary treatment.  He further agreed that, even if the court granted
  his habeas corpus petition because of defective process on May 23, it would
  have no bearing on the legality of his detention pursuant to the pending
  involuntary treatment application.  M.B.'s detention at the time he sought
  habeas corpus relief was lawful, and he was not entitled to immediate
  release; therefore his petition must be denied.

       ¶  10.  Further supporting our holding is the fact that both parties
  agree that the application for emergency examination authorizing M.B.'s
  temporary custody on May 23 and the application for involuntary treatment
  authorizing his confinement on June 9 were two different and wholly
  independent processes.  The only defect M.B. points to is his temporary
  custody at NKHS while Dr. Kiley and Kimberly Roberge completed the
  application for emergency examination.  Assuming without deciding that this
  initial custody was unlawful, the only process directly affected by the
  illegality was the emergency examination application authorizing M.B.'s
  transport to VSH and the subsequent examination.  See id. § 7504(b).  Once
  the examination was completed, the State no longer had the authority to
  detain M.B. pursuant to that application.  The legal basis for M.B.'s
  detention thereafter was the independent psychiatrist's assessment that
  M.B. was a "person in need of treatment" under the separate process
  outlined in 18 V.S.A. § 7508(d).  Section 7508(d) authorized M.B.'s
  detention for an additional 72 hours until either he volunteered to be
  treated or the State filed an application for involuntary treatment.  §
  7508(d).  The State filed the involuntary treatment application on May 26,
  2003 which formed the second separate and lawful basis for M.B.'s
  detention.  He was legally restrained on this basis when his petition was
  heard in superior court on June 9, 2003.      

       ¶  11.  By the time the superior court heard the petition, any
  defective process M.B. might have endured had been superseded by the
  implementation of two different and independent processes that justified
  his current detention.  Each of these steps could have occurred entirely
  independent of the previous action.  As M.B.'s counsel stated at oral
  argument, an application for involuntary treatment could be completed and
  authorized even if the patient was not confined.  Given the obvious
  distinctions between the three different bases for M.B.'s detention, we
  cannot find that the May 23 confinement tainted all of M.B.'s subsequent
  legal proceedings or justified granting his writ of habeas corpus.  
   
       ¶  12.  In this case, application of the statutory procedures
  provided a lawful basis for M.B.'s detention at the time he filed his writ
  of habeas corpus.  Thus, even assuming M.B. is correct that there was a
  defect in the statutory emergency application procedure, M.B. was not
  deprived of his liberty without warrant of law.

       Affirmed.




       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Associate Justice