State v. Brooks

State v. Brooks (98-488); 170 Vt. 597; 750 A.2d 1000

[Filed 27-Jan-2000]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-488

                             JANUARY TERM, 2000


State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
                                       }	Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
Stephen J. Brooks	               }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 999-8-95Wmcr	


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:


       Defendant Stephen Brooks appeals from the district court's denial of
  defendant's motion to withdraw  his guilty plea.  We hold that the court
  had no jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion, and vacate  the order.

       The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In 1995 and 1996, defendant
  was convicted of several charges,  including one count of obstruction of
  justice, and was placed on probation.  Subsequently, defendant  faced other
  criminal charges and several outstanding probation violation complaints,
  including a  complaint that he had violated the terms of his probation
  regarding the obstruction of justice  conviction.  The State and defendant,
  who was represented by counsel, entered into a plea agreement  that
  included an admission to this probation violation.  The parties agreed to a
  total sentence of  eighteen months to five years, with a credit of six
  months and twenty days, and a recommendation  that defendant be placed in
  work camp.  After engaging in the requisite colloquy, see V.R.Cr.P.  11(c),
  the court accepted the plea agreement and the recommended sentence.

       Soon after defendant began serving his sentence, he discovered that he
  was ineligible for, and would  not be placed in, work camp because, under
  Department of Corrections guidelines, a person  convicted of a violent
  crime was ineligible for work camp, and defendant had been convicted of 
  obstruction of justice, which the Department considered a violent crime.

       Pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 32(d), defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
  plea, arguing that his plea was  not voluntary because it was based on his
  belief that he would be placed in work camp.  Therefore,  defendant
  contended, enforcing the agreement would result in manifest injustice.  The
  State opposed  the motion on the merits, and also argued that the court had
  no jurisdiction over the motion.  The  court denied the motion on the
  merits without reaching the State's jurisdictional argument.  The court 
  found the recommendation of placement in work camp to be just that, a 

 

  recommendation, and not a guarantee, and found that defendant's belief that
  it was a guarantee was  not reasonable.  Defendant filed a motion to
  reconsider, which the court summarily denied.  This  appeal followed.

       Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion. 
  According to defendant, given his  circumstances, the recommendation of
  work camp was a factual impossibility.  Therefore, he  contends, his plea
  was not voluntary, and enforcing the agreement would result in "manifest 
  injustice."  V.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  Thus, defendant argues, the court should
  have permitted him to  withdraw his plea.  The State, however, contends
  that the court had no jurisdiction over the motion  in the first instance,
  and alternatively, that the court's decision on the merits was correct.  We
  agree  that the court lacked jurisdiction.

       V.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides, in pertinent part:

     A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be 
     made only by a defendant who is not in custody under sentence.  The 
     motion must be made prior to or within 30 days after the date of entry 
     of judgment, except that a defendant whose sentence does not include 
     a term of imprisonment may make the motion at any time . . . .  If the 
     motion is made after sentence, the court may set aside the judgment 
     of conviction and permit withdrawal of the plea only to correct 
     manifest injustice.

       Defendant argues that the court had jurisdiction over his motion
  because he brought it within thirty  days of the date of entry of judgment. 
  The State counters that, because defendant is in custody under  sentence,
  he may not bring the motion in the first instance.  Defendant does not
  dispute that he is in  custody under sentence.  Rather, he argues that the
  Rule should not be read literally.  Defendant  notes that, for purposes of
  determining the timeliness of a motion to withdraw, the second sentence  of
  the Rule distinguishes between defendants whose sentences include
  imprisonment and those  whose sentences do not include imprisonment. 
  Further, defendant points out that, under State v.  Wargo, 168 Vt. 231, 719 A.2d 407 (1998), a defendant need not be incarcerated to be deemed in 
  custody for purposes of V.R.Cr.P. 32(d); rather, the test is whether the
  defendant has had a  significant restraint imposed on his or her personal
  liberty.  See id. at 234, 719 A.2d  at 409.   According to defendant, any
  defendant who has been sentenced, even when he or she has not  actually
  begun serving the sentence, has had a significant restraint imposed upon
  his or her personal  liberty.  Therefore, defendant argues, any defendant
  who has been sentenced is necessarily in  custody under sentence; and, if
  the Rule were read literally, no defendant who has been sentenced  could
  file a motion to withdraw under V.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  Consequently, defendant
  argues, a literal  reading of the Rule would render meaningless the Rule's
  distinction between defendants whose  sentences include imprisonment and
  those whose sentences do not include imprisonment.  Thus, he  urges us to
  disregard the first sentence of the Rule.

       We do not agree that the imposition of a sentence, in and of itself,
  necessarily imposes 

 

  significant restraints on personal liberty.  See State v. Yates,        
  Vt.        ,        , 726 A.2d 483, 485  (1999) (drawing distinction
  between "in custody" and "under sentence").  Indeed, in Wargo, we  noted
  that whether a defendant has had significant restraints imposed upon his or
  her liberty is a  factual determination.  See Wargo, 168 Vt. at 234, 719 A.2d  at 409 ("Mandatory supervision by  judicial officers coupled with the
  possibility of imminent incarceration without a formal trial and  criminal
  conviction are sufficient restrictions of a defendant's liberty to
  constitute custody. . . .  Both  of these factors are present in this
  case.").  However, those factors will not necessarily be present in  every
  case in which a defendant has been sentenced but has not yet begun serving
  the sentence.   Therefore, we read the Rule according to its terms:  under
  V.R.Cr.P. 32(d), a defendant who is in  custody under sentence may not file
  a motion to withdraw his or her guilty plea.

       Furthermore, under 13 V.S.A. § 7131, a defendant who is in custody
  under sentence may challenge  his or her conviction by filing a petition
  for post-conviction relief.  However, as we emphasized in  Wargo, such a
  defendant may not file a motion under V.R.Cr.P. 32(d).  See id. at 234, 719 A.2d  at  409 (fact that V.R.Cr.P. 32(d) provides that motion to withdraw
  may be made only by defendant who  is not in custody under sentence "'makes
  clear that the procedure of the rule applies only when the  statutory
  relief procedure [13 V.S.A. § 7131] is inapplicable.'") (quoting Reporter's
  Notes, 1980  Amendment to V.R.Cr.P. 32(d)); Yates,         Vt. at        ,
  726 A.2d  at 485 ("The determinative factor  is whether the defendant may
  avail himself of post-conviction relief under 13 V.S.A. § 7131.").  
  Therefore, because defendant was in custody under sentence when he brought
  his motion to  withdraw, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the motion. 
  Consequently, we vacate the decision.  See Subud of Woodstock, Inc. v. Town
  of Barnard,         Vt.        ,        , 732 A.2d 749, 751 (1999)  (in
  absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, decision below must be vacated).

       The State argues that we should affirm the decision because the court
  reached the correct result,  albeit for the wrong reason.  However, we will
  not consider either the court's reasoning or the merits  of its decision
  because the court had no authority over the motion in the first instance. 
  See Verrill  v. Dewey, 130 Vt. 627, 633, 299 A.2d 182, 185 (1972) (when
  court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,  it has no authority to consider
  issue). 

       Order vacated and cause remanded for entry of an order dismissing the
  motion for lack of  jurisdiction.



                                       BY THE COURT:

       
                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice