Subud of Woodstock, Inc. v. Town of Barnard

Subud of Woodstock v. Town of Barnard (98-311); 169 Vt. 582; 732 A.2d 749

[Filed 10-May-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-311

                              APRIL TERM, 1999


Subud of Woodstock, Inc.	       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
     v.	                               }	Property Valuation & Review Division
                                       }	
Town of Barnard	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. Windsor 1997-7


             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The Town of Barnard appeals from a decision of the Division of
  Property and Valuation  that certain property was entitled to tax-exempt
  status.  The Town contends the Division lacked  jurisdiction to determine
  the tax-exempt status of the property.  We agree, and therefore vacate  the
  judgment.

       Subud of Woodstock, Inc. owns a building and approximately four acres
  in the Town.  In  1976, the Town voted to grant Subud tax exempt status,
  and thereafter exempted the building and  two of the four acres from the
  property tax.  In 1997, the Town voted to rescind the property's  tax
  exempt status.  Thereafter, the Board of Listers assessed the property at
  $97,200.  Subud filed  a grievance with the Listers, who subsequently
  lowered the value to $96,900.  Subud appealed  to the Board of Civil
  Authority, claiming that the property: (1) should be tax exempt because it 
  was used for "pious" purposes under 32 V.S.A. § 3802(4), and (2) was
  assessed at more than its  fair market value.  The Board concluded that the
  property was properly assessed, and that it  lacked the statutory authority
  to decide the tax-exemption question.

       Subud appealed the Board's decision to the Division, again claiming
  that the property  should be exempt because it was used for religious
  purposes, and that it was assessed at more than  its fair market value. 
  The Town objected that the Division lacked authority to determine the tax-
  exempt status of the property.  The Director of the Division denied the
  objection.  At the  subsequent hearing before the appointed appraiser,
  Subud indicated that it was not contesting the  value placed on the
  property, but only the removal of the tax exemption.  Subud then presented 
  evidence that it was a religious organization.  The appraiser concluded
  that the property was used  for religious purposes and, therefore, was
  entitled to be tax exempt.  This appeal followed.

       It is well settled that "[p]ublic administrative bodies have only such
  adjudicatory jurisdiction  as is conferred on them by statute, with nothing
  presumed in favor of their jurisdiction."  Gloss  v. The Delaware and
  Hudson R.R. Co., 135 Vt. 419, 422, 378 A.2d 507, 

 

  509 (1977).  The Legislature has made it clear that administrative
  departments may exercise only  those powers expressly conferred, and that
  authority cannot arise through implication.  See 3  V.S.A. § 203
  (departments shall exercise only powers and duties imposed by law); Miner
  v.  Chater, 137 Vt. 330, 333, 403 A.2d 274, 276-77 (1979) (administrative
  authority must be  express).  

       The Division of Property Valuation and Review is a division within the
  Department of  Taxes empowered to assist in the administration of property
  taxation.  See 3 V.S.A. § 2289.   Among its other duties, the Division is
  charged, through its director, with the responsibility to  appraise
  property.  See 32 V.S.A. § 3411(11).  Appeals from decisions of a civil
  board of  authority may be taken to the director.  See id. § 4461(a).  Upon
  such an appeal, the director shall  appoint an appraiser, see id. § 4465,
  who "shall proceed de novo and determine the correct  valuation of the
  property as promptly as practicable."  Id. § 4467.

       It is readily apparent that the Division's statutory authority in this
  case was confined to  appraising the fair market value of the property; it
  had no statutory authority, and therefore lacked  subject matter
  jurisdiction, to determine the tax-exempt status of the property.  See
  Gloss, 135 Vt.  at 422, 378 A.2d  at 509.  As to that issue, Subud's proper
  recourse was to file an action for  declaratory judgment in superior court. 
  See, e.g., American Museum of Fly Fishing, Inc. v.  Town of Manchester, 151
  Vt. 103, 104, 557 A.2d 900, 901 (1989).  

       In the absence of jurisdiction, the decision of the Division must be
  vacated. 

       The decision of the Division of Property Valuation and Review is
  vacated for lack of  jurisdiction.




                                       BY THE COURT:



                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice