Julie Ann Payzant a/k/a Julie Ann Staehli, Appellant, vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Respondent.

Julie Ann Payzant a/k/a Julie Ann Staehli, Appellant, vs. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Respondent. A04-2213, Court of Appeals Unpublished, June 21, 2005.

This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480 A. 08, subd. 3 (2004).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A04-2213

 

Julie Ann Payzant a/k/a Julie Ann Staehli,

Appellant,

 

vs.

 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

Respondent.

 

Filed June 21, 2005

Affirmed; Motion to strike granted

Kalitowski, Judge

 

Goodhue County District Court

File No. CX-04-347

 

Joseph J. Osterbauer, Amy M. Kaldor, Osterbauer Law Firm, 404 Third Avenue North, Suite 201, Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for appellant)

 

Kay Nord Hunt, Margie R. Bodas, Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, P.A., 2000 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402; and

 

David J. Hoekstra, Brett W. Olander & Associates, 1000 Fifth Street Center, 55 East Fifth Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondent)

 

            Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Wright, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge

Appellant Julie Payzant contends the district court erred by concluding that a settlement she entered into with her workers' compensation carrier precluded her recovery of no-fault benefits.  We affirm, and grant respondent's motion to strike certain documents from the record on appeal.

D E C I S I O N

I.

 

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this court must ask whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law.  State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).  This court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted."  Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).  A party resisting summary judgment must "do more than rest on mere averments."  DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997).

Appellant, who was injured in an employment-related car accident, settled with her employer's workers' compensation carrier as to all future chiropractic and wage-loss expenses resulting from the accident.  Subsequently, she brought suit against respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, her no-fault insurer, seeking additional benefits for chiropractic and wage-loss expenses.  The district court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment.

Appellant argues the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the workers' compensation settlement precluded subsequent recovery of no-fault benefits for wage-loss, chiropractic, and nonreserved medical expenses that were specifically closed out by the workers' compensation settlement.  We disagree.

The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-.71 (2004), and the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 176.001-.862 (2004), "share the general policy of providing to injured persons medical and wage loss compensation quickly and efficiently."  Klinefelter v. Crum and Forster Ins. Co., 675 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Minn. App. 2004).  "[T]he statutes are in pari materia . . . [and the] presumption thereby arises that the same general legislative policy underlies these two statutes and that together they constitute a harmonious and uniform system of law."  Record v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 284 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 1979);[1] see also Minn. Stat. § 65B.42 (purposes of no-fault act), and Minn. Stat. § 176.001 (intent of legislature in workers' compensation act). 

"When a person is injured through the use of a motor vehicle while performing duties for an employer, it is possible that insurance coverage under both a workers' compensation policy and a no-fault policy could be triggered."  Klinefelter,675 N.W.2d at 334.  When this occurs, workers' compensation benefits should be paid first: 

Basic economic loss benefits shall be primary with respect to benefits, except for those paid or payable under a workers' compensation law, which any person receives or is entitled to receive from any other source as a result of injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. 

 

Minn. Stat. § 65B.61, subd. 1.  This court "must read the no-fault act as coordinating its benefits in such a manner as to avoid overcompensation of the motor-vehicle user."  Klinefelter, 675 N.W.2d at 335; see also Minn. Stat. § 65B.42(5) (stating the no-fault act was adopted in part "to provide offsets to avoid duplicate recovery").  Together, the workers' compensation act and the no-fault act require that

a person who is injured while using his own motor vehicle in his work for an employer must seek benefits first from a responsible workers' compensation insurer.  He can then look to his no-fault insurer for benefits not already provided, subject, of course, to statutory and policy limitations.  If some workers' compensation benefits are already being provided but do not fully compensate him, he might yet make a claim for the uncompensated items against his no-fault carrier.

 

Klinefelter, 675 N.W.2d at 335-36.

            Here, the district court granted respondent summary judgment based on this court's decision in American Family Ins. Group v. Udermann, which held that an individual who suffers an employment-related injury and enters into a workers' compensation settlement releasing specific future expenses may not subsequently seek no-fault benefits for those expenses.  631 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Minn. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Sept. 25, 2001).  The district court correctly determined that Udermann controls here.  As in Udermann, appellant's workers' compensation settlement closed out all claims except for one specified category, in this case nonchiropractic medical expenses for cervical spine and rib treatment.  "[T]he only reasonable inference is that potential future . . . expenses [for those treatments] were accounted for in the final settlement amount."  Id. at 427.  Those expenses may not now be recovered from respondent, whose reimbursement rights as to those treatments were defeated in the settlement.  See id. at 427-28.

            Appellant argues on appeal that she is entitled to the difference between the wage-loss percentage allowed under the workers' compensation act and the wage-loss percentage allowed under the no-fault act.  But appellant did not raise this argument before the district court, and has therefore waived it on appeal.  See Thiele v. Stitch, 425 N.W.2d at 580, 582 (Minn. 1998) (stating that a reviewing court will generally consider only those issues that were presented to and considered by the district court).  And even if she had preserved the issue, appellant specifically released all future wage-loss claims in the workers' compensation settlement, and is precluded, under Udermann, from now seeking wage-loss benefits from respondent.  Appellant is similarly precluded from seeking no-fault benefits for chiropractic and massage therapies, both of which were also specifically released by the workers' compensation settlement. 

            Appellant challenges the district court's interpretation of the phrase "paid or payable" as used in Minn. Stat. § 65B.61, subd. 1:  "Basic economic loss benefits shall be primary with respect to benefits, except for those paid or payable under a workers' compensation law."  Appellant argues that because the benefits released by the settlement are no longer paid or payable under the workers' compensation settlement, she should be allowed to recover those benefits from her no-fault carrier to the extent that they exceed the workers' compensation benefits and are not duplicative.  But in Udermann, this court considered and rejected this same argument, concluding that where an individual enters into a workers' compensation settlement that releases all future claims for specific types of expenses and thereby defeats the no-fault carrier's reimbursement rights, those expenses are no longer payable under either workers' compensation law or the no-fault law because any such payment would be duplicative.  See Udermann, 631 N.W.2d at 427-28.

            Appellant also contends that the district court erred by retroactively applying Udermann to her June 1999 accident; Udermann was decided in July 2001, and review was denied in September 2001.  But appellant settled her claim in November 2001, and it was not approved by a workers' compensation judge until January 2002.  Because the settlement, and not the fact of the accident, is the critical event for applying Udermann, we conclude that the district court did not apply Udermann retroactively. 

II.

Finally, respondent filed a motion to strike from the record certain documents submitted to this court by appellant that were not part of the record before the district court.  These documents include submissions purporting to demonstrate that appellant incurred postsettlement medical expenses that were reserved by the workers' compensation settlement. 

Appellant concedes that the disputed documents were not presented to or considered by the district court and that this court will not generally consider matters outside the district court record.  See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.  But she argues the documents should be considered in furtherance of the orderly administration of justice.  In support, she relies upon Crystal Beach Bay Ass'n v. Koochiching County, which observed that "[a]lthough an appellate court is ordinarily limited to a consideration of matters contained in the record before it, we think it has inherent power to look beyond the record where the orderly administration of justice commends it."  309 Minn. 52, 56-57, 243 N.W.2d 40, 43 (1976).  But there, the documents concerned findings issued pursuant to administrative and judicial proceedings related to the county board of commissioners' decision from which appeal was eventually taken.  Id.  Here, the documents appellant seeks to introduce do not concern public hearings, and appellant offers no explanation as to why the documentswhich were available at the time of respondent's motion for summary judgmentwere not offered to the district court.

In addition, the documents at issue do not qualify as new evidence that "may be introduced on appeal if it is documentary, essentially uncontroverted, and is not offered in support of a reversal."  In re Risk Level Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Minn. App. 1998).  This court has repeatedly rejected attempts to introduce on appeal new evidence pertaining to the facts of an individual case rather than to maters of public record relevant to broad policy issues.  See, e.g., Richardson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 424 N.W.2d 317, 319-20 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 1988).  We therefore grant respondent's motion to strike the seven document submissions that were not part of the record before the district court.

Affirmed; motion to strike granted.   

[1] The legislature nullified the rule in Record in which the supreme court allowed stacking of no-fault and workers' compensation benefits.  See Hoben v. City of Minneapolis, 324 N.W.2d 161, 162 (Minn. 1982) (stating that the legislature "amend[ed] § 65B.61, subd. 1 and 2, to prevent stacking of  no-fault and workers' compensation benefits in excess of $200 a week") (citing 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 539 §§ 2, 3)).  But this amendment does not alter the proposition for which we cite Record.