KENNETH MITAN V MAURA CAMPBELL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED DECEMBER 6, 2005
KENNETH MITAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 126451
MAURA CAMPBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
The
question
before
us
in
this
defamation
case
is
whether the period of limitations1 runs from the date of the
alleged defamatory statement made by defendant or the date
the
statement
was
republished
by
a
third
party.
We
conclude that the limitations period ran from the date of
the original alleged defamatory statement.
Therefore, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate
the circuit court’s judgment of summary disposition.
1
Currently the statute of limitations is MCL
600.5805(9).
Amendments to MCL 600.5805 since the alleged
defamation occurred in this case have no effect on this
case.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Defendant
was
the
public
relations
director
Department of Consumer and Industry Services.
of
the
On February
22, 2000, she was interviewed by a reporter from WXYZ-TV
regarding employment claims made by plaintiff’s employees.
During the interview, defendant stated that plaintiff was a
“bad
egg,”
defamatory.
a
statement
The
February 25, 2000.
statement
that
plaintiff
was
broadcast
claims
by
WXYZ-TV
was
on
Plaintiff filed a defamation complaint
on February 26, 2001 (February 25 was a Sunday), more than
a year after defendant made her statement but within a year
from the date it was republished by WXYZ-TV.
The limitations period for a defamation claim is one
year.
MCL
defendant
600.5805(9).
summary
limitations,
MCR
The
disposition
2.116(C)(7),
circuit
based
on
ruling
court
the
that
granted
statute
of
defendant’s
statement to the reporter started the limitations period
running, and that defendant could not be held responsible
for the republication by WXYZ-TV.
reversed and remanded.2
The Court of Appeals
It concluded that defendant could
be liable on the basis of the republication because it was
2
Mitan v Campbell, unpublished opinion
issued May 20, 2004 (Docket No. 242486).
2
per
curiam
plausible that the broadcast was the natural, and possibly
intended, result of the interview.
The Court found this
was a factual issue to be considered on remand.
Defendant applied for leave to appeal to this Court.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court heard oral
argument on the application for leave to appeal pursuant to
MCR 7.302(G)(1).3
II. Standard of Review
We
review
a
summary
disposition
ruling
de
novo
to
determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118;
597 NW2d 817 (1999).
Questions of statutory construction
are also reviewed de novo.
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp,
466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002).
In construing a
statute,
intent
courts
are
to
effect
the
of
the
Legislature, and if a statute is clear and unambiguous it
should be enforced as written.
Id. at 63.
III. Analysis
The elements of a defamation claim are:
(1) a false
and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an
unprivileged
amounting
3
at
communication
least
to
to
a
third
negligence
471 Mich 938 (2004).
3
on
party,
the
(3)
part
of
fault
the
publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the
existence of special harm caused by publication.
Rouch v
Enquirer & News of Battle Creek (After Remand), 440 Mich
238, 251; 487 NW2d 205 (1992) (libel); Ledl v Quik Pik Food
Stores, Inc, 133 Mich App 583, 589; 349 NW2d 529 (1984)
(defamation).
The one-year limitations period for defamation claims
is found in MCL 600.5805(1), (9):
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an
action to recover damages for injuries to persons
or property unless, after the claim first accrued
to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the
plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within
the periods of time prescribed by this section.
* * *
(9) The period of limitations is 1 year for
an action charging libel or slander. [Emphasis
added.]
A defamation claim accrues when “the wrong upon which
the claim is based was done regardless of the time when
damage results.”
MCL
Our
MCL 600.5827.
600.5805(1)
Legislature
has
and
(9)
clearly
are
clear
provided
and
that
unambiguous.
a
defamation
claim must be filed within one year from the date the claim
first accrued. The claim first accrued when the defamatory
statement was made on February 22, 2000. The statute does
not contemplate extending the accrual of the claim on the
4
basis
of
republication,
republication
was
regardless
intended
by
of
whether
speaker.4
the
the
Because
plaintiff filed suit against defendant more than a year
after
his
claim
first
accrued,
his
cause
of
action
is
barred by the statute of limitations.
The
with
plain
language
plaintiff’s
claim
of
MCL
that
a
600.5805
third
is
inconsistent
party’s
expected
republication of a defamatory statement affects the running
of the limitations period for the initial statement.
The
statute provides a relatively short limitations period of
one year; there is nothing in the statute suggesting that
the
period
can
effectively
republication is anticipated.
be
lengthened
where
Rather than a rule of first
accrual, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals changes the
statute
to
a
rule
of
last
accrual.
Such
reasoning
undermines the principles of finality and certainty behind
a statute of limitations.
See Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich
531; 536 NW2d 755 (1995).5
4
The republisher of the statement, WXYZ-TV, is not a
party to this action.
We are concerned only with
defendant’s liability for WXYZ-TV’s republication of her
statement.
5
The Court of Appeals relied on Tumbarella v Kroger
Co, 85 Mich App 482, 496; 271 NW2d 284 (1978), for the
proposition that the “general rule is that one who
(continued…)
5
IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the
circuit
court’s
judgment
of
summary
disposition
is
reinstated.6
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
(continued…)
publishes a defamatory statement is liable for the
injurious
consequences
of
its
repetition
where
the
repetition is the natural and probable result of the
original publication.”
We neither accept nor reject that
proposition because plaintiff neither alleged nor claimed
damages for natural and probable consequences in his
complaint.
His sole allegation was that an injurious,
defamatory statement was published on February 25, 2000,
the date of the broadcast.
Further, even if we were to
accept the natural and probable consequences rule, no case
from our jurisdiction has held that the rule extends the
one-year period of limitations.
The Tumbarella Court held
merely that the original publisher was liable for the
natural and probable consequences of his remarks.
Because
the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Tumbarella as extending
the period of limitations, its reliance on Tumbarella was
misplaced.
6
Our decision renders moot the remaining arguments
raised by plaintiff.
6
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
