PHYLLIS L GRIFFITH V STATE FARM MUTUAL
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 14, 2005
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a Legally
Incapacitated Adult,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 122286
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CORRIGAN, J.
In this case, we consider whether the no-fault act,
MCL
500.3101
insurer,
to
et
seq.,
reimburse
husband’s food expenses.
neither
“for
requires
plaintiff
defendant,
for
her
a
no-fault
incapacitated
Because the food in this case is
accidental
bodily
injury”
under
MCL
500.3105(1) nor “for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), we hold that the
expenses for it may not be recovered under those provisions
of the no-fault act.
We thus reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On
April
28,
1994,
plaintiff’s
sixty-three-year-old
husband, Douglas Griffith,1 suffered a severe brain injury
as
a
result
treatment
August
of
at
a
motor
vehicle
accident.
in-patient
facilities
at
time
1995,
which
he
and
was
He
received
hospitals
transferred
until
to
a
residence where he received twenty-four-hour nursing and
attendant care.
On August 6, 1997, Griffith returned home
with plaintiff.
He remains confined to a wheelchair and
continues to require assistance with basic daily tasks such
as eating and bathing.
After
the
accident,
defendant
Griffith’s no-fault insurer.
provided
coverage
as
Until the time that Griffith
returned home, the expenses that defendant covered included
food
expenses.
After
Griffith
returned
home,
defendant
denied plaintiff’s claim for Griffith’s food expenses, and
plaintiff sued to recoup those expenses.2
The trial court
ruled that Griffith’s food costs are an “allowable expense”
1
This
opinion
references
Douglas
Griffith
“Griffith” and Phyllis Griffith as “plaintiff.”
2
as
Plaintiff’s complaint included claims for items other
than Griffith’s food, but those claims are not at issue in
this appeal.
2
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act and ordered
defendant to pay a per diem food charge.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.3
The Court relied on
Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443; 499
NW2d 22 (1993), which held that a person receiving at-home
care
is
entitled
to
room
and
board
costs
under
MCL
500.3107(1)(a) to the same extent that such costs would
constitute
an
allowable
expense
if
the
injured
person
received the same care in an institutional setting.
Thus,
the panel concluded that, under Reed, Griffith’s food costs
are an “allowable expense” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to
this Court, which this Court denied.4
Thereafter, this
Court granted defendant’s motion for reconsideration and
granted leave to appeal.5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case requires us to determine whether an injured
person’s food costs constitute an “allowable expense” under
MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Issues of statutory interpretation are
3
Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court
Appeals, issued August 16, 2002 (Docket No. 232517).
4
468 Mich 946 (2003).
5
469 Mich 1020 (2004).
3
of
questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Jenkins
v Patel, 471 Mich 158, 162; 684 NW2d 346 (2004).
III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
When
interpreting
a
statute,
we
must
ascertain
the
legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the
statutory language itself.
Sotelo v Grant Twp, 470 Mich
95, 100; 680 NW2d 381 (2004).
When the language of a
statute is unambiguous, the Legislature’s intent is clear
and
judicial
permitted.
construction
is
neither
necessary
nor
Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304,
312; 645 NW2d 34 (2002).
Because the role of the judiciary
is to interpret rather than write the law, courts lack
authority to venture beyond a statute’s unambiguous text.
Id.
plain
Further, we accord undefined statutory terms their
and
ordinary
meanings
and
definitions in such situations.
may
consult
dictionary
Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich
572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Language and Legal Background
MCL 500.3105(1) provides:
Under
personal
protection
insurance
an
insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of
this chapter. [Emphasis added.]
4
According to the plain language of MCL 500.3105(1), a no
fault
insurer
is
only
required
The no-fault act further restricts a no-fault
benefits
that
. . . .”
payable
are
defining
“for
the
of
an
“for
accident.
by
out
benefits
bodily
liability
arising
pay
accidental
insurer’s
injury”
to
limited
accidental
automobile
types
bodily
of
injury
MCL 500.3107(1)(a), the statutory provision at
the center of this case, states:
Except
as
provided
in
subsection
personal
protection
insurance
benefits
payable for the following:
(2),
are
(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all
reasonable
charges
incurred
for
reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, in addition to the requirement under MCL 500.3105(1)
that
benefits
500.3107(1)(a)
be
“for
accidental
circumscribes
bodily
benefits
to
injury,”
those
MCL
expenses
consisting only of items or services that are reasonably
necessary
“for
an
injured
person’s
care,
recovery,
or
rehabilitation.”
Both
this
interpreted
Court
and
and
applied
the
the
Court
above
of
Appeals
statutes
in
have
cases
involving claims for food or “room and board” expenses.
In
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 127 Mich
App
444,
(1986),
448;
the
339
NW2d
plaintiffs’
205
(1983),
minor
5
son
rev’d
suffered
425
Mich
severe
140
head
trauma in an automobile accident.
He resided with the
plaintiffs and received care from nurse’s aides.
449.
Id. at
The plaintiffs sued the defendant no-fault carrier,
seeking, among other things, reimbursement for his room and
board costs.
Id. at 448-449.
The defendant insurance
carrier argued that because the plaintiffs already had a
legal duty to care for their child, room and board costs
were not compensable.
Id. at 451.
The Court of Appeals
rejected this argument, largely on the basis of a worker’s
compensation
case
that
distinguished
between
“ordinary
household tasks” such as cleaning and washing clothes and
nonordinary
bathing,
tasks
such
. . . .’”
dressing,
as
and
“‘[s]erving
escorting
meals
a
in
bed
disabled
and
person
Id. at 452, quoting Kushay v Sexton Dairy Co,
394 Mich 69; 228 NW2d 205 (1975).
The
panel
concluded
that
the
distinction
between
ordinary and nonordinary tasks could be reconciled with the
language
“products,
of
necessary
MCL
500.3107(a),
services,
for
the
and
which
then
accommodations
injured
person’s
provided
not
care,
rehabilitation are not ‘allowable expenses.’”
at
453.
reasonably
recovery,
or
127 Mich App
The Court reasoned:
The
necessity
for
the
performance
of
ordinary household tasks has nothing to do with
the
injured
person’s
care,
recovery,
or
rehabilitation; such tasks must be performed
whether or not anyone is injured.
6
that
This reasoning supports a generalization
concerning the circumstances in which a product,
service, or accommodation can fall within the
definition of “allowable expense.”
Products,
services,
or
accommodations
which
are
as
necessary for an uninjured person as for an
injured person are not “allowable expenses.”
[Id. at 453-454 (emphasis added).]
The panel then opined that food “is as necessary for an
uninjured person as for an injured person” and thus would
not ordinarily constitute an “allowable expense” under MCL
500.3107 for an injured person cared for at home.
127 Mich
App at 454.
When Manley was appealed to this Court, we effectively
vacated
the
Court
of
Appeals
room
and
board
analysis.
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 425 Mich
140; 388 NW2d 216 (1986).
We stated that the “question
whether food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and other such
maintenance
injured
expenses
person
is
are
an
allowable
expense
cared
for
at
had
home”
when
neither
the
been
raised before the trial court nor argued in the Court of
Appeals.
Id. at 152.
Accordingly, this Court declined to
address the issue and stated that the Court of Appeals
analysis
of
the
issue
“shall
precedential force or effect.”
Justice
opinion,
Boyle
asserting
issued
that
a
the
not
be
regarded
as
of
Id. at 153.
concurring
room
and
and
board
dissenting
issue
was
properly before this Court because the Court of Appeals had
7
raised
it
opinion.
sua
sponte
discussed
the
issue
in
its
Id. at 168 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
for
and
She could find “no principled basis”
distinguishing
institutional
between
setting
and
food
food
provided
provided
at
in
an
home,
and
concluded that the Court of Appeals “injured person vs.
uninjured
person”
unworkable”
but
test
that
was
it
not
effectively
only
“unwieldy
punished
those
choose to care for injured family members at home.
168-169.
and
who
Id. at
Justice Boyle opined that MCL 500.3107 imposes
three requirements for “allowable expenses”: “1) the charge
must
be
reasonable,
2)
the
expense
must
be
reasonably
necessary, and 3) the expense must be incurred.”
425 Mich
at 169.
Thereafter,
in
Reed,
the
Justice Boyle’s Manley analysis.
Court
of
adopted
The insured in Reed had
been severely injured in an auto accident.
445.
Appeals
Reed, supra at
The plaintiff, the insured’s mother, filed various
claims against the defendant insurer and moved to amend her
complaint to include a claim for room and board expenses.
Id. at 445-446.
The trial court denied the motion on the
basis that such expenses were not recoverable under the no
fault act.
Id. at 446.
The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning as follows:
8
We see no compelling reason not to afford
the same compensation under the act to family
members who provide room and board.
Subsection
1(a) does not distinguish between accommodations
provided by family members and accommodations
provided by institutions, and we decline to read
such a distinction into the act.
Moreover,
holding that accommodations provided by family
members is [sic] an “allowable expense” is in
accord with the policy of this state.
Denying
compensation for family-provided accommodations
while allowing compensation in an institutional
setting would discourage home care that is
generally,
we
believe,
less
costly
than
institutional
care.
Irrespective
of
cost
considerations,
it
can
be
stated
without
hesitation that home care is more personal than
that given in a clinical setting. . . .
We hold that, where an injured person is
unable
to
care
for
himself
and
would
be
institutionalized
were
a
family
member
not
willing to provide home care, a no-fault insurer
is liable to pay the cost of maintenance in the
home.
[Id. at 452-453 (citations omitted;
emphasis added).]
In addition to the above reasoning, the Court of Appeals
relied
on
remedial
the
in
notion
nature,
that
it
because
“must
be
the
no-fault
liberally
favor of persons intended to benefit thereby.”
act
is
construed
in
Id. at 451.
B. Interpretation of Statutory Language and
Application
As
previously
500.3107(1)(a)
requirements
stated,
impose
for
“care,
MCL
two
500.3105(1)
separate
recovery,
or
and
and
MCL
distinct
rehabilitation”
expenses to be compensable under the no-fault act.
First,
such expenses must be “for accidental bodily injury arising
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a
9
motor vehicle . . . .”
MCL 500.3105(1) (emphasis added).
Second, these expenses must be “reasonably necessary . . .
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Defendant contends that MCL 500.3105(1) requires that
allowable
injury.
expenses
be
We agree.
causally
connected
to
a
person’s
In fact, MCL 500.3105(1) imposes two
causation requirements for no-fault benefits.
First, an insurer is liable only if benefits are “for
accidental bodily injury . . . .”
connection.6
“[A]ccidental
“[F]or” implies a causal
bodily
injury”
therefore
triggers an insurer’s liability and defines the scope of
that liability.
to
pay
benefits
Accordingly, a no-fault insurer is liable
only
to
the
extent
that
the
claimed
benefits are causally connected to the accidental bodily
injury arising out of an automobile accident.
Second,
an
insurer
is
liable
to
pay
benefits
for
accidental bodily injury only if those injuries “aris[e]
out
of”
or
are
caused
by
6
“the
ownership,
operation,
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997)
defines “for,” when used as a preposition, as “with the
object or purpose of,” “intended to belong to or be used in
connection with,” or “suiting the purposes or needs of.”
The definition offered by Justice Kelly—“‘by reason of’”—
also implies a causal connection.
See post at 5.
(Citation omitted.)
10
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle . . . .”
It is not
any
liability
bodily
injury
that
under the no-fault act.
triggers
an
insurer’s
Rather, it is only those injuries
that are caused by the insured’s use of a motor vehicle.
In this case, it is uncontested that the insured’s
injuries arose out of his use of an automobile.
Therefore,
to the extent that the insured’s injuries stem from an
automobile
accident,
application
of
the
second
causal
element noted above does not bar plaintiff’s claim.
The first causal element, however, poses a problem for
plaintiff.
Plaintiff does not claim that her husband’s
diet is different from that of an uninjured person, that
his food expenses are part of his treatment plan, or that
these costs are related in any way to his injuries.
She
claims
for
instead
that
Griffith’s
ordinary, everyday food expenses.
not
established
that
these
insurer
is
liable
As such, plaintiff has
expenses
are
“for
accidental
bodily injury . . . .”7
7
Our dissenting colleagues fail to explain how they
avoid the causation requirement in MCL 500.3105(1). As we
will explain, because plaintiff is not on a special diet,
his food expenses are not “for accidental bodily injury,”
and those expenses therefore are not recoverable in this
case.
It is therefore not surprising that our dissenting
colleagues
avoid
developing
their
analysis
of
MCL
500.3105(1), because their position is plainly inconsistent
with the unambiguous language of that provision.
11
Even if ordinary food expenses were compensable under
§ 3105, an insurer would be liable for those expenses only
if
they
were
also
500.3107(1)(a).
“allowable
expenses”
under
MCL
This section provides that benefits are
payable for “reasonably necessary products, services and
accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation.”
for
the
cost
“reasonably
of
In other words, an insurer is liable only
“products,
necessary”
services
“for
an
and
injured
accommodations”
person’s
care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.”8
There
person.”
is
no
dispute
that
Griffith
is
an
“injured
Thus, the question is whether food is reasonably
necessary for his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” as an
injured person.
It is not contended here that the food
expenses at issue are a part of the insured’s “recovery” or
“rehabilitation.”
Indeed, plaintiff does not allege that
the food has special curative properties that might advance
Griffith's
recovery
or
rehabilitation.
8
The
key
issue,
In her concurring and dissenting opinion in Manley,
Justice Boyle read MCL 500.3107(1)(a) as imposing only
three requirements: “1) the charge must be reasonable, 2)
the expense must be reasonably necessary, and 3) the
expense must be incurred.”
425 Mich at 169 (Boyle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition to
these requirements, however, the statute states that an
“allowable expense” must be “for” one of the following: (1)
an injured person’s care, (2) his recovery, or (3) his
rehabilitation.
12
therefore, is whether the food expenses are necessary for
Griffith’s “care.”
Because “care” can have several meanings depending on
the context in which it is used, the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis is helpful in discerning the meaning of that term in
this statute.
This doctrine is premised on the notion that
“the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends
on context.”
King v St Vincent’s Hosp, 502 US 215, 221;
112 S Ct 570; 116 L Ed 2d 578 (1991).9
Thus, under the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “‘“a word or phrase is given
meaning by its context or setting.”’”
Koontz, supra at 318
(citations
matter,
omitted).
As
a
general
“words
and
clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and
those which follow.”
Mich
555,
series
559;
of
70
terms
Sanchick v State Bd of Optometry, 342
NW2d
757
such
(1955).
as
When
“care,
construing
recovery,
a
or
rehabilitation,” we are guided by the principle “that words
grouped in a list should be given related meaning.”
Third
Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432 US 312, 322;
97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).
9
See Koontz, supra at 318, quoting Brown v Genesee Co
Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430, 437; 628 NW2d
471 (2001), quoting Tyler v Livonia Schools, 459 Mich 382,
390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999) (“‘Contextual understanding of
statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur
a sociis: “[i]t is known from its associates,” see Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1060.’”).
13
Generally, “care”
“to
make
Dictionary
means
provision.”
(2001).
“protection; charge,” and
Random
Thus,
House
taken
in
Webster’s
isolation,
College
the
word
“care” can be broadly construed to encompass anything that
is
reasonably
necessary
protection or charge.
“[c]ourts
must
give
to
the
provision
of
a
person’s
But we have consistently held that
effect
to
every
word,
phrase,
and
clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would
render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.”
State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich
142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002).
Therefore, we must neither
read “care” so broadly as to render nugatory “recovery and
rehabilitation” nor construe “care” so narrowly that the
term is mere surplusage.10
is
related
to,
but
“Care” must have a meaning that
distinct
from,
“recovery
and
rehabilitation.”11
10
Our dissenting colleagues make the former error,
construing
“care”
so
broadly
that
“recovery
and
rehabilitation” are mere surplusage.
If “care” means, as
Justice Kelly contends, “‘the provision of what is
necessary for the welfare and protection of someone,’” post
at 8, then “recovery and rehabilitation”—both of which are
certainly necessary for an injured person’s welfare—are
stripped of any meaning.
11
rev), §
grouped
but are
limited
See Sutherland Statutory Construction (6th ed, 2000
47.16, pp 265-267 (“[W]hen two or more words are
together, and ordinarily have a similar meaning,
not equally comprehensive, the general word will be
and qualified by the special word.”
14
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the
statute does not require compensation for any item that is
reasonably
necessary
to
a
person’s
care
in
general.
Instead, the statute specifically limits compensation to
charges
for
necessary
products
“for
an
rehabilitation.”
or
services
injured
that
person’s
(Emphasis added.)
are
care,
reasonably
recovery,
or
This context suggests
that “care” must be related to the insured’s injuries.
This
statute
conclusion
lists
is
supported
together
“care”
“rehabilitation.”
by
the
with
fact
that
“recovery”
the
and
“Recovery” is defined as “restoration or
return to any former and better condition, esp. to health
from
sickness,
Webster’s
injury,
College
addiction,
Dictionary
etc.”
(2001).
Random
House
“Rehabilitate”
is
defined as “to restore or bring to a condition of good
health,
ability
to
work,
or
productive
activity.”
Id.
Both terms refer to restoring an injured person to the
condition
he
was
in
before
sustaining
his
injuries.
Consequently, expenses for “recovery” or “rehabilitation”
are
costs
expended
in
order
to
bring
an
insured
to
a
condition of health or ability sufficient to resume his
preinjury life.
Because “recovery” and “rehabilitation”
are necessary only when an insured has been injured, both
terms refer to products, services, and accommodations that
15
are necessary because of injuries sustained through the use
of a motor vehicle.
“Care”
must
have
a
meaning
that
is
broader
than
“recovery” and “rehabilitation” but is not so broad as to
render
those
“recovery”
terms
and
nugatory.
“rehabilitation”
As
noted
refer
to
above,
an
both
underlying
injury; likewise, the statute as a whole applies only to an
“injured person.”
It follows that the Legislature intended
to limit the scope of the term “care” to expenses for those
products, services, or accommodations whose provision is
necessitated by the injury sustained in the motor vehicle
accident.12
“Care”
“rehabilitation”
is
because
broader
it
may
than
“recovery”
encompass
expenses
and
for
products, services, and accommodations that are necessary
because of the accident but that may not restore a person
to his preinjury state.
12
For instance, the cost associated with setting a
broken leg would be compensable under the term “recovery”
because it is necessary to return a person to his post
injury health, and the cost of learning to walk on a
prosthetic leg would be recoverable under the term
“rehabilitation” because it is necessary to bring the
person back to a condition of productive activity.
Similarly, the cost of such items as a prosthetic leg or
special shoes would be recoverable under the term “care,”
even
though
the
person
will
never
recover
or
be
rehabilitated
from
the
injuries,
because
the
cost
associated with such products or accommodations stems from
the injury.
16
Griffith’s
food
costs
here
are
not
“care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
evidence
introduced
that
he
now
related
to
his
There has been no
requires
different
food
than he did before sustaining his injuries as part of his
treatment plan.
While such expenses are no doubt necessary
for his survival, they are not necessary for his recovery
or
rehabilitation
from
the
injuries
suffered
in
the
accident, nor are they necessary for his care because of
the
injuries
prescription
he
sustained
medications
or
in
the
nursing
accident.
care,
the
Unlike
food
that
Griffith consumes is simply an ordinary means of sustenance
rather
than
a
rehabilitation.”
treatment
for
his
“care,
recovery,
or
In fact, if Griffith had never sustained,
or were to fully recover from, his injuries, his dietary
needs
would
conclude,
be
no
therefore,
different
than
they
are
now.
that
food
costs
are
completely
his
We
unrelated to his “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” and
are not “allowable expenses” under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).13
13
Our dissenting colleagues do not pay sufficient
regard to the context in which the word “care” is used in
MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
They do not give effect to the
Legislature’s choice to use the term “care” in conjunction
with the terms “recovery” and “rehabilitation.” They also
fail to give effect to the statute’s specific reference to
“an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
As we have explained, this contextual background aids our
effort to discern the meaning of the term “care” as used in
the statute.
Footnotes continued on following page.
17
The
costs
for
parties
focus
hospital
food
on
the
and
distinction
food
costs
between
for
an
food
insured
Our dissenting colleagues would instead read the word
“care” in a vacuum, thereby allowing them to impose their
preferred meaning without attempting to discern the context
in which the Legislature used the term.
Our dissenting
colleagues’ failure to read the word “care” in context
renders the word devoid of any definitional limit.
Let
there be no mistake—the implication of their interpretation
is that any expense that is necessary for a person’s
general “care” is recoverable, regardless of whether that
expense bears any causal relationship to an “accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle
. . . .”
MCL 500.3105(1).
Because they would allow a
plaintiff to recover expenses for normal, everyday food
consumed at home that does not differ from what an
uninjured person would eat, would they also allow recovery
of housing costs and expenses for clothing and toiletries,
where those expenses do not bear any causal relationship to
an accidental bodily injury?
Justice Kelly seems to
concede that she would require no-fault insurers to pay for
an injured person’s “shelter” where that expense bears no
causal relation to the injuries. Post at 15.
It thus appears that Justice Kelly would essentially
invent a new entitlement system by converting our no-fault
law into a general welfare scheme.
Her new scheme would
pay all expenses of everyday life, such as mortgage
payments and grocery bills, for anyone who has been injured
in a motor vehicle accident, even where those expenses do
not arise from injuries sustained in the accident. Justice
Kelly does not explain how she would pay for her newly
minted entitlement plan, but the effect of her position
would be to force Michigan citizens to make these general
welfare payments through increased mandatory insurance
premiums.
Perhaps Justice Kelly sincerely believes that
our state’s citizens should bear this new financial burden,
but such a policy choice belongs to the legislative branch
of our government. In deciding the case before us, we must
honor the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the
current language of the no-fault act by applying the
causation requirement embodied in the provisions at issue.
18
receiving at-home care.
Plaintiff contends that there is
no distinction between such costs.
We disagree.
Food costs in an institutional setting are “benefits
for accidental bodily injury” and are “reasonably necessary
products,
services
and
accommodations
for
an
injured
person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
That is, it
is
to
“reasonably
necessary”
for
an
insured
consume
hospital food during in-patient treatment given the limited
dining options available.
Although an injured person would
need to consume food regardless of his injuries, he would
not
need
to
eat
that
associated with it.
type
of
injured
special
person’s
particular
food
or
bear
the
cost
Thus, hospital food is analogous to a
diet
or
select
recovery.
diet
Because
necessary
an
for
an
in
an
insured
institutional setting is required to eat “hospital food,”
such
food
costs
are
necessary
for
an
insured’s
recovery, or rehabilitation” while in such a setting.
an
injured
person
leaves
the
institutional
“care,
Once
setting,
however, he may resume eating a normal diet just as he
would have had he not suffered any injury and is no longer
required to bear the costs of hospital food, which are part
of the unqualified unit cost of hospital treatment.14
14
Our dissenting colleagues opine that the language of
the no-fault act does not distinguish between food expenses
Footnotes continued on following page.
19
This
reasoning
can
be
taken
a
step
further
when
considering the costs of items such as an injured person’s
clothing,
toiletries,
and
even
housing
costs.
Under
plaintiff’s reasoning, because a hospital provided Griffith
with
clothing
while
he
was
institutionalized,
defendant
incurred in a hospital and food expenses at home.
As we
have explained, however, we believe this distinction arises
from
the
language
in
MCL
500.3105(1)
and
MCL
500.3107(1)(a).
Food expenses in an institutional setting
are “benefits for accidental bodily injury,” and are
“reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation,”
given the limited dining options available in hospitals.
After all, an injured person is required to eat hospital
food precisely because his injuries require treatment in a
hospital. By contrast, a person who eats a normal diet at
home
does
not
incur
food
expenses
that
meet
the
requirements of MCL 500.3105(1) and MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Justice Kelly also asks whether the majority is
implying that hospital food expenses would be reimbursable
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a), but not under MCL 500.3105(1).
We have stated clearly, however, that food costs in an
institutional setting are “benefits for accidental bodily
injury” and are “reasonably necessary products, services
and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery,
or rehabilitation.”
See p 19 of this opinion.
In other
words, we have quoted the language from both statutory
provisions in saying that such expenses are recoverable.
Finally,
Justice
Kelly
expresses
concerns
about
allowing recovery for food expenses in a hospital but not
at home.
It is the prerogative of the Legislature,
however, to determine whether the no-fault act should be
amended to allow recovery of food costs that are unrelated
to an accidental bodily injury, taking into account policy
concerns such as those expressed by Justice Kelly and
competing considerations such as the increased costs of
premiums for this mandatory form of insurance coverage.
This Court lacks both the institutional capacity to weigh
the competing policy considerations and the constitutional
authority to amend the no-fault act.
20
should continue to pay for Griffith’s clothing after he is
released.
The same can be said of Griffith’s toiletry
necessities
and
housing
institutionalized,
costs.
defendant
While
paid
his
Griffith
housing
was
costs.
Should defendant therefore be obligated to pay Griffith’s
housing
payment
Griffith’s
now
housing
that
needs
he
have
has
not
been
been
released
affected
by
when
his
injuries?
Under plaintiff’s reasoning, nothing would prevent no
fault insurers from being obligated to pay for any expenses
that an injured person would otherwise be provided in an
institutional setting as long as they are remotely related
to the person’s general care.
Plaintiff’s interpretation
of MCL 500.3107(1)(a) stretches the language of the act too
far
and,
incidentally,
would
largely
containment for this mandatory coverage.
obliterate
cost
We have always
been cognizant of this potential problem15 when interpreting
the no-fault act, and we are no less so today.
15
See, e.g., Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554,
607-611; 267 NW2d 72 (1978) (“In choosing to make no-fault
insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has
made the registration and operation of a motor vehicle
inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is
available at fair and equitable rates.”); Cruz v State Farm
Mut Automobile Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 597; 648 NW2d 591
(2002) (recognizing that, because no-fault coverage is
mandatory, the Legislature has continually sought to make
it more affordable); Celina Mut Ins Co v Lake States Ins
Footnotes continued on following page.
21
Moreover, in seeking reimbursement for food and other
such quotidian expenses, plaintiff is essentially seeking a
wage-loss benefit.
Reimbursement for the value of lost
wages, however, is specifically addressed elsewhere in the
no-fault act.
See MCL 500.3107(1)(b).16
See also Popma v
Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich 460, 463, 471; 521 NW2d 831
(1994).
Plaintiff’s
construction
of
§
3107(1)(a)
is
strongly undermined by the Legislature’s express provision
for, and limitation on, wage-loss benefits in § 3107(1)(b).
Under MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a), defendant
is
not
required
to
reimburse
plaintiff
expenses at issue in this case.
accidental
for
the
food
Such expenses are not
necessary
“for
bodily
injury”
under
MCL
500.3105.
In addition, they are not “allowable expenses”
Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996) (“the no-fault
insurance system . . . is designed to provide victims with
assured, adequate, and prompt reparations at the lowest
cost to both the individuals and the no-fault system”
[emphasis added]); O’Donnell v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 404
Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979) (recognizing that the
Legislature had provided for setoffs in the no-fault act:
“Because the first-party insurance proposed by the act was
to be compulsory, it was important that the premiums to be
charged by the insurance companies be maintained as low as
possible. Otherwise, the poor and the disadvantaged people
of the state might not be able to obtain the necessary
insurance.”).
16
This section provides, in part:
Work loss consisting of loss of income from
work an injured person would have performed
during the first 3 years after the date of the
accident if he or she had not been injured.
22
under MCL 500.3107(1)(a) because food is not necessary for
Griffith’s “care, recovery, or rehabilitation” under that
subsection.
Because the rule announced in Reed, supra, is
contrary
the
to
language
of
the
above
provisions,
we
overrule the Court of Appeals decision in Reed.
V. CONCLUSION
We
reimburse
500.3105
conclude
that
plaintiff
and
Accordingly,
MCL
we
for
defendant
is
Griffith’s
food
500.3107(1)(a)
reverse
the
of
judgment
not
required
costs
the
of
Appeals.
Maura D. Corrigan
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
23
under
no-fault
the
to
MCL
act.
Court
of
S T A T E
M I C H I G A N
O F
SUPREME COURT
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, legal guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a legally
incapacitated adult,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 122286
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).
I
dissent
expenses
for
“allowable
under
MCL
from
the
majority’s
plaintiff’s
expenses”
for
holding
incapacitated
which
500.3107(1)(a).
husband
plaintiff
Rather,
that
should
food
are
not
be
paid
consistently
with
Justice Boyle’s concurrence in Manley v Detroit Automobile
Inter-Ins Exch,1 and with the Court of Appeals opinion in
Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America,2 I would conclude that
the reasonable charges incurred for plaintiff’s husband’s
food
while
he
is
cared
for
at
home
are
recoverable
1
as
425 Mich 140, 168-169; 388 NW2d 216 (1986)(Boyle, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2
198 Mich App 443, 452-453; 499 NW2d 22 (1993).
“allowable expenses” under the statute.
Therefore, I would
affirm the Court of Appeals decision in this case.
Under the statute, “allowable expenses” consist of
all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation. [MCL 500.3107(1)(a).]
With this language, the Legislature provided a fairly broad
definition
things
of
that
person’s
“allowable
might
care,
expenses”
reasonably
recovery,
or
be
to
encompass
needed
for
rehabilitation.
all
the
an
injured
As
Justice
Kelly notes in her dissent, “[i]t is difficult to deny that
food is a product reasonably necessary for the care of an
invalid,
however
narrowly
‘care’
is
defined.
Without
nourishment, an injured person could not be restored to
health and could not properly be cared for.”
Post at 9.
And, as stated by Justice Boyle, there is
no principled basis for deciding that food
provided to [the plaintiff’s husband] at home is
not as much an “allowable expense” as the food
provided in a licensed medical care facility.
Where a person who normally would require
institutional treatment is cared for at home in a
quasi-institutional setting made possible by the
love and dedication of the injured victim’s
family, the test for “allowable expenses” should
not differ from that set out in MCL 500.3107(a).
[Manley, supra at 168-169 (citations omitted).]
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the cost
of plaintiff’s husband’s food is recoverable as “allowable
2
expenses” under the no-fault act, and I would affirm the
Court of Appeals decision.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
3
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PHYLLIS L. GRIFFITH, legal guardian
for DOUGLAS W. GRIFFITH, a legally
incapacitated adult,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 122286
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
Today the Court reaches the extraordinary conclusion
that food is not always necessary for an injured person's
care.
The
unrelated
to
Court
[an
concludes
injured
that
food
person’s]
is
‘care,
“completely
recovery,
or
rehabilitation’” if provided in a home, although it is both
necessary and reimbursable if provided in an institution.
Ante at 8.
I
disagree.
The
Court
of
Appeals
decision
that
reached the opposite conclusion twelve years ago, Reed v
Citizens Ins Co of America,1 was correct and should not be
1
198 Mich App 443; 499 NW2d 22 (1993).
overturned.
It is obvious to me that food should continue
to be an allowable expense under the no-fault act wherever
provided
as
long
as
reasonably
necessary
to
an
injured
person's care.
THE NO-FAULT ACT
We review issues of statutory construction de novo.
Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 696; 692 NW2d 376 (2004).
In construing statutes, our purpose is to determine and
implement the intent of the Legislature.
Sanders v Delton
Kellogg Schools, 453 Mich 483, 487; 556 NW2d 467 (1996).
The
act
under
benefits
for
victims
review
of
here
motor
regard to who was at fault.
was
vehicle
passed
to
provide
accidents
without
Substituting for certain tort
remedies that it abolished, the act created a comprehensive
and expeditious benefit system through insurance.
Shavers v
Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 579; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
This Court has determined that the Legislature intended the
no-fault act to be construed liberally in favor of the
insured.2
Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 28;
528 NW2d 681 (1995).
2
The majority’s decision today, taking food as it were
from the mouth of the injured insured convalescing at home,
is anything but a liberal construction in his favor.
2
MCL 500.3105(1)
In
this
case,
Mr.
Griffith
was
injured
in
an
automobile accident that rendered him unable to care for
himself. He remains injured.
Therefore, without contest,
he satisfies the requirement of § 3105(1), and his insurer
must pay him benefits.
The issue here involves the meaning
of “benefits.”
Section 3105(1) requires:
Under
personal
protection
insurance
an
insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental
bodily injury arising out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of
this chapter.
On
its
face,
benefits
to
this
its
section
injured
in
Legislature
took
pains
The
different
section
of
the
statute
MCL 500.3107(1)(a).3
3
an
insured
accident.
paid.
requires
what
insurer
a
to
motor
to
vehicle
define
benefits
pay
at
must
a
be
As the majority observes, §
In pertinent part, MCL 500.3107 provides:
[P]ersonal protection insurance benefits are
payable for . . .
(a)
Allowable expenses consisting of all
reasonable
charges
incurred
for
reasonably
necessary products, services, and accommodations
for an injured person’s care, recovery, or
rehabilitation. . . .
(b) Work loss . . . .
Footnotes continued on following page.
3
3107(1)(a) is “the statutory provision at the center of
this case.”
Ante at 5.
Because the Legislature defined
“benefits” in § 3107(1)(a), it seems contradictory that it
would have given “benefits” a different definition in §
3105(1).
Yet, the majority reads § 3105(1) to mean that the
only benefits that a no-fault insurer is liable to pay are
those
“causally
injury . . . .”
injury,
it
connected
Ante
reasons,
at
to
10.
that
It
the
is
occasioned
accidental
not
his
Mr.
need
bodily
Griffith's
for
food.
Hence the cost of his food is not a covered expense.
The majority finds that § 3105 limits the benefits
made available in § 3107, despite the fact that the courts
have never before found such a limitation.
The majority
defines “for” in the phrase “an insurer is liable to pay
benefits for accidental bodily injury” as meaning “‘with
the object or purpose of,’” “‘intended to belong to or be
used in connection with,’” and “‘suiting the purposes or
needs of.’” Ante at 10 n 6.
it
concludes
that
these
(Citation omitted.)
definitions
“imply”
From that
that
the
benefit an injured party seeks must be directly caused by
(c) Expenses . . . reasonably incurred in
obtaining ordinary and necessary services in lieu
of those that, if he or she had not been injured,
an injured person would have performed . . . .
4
the injury.
Not only is the majority’s reading of § 3105
novel and unprecedented, it flies in the face of our time
honored determination to liberally construe the no-fault
act for the benefit of the insured.
The
nuances
word
in
“for”
its
in
the
meaning.
English
I
language
feel
confident
has
many
that
the
Legislature added § 3107(1)(a) for the purpose of defining
“benefits” in § 3105.
On the basis of that belief, I find
that the definition of “for” in § 3105 that best accords
with the Legislature’s intent is “by reason of.”
House Webster's College Dictionary (2001).
Random
Hence, § 3105
should be read to mean that benefits are payable “by reason
of” accidental bodily injury.
Reading
§
3105
in
this
way
ensures
that
the
only
limitations placed on “benefits” for an insured injured in
an
auto
accident
Legislature
in
§
are
those
3107.
My
clearly
belief
stated
is
that,
by
the
if
the
Legislature intended that the sole benefits payable for an
insured’s injury were those directly arising therefrom, it
would have said so.
Also, it would not have required at §
3107 payment for so broad a category as “all reasonable
charges
incurred
for
reasonably
necessary
products,
services and accommodations for an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.”
5
Additionally,
irrational.
the
The
qualifies
under
excluded:
majority’s
reading
its
as
a
reading
benefit
of
§
majority
that
the
act
is
under
3105,
the
food
act.
would
be
the need for it does not arise from the injury.
explains
that,
in
an
little choice what food is served.
how
of
The majority believes that food provided in
hospital
However,
the
fact
transforms
institution,
one
has
But it fails to explain
hospital
food
into
an
expense
arising from an accident.
If
the
Legislature
had
intended,
for
example,
that
ground beef be compensable only if no other entrée were
offered,
clear.
it
The
should
have
majority
written
will
something
search
in
to
make
that
vain
for
some
indication in the act that food, or any item, can qualify
for “benefits for an accidental bodily injury” if furnished
in the hospital but not at home. Absolutely nothing in
either § 3105 or § 3107 allows for that distinction.
The
difficulty
the
majority
has
in
providing
a
convincing answer to this question illustrates the weakness
of
its
conclusion.
foundation, unsound.
Its
reading
of
§
3105
is,
at
its
The majority criticizes my analysis
of § 3105(1) as inadequate and “undeveloped.”
Ante at 12,
n 7. It would be inadequate only if I agreed with the
majority's choice to create two requirements where there is
6
only one in § 3105.
I have taken my own analysis of §
3105(1) to its logical conclusion.
It is not the same
analysis as the majority’s, but it is more faithful to the
text
of
belief,
the
I
statute.
have
analysis.
It
set
Contrary
forth
includes
a
a
to
Justice
principled
Corrigan’s
for
my
reading
plain-language
basis
of
§§
fails
to
3105(1) and 3107(1)(a).
MCL 500.3107(1)(a)
The
qualify
majority
not
3107(1)(a).
finds
only
that
under
§
Douglas
3105(1)
Griffith
but
also
under
§
In construing § 3107(1)(a), first it goes to
the dictionary to interpret the meaning of “care.”
As is frequently the case, here a dictionary alone
does
not
clarify
the
several definitions.
Legislature's
intent.
“Care”
has
The majority chooses “protection” or
“charge” as the appropriate one.
But the word can also be
defined as “the provision of what is necessary for the
welfare and protection of someone or something."
Compact
Oxford English Dictionary.
It
is
performance
clear
of
that,
the
when
consulting
interpretative
task,
a
dictionary
one
is
in
normally
required to make a choice among several definitions.
It is
nothing less than a pretense to maintain that, in enforcing
7
a statute “as written,” a court does not make definitional
choices.
The
language
of
§
3107(1)(a)
is
broad.
Yet,
the
majority ultimately limits the meaning of “care” to the
care needed for recovery and rehabilitation, ascribing to
it a restorative meaning.
The logical consequence of using
this restrictive definition demonstrates that it is poorly
chosen.
It reads “care” out of the sentence.
“recovery
and
rehabilitation”
are
in
the
Given that
sentence
with
“care,” the effect of the majority's choice of definitions
turns
“care”
into
a
mere
redundancy.
This
approach
violates our obligation when interpreting statutes to try
to give every word meaning and treat no word as surplusage.
Altman v Meridian Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155
(1992).
My reading of the statute gives independent meaning to
the word “care.”
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,
the meaning of questionable words may be ascertained by
reference to the meaning of other words associated with it.
Applying
this
doctrine,
“care”
fits
with
“recovery”
and
“rehabilitation” when “care” is interpreted broadly to mean
“the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and
protection of someone.”
The Legislature intended that an
8
injured
person’s
needs
be
furnished
(“care”)
until
“recovery” has been accomplished through “rehabilitation.”
In
some
cases,
such
as
where
a
motorist
is
catastrophically injured, recovery and rehabilitation may
not be an achievable goal. In these cases, the Legislature
requires that the injured individual receive all products
and services reasonably necessary for his or her continuing
care.
The
act's
comprehensive
language
demonstrates
the
Legislature's intent to ensure that benefits are provided
in every instance where a motorist suffers injury.
THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENTION WITH RESPECT
It
is
difficult
to
deny
that
TO
food
FOOD
is
a
product
reasonably necessary for the care of an invalid, however
narrowly
“care”
is
defined.
Without
nourishment,
an
injured person could not be restored to health and could
not properly be cared for.
In fact, without it, a person's
physical
be
well-being
would
immediately
threatened.
A
finding that food is necessary for “care” accords with the
purpose of the no-fault act:
to provide benefits needed by
someone injured in an automobile accident.
There is a limitation on those benefits in the act:
all benefits reasonably necessary. Given the wide variety
of circumstances under which injured parties seek no-fault
benefits, the act provides for wide latitude in determining
9
what
benefits
situation.
latitude
are
reasonably
Unfortunately,
provided
by
the
the
necessary
majority
Legislature
in
limits
a
the
given
wide
by
restrictively
Legislature
did
reading the word “care.”
It
is
noteworthy
that
the
not
expressly limit the expenses recoverable in no-fault cases
to those that the injured person did not require before the
injury.
as
It could have included, but did not, a clause such
“benefits
are
payable
except
for
those
that
were
reasonably necessary for the care of the person before the
injury.”
It is the majority, not the Legislature, that
writes this limitation into the act.
The majority concludes that food is not necessary for
the care of Mr. Griffith because he requires food, injured
or not.
It adds that food has nothing to do with an
injured party's “care, recovery, or rehabilitation.”
It
further reasons that food is not an allowable expense when
consumed in the home, although it is an allowable expense
in an institution.4
4
The majority claims a distinction exists where an
injured person is required to eat hospital food because his
or her injuries require treatment in a hospital. This
ignores the closely related situation presented in this
case. A catastrophically injured individual remains injured
and continues to require institutional treatment, but does
not necessarily require the treatment in a hospital or
long-term care facility.
10
This is not a reasonable construction of the statutory
language.
Nothing in the language of the no-fault act
indicates that whether a home-based expense is allowable
depends
on
expense.
whether
an
uninjured
person
has
the
same
The act’s language mandates that the appropriate
question is whether the injured person reasonably incurred
the
questioned
expense
as
part
of
his
or
her
care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.
The logic in the majority’s reasoning is, charitably
speaking, illusory.
If an automobile accident victim is
hospitalized, the reasonable cost of his or her food is a
covered expense under § 3107(1)(a).
If another automobile
accident victim requires the same care, but receives it at
home,
the
reasonable
cost
of
his
or
her
food
likewise
should be a covered expense under § 3107(1)(a).
I agree with Justice Boyle’s partial concurrence in
Manley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch,5 and the Court
of Appeals decision in Reed:
justifies
a
holding
that,
no principled distinction
where
a
patient
is
institutionalized, food is a reasonably necessary expense,
but if he or she is home receiving the same care, it is
not.
Moreover, the plain language of the no-fault act
makes no such distinction.
5
425 Mich 140, 168; 388 NW2d 216 (1986).
11
The majority claims that its ruling is necessary to
keep down the cost of no-fault insurance.
However, the
record contains no evidence to support that claim.
There
is nothing to indicate that no-fault insurance has become
unaffordable because of in-home food expenses that insurers
until now have been required to provide to catastrophically
injured policyholders.6
The
facts
of
Mr.
Griffith’s
case
illustrate
the
complexity of the issue before us and why the Legislature
could
not
majority.
have
intended
the
interpretation
made
by
the
Mr. Griffith is receiving one hundred percent
institutional care, albeit in a home setting.
He resides
in his own home and is being cared for solely by medical
6
The majority claims that my interpretation of the
statute is based on policy considerations.
But, in this
case, I base my interpretation on the language found in the
no-fault act. The Legislature has already made the policy
decision. My construction of the statute is in accordance
with that decision. Nonetheless, policy considerations are
frequently appropriate.
Certainly, the decision in this
case has numerous policy implications.
For example, the
majority appears concerned that no-fault costs be kept low.
This is a policy concern.
In that regard, I fail to see
why my interpretation of the law, which has prevailed at
least since 1993, would increase current no-fault premiums.
One would expect that no-fault providers have been
factoring the potential for these costs into their premiums
for years.
Perhaps this state’s drivers can expect that
their premiums will decrease in response to the majority’s
opinion today. After all, Michigan drivers will no longer
be entitled to the same level of benefits that they have
paid for in premiums during the past twelve years.
12
professionals, his wife having been placed in a nursing
home.
Thus,
family
members
play
no
role
in
Douglas Griffith or in providing his food.
cooking
for
There is no
evidence that his meals differ in any respect from those he
earlier received in the hospital.
settings
is
necessary
for
his
Because food in both
care,
both
should
be
compensable under the act.
The only distinction between Mr. Griffith’s hospital
care
and
his
in-home
receives it.
limit
is
the
location
at
which
he
The language of the no-fault act does not
expenses
setting.
care
only
to
those
incurred
in
a
hospital
This is a new rule created by the Court.
The majority attempts to buttress its interpretation
by asserting that it has discerned the policy choice made
by the Legislature.
policy
choice
that
It insists that my reading is my own
cannot
be
accurate
unless
the
Legislature amends the no-fault act.
This is a logical
fallacy
majority’s
conclusion
majority’s
assertion
that
assumes
the
as
its
that
my
a
new
premise.
Also
reading
faulty
of
the
is
the
statute
entitlement system.”
“essentially
Ante at 19 n 13.
13
invent[s]
To the contrary, my
reading of the statute conforms with the law as interpreted
for at least the past twelve years.
The Court of Appeals made the same application. While
the
majority’s
accusations
and
appeal
to
cost
concerns
create a rhetorical flourish, it is the majority, and not
I, that advocates a drastic change in established law.
Let there be no mistake in this:
to
purchase
Michigan,
no-fault
now
have
insurance
one
less
in
motorists, required
order
resource
to
available
drive
to
in
them
because of the majority’s restrictive reading of the no
fault act.
law,
is
The majority holds that food, as a matter of
never
reasonably
necessary
for
one’s
care,
recovery, or rehabilitation outside a hospital.
A proper reading of the text belies the majority’s
conclusions.
There is no need to require the Legislature
to amend its decision that all expenses should be covered
as
long
as
reasonably
necessary
to
an
injured
person’s
care, recovery, and rehabilitation.
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
The
majority
OF THE
forces
a
MAJORITY’S DECISION
harsh
dilemma
individuals injured in automobile accidents:
institution,
if
insurance
coverage
is
on
insured
remain in an
available,
or
convalesce at home where they or others are burdened with
the cost of their food.
Unfortunately for impoverished
14
families, the only choice may be to remain in institutional
care.7
Reed has been the rule of law in Michigan for twelve
years.
There are unacknowledged alarming implications in
overruling it.
If we apply the majority’s reasoning about
in-home food, is shelter at home an allowable expense? An
uninjured
person
requires
shelter.
The
majority
incentivizes no-fault insurers to refuse to reimburse these
and other expenses in the future, even though they are
without
dispute
reasonably
necessary
for
an
injured
for
in-home
person’s care.
The
food
is
majority
a
form
opines
of
that
wage-loss
reimbursement
benefits.
However,
it
is
unable to substantiate that statement with a showing that
any legislation equates wage-loss benefits with payment for
care of the injured.
Wage-loss benefits exist to replace
lost income, not as reimbursement for expenses incurred.
Furthermore,
the
no-fault
act
limits
wage-loss
benefits to three years. But the insurer’s obligation to
provide for the care of an injured person can extend over
7
Interestingly, although the majority expresses its
concern that costs for insurers be minimized, its decision
arguably helps to increase those costs. In the future, the
care of patients who remain institutionalized during the
period they once might have returned home is likely to be
more expensive.
15
the person’s lifetime.
Therefore, equating the provision
of food with wage loss is inaccurate.
The Legislature
struck a very definite compromise on the duration of wage
loss benefits that stands in contrast to the lifetime care
to which an injured person is entitled.
The majority8 finds that §§ 3105 and 3107 “impose two
separate
and
distinct
requirements”
compensable under the act.
before
expenses
are
It finds that Mr. Griffith’s
expenses for in-home food fail to satisfy the requirements
of both sections.
They fail to satisfy § 3107 because they
were not necessary for his care.
They fail to satisfy §
3105 because they were not caused by the accidental bodily
injury.
The majority informs us that Mr. Griffith’s food, when
provided in the hospital, did satisfy § 3107.
infer
that
the
hospital
food
was
Are we to
nonetheless
not
a
reimbursable expense because it did not satisfy § 3105?9
8
Ante at 9.
9
After quoting both statutory provisions relevant to
the present analysis, the majority concludes that hospital
food remains a covered expense.
But merely quoting the
statutory language does not resolve the question.
According to the majority, an injured person's food is
not “for” an accidental bodily injury because the need for
food was not caused by the automobile accident.
By the
majority’s logic, even one who is hospitalized is not
entitled to food expenses because those expenses are as
Footnotes continued on following page.
16
Clearly,
the
accidental
food
bodily
was
not
injury
an
caused
by
the
furnished
when
expense
either
in
the
hospital or at home.
Finally, the majority makes no provision for those who
in
the
past
ongoing
have
burdens
incurred
in
ongoing
reliance
on
reimbursements for in-home food.
expenses
the
and
assumed
availability
of
Because its holding is
not limited to new cases, many whose caregivers are already
receiving reimbursement for in-home food may be forced to
return to institutional settings.
CONCLUSION
The majority’s conclusion is that food is unnecessary
to
one’s
“care,
recovery,
or
rehabilitation”
outside
institution, although necessary inside an institution.
makes a distinction without a difference.
illogical,
no
statutory
basis
exists
to
an
It
Not only is it
distinguish
the
necessary to an uninjured person as to an injured person.
This logic is equally applicable regardless of the injured
person’s physical location.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not express
policy concerns about allowing recovery for food expenses
in a hospital, but not for the same costs at home.
Rather, my concern is the lack of a logical basis for the
distinction the majority seeks to create. Instead of the
majority’s artificial distinction, I would apply the clear
language of § 3107(1)(a) and allow recovery for products
reasonably
necessary
to
“an
injured
person’s
care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” I would not decide, as the
majority does, that as a matter of law at-home food
expenses are never reasonably necessary to one’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.
17
reimbursability of the cost of institutional food from the
reimbursability of the cost of in-home food.
I
would
affirm
the
trial
court
Appeals decisions and leave Reed intact.
choice
of
meanings
ascribed
to
the
and
the
Court
of
Regardless of the
word
“care,”
the
Legislature’s intent had to be that food is an allowable
expense
for
injured
automobile
accident
convalescing at home.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
18
victims
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