TAMMY SUE STEWART V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED OCTOBER 26, 2004
TAMMY SUE STEWART,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
No. 124676
CARLA K. AMY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
The issue presented in this appeal is whether, under
the
parked
500.3106(1),
vehicle
a
provisions
police
cruiser
of
the
that
no-fault
is
parked
act,
at
MCL
least
partially on a roadway, for the purpose of aiding a stalled
vehicle and with its emergency lights flashing, presents an
unreasonable risk of bodily injury, such that the state may
be
held
liable
under
the
no-fault
act.
The
Court
of
Appeals concluded that a disabled vehicle that had come to
rest in the right-hand lane of a highway and a state police
cruiser that stopped behind it were both vehicles parked in
such a way as to cause an unreasonable risk within the
meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(a).
the
Court
of
Appeals
We reverse the portion of
decision
pertaining
to
the
state
police cruiser.1
I
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 26, 1998, at
about 8:20 p.m., Linda Jones was operating an automobile in
a northbound lane of Dixie Highway in Saginaw County.
In
the area where Jones was driving, Dixie Highway is a fivelane road (two southbound lines, two northbound lines, and
a middle turn lane) with a speed limit of forty-five miles
an hour.
A state police trooper at the scene described the
area as well lit.
A curb runs along the edge of the
highway; there is no shoulder.
After her vehicle stalled, Jones maneuvered it into
the
right
lane.
She
activated
the
vehicle’s
flashers.
Another driver saw her and stopped behind her to offer
help.
A state trooper came upon the scene, and he stopped
1
The only appeal before us is that filed by the state
of Michigan on behalf of the state police.
This opinion
does not address liability issues related to the disabled
vehicle.
2
his police cruiser behind the other two vehicles.
The
trooper activated his cruiser’s emergency lights and the
driver-side
spotlight.
The
trooper
placed
his
police
cruiser in park, got out of his cruiser, and talked to
Jones and the other driver.
After the other driver left,
the trooper decided that he would try to use his cruiser to
push Jones’s vehicle off the road.
As
the
motorcycle
trooper
operated
was
by
returning
Douglas
Amy,
to
and
his
cruiser,
with
Tammy
a
Sue
Stewart as a passenger, approached the scene from behind.
The motorcycle struck the rear of the police cruiser with
considerable
force.
Amy
seriously injured.
was
killed,
and
Stewart
was
Stewart had no insurance of her own,
and many of her medical bills were paid by Medicaid.
Numerous lawsuits were filed in the Saginaw Circuit
Court and the Court of Claims seeking no-fault benefits
from the insurer of the vehicle driven by Ms. Jones and
from the state of Michigan, as the self-insurer of the
state police cruiser.
sought
to
recover
Carla Amy, the widow of Douglas Amy,
survivor’s
benefits.
MCL
500.3108.
Stewart sought to recover first-party personal protection
insurance (PIP) benefits.
MCL 500.3107; MCL 500.3114(5).
The Michigan Department of Community Health (MDCH), acting
as the collection agent for Medicaid, sought to recover
3
amounts
paid
for
Stewart’s
medical
care.
This
appeal
concerns the potential liability of the state of Michigan
arising from the involvement of the police cruiser.
The circuit court determined that the police cruiser
was a parked vehicle, within the meaning of MCL 500.3106,
at the time of the accident and that the parked cruiser did
not cause an unreasonable risk of bodily injury within the
meaning of MCL 500.3106(1)(a).2
Accordingly, the circuit
court granted the state’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10).3
The Court of Appeals agreed that the police cruiser
was a parked vehicle.
However, the Court concluded that,
although the cruiser was legally parked under MCL 257.603,4
2
MCL 500.3106(1)(a) provides:
Accidental bodily injury does not arise out
of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use
of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless any
of the following occur:
(a) The vehicle was parked in such a way as
to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury
which occurred.
3
As for the disabled vehicle, the circuit court found
that it was also a parked vehicle, but that it posed an
unreasonable risk.
4
MCL 257.603(3), part of the Michigan Vehicle Code,
provides:
(continued…)
4
it posed an unreasonable risk by virtue of the fact that it
was parked on the traveled portion of the highway.
Amy v
MIC Gen Ins Corp, 258 Mich App 94, 133-136; 670 NW2d 228
(2003).
The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s
summary disposition ruling in favor of the state.
II
This is an appeal from a decision on a motion for
summary disposition, which we review de novo.
Rozwood,
461
Mich
109,
118;
597
NW2d
817
Maiden v
(1999).
The
underlying question before this Court is whether under §
3106(1) the police cruiser, which was parked on the roadway
for the purpose of aiding a stalled vehicle and with its
emergency lights flashing, presented an unreasonable risk
of bodily injury.
When “the facts are undisputed, the
determination of whether an automobile is parked in such a
(continued…)
The
driver
of
an
authorized
vehicle may do any of the following:
emergency
(a) Park or stand, irrespective of this act.
(b) Proceed past a red or stop signal or
stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be
necessary for safe operation.
(c) Exceed the prima facie speed limits so
long as he or she does not endanger life or
property.
(d)
Disregard
regulations
governing
direction of movement or turning in a specified
direction.
5
way as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily injury
within the meaning of § 3106(1)(a) is an issue of statutory
construction for the court.”
Wills v State Farm Ins Cos,
437 Mich 205, 208; 468 NW2d 511 (1991).
such
statutory
construction
issues
We likewise review
de
novo.
Cardinal
Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n,
437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
III
A no-fault insurer is responsible for paying firstparty
PIP
benefits “for accidental bodily injury arising out
of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .”
MCL 500.3105(1).
For
purposes of this appeal, the parties agree that the police
cruiser was “parked” at the time of the accident.
Under
the no-fault act, accidental bodily injury “does not arise
out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a
parked vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . ,” MCL 500.3106(1),
except
in
the
three
situations
500.3106(1)(a), (b), and (c).
set
forth
in
MCL
Relevant to this case is the
first of these exceptions:
The vehicle was parked in such a way as to
cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury
which occurred. [MCL 500.3106(1)(a).]
6
IV
Contrary to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the
statutory language in MCL 500.3106(1)(a) that is at issue
(i.e., a vehicle may be parked in such a way “as to cause
unreasonable risk . . .”) recognizes that there are degrees
of risk posed by a parked vehicle.
The statutory language
does not create a rule that whenever a motor vehicle is
parked entirely or in part on a traveled portion of a road,
the parked vehicle poses an unreasonable risk.
In each
case cited by the Court of Appeals it was determined that
the vehicle involved posed an unreasonable risk (because it
was parked partly or entirely on the traveled portion of a
road).
But that does not mean that the same result must
necessarily obtain in a situation such as this, in which
the
parked
emergency
vehicle
was
services.
a
Indeed,
police
we
cruiser
find
that
performing
the
police
cruiser in this case was not parked in such a fashion as to
pose
an
unreasonable
risk.
We
have
no
doubt
that
the
cruiser posed a risk to other northbound vehicles and their
occupants,
Appeals
and
said,
we
the
have
no
doubt
operator
of
that,
the
as
the
motorcycle
Court
of
had
to
perceive, react to, and navigate around the police cruiser.
But none of this answers the question whether the parked
police cruiser constituted an unreasonable risk.
7
The policy underlying the parked vehicle exclusion was
explained in Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633,
639-641; 309 NW2d 544 (1981):
Injuries involving parked vehicles do not
normally involve the vehicle as a motor vehicle.
Injuries involving parked vehicles typically
involve the vehicle in much the same way as any
other stationary object (such as a tree, sign
post or boulder) would be involved.
There is
nothing about a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle
that would bear on the accident.
The
stated
exceptions
to
the
parking
exclusion clarify and reinforce this construction
of the exclusion.
Each exception pertains to
injuries related to the character of a parked
vehicle as a motor vehicle—characteristics which
make it unlike other stationary roadside objects
that can be involved in vehicle accidents.
Section 3106(a), which excepts a vehicle
parked so as to create an unreasonable risk of
injury, concerns the act of parking a car, which
can only be done in the course of using the
vehicle as a motor vehicle, and recognizes that
the act of parking can be done in a fashion which
causes an unreasonable risk of injury, as when
the vehicle is left in gear or with one end
protruding into traffic.
* * *
Each of the exceptions to the parking
exclusion thus describes an instance where,
although the vehicle is parked, its involvement
in an accident is nonetheless directly related to
its character as a motor vehicle. The underlying
policy of the parking exclusion is that, except
in three general types of situations, a parked
car is not involved in an accident as a motor
vehicle.
It is therefore inappropriate to
compensate
injuries
arising
from
its
nonvehicular involvement in an accident within a
system designed to compensate injuries involving
motor vehicles as motor vehicles.
[Emphasis in
original.]
8
As even the Court of Appeals recognized, factors such
as the manner, location, and fashion in which a vehicle is
parked
are
material
to
determining
vehicle poses an unreasonable risk.5
whether
the
parked
In this case, a police
cruiser was parked in a travel lane, but it was parked in
an
area
that
was
well
lit,
with
its
emergency
lights
flashing, with its spotlight on, and it was parked there
for the purpose of providing necessary emergency services
to a stalled vehicle that itself posed a risk of bodily
injury.
The
stalled
flashing lights on.
an hour.
available,
vehicle
ahead
of
it
also
had
its
The speed limit was forty-five miles
Moreover, there was another northbound lane
and
the
middle
turn
lane
available for other vehicles to use.
was
potentially
There is nothing in
the record to suggest that an oncoming northbound driver
would not have ample opportunity to observe, react to, and
avoid the hazard posed by the police cruiser.
In short, we
find that the parked police cruiser in this case did not
pose
an
unreasonable
risk
within
500.3106(1)(a).
5
258 Mich App 133-134.
9
the
meaning
of
MCL
V
The
Court
of
Appeals
decision
is
reversed
to
the
extent it holds that the police cruiser was parked in such
a way as to cause an unreasonable risk within the meaning
of
MCL
500.3106(1)(a).
The
circuit
court’s
order
of
summary disposition in favor of the state of Michigan, as
the
self-insurer
of
the
state
police
cruiser,
reinstated.
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
10
is
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