PEOPLE OF MI V TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 123760
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
TAYLOR, J.
The issue presented in this case is whether first
degree child abuse1 requires the prosecution to establish
only that defendant intended to commit an act that causes
serious
physical
harm
or
whether
it
requires
the
prosecution to prove not only that defendant intended the
act, but also that, by so acting, she intended to cause
1
MCL 750.136b(2).
This statute provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree if
the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious
physical harm or serious mental harm to a child.
Child
abuse in the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than fifteen years.
serious physical harm or knew that serious physical harm
would be caused.
We hold that, pursuant to the current language of the
statute, first-degree child abuse requires the prosecution
to establish, and the jury to be instructed that to convict
it must find, not only that defendant intended to commit
the act, but also that defendant intended to cause serious
physical harm or knew that serious physical harm would be
caused by her act.
Because the Court of Appeals reached
the same result, we affirm its decision, but for different
reasons.
FACTS2
On June 28, 2002, defendant left her two children,
Adonnis, age three, and Acacia, age ten months, in her car,
a black Dodge Neon, while she visited a beauty salon.
The
children were belted in their seats, and defendant’s car
was parked some distance from the salon, in an unshaded,
asphalt parking lot.
eighties.
The temperature that day was in the
The child-safety locks on the car were engaged,
and the driver’s side window and possibly a rear window
were rolled down 1 to 1½ inches.
2
This case has not yet been tried; all facts are taken from
the preliminary examination transcript.
2
During her appointment, which lasted approximately 3½
hours,3 defendant had her hair washed, relaxed, and styled.
She also had a sit-up massage, tried on a sundress, and
purchased a snack.
Defendant did not mention the children
to anyone in the salon and never left the salon to check on
the children.
When
defendant
returned
to
appointment, her children were dead.
her
car
after
the
Acacia was lying on
the floorboard near the back seat, and Adonnis was lying on
the back seat.
heat
The children had died of hyperthermia, or
exposure.
state,
After
defendant
drove
discovering
around
for
the
children
several
in
hours
that
before
driving to a hospital emergency room around 11:00 p.m.
When
initially
questioned
by
the
police,
defendant
indicated that she had been abducted and raped and that her
children had been left in her car during the abduction.
But when confronted by the police, she admitted that she
had left her children in the car while she was at the
beauty salon.
Defendant then provided a written statement
to the police.
When asked why she made up the story about
the abduction, she responded, “So that I wouldn’t appear to
be a horrible person, someone who left their [sic] children
3
The appointment started about 4:00 or 4:20 p.m. and ended
about 7:30 or 7:50 p.m.
3
in a hot car.”
She also stated, “I had never left them in
the car before and I didn’t know (was too stupid to know)
that they would die.
Defendant
murder,
with
I didn’t want them to die.”
was
charged
first-degree
with
child
two
counts
as
abuse
of
underlying
the
felony
felony.
Following
the
preliminary
examination,
the
district
court declined to bind defendant over on the felony-murder
charges
and
involuntary
bound
defendant
manslaughter.
over
The
on
two
district
counts
court
of
concluded
that first-degree child abuse was a specific intent crime
and that there was not sufficient evidence to establish
probable
cause
to
believe
that
defendant
intentionally caused her children’s deaths.
knowingly
or
The district
court noted that defendant had stated that she did not
intend to hurt her children but that she was too stupid to
know that they would die, and that there was no evidence in
the record to negate this statement.
Consequently, the
district
was
court
determined
that
there
insufficient
evidence of intent to establish the underlying felony of
first-degree child abuse.
The
reinstate
prosecution
the
moved
felony-murder
to
have
charges.
the
The
circuit
court
circuit
court
granted the prosecution’s motion, reversing the district
court
and
reinstating
the
felony-murder
4
charges.
The
circuit court reasoned that first-degree child abuse was a
general intent, not a specific intent, crime.
Thus, the
circuit court reasoned that the prosecution was required to
establish
that
defendant
had
the
intent
to
perform
the
physical act itself that resulted in the children’s death.
The
circuit
court
concluded
that
the
prosecution
had
presented sufficient evidence that defendant intended to
leave her children alone in the car for several hours and
that there was probable cause to believe that defendant
committed
the
crimes
of
first-degree
child
abuse
and
second-degree murder.
Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal in the Court
of Appeals.
to-one
Although the Court of Appeals held, in a two
decision,
that
first-degree
child
abuse
was
a
specific intent crime rather than a general intent crime,
it affirmed the circuit court’s decision to reinstate the
felony-murder charges because it determined that there was
sufficient evidence of intent to find probable cause to
believe
abuse
that
and,
defendant
consequently,
had
felony-murder charges.4
committed
to
bind
first-degree
defendant
over
child
on
the
In so concluding, the Court of
Appeals relied on the analysis of People v Gould, 225 Mich
App 79; 570 NW2d 140 (1997), and further explained that the
4
256 Mich App 238; 662 NW2d 468 (2003).
5
facts belied defendant’s claim of ignorance of the risks of
leaving her children in a hot car.
The concurring Court of Appeals judge stated that he
would have concluded that first-degree child abuse is a
general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime.
This
Court
granted
the
prosecution
leave
to
appeal
“limited to the issue whether it is sufficient to instruct
the
jury
using
the
statutory
language
regarding
intent
(‘. . . knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical
or serious mental harm to a child’), MCL 750.136b(2), or
whether it is also necessary to instruct the jury regarding
‘specific intent.’”5
Standard of Review
We
review
de
novo
any
question
of
the
proper
interpretation of the underlying criminal law, including
the intent required.
People v Perkins, 468 Mich 448, 452;
662 NW2d 727 (2003).
Analysis
When construing a statute, this Court’s goal is to
give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
construing the language of the statute itself.
language
5
is
unambiguous,
we
give
468 Mich 946 (2003).
6
the
words
We begin by
Where the
their
plain
meaning
and
apply
the
statute
as
written.
People
v
Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).
The child abuse statute, MCL 750.136b(2), provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first
degree
if
the
person
knowingly
or
intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child.
Child abuse in
the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment
for
not
more
than
15
years.
[Emphasis added.]
The prosecution contends that the italicized language only
requires the prosecution to prove that defendant intended
to leave her children in the car, not that she intended to
seriously
harm
them
by
leaving
them
in
the
car.
We
disagree with this argument because it is contrary to the
plain language of the statute.
The plain language of the statute requires that to be
convicted of first-degree child abuse, a person “knowingly
or intentionally causes serious physical harm or serious
mental harm to a child.”
MCL 760.136b(2).
The phrase
“knowingly or intentionally” modifies the phrase “causes
serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.”
Thus,
this language requires more from defendant than an intent
to
commit
an
act.
The
prosecution
must
prove
that
by
leaving her children in the car, the defendant intended to
cause serious physical or mental harm to the children or
that she knew that serious mental or physical harm would be
caused
by
leaving
them
in
the
7
car.
The
recommended
standard
jury
instruction
for
first-degree
child
abuse,
CJI2d 17.18, correctly focuses the jury by directing it to
this method of analysis.6
We find it is unnecessary for the
jury to be given further instruction on “specific intent,”
6
CJI2d 17.18 states:
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime
of first-degree child abuse. To prove this
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
[Choose (2) or (3):]
(2)
First, that [name defendant]
[parent/guardian] of [name child].
is
the
(3)
First, that [name defendant] had care
or custody of or authority over [name child] when
the abuse allegedly happened.
(4)
Second, that the
knowingly
or
intentionally
physical harm/serious mental
child].
defendant either
caused
[serious
harm] to [name
[Choose (a) or (b):]
(a)
By “serious physical harm” I mean any
physical injury to a child that seriously impairs
the
child’s
health
or
physical
well-being,
including, but not limited to, brain damage, a
skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury,
poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut.
(b)
By “serious mental harm” I mean an
injury to a child’s mental condition that results
in visible signs of an impairment in the child’s
judgment, behavior, ability to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life.
(5)
Third, that [name child] was at the time under
the age of 18.
8
such as that found in CJI2d 3.9.
common-law
distinction
between
The need to draw the
“specific”
and
“general”
intent is not required under the plain language of the
statute, as long as the jury is instructed that it must
find
that
defendant
caused the harm.
which
abolished
except
in
one
either
knowingly
or
intentionally
Moreover, the enactment of MCL 768.37,
the
defense
narrow
of
voluntary
circumstance,
has
intoxication
significantly
diminished the need to categorize crimes as being either
“specific” or “general” intent crimes.
Conclusion
We
conclude
that
the
charge
of
first-degree
child
abuse in this case requires the prosecution to establish,
and the jury to be instructed that to convict it must find,
not only that defendant intended to leave her children in
the car, but also that, by doing so, defendant intended to
cause serious physical harm or that she knew that serious
physical harm would be caused.
Court
of
Appeals
decision
reinstatement
of
defendant
remand
and
the
Accordingly, we affirm the
affirming
the
felony-murder
this
case
to
the
circuit
charges
trial
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
9
court’s
against
court
for
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 123760
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J.
(concurring).
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but
write
separately
because
the
majority
fails
to
state
whether first-degree child abuse1 is a general intent crime
or a specific intent crime.2
The failure to address this
aspect of the case will cause confusion in the lower courts
when attorneys and trial judges attempt to determine what
1
MCL 750.136b(2).
This statute provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first
degree
if
the
person
knowingly
or
intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child.
Child abuse in
the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
2
The Court also declined to reach this issue in People v
Sherman-Huffman, 466 Mich 39, 40; 642 NW2d 339 (2002),
because we concluded that there was sufficient evidence in
that case to convict the defendant of third-degree child
abuse regardless of whether the crime was a specific intent
crime or a general intent crime.
instructions must be provided to the jury.
majority’s
assertion,
first-degree
explain
child
that
the
the
abuse,
standard
CJI2d
prosecution
jury
17.18,
must
Contrary to the
instruction
does
not
establish
for
clearly
both
that
defendant intended to leave her children in the car and
that by doing so, she intended to cause harm or knew that
serious
physical
harm
would
be
caused.
Consequently,
attorneys and trial judges will be at a loss about how the
proper burden of proof can be explained to the jury.
I would hold that pursuant to the current language of
the
statute,
first-degree
child
abuse
is
a
crime
of
specific intent, requiring the prosecution to establish not
only that defendant intended to leave her children in the
car, but also that by doing so, defendant intended to cause
serious
physical
harm
or
that
physical harm would be caused.
she
knew
that
serious
Additionally, I would hold
that, because first-degree child abuse is a specific intent
crime,
it
is
appropriate
to
provide
instruction on specific intent.
would
affirm
the
reinstatement
of
Court
the
of
the
jury
with
an
For these reasons, I
Appeals
felony-murder
decision
charges3
affirming
against
defendant.
3
MCL 750.316(1)(b). This statute provides in part that a
person commits murder in the first-degree if the murder is
(continued…)
2
When construing a statute, this Court’s primary goal
is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
We
begin by construing the language of the statute itself.
Where the language is unambiguous, we give the words their
plain meaning and apply the statute as written.
In re MCI,
460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
Traditionally,
general
intent
crimes
involve
merely
the intent to do the physical act, while specific intent
crimes involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act
done.
People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 574; 339 NW2d 461
(1983).
Black’s
Law
Dictionary
further
explains
that
“general intent” is “the intent to do that which the law
prohibits.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to
prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the
precise result which eventuated.”
(6th ed).
accomplish
Black’s Law Dictionary
Specific intent is “[t]he mental purpose to
a
specific
act
prohibited
by
law.”
Id.
Specific intent designates “a special mental element which
is required above and beyond any mental state required with
respect to the actus reus of the crime.”
Id.
The child abuse statute provides:
(…continued)
committed “in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate
. . . child abuse in the first degree. . . ."
3
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first
degree
if
the
person
knowingly
or
intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child.
Child abuse in
the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
[MCL
750.136b(2) (emphasis added).]
The prosecution contends that the italicized language only
requires a general intent on defendant’s part—that is, the
prosecution
must
only
prove
that
defendant
intended
to
leave her children in the car, not that she intended to
seriously harm them by leaving them in the car.
I disagree
with this argument because it is contrary to the plain
language of the statute.
The
plain
language
of
the
current
statute
requires
that to be convicted of first-degree child abuse, a person
“knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child.”
People
v
Whitney,
228
Mich
App
MCL 760.136b(2).
230,
255;
578
NW2d
In
329
(1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that MCL 15.272,
which addresses violations of the Open Meetings Act, was a
specific
intent
crime
because
modified the word “violates.”
degree
child
abuse
statute,
the
word
“intentionally”
Similarly, in the first
the
words
“knowingly
or
intentionally” modify the phrase “causes serious physical
or mental harm to a child.”
Thus, this language requires
more from defendant than a general intent to commit an act.
The prosecution must prove that by leaving her children in
4
the car, the defendant intended to cause serious physical
or
mental
harm
to
the
children
or
that
she
knew
that
serious mental or physical harm would be caused by leaving
them in the car.
Contrasting
abuse
provision
child
abuse
the
language
with
provision
the
of
the
language
further
first-degree
of
the
child
second-degree
demonstrates
that
first
degree requires more than simply an intent on the part of
defendant to leave her children in the car.
The language
of the second-degree child abuse provision provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
second degree if any of the following apply:
(a) The person’s omission causes serious
physical harm or serious mental harm to a child
or if the person’s reckless act causes serious
physical harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally
commits an act likely to cause serious physical
or mental harm to a child regardless of whether
harm results.
(c) The person knowingly or intentionally
commits an act that is cruel to a child
regardless of whether harm results.
[MCL
750.136b(3) (emphasis added).]
In
the
second-degree
child
abuse
provision,
the
words
“knowingly” and “intentionally” modify the phrase “commits
an act.”
Thus, to establish second-degree child abuse, the
prosecution must prove only that a defendant intended to
commit an act likely to cause harm.
5
The prosecution does
not
have
to
prove
that
a
defendant
intended
serious
physical or mental harm.
Had
sustain
the
a
Legislature
conviction
intended
for
that
first-degree
it
be
enough
to
child
abuse
by
proving only that the person intended to commit the act
that
caused
harm,
the
Legislature
could
have
included
language similar to the language used in the second-degree
child abuse provision and stated:
it is first-degree child
abuse to “knowingly or intentionally commit an act that
causes serious physical or mental harm to a child.”
But
the Legislature chose not to include this phrasing, and
will
not
usurp
the
Legislature’s
role
by
reading
I
this
additional language into the statute.4
Because I would hold that first-degree child abuse is
a specific intent crime, I would further conclude that it
4
Several house bills have been introduced to amend the
child abuse statute.
See HB 4327, HB 4468, and HB 4583.
Interestingly, one of these bills, HB 4468, would add an
additional means for establishing first-degree child abuse:
it is child abuse in the first degree if “the person
knowingly or intentionally commits an act that causes
serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.”
(Emphasis added.)
On April 1, 2004, consideration of HB
4468 was postponed temporarily. 2004 Journal of the House
of Representatives 623 (No. 30, April 1, 2004).
A House Bill has also been introduced that would make it a
crime to leave a child unattended in a vehicle.
See HB
4499.
6
is appropriate to provide the jury with the instruction on
specific intent, CJI2d 3.9, which states:
(1) The crime of __________ requires proof
of a specific intent. This means that the
prosecution
must
prove
not
only
that
the
defendant did certain acts, but that [he / she]
did the acts with the intent to cause a
particular result.
(2) For the crime of __________ this means
that
the
prosecution
must
prove
that
the
defendant
intended
to
[state
the
required
specific intent].
(3) The defendant's intent may be proved by
what [he / she] said, what [he / she] did, how
[he / she] did it, or by any other facts and
circumstances in evidence.[5]
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the standard
jury instruction for first-degree child abuse, CJI2d 17.18,6
5
I note that because MCL 750.136b(2) makes it a crime to
“knowingly or intentionally” cause harm, I would instruct
the trial court to include both aspects—intentionally
causing harm and knowingly causing harm—when it states the
required specific intent in § 2.
6
CJI2d 17.18 provides:
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime
of first-degree child abuse. To prove this
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
[Choose (2) or (3):]
(2)
First, that [name defendant]
[parent/ guardian] of [name child].
is
the
(3)
First, that [name defendant] had care
or custody of or authority over [name child] when
the abuse allegedly happened.
(continued…)
7
is
sufficient
evidenced
by
instruction
this
case,
regarding
CJI2d
explanation of intent for the jury.
17.18
intent.
offers
As
no
is
clear
Accordingly, providing
a specific intent instruction is necessary to guide the
jury regarding what the prosecutor must prove under MCL
750.136b(2)—in this case, that defendant not only intended
to leave her children in the car, but also that, by doing
so, she intended to cause serious physical harm or knew
(…continued)
(4)
Second, that the defendant either
knowingly
or
intentionally
caused
[serious
physical harm / serious mental harm] to [name
child].
[Choose (a) or (b):]
(a)
By “serious physical harm” I mean any
physical injury to a child that seriously impairs
the
child’s
health
or
physical
well-being,
including, but not limited to, brain damage, a
skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury,
poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut.
(b)
By “serious mental harm” I mean an
injury to a child’s mental condition that results
in visible signs of an impairment in the child’s
judgment, behavior, ability to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life.
(5)
Third, that [name child] was at the
time under the age of 18.
8
that serious physical harm would be caused.7
The majority’s
conclusion that such an instruction is not necessary will
only result in confusion at the trial court level.
Conclusion
I would conclude that first-degree child abuse is a
crime of specific intent, requiring in this case that the
prosecution establish not only that defendant intended to
leave her children in the car, but also that, by doing so,
defendant intended to cause serious physical harm or knew
that serious physical harm would be caused.
Additionally,
I would conclude that because first-degree child abuse is a
7
I also note that I agree with the Court of Appeals
that there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that defendant acted with the requisite intent for
first-degree child abuse.
In the present case, defendant
left her children, ages ten months and three years, in a
car for approximately 3½ hours on a day in late June, when
temperatures were in the eighties. Defendant admitted that
she made up the story about being abducted so that people
would not think that she was a horrible person “who left
[her] children in a hot car.” She also explained that she
had never left her children alone in the car before. These
statements suggest that defendant was aware of the risks to
her children if they were left alone in a hot car.
Additionally, the fact that at least one of the car windows
was rolled down an inch or two suggests that defendant had
knowledge that the inside of the car would become hot while
it sat in an unshaded, asphalt parking lot on a hot June
day.
Moreover, given the children’s very young ages,
leaving these children unattended anywhere for 3½ hours
could be considered questionable conduct that might harm
the children.
Although defendant left the salon to
purchase a snack, she did not check on her children during
the 3½ hours that she was in the salon.
From all this
evidence, a jury could infer that, by leaving her children
in a hot car for 3½ hours, defendant intended to cause harm
or knew that harm would be caused to her children.
9
specific intent crime, it is appropriate to provide the
jury with an instruction on specific intent.
I
concur
in
the
result
of
the
majority
Accordingly,
opinion,
which
affirms the Court of Appeals decision affirming the circuit
court’s reinstatement of the felony-murder charges against
defendant.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
10
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