JEFFREY SOTELO V TWP OF GRANT
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 489009
Opinion
Chief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 3, 2004
JEFFREY SOTELO, SUSAN SOTELO,
WALTER J. VANDER WALL,
Individually and as Trustee,
and PHYLLIS A. VANDER WALL,
Individually and as Trustee,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
o. 123430
N
v
TOWNSHIP OF GRANT,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs sought to divide their property in Grant
Township, but the defendant township denied approval of the
request
pursuant
560.101 et seq.
decision
and
to
the
Land
Act
(LDA),
MCL
The circuit court upheld the township’s
awarded
summary
The Court of Appeals reversed.
380 (2003).
Division
disposition
for
defendant.
255 Mich App 466; 660 NW2d
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision and
reinstate the Newaygo Circuit Court judgment.
I
The LDA regulates the division of land by imposing
platting (that is, mapping or charting) requirements and
other
building
and
assessment
requirements.1
This
case
concerns “division” rights, a statutory concept found in
the LDA, which limits the ability of a landowner to split
or
partition
real
platting process.
property
without
complying
with
the
“Divisions”2 of parcels that meet certain
criteria are exempt from statutory platting requirements
and must be approved by a municipality.
The
present
case
involves
two
adjacent
MCL 560.109(1).
“parent”
parcels
that were reconfigured when a portion of one was sold to
the
owner
of
the
other.
The
question
is
whether
the
reconfiguration resulted in an increase in the total number
of
1
2
possible
divisions
that
could
be
made
in
the
area
See, e.g., MCL 560.102(a); 560.132 to 560.198.
“Division” is defined by the LDA as
the partitioning or splitting of a parcel or tract of land
by the proprietor thereof or by his or her heirs,
executors,
administrators,
legal
representatives,
successors, or assigns for the purpose of sale, or lease of
more than 1 year, or of building development that results
in 1 or more parcels of less than 40 acres or the
equivalent, and that satisfies the requirements of [MCL
560.108, 560.109].
Division does not include a property
transfer between 2 or more adjacent parcels, if the
property taken from 1 parcel is added to an adjacent
parcel; and any resulting parcel shall not be considered a
building
site
unless
the
parcel
conforms
to
the
requirements of this act or the requirements of an
applicable local ordinance. [MCL 560.102(d).]
2
encompassed
by
the
two
original
parent
parcels
without
complying with statutory platting requirements.
The facts are not in dispute.
They are taken from the
trial court opinion, on which the Court of Appeals also
relied.
Before
July
15,
1999,
plaintiffs
Jeffrey
and
Susan
Sotelo owned a 2.35-acre parcel of land that was adjacent
to, and immediately north of, a 7.63-acre parcel owned by
Robert Filut.
On July 15, 1999, Filut conveyed 3.25 acres
of his property to the Sotelos, making the Sotelo parcel
5.6 acres and the Filut parcel 4.38 acres.
rights were transferred with this conveyance.
No division
By deeds
dated July 15, 1999, the remaining 4.38-acre parcel of the
Filut property was divided into four parcels, each larger
than one acre.3
Filut conveyed these four parcels to two
trusts, which are owned by plaintiffs Walter and Phyllis
Vander Wall.
By deeds dated August 10, 1999, the 5.6-acre
Sotelo property was then divided, also into four parcels,
each larger than one acre.
All the divisions were made
without the township approval required by MCL 560.109.
3
Section 109(1)(d) of the LDA requires parcels that result
from a division to conform to local ordinance lot-size
minimums. The size of the divided parcels was an apparent
attempt to comply with the Grant Township ordinance, which
required that parcels be no smaller than one acre.
3
When they were informed that they were in violation of
the
LDA,
the
plaintiff
owners
township to approve the divisions.
requested
the
defendant
After extensive review,
however, the request was denied by a resolution passed on
July 27, 2000.
The township concluded that the number of
divisions exceeded the number allowed under the LDA.
Plaintiffs initiated suit to compel approval of all
the land divisions.
While the action was pending, the
parties agreed that the transfer of the 3.25 acres from
Filut
to
the
Sotelos
and
the
four
divisions
of
the
reconfigured Filut parcel were consistent with the LDA and
township ordinances.
Thus, the only remaining issue became
the legality of the divisions of the reconfigured Sotelo
parcel.
The Newaygo Circuit Court granted summary disposition
to the township, finding that the number of plaintiffs’
divisions exceeded the number available under the LDA.
The
circuit court held in part:
The Filut parcel and the Sotelo parcel, as
they existed on March 31, 1997, are parent
parcels.
The transfer of land from the Filut
parcel to the Sotelo parcel on July 15, 1999, did
not
count
against
the
potential
divisions
available to the Filut parcel under Section 108
of the LDA;[4] but, this transfer did not change
4
The trial court mistakenly reported that the transfer
Filut to the Sotelos was an “exempt split” under the
Pursuant to MCL 560.102(e), an “exempt split” is
partitioning or splitting of a parcel or tract of
. . . that does not result in 1 or more parcels of
4
from
LDA.
“the
land
less
the boundary lines of the parent parcels for
purposes of determining the number of divisions
available under the LDA.
The division of the
Filut parcel into four separate parcels equaled,
but did not exceed, all divisions available to
the Filut parent parcel. The divisions from the
reconfigured Sotelo parcel on August 10, 1999,
violated the LDA, because some of the divisions
were made within the Filut parent parcel and the
divisions available to this parcel had been
exhausted.
Therefore, the court agreed with the township and found
that plaintiffs were required to comply with the platting
provisions of the LDA in making the four-parcel split of
the reconfigured Sotelo parcel.
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed
the
trial
township.
court’s
grant
of
summary
disposition
for
the
It held first that “the LDA is in derogation of
the common-law right to freely alienate real property” and
that, therefore, the act should be "strictly and narrowly
construed."
255
Mich
App
471.
It
concluded
that
the
division of the Sotelo parcel into four separate parcels
satisfied the requirements of § 108 and that the township
than 40 acres or the equivalent.” (Emphasis added.)
Because the transfer did result in parcels of less than 40
acres, it was not an “exempt split.”
The trial court
nevertheless reached the correct conclusion that the
transfer was also not a “division” and therefore did not
count against the number of divisions available to the
parent parcel.
See MCL 560.102(d) (“Division does not
include a property transfer between 2 or more adjacent
parcels, if the property taken from 1 parcel is added to an
adjacent parcel.”).
5
was required to approve the divisions under § 109(1).
255
Mich App 474.
Defendant Grant Township now seeks leave to appeal in
this Court.5
II
This case concerns the proper interpretation of the
LDA and the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for
the defendant township.
Issues of statutory interpretation
are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo.
Wood v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 401, 403; 668 NW2d 353
(2003).
Our obligation in construing the provisions of the
LDA
to
is
reasonably
be
discern
the
inferred
legislative
from
the
words
intent
that
expressed
in
may
the
statute by according those words their plain and ordinary
meaning.
MCL 8.3a; Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466
Mich 155, 159-160; 645 NW2d 643 (2002).
Decisions
regarding
also reviewed de novo.
summary
disposition
motions
are
First Pub Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich
101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003).
III
We conclude that under the plain language of the LDA,
the division of the reconfigured Sotelo parcel resulted in
5
We grant the motion of the Michigan Department of Consumer
and Industry Services to file a brief amicus curiae in
support of defendant’s application.
6
a number of divisions to the parent parcel that exceeded
the number of divisions permitted, and that plaintiffs were
therefore
required
to
comply
with
the
LDA’s
platting
provisions.
Under § 103(1), if a partitioning or splitting of a
parcel qualifies as a “division,” it “is not subject to the
platting
requirements
requirements
of
of
this
sections
108
act
and
but
109.”
subject
Section
to
the
108(2)
exempts a certain number of divisions from the platting
requirements of the act.
Section 108 provides in part:
A division is not subject to the platting
requirements of this act. . . . [T]he division,
together with any previous divisions of the same
parent parcel or parent tract, shall result in a
number of parcels not more than the sum of the
following, as applicable:
(a) For the first 10 acres or fraction
thereof in the parent parcel or parent tract, 4
parcels. [Emphasis added.]
A “parent parcel” or “parent tract” is defined as "a
parcel
or
effective
tract
date
subdivision.”
.
of
.
the
.
lawfully
amendatory
MCL 560.102(i).
in
act
existence
that
on
added
the
this
The effective date of the
1996 amendment that added that subsection, 1996 PA 591, was
March 31, 1997.
Thus, under the LDA, a parent parcel that
was in existence on March 31, 1997, and is less than ten
acres in size, cannot be divided into more than four total
parcels.
MCL 560.108(2)(a).
7
On March 31, 1997, the Sotelo parent parcel was 2.35
acres
and
Accordingly,
the
Filut
under
parcel
108(2)(a),
§
parent
the
was
two
7.63
acres.
parent
parcels
could not be divided into more than six resulting parcels.
Part of the Filut parent parcel (3.25 acres) became part of
the “reconfigured” Sotelo parcel.6
The parties correctly
assume that the first transfer of property—the conveyance
of
the
3.25
“division,”
acres
“exempt
from
Filut
split,”
to
or
the
Sotelos—was
“subdivision,”
not
as
a
those
terms are defined in the LDA, because it was a transfer to
an adjacent piece of property, MCL 560.102(d),(e), and (f).
Therefore, it does not count as a division when evaluating
Filut’s subsequent four-parcel partitioning.
Because Filut
did not transfer to the Sotelos the right to make any of
his four divisions, his subsequent four-parcel splitting
was within his limit under the LDA.
MCL 560.108(2)(a).
The reconfigured Sotelo parcel could not be divided
into four parcels, however, because it included a portion
of
the
original
Filut
parent
parcel,
reached its maximum potential divisions.
which
had
already
The Sotelo parent
parcel, because it had not previously been divided, was not
in violation of the LDA.
But the Filut parent parcel, a
portion of which was now part of the reconstituted Sotelo
6
Under § 109(2), Filut could have transferred one or more
of his division rights to the Sotelos, but he did not.
8
parcel, had already been divided four times.
Therefore,
its further division (as part of the Sotelo reconstituted
parcel) violated § 108(2)(a).
No portion of the Filut
parent parcel (including the portion that was conveyed to
the Sotelos) could be divided again until at least ten
years expired, MCL 560.108(5)(a), without complying with
the platting requirements of the LDA.
Therefore, the trial
court did not err when it granted summary disposition to
defendant on this basis.
In contrast, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of
the LDA does not comport with the language of the act.
First,
the
Court
ignored
the
requirements
of
§
108(2).
Although the panel correctly observed that a “division” is,
in part, “the partitioning or splitting of a parcel or
tract of land by the proprietor . . . that results in 1 or
more parcels of less than 40 acres . . . ,” 255 Mich App
166 quoting MCL 560.102(d), it erred in interpreting the
phrase “same parent parcel or parent tract” in § 108(2)(a)
as
referring
to
the
reconfigured
Sotelo
property
rather
than to the parent parcels that existed on March 31, 1997.
Section
108(2)
specifically
includes
“any
previous
divisions of the same parent parcel” in the calculation of
the number of allowable divisions.
With respect to the
portion of the resulting Sotelo property that came from
9
Filut,
the
“same
parent
parcel”
was
the
Filut
parent
parcel.
Second, the Court of Appeals misconstrued § 102(d),
which states in part that, in order to “be considered a
building
site,”
between
two
a
parcel
adjacent
that
parcels
results
must
from
a
transfer
conform
to
the
requirements of the LDA or an applicable local ordinance.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that this rule implies that
the LDA allows for the development of a parcel created by
transferring
adjoining
property
ordinances are satisfied.
if
the
LDA
and
local
On the basis of this provision,
the panel broadly concluded that the enlarged Sotelo parcel
that resulted from the transfer from the adjacent Filut
parcel was a proper building site and that the “parcels
into
which
applicable
it
local
was
divided
conformed
ordinances.”
255
to
Mich
the
App
LDA
and
472.
In
contrast to the panel’s conclusion, this portion of the
statute merely states that the parcel that results from an
adjacent-parcel
transfer
must
meet
minimum
local
regulations (i.e, for lot size), or, if there is no local
government
regulation,
imposed under the LDA.
then
whatever
requirements
See MCL 560.109(1)(b) and (5).
are
It
does not state that any transfer of property to an adjacent
parcel is permissible as long as it results in buildable
lots.
Because
the
division
10
of
the
reconfigured
Sotelo
parcel resulted in a number of divisions to the parent
parcel
that
exceeded
the
number
of
divisions
permitted
under § 108(a) of the LDA, plaintiffs were required to
comply with the LDA’s platting provisions.
IV
We hold that the circuit court properly considered the
Filut
and
March 31,
Sotelo
1997—when
parent
it
parcels—as
concluded
they
that
existed
the
on
four-parcel
splitting of the reconfigured Sotelo parcel was required to
comply with the platting provisions of the LDA.
The Court
of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s grant of
summary
disposition
for
the
township.
Therefore,
we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate
the
judgment
of
the
Newaygo
Circuit
Court.
MCL
7.302(G)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ.
We
would
not
dispose
of
this
case
by
opinion
curiam, but would grant leave to appeal.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
11
per
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