YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM INC V STATE OF MICH
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Maura D. Cor rigan
Opinion
Justices
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MAY 15, 2001
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 113656
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF TREASURY and ITS STATE TREASURER,
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE and
ITS DIRECTOR, and MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION and ITS COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Appellants.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
WEAVER, C.J.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation.
Plaintiff,
Yellow
Freight
System,
Inc.,
alleges
that
defendants collected registration fees in excess of the amount
allowed
under
the
1991
Intermodal
Surface
Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49 USC 11506, which restricts a
state's registration fees to an amount "equal to the fee . . .
that such state collected or charged as of November 15, 1991,"
49
USC
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).
Specifically,
plaintiff
contends that in determining the amount of the fee charged or
1
collected on November 15, 1991, one must consider the effect
that any then existing reciprocity agreements had on the fees.
We reject plaintiff's claims and hold that in determining
the
"fee
.
.
.
collected
or
charged"
under
49
USC
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), Michigan's reciprocity agreements are
irrelevant.
We
reverse
the
Court
of
Appeals
decision
affirming the Court of Claims order for summary disposition in
favor of plaintiff and remand this case to the Court of Claims
for
further
proceedings
consistent
with
this
opinion.
I
Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among
the several States” and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” that power
to regulate commerce.
US Const, art I, § 8. Under the
Commerce Clause, states can impose significant regulatory
burdens on interstate motor carriers only when authorized to
do so by Congress.
Michigan Pub Utility Comm v Duke, 266 US
570, 577; 45 S Ct 191; 69 L Ed 445 (1925).
Over the years
Congress has authorized the states to require registration of
interstate motor carriers, subject to the supervision of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
1935, PL 74-265, 49 USC 301 et seq.
See Motor Carrier Act of
In 1991, Congress passed
the ISTEA,1 which directed the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) to restructure the then existing regulations governing
vehicle registration and registration fees. 49 USC 11506. As
a result, the ICC issued the “single state” registration
1
Provisions similar to those in this section are now
contained in 49 USC 14504.
2
system (SSRS) in 1993, 49 CFR 1023.2
A brief overview of the previous interstate motor carrier
registration system is helpful in understanding the dispute
now before this Court.
Before 1991, states could require
interstate motor carriers to annually register and pay fees on
each vehicle that operated within its borders.
Thirty-nine
states, including Michigan, elected to participate in a "bingo
card" system.3
Under the “bingo card” system interstate motor
carriers attached a "bingo card" to each of their motor
vehicles.
States through which the vehicle traveled then
issued each vehicle a registration "stamp" which was placed in
a designated area on the bingo card.
Participating states
were allowed to charge no more than $10 per stamp.
While operating under the prior "bingo card" registration
system, some states entered into reciprocity agreements, under
which a state would discount or waive the registration fee for
carriers based in the other's state.
The motor carrier’s
principal place of business was most commonly used as the
basis
for
determining
reciprocity.
Michigan,
however,
initially based its reciprocity agreements on the state in
which
2
the
vehicle
was
“base-plated,”
i.e.
where
it
was
This was redesignated in 1996 as 49 CFR 367.
3
The “bingo card” system served three main purposes: (1)
to make it easier to determine whether a specific vehicle had
been registered by simply looking at the “bingo card,” (2) to
ensure compliance by interstate motor carriers to register all
vehicles in operation, and (3) to prevent carriers from
operating uninsured vehicles.
3
registered or license-plated.4
Seeking
to
“benefit
the
interstate
carriers
by
eliminating unnecessary compliance burdens” and “to preserve
revenues for the states which had participated in the bingo
program,” Congress
ISTEA.5
replaced the old system by enacting the
The SSRS was intended to serve as the sole avenue for
state registration of interstate carriers.6 Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v Interstate Commerce Comm 309 US
App DC 325; 41 F3d 721 (1994).
Under the SSRS a motor carrier
registers annually with only one state.
This “registration
state” is responsible for collecting the per-vehicle fees and
distributing them to any participating states through which
the
carrier
runs
its
motor
vehicles.
49
USC
11506(c)(2)(A)(iii).
The section of the ISTEA at issue in the present case is
subsection 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).
It provides that each state
“shall establish a fee system” that “result[s] in a fee for
each participating state that is equal to the fee, not to
exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or charged
as of November 15, 1991 . . . .”
In 1991, before the implementation of the SSRS, the
4
In other words, Michigan would waive its registration
fee for vehicles base-plated in a state that waived its fee
for vehicles that were base-plated in Michigan.
5
H R Conf Rep No 102-404, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess 437 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U S Code Cong & Admin News, 1526, 1679,
1817.
6
Participation in the SSRS was limited to the thirty-nine
states that had elected to participate in the “bingo card”
program. 49 USC 11506(c)(2)(D)
4
Michigan
Public
Service
reciprocity agreements.
Commission
(MPSC)
altered
its
The MPSC adopted the more common
"place of business" method of determining reciprocity, instead
of the "base-plated" system that the MPSC had been using.
This change was scheduled to become effective in February
1992.
The MPSC mailed renewal applications reflecting this
change
to
all
interstate
motor
plaintiff, in September 1991.
carriers,
including
the
Plaintiff paid its 1992 fees7
in September of 1991, under protest. Subsequently, plaintiff
instituted this litigation.
Plaintiff contended that Michigan could not alter its
reciprocity agreements, arguing that under the federal statute
those agreements were frozen at their November 15, 1991,
levels.
Ruling on cross motion, the Court of Claims agreed
with plaintiff and granted its motion, in part, for summary
disposition.8
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Court of Claims ruling.
231 Mich App 194; 585
NW2d 762 (1998). This Court granted leave to appeal, 461 Mich
1009 (2000).
7
At that time plaintiff’s principal place of business was
in Kansas, and it had 3,730 vehicles base-plated in Illinois
and Indiana.
Under Michigan's old reciprocity agreements,
Michigan's fees for those 3,730 vehicles base-plated in
Illinois and Indiana would have been waived. However, after
Michigan changed its method for determining reciprocity to one
based on a company’s principal place of business, Plaintiff
was required to pay a $10 vehicle registration fee for each of
the 3,730 vehicles. Thus, rather than paying nothing under
the old reciprocity method, plaintiff was required to pay
$37,300 annually under Michigan’s new system.
8
Plaintiff’s complaint also sought attorney fees under
42 USC 1988. The Court of Claims did not grant this relief,
and plaintiff has not appealed that decision to this Court.
5
III
There is no dispute that 49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III)
froze the registration fees that a state can charge as of
November
15,
1991.
The
parties
dispute
the
proper
interpretation of a key phrase in that section of the ISTEA:
"equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such
State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."
fundamental
question
before
us
is
whether
The
Michigan's
reciprocity agreements should be considered in determining
what fees were charged or collected as of November 15, 1991.
We conclude that under the plain language of the statute,
reciprocity
agreements
determination.
are
not
relevant
in
making
that
A
This is an issue of first impression for this Court; nor
have any other state courts addressed it. The only court that
has considered it is the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs, supra.
That court followed the ICC's decision9 to ban states from
9
The ICC has taken varying positions on this issue. In
its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 57 Fed Reg 20,072
(1992), and its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed Reg 5951
(1993), the ICC found that the reciprocity agreements were
made voluntarily, and that there was no good reason for the
ICC's involvement in them. The ICC had noted that "it might
place a heavy administrative burden on a registration State
were we to require that it collect from different carriers
different fees from the same State depending on the various
reciprocal agreements negotiated by the various states in
which each carrier operates." 9 ICC2d 610, 617 (1993).
However, the ICC subsequently reversed its position, and
now says "we have concluded that participating States must
consider fees charged or collected under reciprocity
agreements when determining the fees charged or collected as
6
charging registration fees in excess of preexisting reciprocal
discounts, saying:
[W]e think the Commission was correct in
concluding that the plain language of the statute
precludes petitioners’ interpretation. It does not
matter whether Congress actually focused on the
reciprocal discount practice or even was aware of
it.
Nor is it of any significance that the
Commission initially misread the statute; that is
what comment periods are for. Id., at 729.
We are not bound to follow that decision,10 and, for the
reasons given below, we do not agree with the federal court's
decision to defer to the ICC's interpretation of the ISTEA.
B
Plaintiff contends that in interpreting the ISTEA we must
give deference to the ICC's interpretation. Because the issue
is the interpretation of a federal statute and the deference
due a federal agency's construction of that statute, we will
apply
the
judiciary.11
rules
of
construction
set
out
by
the
federal
The seminal case is Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural
of Nov 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)." Single
State Insurance Registration Exparte No MC-100 (Sub-No 6), 9
ICC2d 610, 618-619 (1993).
10
Michigan adheres to the rule that a state court is
bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts upon
federal questions, including interpretations of federal
statutes. See Bement v Grand Rapids & Indiana R Co, 194 Mich
64; 160 NW 424 (1916), and In re Hopps Estate, 324 Mich 256;
36 NW2d 908 (1949). However, where there is no United States
Supreme Court decision upon the interpretation in question,
the lower federal courts' decisions, while entitled to
respectful consideration, are not binding upon this Court.
See Winger v Grand Trunk W R Co, 210 Mich 100, 117; 177 NW 273
(1920), Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich 621; 105 NW2d 42 (1960),
and 21 CJS, Courts, § 159, pp 195-197.
11
This Court has not previously determined what deference
the courts of this state owe to a federal agency's
interpretation of a federal statute.
However, in that
7
Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct 2778; 81
L Ed 2d 694 (1984).
There the United States Supreme Court
established that a court must first determine whether the
statute's meaning is clear; if so, then the court must apply
the statute as written. If the statute is ambiguous, then the
court must give deference to the agency's interpretation.
When a court reviews an agency's construction
of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.
If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose
its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. Id. at 842-843.
Here we find that the plain meaning of the terms of the ISTEA
is clear, and we apply the statute as written.
Because we
find that the statute is not ambiguous12, we need not proceed
circumstance the Court of Appeals has applied the federal
standards of deference as set out in Chevron, supra 2778.
See Walker v Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc, 217 Mich
App 705, 713; 552 NW2d 679 (1996), Gibbs v General Motors
Corp, 134 Mich App 429, 432; 351 NW2d 315 (1984), and 231 Mich
App 200. This is also the approach taken by several other
state courts. See for example: Totemoff v State, 905 P2d 954,
967 (Alas, 1995), Delorme v North Dakota Dep’t of Human
Services, 492 NW2d 585, 587, n 2 (ND, 1992), Rodriguez v
Perales, 86 NY2d 361, 367; 657 NE2d 247; 633 NYS2d 252 (1995),
and Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc v Dep’t of Public Utility
Control, 253 Conn 453, 470; 754 A2d 128 (2000).
12
The dissent contends that the statute is ambiguous,
asserting that this is demonstrated by “the several
interpretations of its wording advanced by the parties.” If
8
to the second step of Chevron, supra, and we do not reach the
agency’s interpretation.
C
The question before us is whether any then-existing
reciprocity agreements should be considered when determining
what fee the state charged or collected as of November 15,
1991. The ISTEA itself refers only to the fee collected or
charged, and contains no reference to reciprocity agreements.
49 USC 11504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) directs the ICC to “establish
a fee system” that " result[s] in a fee for each participating
State that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle,
that such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."
The new “fee system” is based not on the fees collected from
one individual company, but on the fee system that the state
had in place on November 15, 1991.
We must look not at the
fees paid by plaintiff in any given year, but at the generic
fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of November
15, 1991.
To determine what registration fee Michigan charged on
November 15, 1991, we examine MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4)
in the Motor Carrier Act.
Since 1989 that statute has
provided for a fee of $10 to be charged for those motor
carrier vehicles operating in Michigan and licensed in another
state or province of Canada:
The annual fee levied on each interstate or
the parties’ conflicting interpretations were the measure of
a statute’s ambiguity, then almost every statute litigated
would be deemed ambiguous. A statute is not ambiguous because
it requires careful attention and analysis.
9
foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this
state and licensed in another state or province of
Canada shall be $10.00.
The same statute, MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4), also gives
the commission the ability to waive the $10 fee under certain
circumstances:
The commission may enter into a reciprocal
agreement with a state or province of Canada that
does not charge vehicles licensed in this state
economic regulatory fees or taxes and may waive the
fee required under this subsection.
Thus, under MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4), the fee charged as
of November 15, 1991, was $10.
While that fee may be waived,
and thus not “charged or collected,” for a particular carrier
under a reciprocity agreement, such voluntary agreements to
waive the fee that happen to benefit a particular carrier do
not affect the generic per vehicle fee in place on November
15,
1991.
As
stated,
the
clear
focus
of
49
USC
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) is on the generic “fee” that Michigan
charged or collected as of November 15, 1991, and not on
whether that fee was charged to or collected from a particular
carrier.
The
ICC's
position
that
consider
fees
charged
or
"participating
collected
under
States
must
reciprocity
agreements when determining the fees charged or collected as
of Nov 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv),”13 added
a concept not within the express language of the statute.
It
added consideration of voluntary agreements between the states
to waive or reduce the fees imposed.
13
It is not for the ICC,
Single State Insurance Registration Exparte No MC-100
(Sub-No 6) 9 ICC2d 610 (1993)
10
or this Court, to insert words into the statute.
IV
We hold that Michigan's reciprocity agreements are not
relevant in determining what fee was "charged or collected" as
of November 15, 1991.
The lower courts erred in granting
summary disposition for plaintiffs.
We reverse the Court of
Appeals decision, and remand this case to the Court of Claims
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CORRIGAN ,
C.J.,
and
TAYLOR ,
concurred with WEAVER , J.
11
YOUNG,
and
MARKMAN ,
JJ.,
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 113656
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY and ITS
STATE TREASURER, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE and ITS
DIRECTOR, and MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION and ITS
COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I
disagree
with
the
majority's
conclusion
that
reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining the
registration
fees
that
Michigan
charged
under
the
1991
Intermodel Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49
USC 11506.1
One such agreement waived registration fees for
vehicles licensed in Illinois, including plaintiff's vehicles,
so that no fee was collected or charged within the meaning of
the statute.
Consequently, I would affirm the decisions of
the Court of Appeals and the Court of Claims.
1
The ISTEA now appears at 49 USC 14504.
The ISTEA replaced the bingo card system of registering
interstate motor carriers with a single state registration
system.
Nat'l
Ass'n
of
Regulatory
Utility
Comm'rs
v
Interstate Commerce Comm, 309 US App DC 325, 328; 41 F3d 721
(1994).
Under the ISTEA system, a state can charge a fee
"that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that
such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."
USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III).
49
The question in this case is
what effect reciprocity agreements have on determining the fee
that Michigan can charge under the single state registration
system.
As an initial point, I disagree with the majority's
conclusion that the meaning of the language in the statute is
plain, reasonably susceptible of only one interpretation.
Rather, I find it ambiguous.
A statute is ambiguous when
reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning.
In re MCI
Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164
(1999).
reciprocity
That
the
ISTEA
agreements
is
is
ambiguous
as
regards
demonstrated
by
the
the
several
interpretations of its wording advanced by the parties and by
justices on this Court.
The language of the statute supports
both positions, allowing for opposing and similarly plausible
constructions.
reasonable
minds
Despite
can
and
careful
do
attention
differ
with
and
analysis,
respect
to
the
statute's meaning concerning reciprocity agreements.
Alternatively, if the statute's language were plain, the
meaning of the words "collected or charged" must lead to a
result opposite that reached by the majority.
2
The majority
concludes that Michigan was entitled to charge plaintiff a
registration fee, but the majority's interpretation of the
ISTEA depends on addition to the statute of words not present
there.
Whether the state of Michigan could have collected or
charged a "generic" per vehicle fee is not pertinent.
The
statute specifies "fees . . . collected or charged as of
November 15, 1991."
It does not say "fees that the state
could have collected or charged."
While the ISTEA does not expressly make reference to
reciprocity agreements, the fee system in place on November
15, 1991, does.
MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4) provides:
The annual fee levied on each interstate or
foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this
state and licensed in another state or province of
Canada shall be $10.00. The commission may enter
into a reciprocal agreement with a state or
province of Canada that does not charge vehicles
licensed in this state economic regulatory fees or
taxes and may waive the fee required under this
subsection.
A plain reading of this provision leads to the conclusion that
reciprocity agreements are an inherent part of the state's
registration fee system.
The generic fee levied under the
statute is not absolute, but subject to reciprocity agreements
that waive the fee.
Thus, the fee charged as of November 15,
1991, was $10.00, unless a reciprocity agreement pertained.
Voluntary
agreements
to
waive
the
fee
are
relevant
in
determining the per vehicle fee system in place on November
15, 1991, as well as the fee collected or charged pursuant to
that system.
The
parties
do
not
dispute
that
Michigan
had
a
reciprocity agreement with Illinois that, by its terms, waived
3
Michigan
registration
licensed in Illinois.
fees
for
interstate
motor
carriers
Pursuant to the agreement, the state
did not charge registration fees for plaintiff's vehicles in
1990 and in 1991.
It was not until Michigan revised its
reciprocity
in
system
1991
that
it
charged
plaintiff
a
registration fee.
This change in the reciprocity system did not become
effective until the 1992 registration year. Plaintiff was not
charged a registration fee in Michigan, nor was one collected
from it in Michigan for the 1991 registration year.
The fact
that the state had a right to or could have charged a
"generic" registration fee does not change the fact: it did
not charge plaintiff a fee until the 1992 registration year.
The majority's characterization of the language of the
statute as "plain" is belied by the fact that the majority is
obliged to construe the phrase "collected or charged" to reach
its result. Only a strained reading of "collected or charged"
leads to the conclusion that the state charged a fee when it
did not do so.
reciprocity
That the statute does not expressly mention
agreements
does
not
change
the
fact
that
reciprocity agreements were an inherent part of the fee system
in place on November 15, 1991.
In this case, the reciprocity
agreement with Illinois in effect during the 1991 registration
year caused Michigan to waive the fees it might have imposed
under MCL 478.7; MSA 22.565(1). As a consequence, no fees had
been "collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."
The Court should give deference, as did the District of
4
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,2 to the Interstate Commerce
Commission's construction of the language in question, because
it is based on a permissible construction of the ISTEA.
Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
467 US 837, 842-844; 104 S Ct 2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984).
It
should affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the
Court of Claims in favor of plaintiff.
2
Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs, supra.
5
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 113656
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, STATE TREASURER,
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DIRECTOR
OF DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION and MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I
disagree
relevant
with
provision
Transportation
the
of
majority’s
the
federal
Efficiency
Act
conclusion
that
Intermodal
(ISTEA),
the
Surface
49
USC
11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), is unambiguous and that this Court is
free to decide that the section does not take into account
reciprocity
agreements.
Rather,
I
conclude
that
this
provision is ambiguous, and that the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) has permissibly construed it to take into
account reciprocity agreements.
Under Chevron, USA, Inc v
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct
2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984), then, this Court should defer to
the ICC’s interpretation of that provision.
I, therefore,
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and must
respectfully dissent.
In this case, the Court is called on to review a federal
statute that was administered by the ICC when this case
arose.1
As the majority points out, under the Supreme Court’s
decision
in
Chevron,
when
a
court
reviews
an
agency’s
construction of a statute the agency administers, the court
faces a two-part inquiry.
First, the court must determine
whether the statute clearly and unambiguously expresses the
legislative intent.
If so, it then must give effect to the
statute as written.
However, if the statute is not clear and
unambiguous,
the
court
“does
not
simply
impose
its
own
construction on the statute,” but instead reviews whether the
agency has permissibly construed the statute.
If it has, the
court should defer to the agency’s construction.
842-843.
Chevron at
As alluded, the ICC, in Single State Insurance
Registration, 9 ICC2d 610, 618-619 (1993), construed the
statute
in
question
to
take
into
account
reciprocity
agreements that exempted some interstate carriers from state
fees, a conclusion opposite to that reached by the majority.
To determine whether a statute clearly and unambiguously
expresses legislative intent, courts begin with the statutory
language.
If
the
words
of
a
statute
are
clear
and
unambiguous, the court must apply them as written, and no
1
The
the ICC in
changed to
USC 14505;
ICC was abolished in 1996, and the references to
the governing statute, which was recodified, were
refer to the Secretary of Transportation. See 49
see also PL 104-88, 109 Stat 803, tit I, § 103.
2
further judicial construction is required or permitted.
See,
e.g., Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135;
545 NW2d 642 (1996).
However, when there can be reasonable
disagreement over a statute’s meaning, see People v Adair, 452
Mich 473, 479; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), or, as others have put it,
when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably
well-informed persons in two or more different senses, that
statute is ambiguous.
See 2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory
Construction (6th ed), § 45.02, pp 11-12.
For example, this
Court has concluded that statutes have been ambiguous when one
word in the statute has an unclear meaning, see Perez v Keeler
Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 610; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), when a
statute’s interaction with another statute has rendered its
meaning unclear, see People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 699; 564
NW2d 13 (1997), or when application of the statute to facts
has rendered the correct application of the statute uncertain,
see Elias Bros v Treasury Dep’t, 452 Mich 144, 150; 549 NW2d
837 (1996).
In this case, the majority concludes that the governing
ISTEA provision is plain and unambiguous. In the words of our
prior decisions, then, the majority concludes that there
cannot be reasonable disagreement over the statute’s meaning,
and that reasonably well-informed people cannot understand the
statute in two or more different senses.
Before amendment,
the governing section provided that the ICC, and through it,
states
shall establish a fee system for the filing of
proof of insurance as provided under subparagraph
(A)(ii) of this paragraph that (I) will be based on
the number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier
3
operates in a State and on the number of States in
which the carrier operates, (II) will minimize the
costs of complying with the registration system,
and (III) will result in a fee for each
participating State that is equal to the fee, not
to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State
collected or charged as of November 15, 1991 . . .
. [49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).]
I cannot agree that the meaning of this language is clear and
unambiguous.
Rather,
it
is
subject
to
reasonable
disagreement.
The
majority
concludes
that
the
fee
“collected
or
charged” refers only to the fee system a state had in place on
November 15, 1991, and that this is clear from the plain
meaning of § 11506(c)(2)(B)(IV).
See slip op at 11-12.
However, the conclusion that the fee “collected or charged”
refers only to the fee system requires that “collected or
charged” include the possibility that the fee “charged” can be
simultaneously “waived.”
Id. at 12.
Otherwise, there would
be no question that the state had not collected or charged
anything from plaintiff until the changes in the reciprocity
system
became
effective
provided in § 11506.
“charged,”
yet
in
1992,
after
the
cutoff
date
The conclusion that a fee can be
concurrently
“waived,”
though,
is
not
consistent with this Court’s approach to plain language.
When
construing
a
statute
according
to
its
plain
language, unless the statute itself dictates otherwise, this
Court
generally
turns
to
dictionary
definitions
of
the
statutory terms to find those terms’ ordinary and generally
accepted meanings.
See, e.g., Denio at 699.
Applying this
approach to the instant case calls the majority’s conclusion
that a fee can be simultaneously “charged” and waived into
4
question.
“Charge” is defined variably as (1) “To hold
financially liable; demand payment from,” (2) “To demand or
ask payment,” (3) “A financial burden, as a tax or lien,” (4)
“To set or ask (a given amount) as a price,” (5) “Expense;
cost,” or (6) “The price set or asked for something.”
The
American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed, 1982).
The
problem
in
this
case
is
that
the
ordinary
and
generally accepted meanings of the term “charge” do not
dictate the majority’s conclusion. Rather, the definitions of
“charge” present a spectrum of concepts ranging from those
that might encompass the majority understanding that a fee can
be “charged” but concurrently “waived”—definitions 4, 6, and
arguably 5—to those that do not encompass that understanding
because they require that the charge be a “demand” or a
“burden.”
Definitions
majority’s
conclusion
1,
2,
and
because,
3
do
under
not
those
support
the
meanings
of
“charge,” the state would have to waive a fee, yet also hold
a carrier financially liable for it, or demand or ask for
payment of a fee that had been waived.
Similarly, if a fee
has been “waived,” it is not a financial burden on the party
responsible for the fee. In this case, plaintiff was not made
financially liable for, or financially burdened with, the
waived fee, and the state did not demand the waived fee before
November
15,
definitions
of
1991.
“charge”
Thus,
although
support
the
several
majority
accepted
conclusion,
several others weigh against it.
As mentioned above, the meaning of a facially unambiguous
term can be ambiguous in certain circumstances.
5
See Denio at
699; Perez at 610.
Thus, although “charged” may not at first
blush appear ambiguous, in the context of a fee that was
established in a fee system, but never demanded because of a
reciprocity agreement, “charged” is ambiguous because the fee
may or may not fit the definition of a fee that is “charged.”
If the statutory term “charged” is narrow and requires a
demand for payment, the state had not charged plaintiff the
fees before November 15, 1991, and cannot charge plaintiff for
later years.
On the other hand, if “charged” is broad and
requires only the setting of a fee, the state had charged the
fee by the cutoff date, and plaintiff cannot avoid payment.
Compare Perez at 610 (“refuses” could have a broad or narrow
meaning).
Although it does so without explanation, the majority
chooses the latter meaning, concluding that even when the fee
was waived for particular carriers, it still had been charged
in general.
Slip op at 12.
I do not contend that the
majority has chosen the wrong definition of “charge,” or that
its
conclusion
about
§
11506's
meaning
is
unreasonable.
However, for the majority to come to its conclusion, it had to
resolve the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the statutory
term “charged,” specifically, whether “charged” was used in
its broad or narrow sense.2
Normally, this Court has a duty
2
To conclude that the fee “charged” refers only to the
fee set by the fee system, the majority must nevertheless
conclude that “charged” is broad, meaning only that the state
“set a price” for carriers but did not hold a carrier liable
for that price.
Such an understanding comports only with
definitions 4 and 6 above, but not the narrower meaning of
“charge” in definitions 1, 2, and 3. Otherwise, the fee
“charged” could refer to only a particular fee and not the
(continued...)
6
to make such a decision. In this case, however, the different
possible meanings of “charged” present an ambiguity in §
11506. Under Chevron, rather than this Court imposing its own
construction on the statute, we must consider whether the ICC,
the agency responsible for administering this statute and
which has already resolved this ambiguity in § 11506, did so
permissibly.
I conclude that the ICC did permissibly construe the
statute, and, therefore, I would defer to that agency.
In
Single
on
State,
registration
the
fees
ICC
considered
enacted
through
whether
the
reciprocity agreements into account.
the
ISTEA
freeze
should
take
It decided that the
ISTEA does take reciprocity agreements into account when
freezing the fees that states “charged.”
Thus, an interstate
carrier that was not charged any fees before November 15,
1991, because it was operating under a reciprocity agreement,
could not be charged fees after that time.
supra at 617-619.
See Single State,
This interpretation evidences that the ICC
preferred the narrow approach to “charged,” concluding that an
2
(...continued)
system itself.
Further, if the majority is correct that the fee charged
refers only to the fee system in place, but not the fees
charged of particular carriers, then apparently Michigan could
waive fees for every carrier operating in the state, under
reciprocity agreements or not, but nevertheless continue to be
said to “charge” a generic fee.
In such a scenario, the
majority would apparently conclude that Michigan “charged” a
fee even though it held no carrier financially liable for any
fee.
Again, there is room for reasonable disagreement over the
proper understanding of these statutory terms. That room for
disagreement, though, indicates that we should defer to the
ICC understanding.
7
interstate carrier had not been “charged” a registration fee
unless a state had made a demand for the fee, or unless the
carrier had been held financially liable for the fee.
Under
reciprocity agreements, states did not make demands for fees,
and did not hold carriers liable for fees.
Hence, carriers
operating under those agreements were not “charged” before the
cutoff date, and could not be charged after it.
Though this
Court may not prefer the ICC’s interpretation of § 11506 or
the narrow approach to the term “charged,” in light of the
different possible meanings of the statute, the ICC approach
is certainly a permissible construction.
I would, therefore,
defer to that agency’s interpretation of this section.
In sum, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 49
USC
11506
is
understandings.
not
reasonably
subject
to
different
Whether the statutory term “charged” is
understood narrowly or broadly affects this statute’s meaning.
Because
the
statute
can
be
understood
differently,
this
Court’s only role is to consider whether the federal agency
responsible for administering this statute, which has already
considered
the
question
answered that question.
meaning
of
“charged,”
supported by § 11506.
before
this
Court,
permissibly
The ICC took a narrow view of the
but
nevertheless
a
view
that
is
I would defer to that agency’s view
and, therefore, must respectfully dissent.
8
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