T.C., the mother v. Department of Children and Families
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2007
T.C., the Mother,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
Appellee.
No. 4D07-645
[July 25, 2007]
STEVENSON, J.
In this case, a mother’s parental rights to sons, E.C. and D.R. were
terminated. To terminate parental rights, the State must establish (1)
the existence of one of the statutory grounds set forth in chapter 39; (2)
that termination is in the child’s best interests; and (3) that termination
is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm. See, e.g.,
C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 953 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
(on reh’g). The trial court relied upon sections 39.806(1)(c), 39.806(1)(e)
and 39.802(8) as the statutory grounds warranting termination. We
affirm. The mother raises a number of issues on appeal. We write to
address only one—her contention that termination was not appropriate
under any of these statutes because the time for completion of the case
plan had not expired and any failures on her part were the result of her
incarceration and DCF’s failure to provide services. The record simply
does not support the mother’s claim in this regard.
Section 39.802(8), Florida Statutes, provides:
If the department has entered into a case plan with a parent
with the goal of reunification, and a petition for termination
of parental rights based on the same facts as are covered in
the case plan is filed prior to the time agreed upon in the
case plan for the performance of the case plan, then the
petition must allege and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has materially breached the
provisions of the case plan.
The concept of “material[] breach[]” is addressed in section 39.806(1)(e)2.,
which allows for termination where the child has been adjudicated
dependent, a case plan has been filed and
[t]he parent has materially breached the case plan by
making it unlikely that he or she will be able to substantially
comply with the case plan before the time for compliance
expires. Time is of the essence for permanency of children in
the dependency system. In order to prove the parent has
materially breached the case plan, the court must find by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unlikely or
unable to substantially comply . . . before time expires . . . .
“‘A trial court’s determination that evidence is clear and convincing will
not be overturned unless it may be said as a matter of law that no one
could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and convincing.’” C.M.,
953 So. 2d at 550 (quoting L.B. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So.
2d 1189, 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)).
The mother’s case plan, formally approved on February 15, 2006,
required drug treatment, random drug testing, psychological and
psychiatric evaluations and recommended treatment, parenting classes,
counseling, stable employment and housing, and not committing any
new law violations. It is true that the mother was incarcerated from May
23, 2006 through October 6, 2006; that DCF offered the mother no
services while she was incarcerated; and that the petition for termination
of parental rights was filed some three months prior to the expiration of
the case plan. And, it is these facts the mother relies upon in asserting
that the termination was in error as she was not afforded the opportunity
to comply.
These facts alone, though, fail to portray the complete picture. The
children were initially removed from the home as a consequence of
allegations of drug abuse and deplorable conditions in the home. The
children were removed a second time about a month later based on
similar allegations and placed in shelter in December of 2005. The
mother was deemed to have consented to their adjudication as
dependent children due to her failure to appear for the proceedings.
As a consequence of the conditions of the home and children, the
mother was charged with, and pled guilty to, child neglect. She was
sentenced to two years probation. A little less than two months prior to
formal adoption of a case plan, DCF held a formal staffing. The mother
expressed a desire to immediately begin taking steps to have her children
2
returned and DCF began making referrals. Shortly thereafter, when DCF
attempted to contact the mother, they found the number she had
provided disconnected and DCF was unable to reach her for
approximately the next month. When DCF did finally speak with the
mother at the end of January 2006, she had been admitted to a drug
abuse halfway house. When DCF tried to contact her there about two
weeks later, the mother had left the program as a consequence of a
medical condition and failed to return. The mother then failed to appear
for a scheduled visit with the children and could not be reached from
February 10 through February 14. The next day, the mother’s case plan
was formally approved by the court.
On February 15th, the same day her case plan was judicially
approved, the mother tested positive for drugs—a violation of her
probation for the child neglect charges and her case plan. The mother
was incarcerated from February 15 through February 28, 2006, and then
released to a drug treatment program and returned to probation. DCF
had contact with the mother in March and April, facilitating visitation
with the children and making referrals for a psychological evaluation,
parenting classes, and counseling. By the middle of April, the mother
had left the drug treatment program. The mother did not follow up on
any of the referrals nor attempt to advise DCF of her whereabouts. On
May 23, 2006, the mother again tested positive for drugs and was
arrested for violation of probation.
It is clear that from the time of the children’s removal until the
mother’s May 2006 incarceration, DCF made the necessary referrals and
attempted to help the mother complete the tasks in her case plan. The
mother failed to avail herself of these services. Rather than pursue drug
treatment—perhaps the most significant aspect of her case plan, the
mother continued to use drugs and twice violated the conditions of her
probation by so doing. She failed to take advantage of referrals made by
DCF in January, February, March, and April. She had on multiple
occasions left DCF without a means of contacting her. By the time of the
mother’s May 2006 incarceration, she had already materially breached
the terms of her case plan. The breach was not occasioned by DCF’s
failure to provide services. And, by the time of the mother’s October
release from jail, there was little likelihood that she would or could
substantially comply with the case plan. The mother apparently had no
inclination to undergo drug treatment because, as of the December 20,
2006 termination hearing, she was not attending AA or NA meetings or
3
receiving any other type of treatment.1 Further, upon the mother’s
release from jail, there were only about two months remaining on a case
plan that required the mother to obtain stable housing and employment.
Accordingly, on this record, we find there was competent, substantial
evidence to support termination pursuant to sections 39.802(8) and
39.806(1)(e)2. and reject the mother’s claim that the order of termination
must be reversed because any breach or failures on her part were
occasioned by her incarceration and DCF’s failure to provide her services
during such time. Cf. In re D.R., 812 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).2
Affirmed.
SHAHOOD, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.
*
*
*
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Peter D. Blanc, Judge; L.T. Case No. CJ 05-300603 JL.
Frank A. Kreidler, Lake Worth, for appellant.
Jeffrey Dana Gillen, West Palm Beach, for appellee Department of
Children and Families.
Wendie Michelle Cooper, Orlando, for appellee Guardian ad Litem
Program.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
While the mother claimed to have gotten drug treatment while
incarcerated, she failed to provide any documentation to substantiate her
claims.
2
Our holding makes it unnecessary to consider whether termination was
warranted under section 39.806(1)(c). See J.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families,
32 Fla. L. Weekly D1606 (Fla. 4th DCA Jun. 27, 2007). We have considered the
other issues raised by the mother and find them to be without merit.
1
4
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