Musa v. Lynch, No. 15-2046 (7th Cir. 2016)
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Musa, a citizen of Botswana, entered the U.S. in 2008 on a visitor’s visa. She met a U.S. citizen and they married. Musa’s husband filed an I‐130 “alien relative” petition on her behalf, and Musa applied at the same time to adjust her status to permanent resident, 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1255(a); The Department of Homeland Security denied both: Musa’s husband was discovered not to have ended a previous marriage. In 2009 Musa was placed in removal proceedings because her visa had expired. In 2010, Musa divorced and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture because she feared that if she returned to Botswana her family would force her to undergo female genital mutilation. The agency denied relief. The Seventh Circuit granted the petition requesting withholding of removal. Substantial evidence did not support the agency’s conclusion that Musa likely will not be subjected to FGM. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Musa’s asylum application was untimely and denied the petition with respect to the Convention Against Torture because the agency did not err by finding that the government in Botswana would not acquiesce to forced FGM.
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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 15 2046 BATHUSI MUSA, Petitioner, v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A087 244 589 ____________________ ARGUED DECEMBER 15, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 19, 2016 ____________________ Before BAUER, POSNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Bathusi Musa, a citizen of Bot swana, petitions for review of the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, all based on her fear that her family will force her to undergo female genital mutila tion (FGM) if she returns. We grant the portion of the peti tion requesting withholding of removal. Substantial evi dence does not support the agency’s conclusion that Musa 2 No. 15 2046 likely will not be subjected to FGM. On the asylum applica tion, however, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that Musa’s asylum application was untimely. We must dismiss that portion. We also deny the portion of her petition seeking relief under the Convention Against Torture because the agency did not err by finding that the government in Botswana would not acquiesce to forced FGM. Musa entered the United States in April 2008 on a visi tor’s visa. She met a United States citizen and they married. Musa’s husband filed an I 130 “alien relative” petition on her behalf, and Musa applied at the same time to adjust her status to permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245.2; In re Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 789–90 (BIA 2009). In June 2009, however, the Department of Homeland Security denied the I 130 petition and Musa’s ap plication to adjust status. The problem was that Musa’s hus band was discovered not to have ended a previous marriage. In November 2009 Musa was placed in removal proceedings because her visa had expired while those applications were pending. In April 2010, Musa and her husband divorced. In October 2010, Musa applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture because she feared that if she returned to Botswana her family would force her to undergo FGM.1 Musa, who belongs to the Kalanga tribe, said that her mother and 1 FGM is defined by the World Health Organization as a collection of “procedures that involve partial or total removal of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital organs for non medical reasons.” See Female Genital Mutilation, World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/. No. 15 2046 3 grandmother hold strict traditional beliefs and think that if a woman does not undergo FGM her entire family will be cursed. Musa’s grandmother is, in Musa’s words, a “medi cine woman” and has performed FGM on other women in the past. When she lived in Botswana, Musa said, her family on two occasions tried unsuccessfully to force her to undergo the mutilation. On the first attempt, when she was 16, Musa was kidnapped by a group of women and brought to a place where other girls were undergoing FGM. She managed to escape through a bathroom window before the procedure could be carried out, and then—suspecting that her family had instigated the events—hid at a friend’s house. Musa’s mother eventually acknowledged the family’s involvement and promised not to force her to undergo the procedure, at which point Musa returned home. The second attempt came a year later. Musa said she was attacked by several men who dragged her into some bushes and attempted to “circumcise” her. They told Musa that her mother had sent them. Musa was able to break away, but she sustained bruises all over her body. Musa did not report the incident to the police, she said, because everyone accept ed that FGM was practiced and she believed the police would not take her accusation seriously. She also testified that she had two friends who had died from undergoing FGM in Botswana in 2004. Musa continued to live with her parents until later in 2004 or 2005 and then moved to another city in Botswana. Her parents were able to contact her over the phone, but Musa did not disclose her address. More recently, since leaving Botswana, Musa said that her parents had found her a significantly older marriage 4 No. 15 2046 partner (he is 75, Musa is now 30), who could help the fami ly financially. To marry the older man, Musa says, she would have to undergo FGM. Her father, who used to resist having the procedure performed on her, wants her to go through with the marriage because he needs money from the suitor to help his struggling business. Musa is afraid to re turn to Botswana because she does not want to undergo FGM or marry this man. Further testimony about FGM in Botswana was present ed by one of Musa’s friends from Botswana, Gaomongwe Selawe said that FGM was practiced in Botswana as an initi ation ritual for girls. She said that she had heard that FGM was practiced by some members of the Kalanga tribe. And she had friends who had undergone the procedure in Bot swana. Selawe said that many women do not talk about be ing forced to undergo FGM because it is a private ritual. The record before the immigration judge contained doc umentary evidence showing that FGM is not prevalent in Botswana. The 2011 State Department Country Report in Human Rights Practices for Botswana stated: “There were no known cases of physically harmful traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation.” According to UNICEF, FGM is “not widely practiced” in Botswana, though its re port in 2005 nevertheless counted 3 million girls in Africa at risk of FGM each year. Finally, Musa attached a letter writ ten by her mother imploring her to return to Botswana to marry the older man the family had found for her. The immigration judge denied Musa’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief. Musa was not eligible for asylum, the judge found, because she had not filed a timely application within No. 15 2046 5 one year of her arrival in the United States. The judge also found that neither her marriage to nor divorce from her hus band was a changed circumstance justifying her delay. And even if the denial of her application for adjustment of status in June 2009 was a changed circumstance, the judge found, Musa waited an unreasonably long time from that date— more than a year—to file for asylum. The judge denied Musa’s request for withholding of re moval because he determined there was not a clear probabil ity that if she returned to Botswana she would be subjected to FGM. The judge believed Musa’s testimony that her fami ly practices FGM and on two occasions had attempted to subject her to it forcibly. The judge concluded, however, that those incidents did not amount to past persecution because Musa had not actually undergone the procedure. The judge also believed Musa’s testimony that she feared returning to Botswana, but he did not regard her fear as reasonable be cause there was no evidence in the record showing that FGM was practiced at all, let alone practiced widely in Botswana. The judge noted Musa’s admission that her desire to avoid a marriage to a much older man was the principal reason she did not want to return to Botswana, not her fear of FGM. Finally, the immigration judge denied Musa’s request for protection under the Convention Against Torture because she had not presented any evidence showing that the gov ernment in Botswana would torture her or acquiesce to tor ture by anyone else. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immi gration judge’s decision. The Board agreed with the judge’s conclusion that Musa’s asylum application was untimely be cause her marriage and divorce were neither changed nor 6 No. 15 2046 extraordinary circumstances and she did not file the applica tion in a reasonable amount of time after the denial of her petition for adjustment of status. The Board then explained that it agreed with the judge’s denial of Musa’s withholding and Convention Against Torture claims because she “has not been able to provide objective evidence of country condi tions in Botswana that corroborates her stated fear of FGM.” The Board agreed with the judge that Musa’s testimony was credible, but it supplemented the judge’s reasoning by pro posing that Musa could relocate to a different part of the country: “in view of the paucity of FGM occurring in Bot swana, and especially in view of the fact that the respondent need not return specifically to her hometown, we cannot conclude that the Immigration Judge clearly erred in con cluding that the respondent did not show that … persecu tion or torture—such as FGM—is likely to occur.” Musa leads off her petition for judicial review with a weak challenge to the agency’s determination that she did not show changed circumstances materially affecting her el igibility for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4), (5). She recognizes that we lack jurisdiction to review such a determination absent a related legal or consti tutional argument, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), 1252(a)(2)(D); Almutairi v. Holder, 722 F.3d 996, 1002 (7th Cir. 2013); Restrepo v. Holder, 610 F.3d 962, 964–65 (7th Cir. 2010), so she tries to frame her disagreement with the agency as a legal issue. She disagrees with the Board’s conclusions that her marriage and divorce did not constitute changed or extraordinary cir cumstances, and that it was unreasonable for her to have waited more than a year to apply for asylum after the denial of her application for adjustment of status. No. 15 2046 7 Those disagreements do not raise a justiciable legal ques tion challenging the basis of the agency’s determination. She disputes only the application of the law to her circumstance, not the governing legal rules. We thus lack jurisdiction to review the denial of her asylum application. See Restrepo, 610 F.3d at 964–65; Viracacha v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 515–16 (7th Cir. 2008). Musa next argues that substantial evidence does not support the denial of her application for withholding of re moval because the judge wrongly disregarded her testimony about her family’s FGM practice—testimony that he explicit ly credited. We agree. The fact that FGM is not widespread in Botswana as a whole does not contradict her statements about her family’s practice. We have held consistently that FGM is a form of persecu tion. See Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 2004); Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2004); see also In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996). Still, Musa bears a high burden to establish eligibility for withholding of removal: she must show a clear probability of persecution if removed to Botswana. See Borovsky v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2010); Guardia v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). A clear probability means it appears more likely than not that she will suffer persecution if removed. Bitsin v. Holder, 719 F.3d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 2013); see Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The immigration judge here erred by placing too much weight on the absence of background evidence confirming prior cases of FGM in Botswana at large. The absence of documented cases of FGM in that country does not contra 8 No. 15 2046 dict Musa’s testimony—testimony that the judge explicitly credited—that her family practiced FGM. The judge found that Musa testified credibly that her family practiced FGM, that they had twice attempted to force her to undergo it, and that her family—including her father, who once opposed subjecting her to the practice—now wants her to enter into a marriage conditioned upon her undergoing it. Whether FGM is widely practiced in Botswana or not has no bearing on whether Musa’s own family is likely to subject her to it. The judge credited Musa’s testimony about her family’s FGM practice. He erred by failing to acknowledge the likelihood that she will be subjected to FGM upon re turning to Botswana and acceding to the marriage. Musa’s credible testimony is sufficient to sustain her burden of proof. Neither the judge nor the Board denied Musa’s claim based on a lack of corroboration under the Real ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). (Under that act, an immigration judge may require an applicant who testifies credibly to provide reliable corroborating evidence as well. See Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2014).) The judge also erred by characterizing Musa’s principal motivation for seeking withholding of removal as her fear of marrying a much older man rather than fear of FGM. Once the judge accepts an applicant’s testimony about fear of per secution as genuine, the existence of other fears does not un dermine her claim. See Mohideen v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005) (“an individual may qualify for asylum if his or her persecutors have more than one motive as long as one of the motives is specified in the Immigration and Na tionality Act”). No. 15 2046 9 The Board’s conclusion that Musa could safely relocate to another part of the country is also problematic. The immi gration judge did not address whether Musa could relocate to a different part of Botswana to avoid her family’s pressure to undergo FGM, or whether she could reasonably be ex pected to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The possibility of relocation, for that matter, was not even argued by the government before the Board. As an initial matter, it is not clear that the Board has the authority to make a finding in the first instance that Musa could relocate. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (“The Board will not engage in de novo review of findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigra tion judge … shall be reviewed only to determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly errone ous.”). Even if the Board were permitted to determine the relocation issue in the first instance, its cursory declaration about the feasibility of relocation gave no rationale. The Board did not address whether Musa’s ability to relocate safely might be compromised in light of her testimony that she now faces greater danger because of her family’s marital arrangements and her father’s apparent change of heart re garding his prior opposition to her undergoing FGM. “‘[I]t seems possible … that the agency might be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion depending how it evaluates the record after remand.’” Kone v. Holder, 620 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2010), quoting Gomes v. Gonzalez, 473 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2007). We add that the agency has waived any argument about denying withholding based on Musa’s failure to provide ev idence of government involvement or acquiescence in the 10 No. 15 2046 practice of FGM in Botswana. Neither the immigration judge nor the Board relied on that ground as a basis to deny with holding. See SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943); Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir. 2011); Moab v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2007). Although we vacate and remand the decision regarding withholding of removal, we agree with the Board that Musa is not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Tor ture. The implementing regulations define torture as “severe pain or suffering … inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18. Female genital mutilation is torture, of course. But the judge did not err by finding that Musa failed to show that torture is likely to be carried out by or with the acquiescence of the government in Botswana. See Khan v. Holder, 766 F.3d 689, 698 (7th Cir. 2014); Ishitiaq v. Holder, 578 F.3d 712, 718 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). The judge justifiably discounted Selawe’s tes timony and was unswayed by Musa’s, and Musa has not pointed to evidence in the record to substantiate her testi mony that the government would have permitted her family to subject her to FGM even if she had reported their attempts in 2002 and 2003. Accordingly, the portion of the petition relating to Musa’s request for asylum is DISMISSED, the portion of the petition relating to withholding of removal is GRANTED, and the portion of the petition relating to protection under the Con vention Against Torture is DENIED. The case is remanded to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
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