Coach, Inc. v. Di Da Import and Export, Inc., No. 15-1480 (7th Cir. 2016)

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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued January 7, 2016 Decided January 22, 2016 Before No. 15-­ 1480 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 13 C 7165 Samuel Der-­ Yeghiayan, Judge. COACH, INC., and COACH SERVICES, INC., Plaintiffs-­ Appellees, v. DI DA IMPORT AND EXPORT, INC., Defendant-­ Appellant. Order Coach contends in this suit under the Lanham Act that DI DA infringed its trade-­ marked double-­ C logo. The district court wrote an opinion concluding that Coach is likely to prevail and is entitled to interlocutory relief. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22222 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2015). DI DA immediately appealed. The parties’ briefs disagree about what relief the district court afforded to Coach, and consequently they disagree about the standard of review and the appropriate legal analysis. A little searching through the record revealed the reason for this disagreement: the district court had not awarded any relief. It issued an opinion but not an injunction No. 15-­ 1480 Page 2 and did not try to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). After the panel identified this shortcoming during the oral argument, Coach returned to the district judge and asked him to issue a formal order. The judge complied and entered a document captioned “Temporary Restraining Order.” Just to make sure that we did not take that caption as a misnomer—issuing a TRO three years into a lawsuit makes little sense—the order states explicitly that it took effect on February 25, 2015, and expired on March 11, 2015. The district court’s order presents DI DA with two insuperable problems. First, the order’s caption and limited duration show that it is a genuine TRO, which canonically cannot be appealed. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 & n.58 (1974). Second, the order’s expiration means that DI DA is not now bound by any injunctive order and cannot ap-­ peal for that reason as well; DI DA is not adversely affected by the belated TRO, which expired before being issued. DI DA has asked us to retain jurisdiction in case the district court should issue a pre-­ liminary injunction, as Coach has asked it to do. But, if the district court issues an ap-­ pealable order, DI DA may file a new appeal. Any such appeal will be submitted to this panel under Operating Procedure 6(b), after an abbreviated briefing schedule that per-­ mits the parties to supplement their current briefs with arguments appropriate to what, if anything, the district court does in response to Coach’s request. The current appeal, which concerns the district court’s decision of February 2015 and an expired TRO, is no longer live. This appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

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