Salim v. Holder, No. 12-3858 (7th Cir. 2013)

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Salim, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith, claims that while living in Indonesia as a teenager, he endured ongoing harassment from Muslim students at nearby public schools because of his Chinese ethnicity. He was robbed for his lunch money several times, and once a student with a knife threatened him and punctured his neck. Salim claims it was difficult for Chinese individuals and Christians to travel safely around Jakarta during intense rioting in 1998. Several Chinese businesses were burned during that time, though his family’s business was not harmed. Salim left Indonesia in 2000 and filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An IJ denied requested relief on grounds that Salim failed to show past or future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed appeal of denial of a motion to reopen because Salim offered no new, previously unavailable evidence and relied on case law from outside the circuit. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding that Salim’s motion to reopen did not point to any evidence that was previously undiscoverable.

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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 12 3858 YOHAN BYLLY SALIM, Petitioner, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General of the United States, Respondent. ____________________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A078 597 192 ____________________ ARGUED MAY 28, 2013 DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2013 ____________________ Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Yohan Bylly Salim, an Indonesian citizen, fled his homeland in 2000 and came to the United States. He sought asylum, withholding of remov al, and relief under the Convention Against Torture on the ground that he endured several instances of harassment and 2 No. 12 3858 discrimination as an ethnic Chinese Christian living in Indo nesia. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all forms of re quested relief because Salim had failed to show past or fu ture persecution. Salim filed a motion to reopen the proceed ings and the IJ denied it. Salim appealed the IJ s denial of his motion to reopen, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal because Salim offered no new, previously unavailable evidence and he relied on case law from outside this circuit. Salim now seeks review of the BIA s order denying his motion to reopen. Because Salim s motion to reopen did not point to any evidence that was previously undiscoverable, we conclude that the BIA s deci sion did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we deny the petition for review. I. BACKGROUND Salim is an Indonesian citizen of Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith. While living in Indonesia as a teenager, Sal im attended private Christian schools but says he endured ongoing harassment from Muslim students at some of the nearby public schools because of his Chinese ethnicity. He was robbed by students from nearby schools for his lunch money several times, and once a student with a knife threat ened him and punctured his neck. Salim also claims it was difficult for Chinese individuals and Christians to travel safely around Jakarta during the period of intense rioting in 1998. He recounts that a number of Chinese businesses were burned down during that time, though his family s business was not harmed. Salim left Indonesia as a young adult in 2000 and filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. His appli No. 12 3858 3 cation was denied. He then appeared before an IJ, conceded his removability, and renewed his application for asylum. At a January 2004 hearing before the IJ, Salim testified that he suffered harassment in Indonesia based on his ethnicity and religion. The IJ found that his testimony was not credible and denied the application. Salim appealed to the BIA. The BIA found that the IJ s decision was not adequately supported and remanded the case so that Salim could sub mit additional evidence of conditions in Indonesia. Salim appeared for a final hearing before a different IJ in February 2010. Salim s attorney did not present any new evidence of conditions in Indonesia, but the government presented the United States Department of State s 2008 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Indonesia. After considering all of the evidence, the IJ found Salim s testimony truthful, but nevertheless concluded that the facts of Salim s case did not rise to the level of past persecution. In the IJ s view, the times Salim was threatened and robbed by other students on his way to and from school appeared to be random acts of vio lence. The IJ also concluded that Salim had failed to establish a well founded fear of future persecution. Salim did not pre sent any evidence suggesting that he would be singled out individually for persecution if returned to Indonesia, and even though general discrimination against ethnic and reli gious minorities in Indonesia still exists, the IJ noted that in stances of harassment against Chinese people were on the decline. Salim did not appeal the IJ s decision, but filed a motion to reopen his proceedings. In support of his motion, he filed over twenty articles about religious tension in Indonesia and argued that he should qualify for asylum under Ninth Cir 4 No. 12 3858 cuit case law because he is a member of two disfavored groups in Indonesia: ethnic Chinese people and Christians. The IJ denied the motion, concluding that Salim s motion was nothing more than a late attempt to submit additional background information on conditions in Indonesia and a legal argument that has been rejected by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Salim then appealed the denial of his mo tion to reopen to the BIA. The BIA dismissed the appeal, concluding that Salim failed to present any new evidence that was previously unavailable or undiscoverable at his former hearing. This petition for review followed. II. ANALYSIS Salim contends on appeal that the BIA s denial of his mo tion to reopen the proceedings constituted an abuse of dis cretion. To prevail on a motion to reopen, a petitioner must point to new evidence that is material and was not availa ble and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Selimi v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). The BIA has broad discre tion in deciding whether to grant a motion to reopen, and we will uphold the BIA s decision unless it was made with out a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from estab lished policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group. Awad v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 336, 341 (7th Cir. 2003). A. No New Evidence Presented To support his motion to reopen, Salim submitted nu merous news articles in an attempt to show the extent of dis crimination against Chinese Christians in Indonesia. But the problem for Salim is that he cannot show that any of this ev No. 12 3858 5 idence was previously unavailable. As the BIA pointed out, all but three of the many articles he submitted with his mo tion were dated before February 23, 2010 (the date of the fi nal hearing before the IJ). See Kucana v. Holder, 603 F.3d 394, 396 97 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that [o]nly evidence that could not have been presented earlier supports a motion to reopen ¦ and then only to show that risk has increased be cause of changes in country conditions ). And while three articles that post dated his hearing show continuing inter religious tensions in Indonesia, they do not demonstrate new or changed circumstances suggesting that the govern ment of Indonesia is now unwilling or unable to protect Sal im against the type of harassment of which he complains. See Ingmantoro v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) ( [T]he acts of private citizens do not constitute persecution unless the government is complicit in those acts or is unable or unwilling to take steps to prevent them. ) (citation omit ted). Salim further argues that the BIA failed to consider a Ninth Circuit case, Tampubolon v. Holder, 610 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2010), as new and material case law in evaluating his motion. The petitioners in that case, Protestant Christians, maintained that they should qualify for withholding of re moval because they had a well founded fear of future perse cution if returned to Indonesia. They argued that Christians are a disfavored group in Indonesia, subject to severe dis crimination and violence, and that their membership in that group made it more likely than not that they would be sin gled out individually for persecution on account of their re ligion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit agreed. The court explained that [e]vidence of both individual and group targeting are relevant to demonstrate the likelihood 6 No. 12 3858 that a particular individual will be persecuted. Therefore, the more evidence of group targeting an ¦ applicant proffers, the less ¦ individually specific evidence she needs. 610 F.3d at 1062 (citing Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1062 64 (9th Cir. 2009)). According to Salim, Tampubolon constituted new evidence since it was issued after his February 2010 hearing before the IJ and it was the first case to explicitly hold that Christians in Indonesia are a disfavored group. Unfortunately for Salim, Tampubolon does not help him for several reasons. As an initial matter, a change in case law is not consid ered new evidence for purposes of a motion to reopen. Mungongo v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2007). It is a motion for reconsideration, as opposed to a motion to reo pen, that asks the agency to consider a change in the law. See Victor v. Holder, 616 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a motion to reconsider asks the BIA to revisit its deci sion in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or an argument that was overlooked earlier, whereas a motion to reopen does not take issue with the BIA s decision at the time it was entered, but instead asks the BIA to re examine its opinion in light of evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original opinion ). But more importantly, the disfavored group analysis used in asylum and withholding of removal cases in the Ninth Circuit is also not new or a change in the law. This approach dates back to at least 1994 in the asylum context. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding Indone sia s ethnic Chinese minority a disfavored group). And the Ninth Circuit s decision in Wakkary v. Holder (which recog No. 12 3858 7 nized that Chinese Christians like Salim are disfavored in Indonesia), held that this mode of analysis is applicable in the withholding of removal context as well. 558 F.3d at 1063 64. In other words, it is not as if the IJ and BIA did not have the benefit of a fully developed body of Ninth Circuit case law on this issue when evaluating Salim s claims. The fact that the Ninth Circuit had not yet definitively said that Christians (who are not Chinese) are also considered a disfa vored group until June 2010 in Tampubolon is beside the point the approach being used to evaluate these claims ex isted well before Salim s February 2010 hearing, and Salim could have invoked it. B. Disfavored Group Approach Does Not Apply Both the IJ and BIA found Tampubolon unhelpful to Sal im s case not only because it was not evidence and did not offer anything new, but also because the disfavored group analysis used in the Ninth Circuit has been expressly reject ed by our circuit. Indeed, several of our cases have rejected this approach on the grounds that it is a less stringent test. See Ingmantoro, 550 F.3d at 652 n.7 (citing cases); Kaharudin v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that while [t]he Ninth Circuit has deemed ethnic Chinese a disfavored group in Indonesia, ¦ [w]e previously have considered and rejected the application of the Ninth Circuit s disfavored group analysis in the context of withholding removal, and we decline to revisit the issue in this case. ); Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 607 n.6 (7th Cir. 2005) ( This circuit has not recognized a lower threshold of proof based on membership in a disfavored group. ). In light of the con trolling precedent in this circuit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply Tampubolon. 8 No. 12 3858 Salim nevertheless invites us to use his case as an oppor tunity to reverse course and hold that the disfavored group analysis does not create a new test or lower a petitioner s burden of proof, but rather simply uses an evidentiary standard that falls within the established framework of proving a well founded fear of future persecution in both asylum and withholding of removal cases. Given that Salim never appealed the IJ s February 2010 decision on the merits, we decline the invitation. But the central question of whether the Ninth Circuit s disfavored group approach actually differs from our circuit s analysis of these cases in a meaningful way remains. In both the asylum and withholding of removal context, an appli cant may be eligible for relief if he can demonstrate a well founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (using reasonable possibility standard in asylum context); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (using more likely than not stand ard in withholding of removal context). A probability of fu ture persecution may be established by either one of two methods. Under one method, the applicant must show that there is a pattern or practice of persecution against a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on ac count of a protected ground, and that his or her own inclu sion in and identification with such group of persons makes it reasonable or more likely than not that his or her life or freedom would be threatened upon return to that country. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii), 208.16(b)(2)(i) (ii). We have said before that in order to use the pattern or practice method, the persecution of a protected group must be a systematic, pervasive, or organized effort to kill, imprison, or severely injure members of the protected group, and this effort must be perpetuated or tolerated by state actors. No. 12 3858 9 Ingmantoro, 550 F.3d at 651 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 452 53 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that member of persecuted ethnic and political party had reasonable fear of future per secution in light of pattern or practice of persecution). Salim does not raise such a claim here. The second, alternative method of finding future perse cution calls for an individualized assessment of the risk of harm. Under this method, an applicant must show that there is a reasonable possibility (in the asylum context) or that it is more likely than not (in the withholding of removal context) that he will be singled out individually for persecution if forced to return home. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2), 208.16(b)(2); see also Munoz Avila v. Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 982 83 (7th Cir. 2013) (reiterating that the level of overall danger in a coun try is not a sufficient basis to find persecution, and that a pe titioner must demonstrate that he or she is likely to be sin gled out ). This is where the Ninth Circuit s disfavored group analysis comes into play. That court has defined a dis favored group as a group of individuals in a certain coun try or part of a country, all of whom share a common, pro tected characteristic, many of whom are mistreated, and a substantial number of whom are persecuted, but who are not threatened by a pattern or practice of systematic persecu tion. Tampubolon, 610 F.3d at 1060 (citing Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1052, 1062) (emphasis added). The idea is that belonging to a disfavored group is relevant to demonstrating an indi vidualized risk of persecution because one s chances of be ing singled out from the general population and subjected to persecution is often strongly correlated with the frequency with which others who share the same disfavored character istic are mistreated and persecuted. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 10 No. 12 3858 1063; see also id. at 1064 ( In other words, when asking how likely it is that an individual applicant will be singled out in the future on the basis of his group membership, it is in disputably relevant ¦ how others in his group are treat ed. ). In theory, one could view the Ninth Circuit s approach on this score as a simple recognition that group membership matters, as it is an aspect of nearly all asylum claims, not a special problem limited to pattern or practice cases. See Ko tasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1994). And the INS reg ulations clearly contemplate the effect of group member ship on an individual s circumstances by enumerating the five statutory categories of withholding eligibility. Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2007). But this approach has led to significant disagreement among the circuits because it invites one to question what exactly it seeks to add to the ex isting regulatory regime that is not already covered under the pattern or practice theory of persecution. In practice, the Ninth Circuit appears to be using a sliding scale ap proach to find the more serious and widespread the threat to the [disfavored] group in general, the less individualized the threat of persecution needs to be. Sael, 386 F.3d at 925. In Sael, the record showed significant discrimination against Chinese minorities in Indonesia, but this mistreatment did not rise to the level of a pattern or practice of persecution. Id. at 929. However, the petitioner did successfully demon strate the general persecution of ethnic Chinese, sufficient to characterize their status as disfavored in Indonesia, id., and so she only had to establish a comparatively low level of individualized risk in order to prove that she has a well founded fear of future persecution. Id. at 927; see also Wak kary, 558 F.3d at 1064. Essentially, this approach serves as a No. 12 3858 11 safety net for those who fall short of establishing a pattern of practice of persecution, but have shown membership in a historically mistreated group. See Kho, 505 F.3d at 55 ( A group may be deemed disfavored on the basis of evidence of mistreatment that is less pervasive and less severe than that required to establish a pattern or practice of persecu tion. ). Though we often discuss a petitioner s membership in a particular group in the context of assessing an individual ized threat of future persecution, see Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 549 (7th Cir. 2011), we have never held that a peti tioner may put forth less evidence of individualized persecu tion simply by virtue of belonging to a disfavored group. See, e.g., Zhou Ji Ni v. Holder, 635 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011) (denying petition for review where evidence of coun try conditions regarding Chinese repression of Christianity were untethered from facts establishing an individualized risk of persecution ). Instead, we have always required a pe titioner to show specific, detailed facts supporting the rea sonableness of [his] fear that [he] will be singled out for per secution. Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1999) (cit ing cases). In reality, the disfavored group approach in the Ninth Circuit may yield similar or even identical results. See, e.g., Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 978 79 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying petition for review where petitioner failed to make the minimal showing of individual targeting). But to the extent that the Ninth Circuit uses a lower standard for in dividualized fear absent a pattern or practice of persecu tion, Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 538 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005), we must join other circuits that have rejected the disfavored group approach. See id.; Kho, 505 F.3d at 55; Wijaya v. Gonza les, 227 Fed. Appx. 35, 38 n.1 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order). 12 No. 12 3858 Here too, Salim presented no new evidence on reopening to show his individualized risk of future persecution, and, therefore, the disfavored group approach would not have helped him in any event. III. CONCLUSION The petition for review is DENIED.

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